Who is early voting? An individual level examination

Objective. Early voting has been suggested as one method of increasing voter turnout. Allowing voters to cast their ballots during a longer time period may ameliorate some barriers to participation that exist. However, the question of whether early voting mobilizes previous nonvoting registrants or simply makes voting easier for those who would have participated anyway remains largely unanswered. Methods. We test these questions through the use of an individual level survey of voters in one Tennessee county. Using logistic regression, we consider the impact of demographic and attitudinal factors on the propensity to vote on election day or to use early voting. Results. We find marked differences between nonvoters and voters of either type, but we find few significant differences between early voters and traditional voters. We find little support for a mobilization effect and some evidence suggests that early voting merely conveniences those who would have voted anyway.     

Election Day Registration's Effect on U.S. Voter Turnout

Objective . Early voter registration deadlines make voting more difficult for many American citizens. In an attempt to facilitate voting, several U.S. states now permit registration on election day, at the height of the campaign. This article examines the turnout effects of adopting election day registration (EDR) and other smaller reductions in closing dates. Methods . Primarily using the Current Population Study (1972-1996), we estimate the turnout advantage of EDR for citizens having low, middle, and high socioeconomic status. Results . The elimination of closing dates, through EDR, is predicted to produce about a 7-percentage-point turnout boost in the average state. Those having a high school education and middle incomes are expected to see the largest turnout gains, with the less educated and poorer citizens doing almost as well. No evidence is found to link the implementation of EDR to subsequent changes in the electorate's partisan balance. Conclusions . Even the most dramatic easing of voter registration costs has a modest effect on the total number of voters and little impact on the long-standing skew toward greater representation of those having higher status in the voting electorate of the United States.     

Voting by Mail: Turnout and Institutional Reform in Oregon*

Objectives. I test the impact of Oregon's vote‐by‐mail system on voter turnout. Methods. To determine the impact, I create a cross‐sectional time‐series regression model of state turnout in presidential elections from 1980 to 2004 and mid‐term elections from 1982 to 2006. Results. I find that Oregon's turnout increases by around 10 percentage points of registered voters in both presidential and mid‐term elections due to the voting‐by‐mail reform. Conclusions. These results suggest that one of the reasons that the United States has comparatively lower turnout is due to its more onerous voting procedures.     

Rethinking electoral reform in New Zealand: the benefits of citizens' assemblies

In 2011, New Zealanders decided by referendum to retain the mixed member proportional representation voting system. This article investigates the benefits of including a deliberative, participatory process in electoral reform to encourage collective debate and an informed choice by voters. In the last decade, Canada and the Netherlands have used citizens' assemblies, a form of participatory democracy, for electoral reform. This paper argues that a similar process would have been appropriate and valuable for New Zealand. Moreover, the discussion highlights the value of citizens' assemblies for minorities who can be outvoted in a referendum. This is considered with specific reference to voters in the Māori seats who had much at stake in the electoral reform. In addition to the general benefit of citizens' assemblies for electoral reform, a New Zealand assembly would have allowed for collective deliberation that ensured the inclusion of the perspectives of voters in the Māori seats.     

The potential of iterative voting to solve the separability problem in referendum elections

In referendum elections, voters are often required to register simultaneous votes on multiple proposals. The separability problem occurs when a voter’s preferred outcome on one proposal depends on the outcomes of other proposals. This type of interdependence can lead to unsatisfactory or even paradoxical election outcomes, such as a winning outcome that is the last choice of every voter. Here we propose an iterative voting scheme that allows voters to revise their voting strategies based on the outcomes of previous iterations. Using a robust computer simulation, we investigate the potential of this approach to solve the separability problem.     

