Pakistan's population growth: the need for action

Despite the existence of a national family planning program that dates to 1965 Pakistan has not seen a reduction in the fertility rate. One of the poorest countries in the world, Pakistan has 1 of the highest population growth rates in the world at about 3.0% annually. For over 2 decades, the average woman in Pakistan has given birth to more than 6 children. At the current fertility rate, the country's current population of 120 million will increase to over 150 million by the year 2000, and it will increase to 280 million by 2020. And even if today every woman were to begin having only 2 children, the population would still reach 160 million before leveling off. But reducing fertility in Pakistan will prove difficult. One of the leading obstacles is the low status of women. Few women in Pakistan have advanced education or professional jobs. Only 1/4 of those women without education or who are not working have any knowledge concerning contraception. Family size and composition also fuel the high rate of fertility. On the average, women desire 5 children (the fact that women average more than 5 suggests an unmet need for contraception). And due to social, cultural, and economic conditions, Pakistanis generally prefer male offsprings. Islamic opposition to family planning has also contributed to the continued high rates of fertility. Finally, administrative and management weaknesses have hindered Pakistan's family planning program. In order to overcome these obstacles, Pakistan will have to enlist the commitment of political, religious, and community leaders. The status of women will have to be improved, and the attitudes of people will need to change.     

New survey finds fertility decline in India

A brief indication was provided of demography, fertility, and contraceptive usage and knowledge based on the recent 1992/93 Indian National Family Health Survey. The sample included 88,562 households and 89,777 ever married women aged 13-49 years in 24 states and the National Capital Territory of Delhi. About 38% of household members were aged under 15 years. The sex ratio was 944 females to 100 males. 54% aged over 5 years were currently married; 10% were widowed, divorced, or separated. 43% were literate and 9% had secondary or higher education: 67% for females in cities and 34% in rural areas. Female literacy was 82% in Kerala but under 30% in Rajasthan, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Madhya Pradesh. During 1990-92, the crude birth rate was 28.9 per 1000 population. Total fertility was 3.4 for women aged 15-49 years: 3.7 in rural and 2.7 in urban areas. 31% of parents had been sterilized. 26% desired no more children. Only 6% of women with four or more children desired another child. 99% of urban and 95% of rural respondents had knowledge of at least one modern or traditional method. Female and male sterilization were the most well-known modern methods. 47% of women had ever used contraception: 42% with a modern method and 12% with a traditional method. 41% were current users of family planning: 36% with a modern and 4% with a traditional method (45% in urban and 33% in rural areas with a modern method). The highest contraceptive use was in Kerala, Himachal Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Punjab states and Delhi (over 50%). The two most populous states, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, had the lowest rates, which were under 25%; other low usage was in Assam and several small northeastern states. 75% of all female modern contraceptive use was female sterilization. 12% in urban and 3% in rural areas used a modern spacing method. Use increased with increased educational level. Rural sources of supply emphasized public facilities: sterilization and IUDs.     

An analysis of the fertility transition in developing countries]

Most developing countries are in the demographic stage of early mortality, high birth rates and high rates of natural population increase. A characteristic of developing countries is that after World War ii, particularly since the 1960s fertility rates are on the decline, even though they still remain high. The fertility rate of developed countries fell from a 1950 rate of 22.9/1000 to 15/1000 in 1982, a decrease of 34.5%, whereas the fertility rate of developing countries hovered around 43/1000 between 1930-1950, 40.6/1000 during the 1960s and 33/1000 in 1982. Between 1950 and 1982 there was a decrease of 24.8%. But the main reason for this decrease is the decline in the last 20 years of the fertility rates of China and India, whose rates fell 34.9% from 1960-1980. Changes in fertility rates are influenced by the age structure of a country, as seen in the changing age structure of developing countries from 1960-80. For example, an increase in fertility rates was 1 consequence of an increase in the number of fertile women aged 15-45 from 42.6% in 1960 to 44.4% in 1980. Nevertheless, there exists some sort of birth control, whether conscious or subconscious, because the number of births per fertile woman is 3-4 fewer than the 14-15 children a woman can theoretically bear. The reason for changes in fertility rates in developing countries can be traced to marriage and family customs, and even more important, to social and economic factors. For example, Asian, African and Latin American cultures tend to support early marriages. When the fertility rates of developed and developing countries are looked at for a comparable period, then the rate of decrease for developing countries is slower than developed countries. But, if the comparison is made for a transitional period (i.e., industrialization), then the rate of decrease for developing countries is faster than for developed countries. Currently there are 25 developing countries that have attained a fertility rate of 25/1000 or lower, and 52 developing countries with a rate of 35/1000.     

