The 2011 Industrial Relations Reform and Nominal Wage Adjustments in Greece

This study investigates nominal contractual base-wage adjustments in Greece associated with the 2011 industrial relations reform which re-defined the limits within which base wages could oscillate and allowed workers’ associations to negotiate for wages at the firm level. The assessment covers the period 2010–2013 and is based on information extracted from the universe of firm-level contracts signed in this period. We found that firm-level contracts increased dramatically shortly after the reform, now covering a larger pool of workers, especially in larger firms, and are associated with higher base-wage reductions in the post-reform period. At the firm level, wage reductions are higher when workers are represented by a workers’ association rather than a typical trade union. In addition, a heterogeneous effect is uncovered regarding the factors that shape base-wage adjustments (firm size, profitability, structure of bargaining body and aggregate unemployment) between new and traditional forms of workers’ representation in collective bargaining.     

LABOR CONTRACTS AND FLEXIBILITY: EVIDENCE FROM A LABOR MARKET REFORM IN SPAIN

This paper evaluates the effects of a labor market reform in Spain that removed restrictions on fixed‐term or temporary contracts. Our empirical results are based on longitudinal firm‐level data that cover observations before and after the reform. We posit and estimate a dynamic labor demand model with indefinite and fixed‐term labor contracts, and a general structure of labor adjustment costs. Experiments using the estimated model show important positive effects of the reform on total employment (i.e., a 3.5% increase) and job turnover. There is a strong substitution of permanent by temporary workers (i.e., a 10% decline in permanent employment). The effects on labor productivity and the value of firms are very small. In contrast, a counterfactual reform that halved all firing costs would produce the same employment increase as the actual reform, but much larger improvements in productivity and in the value of firms. (JEL J23, J32, J41)     

Information and communication technology adoption in micro and small firms: Can internet access improve labour productivity?

The rapid spread of information and communication technologies (ICT) may increase firms’ productivity with important consequences for job creation and for economic growth. This article contributes to this discussion by analysing the impact of internet adoption on labour productivity and the mechanisms shaping this relationship in Peruvian micro and small manufacturing firms over the period 2011–2013. The article estimates a reduced form where labour productivity is a function of internet adoption and other explanatory factors. Internet adoption is instrumented using a measure of the availability of financial opportunities for micro and small firms in Peru. Findings indicate that internet adoption: (a) increases firms’ labour productivity; (b) reallocates employment away from temporary administrative workers and non‐remunerated workers and expands employment of permanent production workers; (c) leads to the formalization of labour relationships, to the implementation of new organizational practices and to the improvement of training measures. While changes in employment and formalization of workers are linked to labour productivity gains, increases in training measures and organizational changes do not generate any additional productivity increase. Policies oriented to promote the adoption of ICT in micro and small firms can be beneficial to close the productivity gap with larger firms in Peru. Moreover, policies directed to the formalization of the workforce can provide an extra benefit, i.e. additional labour productivity gains in firms adopting the internet. Finally, policies oriented to the development of digital skills are also important to ease the re‐employment of those workers losing their jobs and the achievement of additional productivity gains that new organizational practices can provide.     

Exploitation in Contemporary Capitalism: An Empirical Analysis of the Case of Taiwan

Abstract

Using data for manufacturing firms in Taiwan, we developed a measure of exploitation and analyzed its prevalence in the labor force. Our results indicated that almost two-thirds of the firms in our sample exploit at least some of their workers. For these firms, the average profit rate is 34 percent, but three-fourths of this figure derives from the expropriated wages of their workers. Female and blue-collar workers are the largest groups that are underpaid relative to their productivity (that is, exploited). Managers, professionals, and workers with seniority are not exploited by our definition because our data showed that these groups are paid according to the market value of their productivity, at least on average. Our analysis demonstrates the feasibility of the empirical investigation of exploitation, which should be further considered in future research.     