Legislating morality outside of the legislature: Direct democracy,voter participation and morality politics

Twenty-four states currently use some form of the initiative and referendum in an effort to give Americans the opportunity to make laws directly and vote on proposals given to them by their state legislatures. In one area in particular, morality policy, voters have historically used the ballot box to craft important and often controversial legislation. These have included items concerning gambling, alcohol, abortion, narcotics, obscenity and religion. This research examines two important aspects of the direct democracy issue: does the initiative and referendum increase voter participation in the states giving this option to voters and what is the impact on participation levels when morality issues are considered? For the first question a unique data set is developed to test voter turnout on ballot issues using the state as the unit of analysis. Results of this ordinary-least-squares analysis suggest direct democracy does increase voter turnout rates. In the second part of the analysis, however, several state ballots from 1972 to 2006 are analyzed suggesting that voter interest is strongest when they face morality issues. Hence, ‘legislating morality’ takes on a new meaning here since we commonly associate the phrase only with legislative institutions. As shown, over time citizens have been legislating morality directly in their own unique way. Theoretically, while advocates of direct democracy contend the process increases voter participation, it is argued here that the participation is often skewed toward certain morality issues and not toward issues as a whole. The data support this contention and raise normative questions concerning voters and their propensity to ‘legislate morality’.     

Pareto efficiency in multiple referendum

We consider situations of multiple referendum: finitely many yes-or-no issues have to be socially assessed from a set of approval ballots, where voters approve as many issues as they want. Each approval ballot is extended to a complete preorder over the set of outcomes by means of a preference extension. We characterize, under a mild richness condition, the largest domain of top-consistent and separable preference extensions for which issue-wise majority voting is Pareto efficient, i.e., always yields out a Pareto-optimal outcome. Top-consistency means that voters’ ballots are their unique most preferred outcome. It appears that the size of this domain becomes negligible relative to the size of the full domain as the number of issues increases.     

“I Pay Enough Taxes Already!” Applying Economic Voting Models to Environmental Referendums*

Objectives. Models of economic voting have rarely been applied to referendum votes. We fill this gap by testing citizens' voting behavior on environmental policy in relation to their perception of the business cycle and general orientation toward politics. Thus, the study examines the personal, institutional, and economic determinants of vote choice on 36 environmental bills from 1983 to 2004 in Switzerland. Methods. We apply a logistic hierarchical model, where individual characteristics on Level 1 are nested within contextual determinants situated on Level 2. Results. We confirm the crucial importance of the individual‐level variables education, political affinity, car ownership, and urbanity. Classifying the electorate into five groups, using open‐ended survey questions about respondents' reasons for approval or dismissal of the bills, allows for finer hypotheses testing. We show that the individuals' positive perception of their personal current economic condition has a positive effect on the likelihood of supporting the proposals. In turn, we prove the negative, constraining effect of deteriorating macroeconomic conditions on approval rates. Conclusions. By applying economic voting models to referendum analyses we advance the understanding of citizens' vote choice on environmental ballots, we show the role of context, and we propose an original typology of voters' general orientation toward politics.     

Losing to nobody? Nevada's “none of these candidates” ballot reform

Since 1975, Nevada voters have had the option of voting for “none of these candidates” in all statewide elections—a reform that one-third of the American states have since considered copying. It remains unclear, however, what effects this reform has had. By testing several arguments made by proponents and opponents of this reform, I find, first, that voters who actually choose “none of these” are motivated by a mixture of ignorance and protest; second, that most voters who choose “none” would probably have left parts of their ballot blank in the absence of the “none” option; and third, that “none” does not drain votes from third-party candidates, as some have feared.     

How Does Separability Affect The Desirability Of Referendum Election Outcomes?

Recent research has shown that in referendum elections, the presence of interdependence within voter preferences can lead to election outcomes that are undesirable and even paradoxical. However, most of the examples leading to these undesirable outcomes involve contrived voting situations that would be unlikely to occur in actual elections. In this paper, we use computer simulations to investigate the desirability of referendum election outcomes. We show that highly undesirable election outcomes occur not only in contrived examples, but also in randomly generated elections. Our data suggest that the presence of interdependent preferences significantly increases the likelihood of such undesirable outcomes, and that certain alternative voting methods, such as sequential voting and setwise aggregation, hold the potential to produce outcomes that more accurately reflect the will of the electorate.     