The World Fertility Survey: charting global childbearing

Interviewing some 350,000 women in 42 developing countries and 20 developed countries representing nearly 40% of the world's population, the World Fertility Survey (WFS) is in a unique position to document the historic 1970s slowdown in global population growth. This Bulletin describes efforts begun in 1972 to ensure high quality, internationally comparable, accessible data, the data's importance for policymakers, planners and researchers, and major findings available by early 1982 from directly assisted WFS surveys in 29 developing countries and contraceptive use data from WFS-type surveys in 16 developed countries. Marital fertility has declined in all developing regions except Africa but still averages from 4.6 children/woman in Latin America to 6.7 in Africa, while preferred family size ranges from 3.0 children in Turkey to 8.9 in Senegal--far above the average 2.2-2.5 children/woman needed to end developing countries' population growth in the long run. However, women ages 15-19 prefer nearly 2 children fewer than the oldest women ages 45-49; 3.8 vs. 5.7 on the average. Nearly 1/2 (48%) of married women surveyed in 27 countreis said they wanted no more children. Preventing all unwanted births would reduce birth rates up to 15 births/1000 population in these countries. Overall, 32% of married, fecund women in developing countries are using contraception compared to an average 72% in 16 developed countries. Education, literacy, and more available family planning services increase contraceptive use. Age at marriage is rising in Asia, but this factor alone has little effect on fertility. Infant mortality is higher in many developing countries than previously thought. Breastfeeding is an important restraint on fertility in most developing countries but is declining among more educated, employed, and urban women which could raise fertility if not compensated for by gains in contraceptive use.     

What's happening to U.S. family size?

A telephone survey by Zero Population Growth demographers found that birthrates have risen slightly for the 1st quarter of 1977. Average estimated family size is now 1.85 children per women compared with 1.77 for the 1st quarter of 1976. For all of 1976 the total fertility rate was 1.76 children per woman. It is predicted, on the basis of the informal survey, that the total fertility rate will rise to 2.0 or 2.1 children by the early or mid-1980s. In 1976, married women expected an average of 2.4 children each. Wives 18-24 expected 2.1 children each while older women (35-39) expected 3.0. Many women are delaying births. Wives 18-24 have an average of .8 children each, wives 25-29 have 1.6 children each. Campbell Gibson, former chief of the projections branch of the Census Bureau, believes births will not reach levels of expectations becuase of the financial, employment, and social problems the huge Baby Boom age group faces throughout its lifetime. The undecided women in the surveys reduce the predictive value. 18% of single women aged 14-39 and 8% of married women in the same age group said they were uncertain about how many children they would have. Since the personalitites and motivations of this undecided group are similar to those who expect to remain childless, it is possible that this group will have fewer children. Such nondemographic factors as media publicity about low fertility rates may inspire some couples to have children. Conversely, the postponement of births may enable couples to become comfortable with a certain lifestyle and these couples may not have as many children as they expect. Social norms are already changing. The percent of wives expecting to be childless rose from 1.3 to 4.1% between 1967-1975. Those expecting only 1 child rose from 6.1 to 11.2%.     

