Recent European fertility patterns: fitting curves to 'distorted' distributions

Recent patterns of fertility in Europe show marked differences between countries. Recent United Kingdom and Irish fertility curves show 'distortions' in terms of a 'bulge' in early age fertility, distinct from the smoother curves of other European countries. These patterns may not be adequately described by mathematical functions used by previous studies to model fertility curves. A mixture model with two component distributions may be more appropriate. The suitability of the simple and mixture Hadwiger functions is examined in relation to the fertility curves of a number of European countries. While the simple Hadwiger model fits recent period age-specific fertility distributions for some countries, others which display a 'bulge' in early age fertility distributions for some countries, others which display a 'bulg' in early age fertility require a mixture Hadwiger model. Some of the parameters of the Hadwiger models appear to be related to familiar demographic indices. The simple and mixture Hadwiger models appear useful in describing and comparing fertility patterns across European countries.     

Mortality–fertility synergies during the demographic transition in the developed world

The classic theory used to explain the demographic transition assumes that mortality is the key explanatory variable influencing the decline in fertility. However, the empirical results obtained in what is known as the Princeton European Fertility Project have led many specialists to question this assumption. Using both national and provincial aggregated data for 25 countries over a long time span, the analysis reported in this paper found that mortality does indeed play a fundamental role in accounting for the main demographic changes that occurred both before and during the transitional period. Others’ research based on individual data has shown clearly that the number of surviving children was indeed an important factor for reproductive decisions. My analysis, using aggregated data, reached largely similar conclusions regarding the role of mortality in changing reproductive trends, via its impact on nuptiality and marital fertility at different stages of the demographic transition.     

Is Lowest‐Low Fertility in Europe Explained by the Postponement of Childbearing?

In 2001, more than half of Europe's population lived in countries with a total fertility rate (TFR) at or below 1.3. Use of the adjusted TFR proposed by Bongaarts and Feeney, which takes into account the effects of the ongoing fertility postponement, changes the European fertility map considerably. All 27 countries analyzed had adjusted TFRs in 1995–2000 above 1.4. Thus, the “lowest‐low” fertility in Europe may be interpreted as a temporary consequence of the increasing age at motherhood. However, substantial regional differences in fertility level across Europe persist even when the differential pace of fertility postponement is taken into account. The estimated adjusted TFRs in Europe (1.63) and in the 25‐member European Union (1.71) contrast with the TFR levels of 1.40 and 1.46, respectively. These seemingly small differences have vastly different implications in terms of the potential long‐term pace of population decline.     

Recent European fertility patterns: Fitting curves to ‘distorted’ distributions

Recent patterns of fertility in Europe show marked differences between countries. Recent United Kingdom and Irish fertility curves show ‘distortions’ in terms of a ‘bulge’ in early age fertility, distinct from the smoother curves of other European countries. These patterns may not be adequately described by mathematical functions used by previous studies to model fertility curves. A mixture model with two component distributions may be more appropriate. The suitability of the simple and mixture Hadwiger functions is examined in relation to the fertility curves of a number of European countries. While the simple Hadwiger model fits recent period age-specific fertility distributions for some countries, others which display a ‘bulge’ in early age fertility require a mixture Hadwiger model. Some of the parameters of the Hadwiger models appear to be related to familiar demographic indices. The simple and mixture Hadwiger models appear useful in describing and comparing fertility patterns across European countries.     

