A Perspective on Nuclear Waste

The management of spent nuclear fuel and high-level nuclear waste has the deserved reputation as one of the most intractable policy issues facing the United States and other nations using nuclear reactors for electric power generation. This paper presents the author's perspective on this complex issue, based on a decade of service with the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board and Board on Radioactive Waste Management of the National Research Council.     

Attitudes as an Expression of Knowledge and “Political Anchoring”: The Case of Nuclear Power in the United Kingdom

Attitudes toward the use of nuclear energy pose fundamental issues in the political debate about how to meet future energy needs. Development of new nuclear power facilities faces significant opposition both from knowledgeable individuals who display an understanding of the risks attached to various forms of power generation and those who follow strict politically based ideological dogmas. This article employs data from a 2005 Eurobarometer survey of UK citizens to examine the influence of both political preferences and knowledge in explaining support of nuclear power. Findings reveal that attitudes about nuclear power are highly politically motivated while the influence of knowledge about radioactive waste is dependent upon beliefs about the consequences of nuclear energy use. Perceptions of being informed about radioactive waste and trust in sources providing information about radioactive waste management also predict attitudes toward nuclear power generation.     

Managing Nuclear Waste from Power Plants

National strategies to manage nuclear waste from commercial nuclear power plants are analyzed and compared. The current strategy is to try to operate a repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, to dispose of high-level nuclear waste underground. The main alternatives involve temporary above-ground storage at a centralized facility or next to nuclear power plants. If either of these is pursued now, the analysis assumes that a repository will be built in 2100 for waste not subsequently put to use. The analysis treats various uncertainties: whether a repository at Yucca Mountain would be licensed, possible theft and misuse of the waste, innovations in repository design and waste management, the potential availability of a cancer cure by 2100, and possible future uses of nuclear waste. The objectives used to compare alternatives include concerns for health and safety, environmental and socioeconomic impacts, and direct economic costs, as well as equity concerns (geographical, intergenerational, and procedural), indirect economic costs to electricity ratepayers, federal government responsibility to manage nuclear waste, and implications of theft and misuse of nuclear waste. The analysis shows that currently building an underground repository at Yucca Mountain is inferior to other available strategies by the equivalent of $10,000 million to $50,000 million. This strongly suggests that this policy should be reconsidered. A more detailed analysis using the framework presented would help to define a new national policy to manage nuclear waste.     

Local Acceptance of a High-Level Nuclear Waste Repository

The siting of nuclear waste facilities has been very difficult in all countries. Recent experience in Sweden indicates, however, that it may be possible, under certain circumstances, to gain local support for the siting of a high-level nuclear waste (HLNW) repository. The article reports on a study of attitudes and risk perceptions of people living in four municipalities in Sweden where HLNW siting was being intensely discussed at the political level, in media, and among the public. Data showed a relatively high level of consensus on acceptability of at least further investigation of the issue; in two cases local councils have since voted in favor of a go-ahead, and in one case only a very small majority defeated the issue. Models of policy attitudes showed that these were related to attitude to nuclear power, attributes of the perceived HLNW risk, and trust. Factors responsible for acceptance are discussed at several levels. One is the attitude to nuclear power, which is becoming more positive, probably because no viable alternatives are in sight. Other factors have to do with the extensive information programs conducted in these municipalities, and with the logical nature of the conclusion that they would be good candidates for hosting the national HLNW repository.     

Duties to Future Generations, Proxy Consent, Intra- and Intergenerational Equity: The Case of Nuclear Waste

How does one deal with problems of risk transfer if it is the case that increasing risks to future generations decreases the risks to present generations, and increasing the risks to present generations decreases the risks to future generations? In the case of high‐level nuclear waste and spent fuel, for example, should billions of dollars be spent to secure the wastes and protect future generations, or should the same monies be spent on present‐day needs, under the assumption that future generations will be better able to deal with the waste than we are at present? Although these questions may appear insoluble, they become less so when one recognizes several common ethical and logical errors that beset many discussions of technological risk and duties to future generations. After briefly explaining the grounds for inter‐ and intragenerational equity, this analysis argues for three propositions about many treatments of inter‐ and intragenerational ethics: (1) these discussions often err because they frame policy arguments in terms that ignore rights and focus on maximizing welfare or utility, (2) they err because they frequently frame policy arguments in ways that set inter‐ and intragenerational welfare at odds, when they are not, because they ignore ameliorating practices and the conditions for proxy consent, and (3) they also err because they engage in risk practices that do not match their risk rhetoric.     