Effects of education on reproductive behavior: lessons from Pakistan

Evidence from the Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey 1990/91 (PDHS) and a 1987 study by Zeba A. Sathar and Karen Oppenheim on women's fertility in Karachi and the impact of educational status, corroborates the correlation between improved education for women and fertility decline. PDHS revealed that current fertility is 5.4 children/ever married woman by the end of the reproductive period. 12% currently use a contraceptive method compared to 49% in India, 40% in Bangladesh, and 62% in Sri Lanka. The social environment of high illiteracy, low educational attainment, poverty, high infant and child and maternal mortality, son preference, and low status of women leads to high fertility. Fertility rates vary by educational status; i.e., women with no formal education have 2 more children than women with at least some secondary education. Education also affects infant and child mortality and morbidity. Literacy is 31% for women and 43% for men. 30% of all males and 20% of all females have attended primary school. Although most women know at least 1 contraceptive method, it is the urban educated woman who is twice as likely to know a source of supply and 5 times more likely to be a user. The Karachi study found that lower fertility among better educated urban women is an unintended consequence of women's schooling and deliberate effort to limit the number of children they have. Education-related fertility differentials could not be explained by the length of time women are at risk of becoming pregnant (late marriage age). Fertility limitation may be motivated by the predominant involvement in the formal work force and higher income. The policy implications are the increasing female schooling is a good investment in lowering fertility; broader improvements also need to be made in economic opportunities for women, particularly in the formal sector. Other needs are for increasing availability and accessibility of contraceptive and family planning services and increasing availability and accessibility of contraceptive and family planning services and increasing knowledge of contraception. The investment will impact development and demography and is an adjunct to child health an survival.     

Determinants of fertility and the unmet need for family planning in Indonesia

Indonesia's fertility has declined to an average of slightly more than 3 children/woman. The islands of Java and Bali have the lowest birth rates. Indonesia's family planning program has been a model of innovation, flexibility, and community involvement, and has been effective in reducing fertility, changing family preferences, and increasing contraceptive use. Fertility decline is also determined by factors other than contraceptive use, as provinces in Jakarta and East Java has low fertility and low contraceptive use. Recent research by Suyono and Palmore found that among cohorts of women in Jakarta lowest fertility rates were explained by greater nonexposure to pregnancy in an unmarried state or by a divorced or widowed status, and by infecundity. In East Java, fertility determinants were the same with the possible addition of lower coital frequency. The study estimated nonexposure due to marriage, infecundity, and contraceptive use. Policy considerations, however, are concerned with the exposed state of the percentage of time women are currently married, fecund, not using contraceptive, and sexually active. Suyono and Palmore also calculated the percentage of time spent in the exposed state by province. The estimates ranged from 12% in Yogyakarta to 25% in West Java and the Outer Islands. Exposed was further divided into groups with a manifest, latent, and no current need. Women with a manifest need for family planning are those who are aware of their contraceptive needs to stop or postpone childbearing and not using. Manifest need was highest in high fertility areas: 12% in Central Java, 13% in West Java, and 12% in the Outer Islands. Programs targeting these women should focus on wider availability of information and services. Women with latent needs are unaware of their need for family planning and are not using contraception. These women were also concentrated in high fertility areas. The percentage of years spent in the latent unmet need state was estimated at 23-24% in West Java and the Outer Islands. Program emphasis should be on education and motivation to show how family size can be controlled. Women with current need can be educated toward future acceptance.     

How female education affects reproductive behavior in urban Pakistan

Although Pakistan remains in a pretransitional stage (contraceptive prevalence of only 11.9% among married women in 1992), urban women with post-primary levels of education are spearheading the gradual move toward fertility transition. Data collected in the city of Karachi in 1987 were used to determine whether the inverse association between fertility and female education is attributable to child supply variables, demand factors, or fertility regulation costs. Karachi, with its high concentration of women with secondary educations employed in professional occupations, has a contraceptive prevalence rate of 31%. Among women married for less than 20 years, a 10-year increment in education predicts that a woman will average two-fifths of a child less than other women in the previous 5 years. Regression analysis identified 4 significant intervening variables in the education-fertility relationship: marriage duration, net family income, formal sector employment, and age at first marriage. Education appears to affect fertility because it promotes a later age at marriage and thus reduces life-time exposure to the risk of childbearing, induces women to marry men with higher incomes (a phenomenon that either reduces the cost of fertility regulation or the demand for children), leads women to become employed in the formal sector (leading to a reduction in the demand for children), and has other unspecified effects on women's values or opportunities that are captured by their birth cohort. When these intervening variables are held constant, women's attitude toward family planning loses its impact on fertility, as do women's domestic autonomy and their expectations of self-support in old age. These findings lend support to increased investments in female education in urban Pakistan as a means of limiting the childbearing of married women. Although it is not clear if investment in female education would have the same effect in rural Pakistan, such action is important from a human and economic development perspective.     

