Measuring inequality of opportunity with imperfect data: the case of Turkey

The measurement of inequality of opportunity has hitherto not been attempted in a number of countries because of data limitations. This paper proposes two alternative approaches to circumventing the missing data problems in countries where a demographic and health survey (DHS) and an ancillary household expenditure survey are available. One method relies only on the DHS, and constructs a wealth index as a measure of economic advantage. The alternative method imputes consumption from the ancillary survey into the DHS. In both cases, we compute a lower bound estimator of the share of (ex-ante) inequality of opportunity in total inequality. Parametric and non-parametric estimates are calculated for each method, and the parametric approach is shown to yield preferable lower-bound measures. In an application to the sample of ever-married women aged 30–49 in Turkey, inequality of opportunity accounts for at least 26% (31%) of overall inequality in imputed consumption (the wealth index).     

Social capital and the reproduction of economic inequality in polarized societies

This paper explores the idea that the distribution of wealth across social groups fundamentally affects the evolution of economic inequality. By providing microfoundations suitable for this exploration, this paper hopes to enhance our understanding of when social forces contribute to the reproduction of economic inequality. In tackling this issue, this paper offers contributions in two domains. First, it models social capital as a real capital asset with direct use and collateral values. Second, it extends the concepts of identity, alienation and polarization originally advanced by Esteban and Ray (Esteban, J.M. and Ray, D.: On the measurement of polarization, Econometrica 62(4) (1994), 819–851). This generalization permits us to consider the multiple characteristics that shape social identity, inclusion and exclusion. It also underwrites a higher-order measure of socio-economic polarization that permits us to explore the hypothesis that economic inequality is most pernicious and persistent when it is socially embedded. Holding constant the initial levels of economic polarization and wealth inequality, we show that higher socio-economic polarization increases subsequent income and wealth inequality. Far from being a distributionally neutral panacea for missing markets, social capital in this model may itself generate exclusion and deepen existing economic cleavages.     

Rurality and Income Inequality in the United States, 1975–2015

Recent events have focused attention on the perceived widening of the economic divide between urban and rural areas, and on the continued rise of national income inequality. We demonstrate that, in fact, the average income gap between urban (metropolitan) and rural (nonmetropolitan) households has not risen over the past 40 years, and makes virtually no contribution to national income inequality. Rising national inequality is driven by rising inequality within both urban and rural America, not by an urban/rural divergence. As is well known, the growing dispersion of household money income is partly driven by rising wage inequality, particularly in urban areas. Less well recognized is the role played by other income sources. We show that a decline in the progressivity of the distribution of social security payments and cash transfers, and an increase in the regressivity of the distribution of retirement incomes, have jointly made a comparably large contribution to rising income inequality. At the same time, the share of income from self-employment has declined, particularly in rural America, and because self-employment income is very unequally distributed, its diminution has retarded the growth of rural inequality. In 2014–15, however, rural inequality increased, cutting the urban/rural inequality gap in half.     

Who Gets What? Gender Differences in “Spendable” Income

SUMMARY

Feminist policy makers need accurate measures of inequality in the economic well-being of men and women. In this paper, we explain why the wage gap by gender gives a misleading measure of women's relative economic well-being in the United States, emphasizing the effects of income pooling within households. We construct a household-level index of women's “spendable” income relative to men's that builds on Randy Albelda's (1988) “PAR index.” We improve on the PAR index in three ways. First, we account for economies of scale associated with additional household members. Second, we utilize the Current Population Survey to capture the impact of government taxes and transfers, providing an indicator of “spendable,” rather than “money,” income. Finally, as a step toward redefining the concept of “spendable” income, we deduct a lower-bound estimate of child care costs.     

Performance pay,the marriage market and rising income inequality in Taiwan

Taiwan expanded its college access significantly over the past two decades by converting 2-year junior colleges to 4-year colleges and relaxing entrance standards. The share of college graduates in the 22–24 years old population rose from 12 to 71% between 1990 and 2014. This should have suppressed returns to schooling and lowered household income inequality. Instead, Taiwan’s Gini coefficient rose. We show that rising use of performance pay and positive assortative mating in the marriage market jointly increase the household income inequality by 46.5% between 1980 and 2014. Our results suggest that uneven quality of the most recent cohorts of college graduates led to two sources of rising household income inequality: the increased use of bonus pay which increases residual inequality among college graduates; and matching on unobserved skills in the marriage market which increases inequality among married couples.