Why Do People Vote? A Psychological Analysis of the Causes of Voter Turnout

A great deal of scholarship has explored why some democratic citizens vote while others do not. This article reviews that literature through a lens presuming that a person's likelihood of turning out on election day is a multiplicative function of his or her ability to vote, her or her motivation to vote, and the difficulty of obtaining the needed information and carrying out the behavior of voting. We conclude that (a) turnout is made more difficult and less likely by onerous registration procedures; (b) turnout is more likely among some demographic groups because of greater motivation or ability or less difficulty; (c) the social setting in which a person lives and the psychological dispositions he or she possesses can affect turnout by shaping motivation, ability, or difficulty; (d) characteristics of a specific electoral contest can inspire or discourage turnout; and (e) canvassing and interviewing people about an election can increase turnout, but preelection polls and election-day outcome projections do not. Consequently, an individual citizen/s turnout behavior is a joint function of his or her social location, his or her psychological dispositions, the procedures involved in voting, and events that occur at the time of each election .     

Black Voters,Black Candidates,and Social Issues: Does Party Identification Matter?*

Objective. Much is known about voting behavior generally; less is known about voting behavior of African Americans in particular due in part to the overwhelming support of black voters for Democratic candidates. However, some argue that black conservatism on social issues could lead to more Republican voting. Methods. We test this question with a set of data on black voting behavior in a 2004 congressional race where two black candidates ran against each other. We thus hold race of candidate constant and look at the influence of social issues and party identification on black vote choice. Results. We find evidence to suggest that evangelicalism and support for the war in Iraq is related to being Republican, but that Democratic Party identification plays the dominant role in black voter decision making. Conclusions. Black conservatism on at least certain social issues is real and has the potential to influence vote choice, but the influence of Democratic Party allegiance is still a very powerful cue for black voters.     

The Pro‐Elderly Bias of Social Policies in Israel: A Historical‐Institutional Account

Accelerated population ageing and high voting turnout rates among elderly voters in recent decades have led many social scientists to predict increasing pro‐elderly biases in the social policies of mature welfare states. This article investigates and empirically estimates the evolving age orientation of social policies in Israel, which is a comparatively young society that has nevertheless aged significantly since independence in 1948. We present a historical and qualitative overview of the development of policy efforts towards different age groups and develop an Elderly/Non‐elderly Spending Ratio at four points in time between 1975 and 2005. We argue that in its first five decades, the Israeli welfare state uniquely combined a broadly universalistic and citizenship‐based outlook with a number of significant particularistic spending biases towards specific subgroups. But from the second half of the 1990s onwards, the pro‐elderly policy bias of the Israeli welfare state has strongly increased. These findings support Lynch's thesis for 21 OECD countries, which posits that a shift from a universal to a more occupationally based institutional model of welfare will result in a higher pro‐elderly bias of social spending.     

Strategic and Sincere Voting in a One‐Sided Election: The Canadian Federal Election of 1997*

Objective. We are interested in whether and how voters make strategic decisions in a race that is, according to the polls, expected to be very one sided. Looking specifically at the choices available to ideologically right‐of‐center voters in the 1997 Canadian federal election, we argue that strategic considerations will be filtered by voters' assessments of the competitiveness of the race both locally and nationally. Methods. We estimate logistic regression models measuring support for the two right‐of‐center Canadian political parties. Our models focus on the relationship between assessments of district‐ and national‐level party prospects on voting for the Progressive Conservative Party. Results. We find that voters who consider the race competitive emphasize district‐level data in their strategic calculations. However, those who consider the election to be all but over look more closely at national‐level concerns when deciding which right‐wing party to support. Conclusions. We conclude that earlier understandings of tactical voting should be updated to take into consideration the circumstances under which voters will use national‐level evaluations of relative party viability in casting their ballots.     