Population policy: Authoritarianism versus cooperation

The people whose interests are most adversely affected by frequent bearing and rearing of children are young women. Social changes that expand the decisional power of young women (such as expansion of female literacy, or enhancement of female employment opportunity) can, thus, be major forces in the direction of reducing fertility rates. This “cooperative” route seems to act more securely – and often much faster – than the use of “coercion” in reducing family size and birth rates. This essay examines the comparative evidence from India and China on this subject as well as the interregional contrasts within India. JEL classification: J11, J13, O15 Received August 20, 1996/Accepted November 14, 1996     

Social and economic factors affecting China fertility transition]

China's fertility rate, affected by various economic, cultural and social factors, is in a state of flux. In analyzing the major factors affecting the change, and in determining a fixed ratio for the degree of effectiveness of each factor, it is possible to improve birth policy in terms of predicting trends in fertility changes. Based on data gathered in 1981, the following observations were made: 1) A look at gross output value for industry and agriculture by geography shows that the more economically developed an area is, the lower is the fertility rate, and that the less economically developed an area is, the higher is the fertility rate. For example, Yunnan, with an average gross output value per person of 406.5 yuan, has a total fertility rate of 3.814, whereas Shanghai's average gross output value per person is 5566.4 yuan, and its total fertility rate is 1.316. 2) Figures comparing educational levels with total fertility rates show that cities with a greater number of women with a middle school education tend to have a lower fertility rate than cities with fewer such women. For example, Beijing's 516,000 middle school educated women have a total fertility rate of 1.589, compared to Anhui's 186,000 middle school educated women who have a total fertility rate of 2.799. Also, among college educated women, the fertility rate is 41.5/1000, the 1 child rate is 88.6%, and the multiple child rate is 1.2%, whereas those women with a primary school education have a fertility rate of 86.4/1000, a 1 child rate of 44.3%, and a multiple child rate of 26.7%. 3) As towns become urbanized, the fertility rate of those towns tend to decline. For example, Sichuan, with an Urbanization Index of 14.3 has total fertility rate of 2.650; Tianjin's Urbanization Index is 68.7, and its total fertility rate is 1.645. 4) A comparison of women engaged in physical labor to those in non-physical jobs shows that the former tend to have a higher fertility rate: women working at physical labor have a fertility rate of 86.7/1000, compared to a fertility rate of 65/1000 for those in non-physical jobs. 5) China's family planning programs advocating late marriage, late births and 1 child per couple in itself does not influence fertility rates, but taken with economic factors, it will have far reaching consequences. For example, cities with high gross output value tend to have a higher rate of 1 child per couple. 6) As the average age at marriage for women rose from 18 years in 1949 to 23 years in 1981, the rate of women having multiple children has declined in all age groups since 1964.     

Demographic aspects of fertility in Thailand

Abstract Data from a national rural and urban sample survey are analysed in order to examine various demographic aspects of fertility in Thailand. Marital fertility rates found for Thailand are among the highest in Asia. Particularly noteworthy is the persistence of high fertility at older ages of childbearing for rural women. Cumulative fertility shows a pronounced relationship with age at marriage and current marital status. Women who marry at an older age or who experience disruption of their marriages are clearly more likely to have fewer children ever born. Differences in both current and cumulative fertility are strongly associated with residence. Rural women who constitute the vast majority of Thai women, experience the highest fertility, Bangkok-Thonburi women experience the lowest fertility and provincial urban women are characterized by an intermediate fertility level which is closer, however, to the experience of their counterparts in the capital than in the countryside. Rural-urban fertility differences are mitigated but by no means eliminated by differences in infant mortality. In both rural and urban areas a positive association between cumulative fertility and infant morality is evident. Breast-feeding, commonly practised for extended periods-among both rural and urban Thai women, undoubtedly serves to some extent as an intervening variable in this relationship. A comparison of current fertility with cumulative fertility strongly suggests that a decline in marital fertility has been under way recently among urban women, especially those residing in the capital, but not at all among rural women. Although it seems safe to assume that the urban fertility decline results in large part from an increasing use of contraception among urban women, those still in the reproductive ages who were using or had previously used birth control were characterized by higher cumulative fertility than women who had never practised contraception. Evidently couples resort to family planning only late in the family building process after they have already achieved or exceeded the number of children they wish to have.     