Nuptiality and population growth

Abstract In the European historical experience, nuptiality patterns played a very significant role in the development of low fertility. Late marriage and widespread celibacy provided one of the mechanisms by which age-specific fertility rates were brought to low levels in the populations of Western Europe. In Eastern and Central Europe on the other hand, where marriage customarily occurred earlier and was more nearly universal, a somewhat slower fertility transition was achieved through a reduction in marital fertility - without any drastic accompanying nuptiality change. Populations of developing countries, however, commonly exhibit nuptiality patterns characterized by a still higher incidence and a considerably younger age-pattern of marriage than even the earliest observed schedule from Eastern Europe. With few exceptions, little work has been done to date to examine the implications of these very early and universal marriage schedules for fertility in general and for the growth of these populations in particular.(1) We have therefore tried to analyse the impact of nuptiality on the fertility and growth of a series of populations from developing nations where extra-marital fertility is negligible. Populations in which the prevalence of cohabitation by age is not well documented by existing marital-status data (mainly those in Latin America and tropical Africa) are excluded from this analysis; an attempt will be made in later work, however, to extend the analysis to these populations.     

Nuptiality and population growth

In the European historical experience, nuptiality patterns played a very significant role in the development of low fertility. Late marriage and widespread celibacy provided one of the mechanisms by which age-specific fertility rates were brought to low levels in the populations of Western Europe. In Eastern and Central Europe on the other hand, where marriage customarily occurred earlier and was more nearly universal, a somewhat slower fertility transition was achieved through a reduction in marital fertility — without any drastic accompanying nuptiality change. Populations of developing countries, however, commonly exhibit nuptiality patterns characterized by a still higher incidence and a considerably younger age-pattern of marriage than even the earliest observed schedule from Eastern Europe. With few exceptions, little work has been done to date to examine the implications of these very early and universal marriage schedules for fertility in general and for the growth of these populations in particular.¹ We have therefore tried to analyse the impact of nuptiality on the fertility and growth of a series of populations from developing nations where extra-marital fertility is negligible. Populations in which the prevalence of cohabitation by age is not well documented by existing marital-status data (mainly those in Latin America and tropical Africa) are excluded from this analysis; an attempt will be made in later work, however, to extend the analysis to these populations.     

Population policies in socialist countries of Europe

Abstract The emergence, in the mid-sixties, of policies aimed at counteracting rapid fertility decline in some socialist countries of Europe is discussed in the paper. Following a summary of recent population trends and policies in nine European socialist countries, and brief comments on ideological and theoretical considerations, factors relevant to policy decision are discussed. Population policies aiming at encouraging fertility exist in five countries, viz. German Demographic Republic, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Recent developments appear to include attempts to stimulate third births with measures aiming to improve economic conditions of large families, the status of women, education and restriction of induced abortion.     

Delayed Marriage and Very Low Fertility in Pacific Asia

The general decline in fertility levels in Pacific Asia has in its vanguard countries where fertility rates are among the lowest in the world. A related trend is toward delayed marriage and nonmarriage. When prevalence of cohabitation in European countries is allowed for, levels of “effective singlehood” in many countries of Pacific Asia have run ahead of those in northern and western Europe. This raises questions about the extent to which delayed marriage has been implicated in fertility declines, and whether the same factors are leading both to delayed marriage and to lowered fertility within marriage. The article argues that involuntary nonmarriage is likely to be more common in Pacific Asia than in Western countries, and that resultant involuntary childlessness plays a substantial role in the low fertility rates currently observed.     

When the grass is greener: Fertility decisions in a cross-national context

In research and policy discourse, conceptualizations of fertility decision-making often assume that people only consider circumstances within national borders. In an integrated Europe, citizens may know about and compare conditions across countries. Such comparisons may influence the way people think about and respond to childrearing costs. To explore this possibility and its implications, we present evidence from 44 in-depth interviews with Polish parents in the United Kingdom and Poland. Explanations of childbearing decisions involved comparisons of policy packages and living standards across countries. Individuals in Poland used richer European countries as an important reference point, rather than recent conditions in Poland. In contrast, migrants often positively assessed their relatively disadvantaged circumstances by using the Polish setting as a reference. The findings could help explain why, despite substantial policy efforts, fertility has remained at very low levels in poorer European countries, while migrants from those countries often have higher fertility abroad.     

