Assessing the Benefits and Costs of Homeland Security Research: A Risk-Informed Methodology with Applications for the U.S. Coast Guard

This article describes a methodology for risk-informed benefit–cost analyses of homeland security research products. The methodology is field-tested with 10 research products developed for the U.S. Coast Guard. Risk-informed benefit–cost analysis is a tool for risk management that integrates elements of risk analysis, decision analysis, and benefit–cost analysis. The cost analysis methodology includes a full-cost accounting of research projects, starting with initial fundamental research costs and extending to the costs of implementation of the research products and, where applicable, training, maintenance, and upgrade costs. The benefits analysis methodology is driven by changes in costs and risks leading to five alternative models: cost savings at the same level of security, increased security at the same cost, signal detection improvements, risk reduction by deterrence, and value of information. The U.S. Coast Guard staff selected 10 research projects to test and generalize the methodology. Examples include tools to improve the detection of explosives, reduce the costs of harbor patrols, and provide better predictions of hurricane wind speeds and floods. Benefits models and estimates varied by research project and many input parameters of the benefit estimates were highly uncertain, so risk analysis for sensitivity testing and simulation was important. Aggregating across the 10 research products, we found an overall median net present value of about $385 million, with a range from $54 million (5th percentile) to $877 million (95th percentile). Lessons learned are provided for future applications.     

How Security Agencies Control Change: Executive Power and the Quest for Autonomy in the FBI and CIA

The US Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency gain autonomy when they exercise executive power, performing tasks that are so urgent, secretive, or forceful that they cannot be anticipated by law. The FBI exhibited a clear instance of autonomy when, with a view to its long term responsibilities, it resisted remaking itself as a counterterrorism agency to the degree that politicians requested. The second case, involving the CIA, produced more mixed results. The agency appeared to exhibit autonomy by exercising its powerful security tasks, including control over information and covert operations, and by resisting a consensus for major organizational change. Nevertheless, its large number of administrative and analytical rather than executive tasks prevented the agency from developing the coherent, independent perspective necessary for a high degree of true autonomy.

A Multicompartment SIS Stochastic Model with Zonal Ventilation for the Spread of Nosocomial Infections: Detection,Outbreak Management,and Infection Control

In this work, we study the environmental and operational factors that influence airborne transmission of nosocomial infections. We link a deterministic zonal ventilation model for the airborne distribution of infectious material in a hospital ward, with a Markovian multicompartment SIS model for the infection of individuals within this ward, in order to conduct a parametric study on ventilation rates and their effect on the epidemic dynamics. Our stochastic model includes arrival and discharge of patients, as well as the detection of the outbreak by screening events or due to symptoms being shown by infective patients. For each ventilation setting, we measure the infectious potential of a nosocomial outbreak in the hospital ward by means of a summary statistic: the number of infections occurred within the hospital ward until end or declaration of the outbreak. We analytically compute the distribution of this summary statistic, and carry out local and global sensitivity analysis in order to identify the particular characteristics of each ventilation regime with the largest impact on the epidemic spread. Our results show that ward ventilation can have a significant impact on the infection spread, especially under slow detection scenarios or in overoccupied wards, and that decreasing the infection risk for the whole hospital ward might increase the risk in specific areas of the health‐care facility. Moreover, the location of the initial infective individual and the protocol in place for outbreak declaration both form an interplay with ventilation of the ward.