     

The concept and measurement of asset poverty: Levels, trends and composition for the U.S., 1983–2001

American prosperity in the second half of the 1980s together with the booming economy of the 1990s created the impression that American households have done well, particularly in terms of wealth acquisition. In this paper, we develop the concept of “asset poverty” as a measure of economic hardship, distinct from and complementary to the more commonly used concept of “income poverty.” We define a household with insufficient assets to enable it to meet basic needs (as measured by the income poverty line) for a period of three months to be asset poor. The results reveal that in the face of the large growth in overall assets in the U.S. and a fall in standard income poverty over the period from 1983 to 2001, the level of asset poverty increased from 22.4 to 24.5 percent. We also find that asset poverty rates for blacks and Hispanics are over twice those for whites; that asset poverty rates fall monotonically with both age and education; that they are much higher for renters than homeowners; and that by family type they range from a low of 5 percent for elderly couples to 71 percent for female single parents.     

The sensitivity of income polarization

This study looks at polarization and its components’ sensitivity to assumptions about equivalence scales, income definition, ethical income distribution parameters, and the income accounting period. A representative sample of Danish individual incomes from 1984 to 2002 is utilised. Results show that polarization has increased over time, regardless of the applied measure, when the last part of the period is compared to the first part of the period; primary causes being increased inequality (alienation) and faster income growth among high incomes relative to those in the middle of the distribution. Increasing the accounting period confirms the reduction in inequality found for shorter periods, but polarization is virtually unchanged, because income group identification increases. Applying different equivalence scales does not change polarization ranking for different years, but identification ranks are affected. The welfare state considerably reduces income polarization and inequality, but at the expense of some more identification.      

From Soviets to oligarchs: inequality and property in Russia 1905-2016

This paper combines national accounts, survey, wealth and fiscal data (including recently released tax data on high-income taxpayers) in order to provide consistent series on the accumulation and distribution of income and wealth in Russia from the Soviet period until the present day. We find that official survey-based measures vastly under-estimate the rise of inequality since 1990. According to our benchmark estimates, top income shares are now similar to (or higher than) the levels observed in the United States. We also find that inequality has increased substantially more in Russia than in China and other ex-communist countries in Eastern Europe. We relate this finding to the specific transition strategy followed in Russia. According to our benchmark estimates, the wealth held offshore by rich Russians is about three times larger than official net foreign reserves, and is comparable in magnitude to total household financial assets held in Russia.     

Changing Income Inequality in Nonmetropolitan Counties, 1980 to 1990*

Abstract Income inequality has been increasing across the United States, but little is known about changing income inequality in nonmetropolitan counties. Data from the 1980 and 1990 Summary Tape Files of the U.S. Census of Population and Housing are used to estimate ordinary least squares models of change in income inequality. Household income inequality increased in a smaller share of nonmetro than metro counties from 1980 to 1990, and increases in income inequality were influenced more strongly by economic restructuring in nonmetro than in metro counties. Other factors, such as change in household structure, demographic composition, and labor supply and job quality, were generally similar in affecting income inequality in nonmetro and metro counties. The greater importance of economic restructuring in nonmetro counties indicates the lesser diversity and smaller size of local economies, and their greater vulnerability to forces of economic restructuring.     

How to measure and proxy permanent income: evidence from Germany and the U.S.

Permanent income (PI) is an enduring concept in the social sciences and is highly relevant to the study of inequality. Nevertheless, there has been insufficient progress in measuring PI. We calculate a novel measure of PI with the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) and U.S. Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Advancing beyond prior approaches, we define PI as the logged average of 20+ years of post-tax and post-transfer (“post-fisc”) real equivalized household income. We then assess how well various household- and individual-based measures of economic resources proxy PI. In both datasets, post-fisc household income is the best proxy. One random year of post-fisc household income explains about half of the variation in PI, and 2–5 years explain the vast majority of the variation. One year of post-fisc HH income even predicts PI better than 20+ years of individual labor market earnings or long-term net worth. By contrast, earnings, wealth, occupation, and class are weaker and less cross-nationally reliable proxies for PI. We also present strategies for proxying PI when HH post-fisc income data are unavailable, and show how post-fisc HH income proxies PI over the life cycle. In sum, we develop a novel approach to PI, systematically assess proxies for PI, and inform the measurement of economic resources more generally.     

Long-run trends in top income shares: The role of income and population growth

This paper studies the sensitivity of long-run trends in top income shares to differences in top-share measures. While the standard measure fixes a share of the population, we define alternatives that allow variation in both incomes and size of the top group based on defining absolute income thresholds. In an application to United States data, we find that top income share trends over the past century vary somewhat depending on the measure used. Allowing top groups to increase in size after 1980 along with overall economic growth results in a larger increase of top income shares. The historical drops before WWII are sensitive to the choice of income deflator: using GDP inflates interwar top income shares but using CPI deflates them. Altogether, these results recommend using complementary approaches to defining top income groups when measuring long-term top income share trends.

     

Improvements in children’s health: Does inequality matter?