Developing and Testing a Facility Location Model for Canadian Nuclear Fuel Waste

The purpose of this paper is to develop and test a facility location model for the siting of a nuclear fuel waste disposal facility in Canada. The model is based on successful Canadian siting processes related to hazardous waste and low level radioactive waste facilities, as well as attributes of facility siting found in the literature. The proposed model was presented to a sample of participants in the federal environmental assessment review of the technical feasibility of the Canadian Nuclear Fuel Waste Disposal Concept (CNFWDC) held throughout Canada in 1990. Results demonstrate that despite the fact that over half of the survey respondents did not support the CNFWDC during the public hearings, the majority favorably rated the proposed facility location model. Components of the model that were tested included siting criteria and goals, decision-making groups, and siting safeguards. On the basis of these results, it is concluded that the siting of a nuclear fuel waste disposal facility must make the decentralization of decision-making authority to local communities and governments a priority.     

NIMBY, CLAMP, and the Location of New Nuclear-Related Facilities: U.S. National and 11 Site-Specific Surveys

Public and political opposition have made finding locations for new nuclear power plants, waste management, and nuclear research and development facilities a challenge for the U.S. government and the nuclear industry. U.S. government-owned properties that already have nuclear-related activities and commercial nuclear power generating stations are logical locations. Several studies and utility applications to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission suggest that concentrating locations at major plants (CLAMP) has become an implicit siting policy. We surveyed 2,101 people who lived within 50 miles of 11 existing major nuclear sites and 600 who lived elsewhere in the United States. Thirty-four percent favored CLAMP for new nuclear power plants, 52% for waste management facilities, and 50% for new nuclear laboratories. College educated, relatively affluent male whites were the strongest CLAMP supporters. They disproportionately trusted those responsible for the facilities and were not worried about existing nuclear facilities or other local environmental issues. Notably, they were concerned about continuing coal use. Not surprisingly, CLAMP proponents tended to be familiar with their existing local nuclear site. In short, likely CLAMP sites have a large and politically powerful core group to support a CLAMP policy. The challenge to proponents of nuclear technologies will be to sustain this support and expand the base among those who clearly are less connected and receptive to new nearby sites.     

Reversing Nuclear Opposition: Evolving Public Acceptance of a Permanent Nuclear Waste Disposal Facility

Nuclear facilities have long been seen as the top of the list of locally unwanted land uses (LULUs), with nuclear waste repositories generating the greatest opposition. Focusing on the case of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in southern New Mexico, we test competing hypotheses concerning the sources of opposition and support for siting the facility, including demographics, proximity, political ideology, and partisanship, and the unfolding policy process over time. This study tracks the changes of risk perception and acceptance of WIPP over a decade, using measures taken from 35 statewide surveys of New Mexico citizens spanning an 11‐year period from fall 1990 to summer 2001. This time span includes periods before and after WIPP became operational. We find that acceptance of WIPP is greater among those whose residences are closest to the WIPP facility. Surprisingly, and contrary to expectations drawn from the broader literature, acceptance is also greater among those who live closest to the nuclear waste transportation route. We also find that ideology, partisanship, government approval, and broader environmental concerns influence support for WIPP acceptance. Finally, the sequence of procedural steps taken toward formal approval of WIPP by government agencies proved to be important to gaining public acceptance, the most significant being the opening of the WIPP facility itself.     

Are Nuclear-Weapon States not Parties to the Non-proliferation Treaty Ready to Renounce to the Possession of Nuclear Weapons?

The situation of nuclear-weapon states not parties to the NPT is different from the situation of the nuclear-weapon states parties to that treaty. This last group of countries has signed and ratified a treaty that encourage them to begin negotiations in good faith for the discussion of concrete measures that lead them to nuclear disarmament, while the first group of states have made no commitment to do that. In other words, nuclear-weapon states not parties to the NPT have made no commitment to nuclear disarmament and are not obliged to report anything related to the possession of nuclear weapons to the any specific body or organ or to the international community. Taking into account the position of nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT regarding the possession of nuclear weapons, there is no possibility to convince nuclear-weapon states not parties to this treaty to renounce to the possession of this type of weapons under the present circumstances.     

Can Sisyphus Succeed? Getting U.S. High‐Level Nuclear Waste into a Geological Repository

The U.S. government has the obligation of managing the high‐level radioactive waste from its defense activities and also, under existing law, from civilian nuclear power generation. This obligation is not being met. The January 2012 Final Report from the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future provides commendable guidance but little that is new. The author, who served on the federal Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board from 1989 to 1994 and subsequently on the Board on Radioactive Waste Management of the National Research Council from 1994 to 1999, provides a perspective both on the Commission's recommendations and a potential path toward progress in meeting the federal obligation. By analogy to Sisyphus of Greek mythology, our nation needs to find a way to roll the rock to the top of the hill and have it stay there, rather than continuing to roll back down again.     