The roll-off effect in judicial retention elections

Because of the absence of powerful traditional voting cues and the unusual nature and format of uncontested judicial retention elections, a large number of voters deliberately fail to cost ballots in retention elections. Filling a void in the study of retention elections, this study empirically examines the voter roll-off in 1,864 retention elections for major trial court judges for the period 1964–1984. The mean roll-off for these elections was 36.2%. Voter roll-off was found to be positively related to district size and number of counties in a judicial district. These trial court retention elections exhibit mixed relationships for different types of elections. Although in presidential and nonpresidential elections there is clear surge and decline in voter turnout, there is no corresponding surge and decline in roll-off. However, close retention elections have less roll-off than nonclose elections.     

Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting

Under approval voting, each voter can nominate as many candidates as she wishes and the election winners are those candidates that are nominated most often. A voter is said to have voted sincerely if she prefers all those candidates she nominated to all other candidates. As there can be a set of winning candidates rather than just a single winner, a voter’s incentives to vote sincerely will depend on what assumptions we are willing to make regarding the principles by which voters extend their preferences over individual candidates to preferences over sets of candidates. We formulate two such principles, replacement and deletion, and we show that, under approval voting, a voter who accepts those two principles and who knows how the other voters will vote will never have an incentive to vote insincerely. We then discuss the consequences of this result for a number of standard principles of preference extension in view of sincere voting under approval voting.     

Sophisticated voting under the plurality procedure: A test of a new definition

The Niemi-Frank definition of sophisticated voting can now be evaluated on two grounds. First, we can compare our definition to Farquharson's. For the most part, the two definitions yield identical outcomes. Both pickCondorcet winners a very high proportion of the time and prevent the selection of Condorcet losers. The major differences are in the logic underlying the two definitions and in the rate of determinacy of outcomes. Here there is a tradeoff. The logic underlying the Farquharson model is especially persuasive, although it is our feeling that the Niemi-Frank definition comes closer to mirroring the way in which voters might actually analyze a plurality situation. In any case, the price paid by the Farquharson definition for its ironclad logic is a much higher rate of indeterminacy. In over half of the cases, the Farquharson logic fails to lead to any conclusion whatsoever. The Niemi-Frank definition yields many more determinate situations, with mostly Condorcet winners and with strategies that make good, if not completely unassailable sense. A second way of evaluating the Niemi-Frank definition is in comparison with sincere voting. A commonly-cited shortcoming of plurality voting is that often fails to choose a Condorcet winner. As we notedearlier, sophisticated plurality voting, unlike binary voting, is imperfect in this respect. Nonetheless, even taking account of the indeterminacy thatremains in the Niemi-Frank definition, sophisticated voting picked a Condorcet winner about 10 percent more frequently than did sincere voting as well as eliminating the possibility of a Condorcet loser being chosen. By this measure, the Niemi-Frank definition is not only acceptable but suggests that this form of strategic behavior actually leads tobetter outcomes. By proposing and now by testing a new definition of sophisticated voting under plurality rule, we have begun to make some headway on understanding strategic behavior and its effects in an outwardly simple yet deceptively complex voting system. We are, of course, far from finished. Most significantly, our definition applies to only three alternatives, and Farquharson's (even if one is willing to live with its high indeterminacy) becomes extraordinarily cumbersome with more than three alternatives? In any event, the results of this foray into sophisticated nonbinary voting suggests once again that strategic behavior, rather than making things worse, improves the chances that the outcome will be the one most favored by the majority criterion.     

A characterization of majority voting rules with quorums

We give a characterization of majority voting rules with quorums in the framework of May (Econometrica 20:680–684, 1952)’s seminal article. According to these voting rules, an alternative is socially chosen if and only if it obtains the relative majority of votes and the total number of voters not abstaining reaches the quorum.