Constructing fertility tables for Soviet populations

Because the 1970 Soviet Union census does not provide information on the age structure of men and women separately by sex and according to their ethnic affiliation, the 1959 USSR census data serve as the basis to infer knowledge about ethnic fertility. The model takes into account (1) the total number of births in 1960, estimated from the child-woman ratio in 1959, (2) the age structure of women in 1959, and (3) the assumed pattern of age-specific birth rates structured in terms of the modal age at childbearing and the length of the fertility age span. The results show that Ukrainians among the Slav populations ranked as the lowest with 2.07 children born per woman. Their total fertility contrasts with that of Kazakhs native to Central Asia, who reportedly according to Soviet sources had 7.46 children per woman in 1958-1959, and whose estimated rate is around 8.59 children. Extreme variations appear in the estimates of fertility among nationalities of the Caucasus region, Volga Basin, and to a lesser degree in Siberia. Official Soviet calculations of crude birth rates and age-specific rates for 15 Union Republics in 1967-1968 are transcribed and compared with the estimates for nationalities in 1959-1960. The same theoretical model used to generate the Soviet rates may be adapted under different assumptions to non-Soviet populations in other situations where the data are scanty or incomplete.     

The achievements in family planning work in Rudong County as suggested by the data of the Fertility Survey]

A 15% random sampling from Rudong County was recently taken to survey fertility rates. 1153 primary units were chosen, which included 160,832 people. Among this group were 57,050 women aged 15-67 years. Topics surveyed included: marriage, birth, contraception, and population structure. Rudong County, among the earliest counties in China to begin the work of birth control, started in the 1960s with birth control education. The natural rate of population increase by the early 1970s had already fallen. From 1974 to 1982 the average rate of natural population growth was 3.8/1000. Reproduction has gone from a rising trend to a stabilized trend. The base of the population structure pyramid has shrunk; the number of youths aged from birth to 14 years has fallen from 35.05% in 1964 to 21.77% in 1982. The number of people who must be supported (the old and the young) has decreased, lessening society's responsibility for them. 29.45% of the total population are over 65 years or under 14. Society's coefficient factor of support has fallen from 66.31% in 1964 to 41.75%. There is a decrease in the number of people marrying at a young age; the trend is toward marriage at a later age. The average age at marriage had risen from 23.81 years in 1980 to 23.89 years in 1981. The fertility rate has decreased, as has the number of offspring per woman. 1 child family is on the rise and multiple children family is on the decline. In 1981 the 1 child rate reached 92.98%, the 2 children rate was 6.63% and the multiple children rate was 0.49%. Prior to 1979 the 1 child rate was under 10%. The fertility rate fell from 136/1000 in the 1960s to 41.5/1000 in 1981.     

India's population: second and growing

Attention in this discussion of the population of India is directed to the following: international comparisons, population pressures, trends in population growth (interstate variations), sex ratio and literacy, urban-rural distribution, migration (interstate migration, international migration), fertility and mortality levels, fertility trends (birth rate decline, interstate fertility differentials, rural-urban fertility decline, fertility differentials by education and religion, marriage and fertility), mortality trends (mortality differentials, health care services), population pressures on socioeconomic development (per capita income and poverty, unemployment and employment, increasing foodgrain production, school enrollment shortfalls), the family planning program, implementing population policy statements, what actions would be effective, and goals and prospects for the future. India's population, a total of 684 million persons as of March 1, 1981, is 2nd only to the population of China. The 1981 population was up by 136 million persons, or 24.75%, over the 548 million enumerated in the 1971 census. For 1978, India's birth and death rates were estimated at 33.3 and 14.2/1000 population, down from about 41.1 and 18.9 during the mid-1960s. India's current 5-year plan has set a goal of a birth rate of 30/1000 population by 1985 and "replacement-level" fertility--about 2.3 births per woman--by 1996. The acceleration in India's population growth has come mainly in the past 3 decades and is due primarily to a decline in mortality that has markedly outstripped the fertility decline. The Janata Party which assumed government leadership in March 1977 did not dismantle the family planning program, but emphasis was shifted to promote family planning "without any compulsion, coercion or pressures of any sort." The policy statement stressed that efforts were to be directed towards those currently underserved, mainly in rural areas. Hard targets were rejected. Over the 1978-1981 period the family planning program slowly recovered. By March 1981, 33.4 million sterilizations had been performed since 1956 when statistics were 1st compiled. Another 3 million couples were estimated to be using IUDs and conventional contraceptives.     