The Future of Nuclear Power: Value Orientations and Risk Perception

Since the turn of the 21st century, there has been a revival of interest in nuclear power. Two decades ago, the expansion of nuclear power in the United States was halted by widespread public opposition as well as rising costs and less than projected increases in demand for electricity. Can the renewed enthusiasm for nuclear power overcome its history of public resistance that has persisted for decades? We propose that attitudes toward nuclear power are a function of perceived risk, and that both attitudes and risk perceptions are a function of values, beliefs, and trust in the institutions that influence nuclear policy. Applying structural equation models to data from a U.S. national survey, we find that increased trust in the nuclear governance institutions reduces perceived risk of nuclear power and together higher trust and lower risk perceptions predict positive attitudes toward nuclear power. Trust in environmental institutions and perceived risks from global environmental problems do not predict attitudes toward nuclear power. Values do predict attitudes: individuals with traditional values have greater support for, while those with altruistic values have greater opposition to, nuclear power. Nuclear attitudes do not vary by gender, age, education, income, or political orientation, though nonwhites are more supportive than whites. These findings are consistent with, and provide an explanation for, a long series of public opinion polls showing public ambivalence toward nuclear power that persists even in the face of renewed interest for nuclear power in policy circles.     

Perceptions of Nuclear and Other Risks in Japan and the United States

As part of a study of nuclear power development in Japan and the United States, surveys of perceptions of risk toward 30 activities, substances, and technologies have been carried out in the Pacific Northwest and Tokyo, Japan. The results show that people in both countries have the highest level of dread toward nuclear waste disposal, nuclear accidents, and nuclear war, greater even than their dread of crime and AIDS. In addition to comparisons of dread, the paper also discusses similarities and differences between Japanese and American responses for other dimensions of risk perception.     

Perception of Nuclear Energy and Coal in France and the Netherlands

This study focuses on the perception of large scale application of nuclear energy and coal in the Netherlands and France. The application of these energy-sources and the risks and benefits are judged differently by various group in society. In Europe, France has the highest density of nuclear power plants and the Netherlands has one of the lowest. In both countries scientists and social scientists completed a questionnaire assessing the perception of the large scale application of both energy sources. Furthermore, a number of variables relating to the socio cultural and political circumstances were measured. The results indicate that the French had a higher risk perception and a more negative attitude toward nuclear power than the Dutch. But they also assess the benefits of the use of nuclear power to be higher. Explanations for these differences are discussed.     

The VIII NPT Review Conference: A Successful or Failure Event?

In August 1945, the United States dropped two nuclear bombs against the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki initiating the so-called “nuclear era”. Some years later, the number of countries possessing this terrible weapon increased to five. Today, eight or nine countries are in possession of such destructive weapons. What has done by the international community to stop the proliferation of such deadly weapon? The international community began in the 1950s the consideration of specific measures with the purpose of impeding further the proliferation of nuclear weapons and, at appropriate time, to begin the destruction of all nuclear weapons in a defined period at multilateral level and under international supervision. After so many years of efforts in this direction, these two important objectives have not been still reached. This paper analyses each one of the main outcomes of the VIII NPT Review Conference and recommend specific actions to be implemented by all NPT State parties in order not only to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons but to destroy them.     

Public Attitudes Toward Siting a High-Level Nuclear Waste Repository in Nevada

This paper examines the sources of public opposition to a high-level nuclear waste repository among samples of 1001 residents of Nevada and a national sample of 1201 residents. Two models of choice are contrasted: A benefit-cost model and a risk-perception model of individual choice. The data suggest that the willingness of Nevada residents to accept a repository at Yucca Mountain depends upon subjective risk factors, especially the perceived seriousness of risk to future generations. Perceived risk depends in part on level of trust placed in the Department of Energy to manage a repository safely. Opposition to a local repository did not decrease significantly if compensation in the form of annual rebates, either ($1000, $3000, or $5000 per year for 20 years) were offered to residents. The public needs to be convinced before compensation is considered, that the repository will possess minimal risks to themselves as well as to future generations, and that the site currently targeted is suitable. One way to do this is through adoption of mitigation and control procedures such as strict federal standards and local control over the operation of the repository. The federal government should also consider returning to the fair procedure for selection between candidate sites specified in the initial Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982.     