MODELING INFORMALITY FORMALLY: HOUSEHOLDS AND FIRMS

Informality is widespread in most developing countries. In Latin America, 50% of salaried employees work informally. Three stylized facts characterize informality: (1) small firms tend to operate informally while large firms tend to operate formally; (2) unskilled workers tend to be informal while skilled ones have formal jobs; (3) ceteris paribus, secondary workers (a worker other than the household head) are less likely to operate formally than primary workers. We develop a model that accounts for all these facts. In our model, both heterogeneous firms and workers have preferences over the sector they operate and choose optimally whether to function formally or informally. There are two labor markets, one formal and the other informal, and both firms and workers act unconstrained in them. By contrast, a prominent feature of the preexisting literature is that workers' decisions play no role in determining the equilibrium of the economy. In our model, policies that reduce the supply of workers in the informal labor market at given wages will increase the level of formality in the economy. This has noteworthy implications for the design of social programs in developing countries. We also show that an increase in the participation of secondary workers would tend to raise the level of informality in the economy. (JEL J24, J33)     

On Farm and Packhouse: Employment at the Bottom of a Global Value Chain*

Abstract The fresh vegetables commodity chain linking Kenyan producers with United Kingdom (UK) consumers employs significant numbers of workers in production and processing. This chain is dominated by UK retailers that determine the production imperatives of Kenyan firms upstream in the chain and, indirectly the employment strategies they adopt. This paper explores how competitive pressures are transmitted through the supply chain, and how exporters absorb these risks by placing greater emphasis on organizational flexibility and the elasticity of labor in horticultural production. The paper argues that while the industry provides substantial employment opportunities in Kenya, the commodity chain is dependent upon the “gendered” and insecure forms of employment it creates.     

The private sector and urban housing production process in Nigeria: A study of small-scale landlords in Abuja

The private production system continues to supply the majority of housing to the population of Third World cities. In Nigeria, statistics show that the bulk of urban housing units is supplied for rent by small-scale private landlords. This paper examines the process of housing production among this category of producers using, as a case study, the peripheral settlements of Abuja, Nigeria's new capital city. A predominance of small-size sole proprietorships is established among the small-scale house building firms, mostly for reasons of maintaining operational flexibility and cost saving. It is also found that the greatest attraction of investing in rental housing by small entrepreneurs is the hedge it provides against inflation and the stability and permanence it introduces into the capital base of economic pursuits. A strong influence of traditional chiefs in land supply is revealed, together with the emergence of a commercialised land market, resulting in speculation and contributing to rising land prices. It is shown that building materials are the most problematic of the key building components to the housing production process. It is argued that small building firms would make more profit if they had access to formal sector working capital and that the practice of using casual workers in project execution has the advantage of enabling firms to survive periods of job drought, but does not encourage growth of the firms, apprenticeship training and skills development in the house construction industry. It is concluded that what is needed to enhance the operation of this category of producers is for government to accept an enabling role that will seek to minimise the financial burden and risks to which they are currently exposed.     

THE EFFECT OF SELECTIVE INS MONITORING STRATEGIES ON THE INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT CHOICE AND EARNINGS OF RECENT IMMIGRANTS

One effect of 1986's immigration reform was to make INS inspection of firms more costly relative to other industries. In response, we suggest, the INS refocused its enforcement efforts toward industries with a higher concentration of illegals per establishment, especially manufacturing. We test this hypotheses and model the effects of a selective monitoring strategy on the employment choice and wages of illegal workers. We find evidence of selective monitoring by the INS and that this policy has redistributed illegal workers from closely to weakly monitored industries. Specifically, we find a shift from the higher-paying manufacturing sector to the agricultural.     

Labour segmentation and outmigration in Japan: Evidence using firm–worker matching data

Determinants of foreigner outmigration from host countries have attracted considerable attention. However, minimal research examines the influence of firms’ working environments. Although the third largest economy, Japan's inability to attract skilled foreign labour remains a concern. This study is the first to investigate the effect of Japanese firms’ labour segmentation practices on foreign workers’ outmigration intentions. Segmentation refers to firms’ concentration on foreigner-specific skills, regarding foreign labour as complementary to local workers. This is widely practised because of immigration policy's avoidance of substituting Japanese labour or causing unemployment. The findings suggest that although foreigner-specific skills are highly valued in Japan, segmentation could significantly increase foreign workers’ outmigration intention. The lifetime employment system in Japan, job satisfaction and original migration motivations also affect outmigration. The results indicate that Japanese policies encouraging firms to employ foreign workers as complementary may harm its attractiveness to skilled foreign labour.     