Birth and death in cities in the developing world

City dwellers in Sub-Saharan Africa have increased roughly 600% in the last 35 years. Throughout the developing world, cities have expanded at a rate that has far outpaced rural population growth. Extensive data document lower fertility and mortality rates in cities than in rural regions. But slums, shantytowns, and squatters' settlements proliferate in many large cities. Martin Brockerhoff studies the reproductive and health consequences of urban growth, with an emphasis on maternal and child health. Brockerhoff reports that child mortality rates in large cities are highest among children born to mothers who recently migrated from rural areas or who live in low-quality housing. Children born in large cities have about a 30% higher risk of dying before they reach the age of 5 than those born in smaller cities. Despite this, children born to migrant mothers who have lived in a city for about a year have much better survival chances than children born in rural areas to nonmigrant mothers and children born to migrant mothers before or shortly after migration. Migration in developing countries as a whole has saved millions of children's lives. The apparent benefits experienced in the 1980s may not occur in the future, as cities continue to grow and municipal governments confront an overwhelming need for housing, jobs, and services. Another benefit is that fertility rates in African cities fell by about 1 birth per woman as a result of female migration from villages to towns in the 1980s and early 1990s. There will be an increasing need for donors and governments to concentrate family planning, reproductive health, child survival, and social services in cities, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, because there child mortality decline has been unexpectedly slow, overall fertility decline is not yet apparent in most countries, and levels of migration to cities are anticipated to remain high.     

Comparative analysis of the index of our population life quality]

A comprehensive method of calculating and measuring a country's or an area's health and literacy levels is examined. The method, known as population quality life inference (PQLI), was used to determine which of China's provinces has the highest and the lowest degree of population quality. The PQLI indicates infant mortality, average life expectancy of 1 year olds, and literacy rates of those 15 years and older. Because developing countries traditionally have high rates of infant mortality and illiteracy and low life expectancy rates during their industrialization, measuring the degree of population quality of life improvement of such countries during this period was found to be significant. These factors (infant mortality, illiteracy, and life expectancy) will improve substantially as industrialization continues. In order to compare various areas, these 3 factors must be changed into "inferences" 0-100, "0" representing the lowest population quality and "100" the highest. These 3 inferences must then be averaged in order to calculate the PQLI. For example: life expectancy value 77 (highest in the world) minus 38 (lowest)/100 = .39. In order to measure the value of India's life expectancy: value of 1-year-old's life expectancy = 56 (1-year-old's life expectancy in India) minus 38/.39 = 46. The value of adult illiteracy does not need to be changed. Thus, the actual comparison will be based on the values of the 3 inferences. Using this method of calculation, it is concluded that the PQLI analysis indicated that Peking (93.04) is the highest in China and Yumnan Province (60.72) is the lowest.     

Kenya's record population growth: a dilemma of development

The causes and implications of Kenya's 4% rate of natural increase and fertility rate of 8.1 births per woman were examined. Attention was directed to the following: pronatalist pressures; inadvertent pronatalist impact of development; women's education and employment and fertility; population growth and pressures; mortality decline and population growth; fertility levels and differentials; fertility desires; the family planning program; and family planning knowledge, attitudes, and practice. Kenya's development success has worked to push up the population growth rate. Improved health care and nutrition halved infant mortality from 160 to 87 deaths/1000 live births between 1958 and 1977 and a marked increase in primary school enrollment may be factors in the birthrate increase to 53/1000 population. At this time fertility is highest among women with 1-4 years of education. The 1977-1978 Kenya Fertility Survey showed that only 5.8% of married women were using modern contraception, indicating that the national family planning program, established in 1967, has made little progress. Program difficulties have included shortages of staff, supplies and easily accessible clinic as well as an almost universal desire on the part of Kenyans for families of at least 7 children. Children are viewed as essential to survival and status to the rural population.     