The objectives of government policies on fertility control in Eastern Europe

Although demographers from the communist countries continue to maintain that overpopulation in the Malthusian sense Is possible only under capitalism, some East European demographers now concede that a form of overpopulation may, at times and under certain conditions, exist In a communist society. In this connection the ideological framework for an optimum population policy under communism has been developed, and demographers have been given the task of determining what the optimum population is and how it is to be attained. There has been considerable ferment on the Issue of fertility control in both the literature and action programmes of Poland, Chechoslovakia, and Hungary. The latter two countries have conducted surveys on family planning, including the use and effectiveness of contraceptives, and have established demographic journals.

All the communist countries of Eastern Europe except Albania and East Germany have relaxed laws restricting abortions and conducted campaigns for the spread of contraceptives. At the same time family allowances have been continued. These paradoxically divergent policies can be rationalized as attempts to sustain existing families while providing the basis for regulating future fertility to achieve an optimum population in relation to the resources of the respective countries.     

Variations in Kinship Networks Across Geographic and Social Space

This article analyzes variations in interaction with non‐coresident adult kin based on comparable cross‐national surveys conducted in 2001 in 27 countries. The two main dimensions of kin contact are considered: (1) overall levels and (2) the relative emphasis given to contacts with primary kin (parents, adult children, siblings) and secondary kin (aunts, cousins, in‐laws). Age‐adjusted variations in kin contact between countries are much greater than those within countries. These results do not confirm the commonly hypothesized existence of well‐defined family system boundaries in Europe arising from historical factors. The similarity of patterns of countries outside Europe with European countries with which they have historical ties suggests cultural factors are important in explaining interaction with kin, whereas welfare regimes appear to have little explanatory value. Within Europe, kin contact levels are more strongly related to a north/south divide than to indicators of economic development or religiosity. The findings suggest that neither of the extreme assumptions—homogenizing pressures toward a nuclear family model or persistent well‐defined groupings arising from historical contexts—can be substantiated. Rather, there is a continuum in family behaviors over a substantial range, related to a number of explanatory factors.     

What is Happening with Quality of Life Among the Oldest People in Southern European Countries? An Empirical Approach Based on the SHARE Data

Population aging in developed countries has created new challenges to improve the well-being of individuals at different age cohorts. This issue is especially significant for Southern European countries, were aging societies have worse health and less socio-economic resources. The aim of this study is to contribute to this body of literature and to estimate the effect of aging on quality of life of oldest people. This paper uses the latest available data (6th wave) from the Survey on Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). Specifically, robust ordinary least squares and multilevel regressions are employed to analyse the effects of socioeconomic, health, and community factors on quality of life among the oldest population for Southern European countries. Our findings confirm the significance of several factors on life satisfaction among the oldest population in this group of countries. Moreover, we show that the determinants which are correlated with quality of life include predisposing, health, geographic area and social isolation factors.     

Economic fortunes, ethnic divides, and marriage and fertility in Central Asia: Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan compared

Declining marriage and fertility rates following the collapse of state socialism have been the subject of numerous studies in Central and Eastern Europe. More recent literature has focused on marriage and fertility dynamics in the period of post-crisis political stabilization and economic growth. However, relatively little research on marriage and fertility has dealt with the Central Asian part of the post-socialist world. We use survey and published data from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, two multiethnic countries with differing paths of post-crisis recovery, to examine overall and ethnic-specific trends in entry into marriage and fertility. We find that in both countries rates of entry into marriage continued to decline throughout post-crisis years. By contrast, fertility rose, and this rise was greater in the more prosperous Kazakhstan. However, we also detect considerable ethnic variations in fertility trends which we situate within the ethnopolitical and ethnodemographic contexts of both countries.     