PENSIONS AND WAGE PREMIA

We hypothesize that the magnitude of the pension-wage compensating differential should vary by sector, because sectoral differences in firms 'technologies result in cost differences in providing non-wage benefits'. Using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances, we find that the pension-wage compensating differential is smaller in the union sector and large firms than in small, nonunion firms. Controls for sectoral selectivity do not alter the results. Thus, workers at unionized and large firms pay a lower implicit price for their pensions either because pensions have productivity-enhancing effects, or because these firms pay workers economic rents via pensions. (JEL 532, J31, 541)     

Organizational Uncertainty and Labor Contracts in China's Economic Transition

Lifetime employment was a cornerstone of the Chinese socialist system constructed under Mao. In this system, organizations served the function of social security, and as a result, many organizations were overburdened with bloated work forces and retirees that drew from organizational coffers well into old age. Labor contracts fundamentally alter this system, as they allow firms to end the socialist institution of lifetime employment. Yet there is significant variation on the institutionalization of labor contracts in organizations. Based on a sample of 81 firms in industrial Shanghai, I show that organizations that are experiencing uncertainty in the economic transition are more likely to institutionalize labor contracts on an organizationwide basis. There are two types of organizational uncertainty in the economic transition: economic uncertainty and administrative uncertainty. In cases of economic uncertainty, firms that lost money in 1990 and firms that are burdened by large forces of retired workers are more likely to place their workers on labor contracts. In the case of administrative uncertainty, firms that are at the highest levels of the industrial hierarchy are also significantly more likely to place their workers on labor contracts. Although these upper level firms were the most protected under the command economy, they are being forced to handle the greatest among the responsibilities in the economic transition, and as a result, they experience the greatest sense of being set adrift by the state.     

BROADBAND INTERNET,FIRM PERFORMANCE,AND WORKER WELFARE: EVIDENCE AND MECHANISM

This paper examines the effect of high-speed internet on firm's productivity and worker's wage in China. We exploit a national policy reform and devise a difference-in-difference strategy to address the endogeneity. We find that high-speed internet significantly increases firm's productivity and worker's wage, and the estimate is larger for firms in industries with high skill intensity and for more educated workers. We provide suggestive evidence that the mechanism is likely from firm's increased use of skill-biased technology and the flattened management organization. (JEL O2, O3, J3)     

"BUMPING", LAYOFFS, AND WORKSHARING

This paper deals with an interesting but often-neglected labor practice prevalent in large North American firms with well-developed internal labor markets. Large North American firms typically respond to a decline in demand for their products by first reducing the number of hours worked (or worksharing). As the demand continues to fall, however, they begin to make skilled workers "bump onto" unskilled jobs, displacing unskilled workers. Skilled workers are laid off only after a considerable number have bumped. I develop an implicit contract model and explain the practice.     

DO UNIONIZED FIRMS HIRE BETTER WORKERS?

It is a strong prior among many economists that unionized firms hire better-quality workers to offset higher union wages. In fact, standard economic theory does not support this prior. The key insights introduced by this paper are that, first, unions will likely raise future wages to reflect improvements in worker quality and, second, that unionized firms, anticipating this, often do better by hiring lower-quality workers. This surprising result has empirical support.     

Employment-based health benefits: analysis of the April 1993 Current Population Survey

