PERCEIVED GAME UNCERTAINTY,SUSPENSE AND THE DEMAND FOR SPORT

This study tries bridging between different behavioral economic explanations for the lack of support of the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis in spectator sports. We test a measure of perceived game uncertainty that is comparable to objective measures frequently tested in the literature. Econometric results suggest that fans do not perceive closeness of a game differently than how economists have tended to measure it. However, fans' perceptions of suspensefulness are distinct from their perceptions of game uncertainty. Moreover, the finding that fans' preferences for game uncertainty are dominated by loss aversion also emerges—independently of fanship status—in our stated‐preference setting. (JEL L83, D12, Z2)     

INCIDENCE AND CONSEQUENCES OF RISK‐TAKING BEHAVIOR IN TOURNAMENTS—EVIDENCE FROM THE NBA

We empirically explore the relevance and efficiency of risk‐taking behavior in tournaments. We use data from the National Basketball Association (NBA) and measure risk‐taking by the fraction of three‐point shots in basketball games. We examine how point differences between teams during games affect their subsequent risk‐taking behavior. It is found that teams that are trailing are more likely to increase their use of three‐point shots. We additionally analyze the consequences of this change in behavior. Enhanced risk‐taking is inefficient in the vast majority of cases and is only beneficial if a team is trailing by a rather large margin. We discuss possible explanations for these decision errors. (JEL M5, D81, J30)     

LOST IN THE MAIL: A FIELD EXPERIMENT ON CRIME

Stealing, shirking, and opportunistic behavior in general can create barriers to the development of markets. The costs associated with such behavior are shared by both firms and individuals and can be large enough to even prevent the initiation of trade. Measurement of these costs is difficult because information is not available for transactions that fail to occur. We use a field experiment to identify opportunistic crime in a task that is important and relevant for trade: the delivery of mail. We subtly manipulate the content and information available in mail sent to households across neighborhoods that vary by income, and detected high levels of shirking and stealing. Eighteen percent of the mail never arrived at its destination, and significantly more was lost if there was even a slight hint of something additional inside the envelope. Our results demonstrate the importance of transaction costs created by crime and that not all populations are equally affected. Middle‐income neighborhoods suffer the most. (JEL C93, K42, H41, L87, O21)     

RENT-SEEKING FIRMS, CONSUMER GROUPS, AND THE SOCIAL COSTS OF MONOPOLY

Do consumers' consumer-surplus (CS)–defending activities increase the social costs of monopoly compared to when consumers are inactive? Given just one rent-seeking firm, consumers ' CS-defending activities generally increase the social costs of monopoly, but given two or more rent-seeking firms, such activities generally reduce the social costs. (JEL D72, L12)     

STRATEGIC EXCLUSION OF THE HIGHEST‐VALUED BIDDERS IN WHOLESALE AUTOMOBILE AUCTIONS

By restricting bidders to be qualified dealers, wholesale automobile auctions exclude the bidders who place the highest value on the vehicles: consumers. This article provides an explanation for this puzzling entry restriction by modeling the inventory‐management decisions of a firm. If an automobile dealer has more vehicles in inventory than is optimal, it cannot reduce its inventory by selling directly to consumers without impacting the demand for the automobiles that remain. However, if the dealer sells his/her excess inventory to a competitor, the demand for his/her remaining vehicles increases as the competitor responds by acquiring fewer additional vehicles. We demonstrate that for any market demand function and any cost of the competitor acquiring additional vehicles, a dealer with excess inventory does better by selling a subset of its vehicles to a competitor rather than directly to consumers. We discuss the market for wholesale automobiles in relation to other markets where goods are also auctioned but where entry is not restricted to qualified dealers. Doing so allows us to compare our inventory‐management explanation to common explanations provided by industry practitioners. We find that intuitive alternative stories do not consistently explain practices across markets. (JEL D44, L11, L62)     

WHY DO PEOPLE USE DEBIT CARDS: EVIDENCE FROM CHECKING ACCOUNTS

Debit cards are the fastest growing consumer payment method despite being more expensive and less versatile than credit cards. In this paper, we investigate some of the oft cited explanations for debit card use. Checking account data shows that debit card use is correlated with age, pay frequency, overdrafting, and ATM use, but not income, gender, crime, or expenditure. The data contain some signs that debit cards might be used as a method of spending restraint. (JEL D14, G21, L14)     