The emergence of Sub-Replacement Family Size Ideals in Europe

Period fertility started to drop significantly below replacement in most Western European countries during the 1970s and 1980s, while most fertility surveys, value studies and opinion polls have found that the number of children considered ideal for society or for one's own family has remained above two children per woman. These surveys have led to the expectation that, sooner or later, period fertility would recover in Europe. The most recent data from the Eurobarometer 2001 survey, however, suggest that in the German-speaking parts of Europe the average ideal family sizes given by younger men and women have fallen as low as 1.7 children. This paper examines the consistency and the credibility of these new findings, which – if they are indeed indications of a new trend – may alter the current discussion about future fertility trends in Europe.     

Three Fertility Compromises and Two Transitions

Demographers and those concerned with population policy are increasingly focusing on the steep fertility declines that occurred in developed countries from the 1960s and the consequent widespread below-replacement fertility levels. The decline has been termed the Second Demographic Transition. This paper argues that the recent demographic change can best be understood and analyzed if we broaden the concept to include the first demographic transition, and the three demographically more settled periods preceding, separating, and following the two fertility transitions. These more settled periods or “compromises” are examined to ascertain their nature and so to help predict the likely developments in the present or third compromise. It is argued that the third compromise has now extended for 20 years with little movement in fertility rates or other socioeconomic behavior which has been said to be associated with the second transition, and that this provides sufficient evidence for analysis. The approach has two key aspects. First, it is confined in Europe to countries that distinctly experienced the full five demographic periods, namely northwestern and central Europe. Second, the analysis gains strength by including non-European countries that progressed through all five stages, namely the English-speaking countries of overseas European settlement: USA, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand.     

Gender Equity,Religion, and Fertility in Europe and North America

Religion has historically been a pronatalist force, but because it fosters traditional gender role attitudes, its importance for fertility may wane where gender equity is thought to be emerging as the new natalism. In this study, I used World Values Survey and European Values Survey data from 1989 to 2018 to determine whether more religious Northern countries are slower to develop the widespread egalitarian gender role attitudes associated with fertility recovery. I concluded that the “old natalism” and the “new natalism” do not compete with each other as much as their negative association implies that they might. By tracing the evolution of country‐level gender equity in more‐ and less religious countries of Europe and North America, I showed how country‐level religiosity does not dampen the potential for a gender equity‐stimulated fertility recovery. This paper also contributes by showing that the curvilinear relationship between gender equity and fertility has continued into more recent time periods than covered by previous work.     

Marriage patterns and fertility of the world population]

Marriage patterns of the world population may be divided into two major categories; i.e., the traditional marriage pattern, and the European marriage pattern. Characteristics of the traditional marriage pattern are: early marriage, a high percentage of married people, and a low percentage of people who remain single during their lifetime. Characteristics of the European marriage pattern include: late marriage and a higher percentage of females who do not marry in their lifetime. In most parts of Asia and Africa and some Latin American countries, the traditional marriage pattern is dominant, and the birth rate in these countries has remained very high. Most countries in Europe show the characteristics of the European marriage pattern, and the fertility rate in these countries is comparatively low. Some other countries, such as Sri Lanka, are in a process of transformation in their marriage pattern, and their fertility level also shows a transition from a high fertility rate to a lower fertility rate. There is a close relationship between marriage patterns and the level of fertility.     

Declining fertility and policy intervention in Europe: Some lessons for Australia?

The contemporary fertility situation in Europe is outlined with emphasis on trends in the late 1990s. It is shown that while most European countries have lower fertility levels than Australia there is wide variation between countries with respect to both their levels of fertility and their rate of fertility decline. While almost all countries are experiencing fertility decline the rate of decline is higher and the fertility is lower in countries where the male-breadwinner model is strongest. Attempts to influence fertility in European nations are discussed, particularly those involving the introduction of family-friendly policies. It is clear that despite popular beliefs to the contrary, societies where male-breadwinner models influence policy most are those with lowest fertility. The lesson for Australia is that family-friendly policies not only are desirable from the perspective of moving toward gender equality but are likely to stabilize or perhaps even marginally increase fertility.