The April 1993 CPS differs from the March 1993 CPS in a number of respects. The April 1993 CPS supplement surveys only workers, whereas the March CPS examines the noncash benefits received by all Americans. The April CPS asks workers about health coverage in the week in which the questions were fielded, whereas the March CPS asks about coverage in the preceding year. In April 1993, there were 112.5 million civilian American workers between the ages of 18 and 64 with jobs. Eighty-two million (73 percent) of them worked for an employer that sponsored a health insurance plan, and 65 million (58 percent of all workers) participated in their employer's health plan. About one-third of workers at firms with fewer than 10 employees had employers who offer health benefits; about one-quarter of all of the workers in these firms participated in their employer's plan. Conversely, 94 percent of workers at firms with more than 1,000 employees had an employer who sponsored health benefits, and over 77 percent of these workers participated in their employer's plan. There are 16.5 million American workers whose employers sponsored health benefits but who did not participate in these benefits. Over one-half of these workers (8.5 million) chose not to be covered. Another 36 percent of these workers (5.9 million) did not participate because they were ineligible or denied coverage. Over 66 percent of the ineligible workers did not participate because they were part-time, contract, or temporary workers. Another 26 percent had not yet completed a probationary period. Among the reasons that those who chose not to participate in their employer's coverage, the vast majority (75 percent) stated they were covered by another health care plan. Twenty-nine percent stated that they chose not to purchase coverage because it was too costly or that they did not need or want the coverage. In 1993, there were 16.7 million workers with no health insurance coverage. The vast majority of these workers (95 percent) were employed by private employers. Sixty-six percent of the workers with no health insurance coverage were self-employed or worked for firms with fewer than 100 employees.     

PAYING MORE TO HIRE THE BEST? FOREIGN FIRMS,WAGES, AND WORKER MOBILITY

In the context of the debate on the labor‐market consequences of globalization, we adopt an original approach toward the identification of the wage differences between foreign and domestic firms: worker mobility. Using matched employer‐employee panel data for Portugal, we consider virtually all spells of interfirm mobility over a period of 10 yr. We find that foreign firms offer significantly more generous wage policies, although there is also a (smaller) selection effect. The results are robust to the consideration of displaced workers, wage growth differences in the new firms, and different subsets of workers. (JEL J31, J63, F23)     

MONITORING OF WORKERS AND PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION: THE ROLE OF WORKS COUNCILS

Often the consent of worker representations, such as works councils, is required before firms are allowed to install technologies that monitor workers' behavior. Absent monitoring, workers produce low output, while at the same time receiving an information rent. To gain the works council's consent to the installation of a monitoring technology, firms need to compensate workers for the lost information rent. Hence, by making it more costly to produce high output, works councils can serve firms as an instrument to commit to low output levels. This provides a rationale for why works council rights are not opposed more strongly by employers. (JEL D43, D86, J83, L13)     

A Note on Dual Internal Labor Markets and Wages of Temporary Workers: Evidence from Linked-Employer-Employee Data

I use linked employer-employee data from the German Federal Statistical Office to estimate within-firm wage differentials between temporary workers with fixed-term contracts and workers with permanent contracts in the context of dual internal labor markets. Wage-tenure profiles of permanent workers are estimated separately for each firm to obtain a proxy for the prevalence of internal labor markets. Temporary workers earn significantly lower wages in firms with steeper wage-tenure profiles. This finding is consistent with the segmentation in a primary permanent workforce with high wages and a secondary temporary workforce with low wages, if internal labor markets are more prevalent.     

Vers une représentation européenne des salariés. Les comités d’entreprise européens face aux restructurations

Nearly 900 European works councils (EWCs), transnational committees for informing and consulting workers, are now active in firms operating across borders inside Europe. How do they help establish a European industrial relations system? How have these new forms of representation been molded into a collective actor that is making itself heard at the EU level, in particular when the firms where EWCs exist are to be restructured? The intent is to see how an “additive logic”, whereby the EWC is the sum of the representatives of the firm's European workers, turns into an “integrative logic”, whereby the EWC becomes the place of a European representation of these workers. This study follows European works councils from the negotiations leading to their creation to their activities in coping with economic restructuring. It shows how they take part in the Europeanization and renewal of collective action in the social Europe under construction.     

ANTI‐POACHING AGREEMENTS IN LABOR MARKETS

We analyze competition for experienced workers among wage‐setting firms. The firms can design poaching offers with higher wages to workers who switch from rivals relative to wages paid to their own existing employees. We evaluate the profit and welfare effects of anti‐poaching agreements that eliminate poaching offers as a recruiting method. Anti‐poaching agreements increase industry profits, whereas workers are made worse off. We show that the effects of anti‐poaching agreements on total welfare are determined by the magnitude of workers' switching costs and the productivity change associated with switching employers. (JEL L41, L40, J42)