Fertility survey in the rural area of Henan province]

The population of Henan Province is 72,850,000, 92% of whom live in villages. From July 12 to August 11, 1981, a fertility survey was taken of 20 communes and 31 work brigades in the counties of Fugou, Shancai, and Dengfeng, in which 38,168 people and 5700 fertility registration forms were studied. In 1980, 15% of the 3 counties' population were women aged 18-49, 80% of whom were married. The birth rate was 134.56/1000, of which the rate for married women was 172.36/1000. A random sampling from Shancai of 18-49 year old women showed an average of 2.3 children per couple. The factors influencing rural fertility are economic, social, ideological, and cultural. The economic system of distribution according to work has actually encouraged population growth because in rural areas where the standard of living is low larger families with more workers have greater incomes than smaller families with fewer workers. Early marriage and early births are encouraged under this system, as evidenced by findings in Fugou County. The survey also found that in the 3 counties, virtually everyone marries, women who work tend to work in the village close to home, high illiteracy is prevalent, and traditional attitudes of favoring males over females were all factors contributing to early and frequent births. In order to lower rural birth rates, rural economy should be developed, old attitudes and habits should be changed, and literacy should be increased.     

Communique of the National Sample Survey of Fertility and Birth Control (abstract)

The State Family Planning Commission in China surveyed 2,151,212 people, including 459,269 married women aged 15-57 on fertility and birth control, in July, 1988 from 30 provinces and other regions. From 1980- 87 the average total fertility rate was 2.47 vs. 4.01 in the 1970s. Fertility rates in the 80s were 1.33 for cities, 2.43 for towns, and 2.84 for villages. 1st parity births rose from 44.15% to 52.55% from Jan. to July of 1988 and 2nd parity births were about 30%. Women aged 50-57 had an average of 5.27 children while women aged 45-59 had an average of 4.44 children. 71.21% of childbearing-age women use contraception: 10.99% use male sterilization, 38.24% use female sterilization, 41.48% use IUDs, 4.91% oral pills, 2.65% condoms, 0.42% external contraceptives, and 1.32% use other methods. 13.79% of the married, childbearing-age couples have one-child certificates. The population of China as of April 1989 was 1.1 billion. In 1988 the birth rate was 20.78/1000 and the death rate was 6.58/1000.     

Low fertility due to delay in -- not dearth of -- births

Population Council demographer John Bongaarts and his colleague Griffith Feeney argue that recent concern about a lack of births overlooks the fact that many women in developed countries are simply choosing to bear children later than women used to. So-called birth dearths are often caused by temporary delays in childbearing. The two demographers have designed a new way for demographers to account for the timing, or tempo, of childbearing in estimates of fertility. Their tempo-adjusted total fertility rate (TFR) allows demographers to correct skewed fertility trends, such as those leading to projections of birth dearths. The new measure provides a better indication of women's true propensity to bear children. Standard measures of fertility are distorted by changes in tempo. Such changes occur when large numbers of couples delay or accelerate their initiation of family building. The authors used historical data and theoretical arguments to validate the tempo-adjusted TFR, which improves upon the two common measures of fertility. Flaws in the TFR and the completed fertility rate (CFR) are corrected by Bongaarts and Feeney's new measure. To demonstrate their new tool, they examined the below-replacement fertility seen in recent decades in the US. By the mid-1990s, the TFR in almost every developed country had fallen below the replacement level of 2.1 births/woman, and in Italy, Spain, and Germany it fell below 1.5. If such fertility persists, declining population size, extreme population aging, and financial pressure upon social security systems may result. However, if fertility preferences hold at current levels, the very low fertility rates observed in the developed world will approach 2 children/couple.