On-Site Storage of High Level Nuclear Waste: Attitudes and Perceptions of Local Residents

No public policy issue has been as difficult as high-level nuclear waste. Debates continue regarding Yucca Mountain as a disposal site, and—more generally—the appropriateness of geologic disposal and the need to act quickly. Previous research has focused on possible social, political, and economic consequences of a facility in Nevada. Impacts have been predicted to be potentially large and to emanate mainly from stigmatization of the region due to increased perceptions of risk. Analogous impacts from leaving waste at power plants have been either ignored or assumed to be negligible. This paper presents survey results on attitudes of residents in three counties where nuclear waste is currently stored. Topics include perceived risk, knowledge of nuclear waste and radiation, and impacts on jobs, tourism, and housing values from leaving waste on site. Results are similar to what has been reported for Nevada; the public is concerned about possible adverse effects from on-site storage of waste.     

Waste Package Performance Evaluations for the Proposed High-Level Nuclear Waste Repository at Yucca Mountain

The evaluation studies of the proposed repository for long-term storage of spent nuclear fuel and high-level nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, are underway. Fulfillment of the requirements for limiting dose to the public, which includes containment of the radioactive waste emplaced in the proposed repository and subsequent slow release of radionuclides from the Engineered Barrier System (EBS) into the geosphere, will rely on a robust waste container design, among other EBS components. Part of the evaluation process involves sensitivity studies aimed at elucidating which model parameters contribute most to the waste package and overlying drip shield degradation characteristics. The model parameters identified for this study include (1) general corrosion rate parameters and (2) stress corrosion cracking (SCC) parameters. Temperature dependence and parameter uncertainty are evaluated for the general corrosion rate model parameters while for the SCC model parameters, uncertainty treatment of stress intensity factor, crack initiation threshold, and manufacturing flaw orientations are evaluated. Based on these evaluations new uncertainty distributions are generated and recommended for future analyses. Also, early waste package failures due to improper heat treatment were added to the waste package degradation model. The results of these investigations indicate that the waste package failure profiles are governed by the manufacturing flaw orientation model parameters.     

Determinants and Mapping of Collective Perceptions of Technological Risk: The Case of the Second Nuclear Power Plant in Taiwan

Nuclear power is a highly controversial and salient example of environmental risk. The siting or operating of a nuclear power plant often faces widespread public opposition. Although studies of public perceptions of nuclear power date back to 1970s, little research attempts to explain the spatial heterogeneity of risk attitude toward nuclear power among individuals or communities. This article intends to improve the knowledge about the major factors contributing to nuclear power plant risk perceptions by mapping the geographical patterns of local risk perception and examining the determinants in forming the nature and distribution of the perceived risk among potentially affected population. The analysis was conducted by a case study of the Second Nuclear Power Plant (SNPP) in Taiwan by using a novel methodology that incorporates a comprehensive risk perception (CRP) model into an ethnographic approach called risk perception mapping (RPM). First, we examined the determinants of local nuclear power risk perceptions through the CRP model and multivariate regression analysis. Second, the results were integrated with the RPM approach to map and explain the spatial pattern of risk perceptions. The findings demonstrate that the respondents regard the nuclear power plant as an extremely high‐risk facility, causing them to oppose the SNPP and reject the compensation payment to accept its continuing operation. Results also indicate that perceptions of nuclear power risk were mainly influenced by social trust, psychological and socioeconomic attributes, proximity, and the perceived effects of the SNPP on the quality of everyday life.     

Decision-Making, Time Horizons, and Risk in the Very Long-Term Perspective

Some decisions made today have far-reaching consequences as exemplified by those concerning nuclear power and spent nuclear fuel. The investigation presented here uses a decision theoretic framework in which time horizons and the discounting of negative consequences play significant roles. The results indicated wide variations in the lengths of the planning horizons judged to be adequate not only across a number of activities, including nuclear waste management, but also across groups of subjects (e.g., engineering students, retired people, and nuclear fuel experts). The paper reports typical judgments and correlations between different variables for different groups of subjects. The differences across groups reflect potential sources of conflict, depending in part on different values and different perceptions of more or less uncertain facts. Discounting functions for negative consequences in the future were also established. A range in differences in the speed of discounting were found and illustrated. Furthermore, it was found that substantial proportions in all groups regarded negative consequences related to nuclear waste as nondiscountable. When asked about the effect of time until outcome on acceptable probability of a negative outcome, many subjects used the probability concept in an incoherent way, illustrating the great difficulty in communicating small probabilities in a long-term risk context.     

Public Distrust and Hazard Management Success at the Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant

Based on experience gained while serving a public oversight commission appointed by the governor of Colorado, hazard management at the Department of Energy's Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant is reviewed. Specific reference is made to the plant's history of controversy, its defense-in-depth strategy of hazard control, occupational health issues, public exposure to plutonium, and the assessment of low-probability, high-consequence risks. This leads to the conclusion that Rocky Flats is, by any objective standard, a hazard management success. It follows that public distrust of Rocky Flats arises as much from fear and loathing of nuclear weapons themselves as from the manufacturing process by which they are made.