DISSECTING THE MONTY HALL ANOMALY

We assess competing explanations of irrational behavior in the Monty Hall problem by creating new variants of the problem. Some variants employ a feature that automates the merging of probabilities, thus rendering transparent the probabilistic advantage of the rational choice. That feature also enables systematic variation in informational asymmetry, and in ordering of actions. Data from 77 subjects, each of whom makes 30 binary decisions, indicate that automated merging raises the fraction of rational choices from around 40% to over 80%. Other features examined have much less impact, indicating the importance of a Bayesian updating failure. (JEL C91, D02, D81, D83)     

THE EVOLUTIONARY LOGIC OF HONORING SUNK COSTS

Although economics claims that sunk costs should not figure in current decision‐making, there is ample evidence to suggest that people squander resources by honoring bygones. We argue that such wastage of resources was tolerated in our evolutionary past by Nature because it served fitness‐enhancing functions. In this study, we propose and model one such function. We demonstrate how the honoring of sunk costs could have arisen as a commitment device that Nature found expedient for scenarios where conflicts over temptations between the emotional and rational centers of the brain might sabotage long‐term investments. By applying this idea to the self‐concept, we argue that this model provides a rationale for cognitive dissonance, a well‐established phenomenon in social psychology. (JEL D01, D03)     

STOCK OWNERSHIP AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MUTUAL FUND REVOLUTION

We find that higher stock ownership rates are linked to an upward shift in the Republican share of the House popular vote since the late 1980s, consistent with theories that property interests affect voting. To proxy for discontinuous stock ownership rates, we use equity mutual fund costs, which have fallen, are negatively correlated with stock ownership rates and the Republican vote share in the long run, and help explain short‐run changes along with midterm elections, economic conditions, and presidential popularity. Findings suggest that the major parties’ shares of the House popular vote will fluctuate around 50% until other factors trigger a political realignment. (JEL D72, G11)     

THE CHARITY OF THE EXTREMELY WEALTHY

In this article, we show that, compared to billionaires who have inherited their wealth, billionaires who have made their own wealth are more likely to sign the Giving Pledge and more likely to be in the Million Dollar Gifts list or the Philanthropy Top 50 list of big givers. If they give, self‐made billionaires also tend to donate more money. We explore several possible explanations for this correlation between the origin of billionaires' wealth and their charitable giving, and present evidence that suggests that self‐made billionaires tend to spend more money, both by giving money away and by buying expensive items. (JEL D03, H40)     

CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS AND INFORMATION REVELATION IN PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS

We utilize laboratory experiments to study behavior in sequential procurement auctions where winning an auction round increases a bidder's future costs. The game admits competitive as well as bid‐rotation style collusive equilibria. We find that (a) bidders show some propensity to account for the opportunity cost of winning an auction, but underestimate its magnitude; (b) revealing all bids (instead of only the winning bid) after each round leads to dramatically higher procurement costs. The rise in procurement costs is accompanied by an increase in very high (extreme) bids, a fraction of which appear to be collusive in nature. (JEL C91, D44, L44)     

ARE SUNK COSTS IRRELEVANT? EVIDENCE FROM PLAYING TIME IN THE NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION

We use playing time in the National Basketball Association to investigate whether sunk costs affect decision making. Behavioral economics implies that teams favor players chosen in the lottery and first round of the draft because of the greater financial and psychic commitment to them. Neoclassical economics implies that only current performance matters. We build on previous work in two ways. First, we better capture potential playing time by accounting for time lost to injuries or suspension. Second, we use regression discontinuity to capture changes when a player's draft position crosses thresholds. We find that teams allocate no more time to highly drafted players. (JEL L83, J23, D03)     

PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION UNDER CONGESTION: HOTELLING WAS RIGHT

We introduce negative network externalities—“congestion costs”—into H. Hotelling's (1929) model of spatial competition with linear transportation costs. For any firm locations on opposite sides of the midpoint, a pure strategy price equilibrium exists and is unique if congestion costs are strong enough relative to transportation costs. We analyze product differentiation and find that Hotelling's Principle of Minimum Differentiation comes closer to holding in the presence of congestion costs. The greater are congestion costs, the less differentiated products can be in (locationally symmetric) equilibrium. In fact, minimum differentiation comes arbitrarily close to holding depending on the magnitude of these costs relative to transportation costs. Intuitively, greater congestion effects stabilize competition at closer quarters, eliminating aggressive pricing equilibria. Thus, negative network externalities can play a significant role in product differentiation. (JEL D21, L15, R12)     

CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL: THE CASE OF THE DESIGNATED HITTER AND HIT BATTERS

Past studies have found a positive correlation between the use of the designated hitter in baseball and hit batters, but the reason for this is debatable. Using a new micro‐level data set of individual plate appearances, we control for detailed cost‐benefit attributes that affect the decision calculus of the pitcher to isolate the deterrent impact of requiring the pitcher to bat. We find that pitchers hit batters strategically, and the deterrent effect of requiring pitchers to bat explains 60%–80% of the difference in hit batsmen between leagues. We also identify evidence of direct retaliation against plunking pitchers. (JEL D81, KC42, L83)     

REPUTATION AND EARNINGS: THE ROLES OF QUALITY AND QUANTITY IN ACADEME

We examine the determinants of professional reputation. Does quantity of exposures raise reputation independent of quality? Does quality of the most important exposure have extra effects on reputation? In a very large sample of academic economists, there is little evidence that a scholar's most influential work provides any extra enhancement of reputation. Quality rankings matter more than absolute quality. Quantity has a zero or even negative effect on proxies for reputation. Data on salaries, however, show positive effects of quantity independent of quality. We test explanations for the differences between the determinants of reputation and salary. (JEL L14, J31)     

INFLATION DYNAMICS AND SUBJECTIVE EXPECTATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

We estimate a forward‐looking New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) for the United States using data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters as proxy for expected inflation. We obtain significant and plausible estimates for the structural parameters independently of whether we use the output gap or unit labor costs as a measure of marginal costs. Moreover, when estimating a Phillips curve where lagged inflation enters due to price indexation by nonreoptimizing firms, we obtain significant parameter estimates of the sign predicted by theory independently of the marginal cost measure used. (JEL E31)     

THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF DISTRIBUTION REGULATIONS IN OECD COUNTRIES

This article presents new data on distribution margins in eight OECD countries and uses an Applied General Equilibrium (AGE) framework to assess the welfare impacts of inefficient distribution. I estimate the extent to which regulations inflate margins. A comparison of margins across countries finds, in contrast to other studies, that Japan's margins are unusually high. The AGE simulations imply that inefficient distribution imposes substantial welfare costs, especially in Japan, with the costs rivaling those of trade barriers. The results also imply that distribution impediments can significantly reduce imports. (JEL D58 , F13 , L81 )     

UP OR DOWN? A MALE ECONOMIST'S MANIFESTO ON THE TOILET SEAT ETIQUETTE

This paper develops an economic analysis of the toilet seat etiquette. I investigate whether there is any efficiency justification for the presumption that men should leave the toilet seat down after use. I find that the “down rule” is inefficient unless there is a large asymmetry in the inconvenience costs of shifting the position of the toilet seat across genders. I show that the “selfish” or the “status quo” rule that leaves the toilet seat in the position used dominates the down rule in a wide range of parameter spaces including the case where the inconvenience costs are the same. (JEL D7, H4)     

BERTRAND COMPETITION WITH ASYMMETRIC MARGINAL COSTS

This article tests the prediction of three discrete asymmetric duopoly price competition games in the laboratory. The games differ from each other in terms of the size of the cost asymmetry that induces a systematic variation in the difference between the firms' marginal costs. While the standard theory requires the low‐cost firm to set a price just equal to the high‐cost firm's marginal cost, which is identical across all three games, and win the entire market, intuition suggests that market price may increase with a decrease in the absolute difference between the two marginal costs. We develop a quantal response equilibrium model to test our competing conjecture. (JEL L11, L12, C91, D43)     

Non-minimization of source taxes on labor income: empirical evidence from Germany

The present paper analyzes the choice of tax classes by married couples under the German withholding tax on wage income. Making use of micro data from official tax returns for the year 1998 and conducting simulation analysis, it is shown that more than 20 percent of the observed households do not choose the tax class combination that minimizes withholding. In the second part of the paper, several explanations for this result are discussed. Among those explanations, transaction costs and Pareto-inefficient intrahousehold-decision-making are the most likely.