The literature on the contributions to poverty reduction of average improvements in living standards vs. distributional changes uses only one measure of well-being – income or expenditure. Given that poverty is defined by deprivation over different dimensions, we explore the role of average improvements and distributional changes in children’s health and nutrition using the height of young children as our measure of well-being. Similar to the income literature, we find that shifts in the mean level of heights, not changes in distribution, account for most improvements in heights. Unlike the literature on income inequality, however, there is a positive association between improvements in average heights and reduced dispersion of those heights.     

Money, power and inequality within marriage

The growing body of research on the intra-household economy suggests that in couple households there are significant associations between control over household finances and more general power within the household. However, most earlier research has been based on relatively small samples. Here a major new British data set, produced by the Social Change and Economic Life Initiative, is used to examine the relations between money, power and inequality within marriage. Six different systems of financial allocation are identified. The results suggest that even when couples nominally pool their money, in practice either husband or wife is likely to control the pool. In only one fifth of couples was the pool jointly controlled, but these households were characterised by the highest levels of equality between husband and wife in terms of decision making, experience of deprivation and access to personal spending money. Findings from the study indicate a complex pattern of relationships between household income level, household allocative system and gender. Female control of finances, though it was associated with greater decision-making power for women, did not protect them against financial deprivation; however, male control of finances, especially when it took the form of the housekeeping allowance, did serve to protect the financial interests of men in comparison with women. Gender inequality was least in households with joint control of pooled money and greatest either in low income households or in higher income households with male control of finances.     

Verteilungseffekte von Finanzialisierung

Financialisation is often associated with rising income inequality. The article describes the major aspects of financialisation in the foreign, financial, business and household sector, and identifies several hypotheses how financialisation affects functional income distribution. We discuss enhanced exit options of firms, rising financial overhead costs for businesses, increased competition in capital markets, and weakened bargaining power of workers due to indebtedness. The different hypotheses are operationalised through empirical measures and their effect on the wage share is tested econometrically by means of a panel data set of 14 OECD countries over the period 1992–2014. We find statistically significant negative effects of financial payments of firms and financial openness on the wage share.     

Changes in financial status influencing level of satisfaction in households

This study explores the impact of changes in family financial status over a four year period on level of satisfaction with various aspects of household finances. Data were collected through personal interviews with 123 families in 1982 and 1986. Information was obtained on household income, assets, liabilities, and on the satisfaction of the money managers with seven aspects of household finances. Two-tail pairedt-tests were used to compare differences in financial and satisfaction variables between the two time periods. Regression analyses were applied to ascertain factors affecting the satisfaction of the money managers. The financial status of households improved during the 4 year period as reflected by net worth. The mean net worth, with and without real estate, increased significantly during this time period. In spite of this improvement, money managers are less satisfied with various aspects of their household finances.This research was supported by the Iowa Agriculture and Home Economics Experiment Station Project No. 2773 (Journal Paper No. J-13098).Tahira K. Hira is a Professor and Alyce M. Fanslow is a Distinguished Professor in the College of Family and Consumer Sciences; Patricia Titus is an Instructor in the College of Education; all are at Iowa State University, Ames, IA 50011-1120. Dr. Hira's research interests include consumer bankruptcies and various aspects of household economic well-being Dr. Fanslow's and Dr. Titus' research interests include competencies of household money managers.     

Baby booming inequality? Demographic change and earnings inequality in Norway, 1967�C2000

In this paper, we demonstrate how age-adjusted inequality measures can be used to evaluate whether changes in inequality over time are due to changes in the age-structure. To this end, we use administrative data on earnings for every male Norwegian over the period 1967–2000. We find that the substantial rise in earnings inequality over the 1980s and into the early 1990s, is to some extent driven by the fact that the large baby boom cohorts are approaching the peak of the age–earnings profile. We further demonstrate that the impact of age-adjustments on the trend in inequality during the period 1993–2000 is highly sensitive to the method used: While the most widely used age-adjusted inequality measure indicates little change in inequality over this period, a new and improved age-adjusted measure suggests a decline in inequality.     

Inequality measurement and the time structure of household income in Israel

The aim of this paper is to empirically evaluate the effect of the length of the accounting period on indices of inequality of household income in Israel. There are three main findings: (1) The analysis of the impact of the accounting period on the Gini index of inequality can be done in a way which is identical to analyzing the effect of the accounting period on the coefficient of variation; (2) changing the accounting period from one to three months decreases, on average, the Gini index of inequality by about 1.7%. Furthermore, the Gini index calculated from a three-month accounting period was 3.9%–4.1% higher than the index based on a 12-month period. The change in the accounting period from 12 months to three months accounts for 27% to 37% of the increase in inequality in the last two decades, depending on the type of income considered. (3) The above relationship is stable over the years but is sensitive to the definition of income.     

Top incomes and human well-being: Evidence from the Gallup World Poll

The share of income held by the top 1 percent in many countries around the world has been rising persistently over the last 30 years. But we continue to know little about the relationship between the rising top income shares and human wellbeing. Using data from 24 countries and years ranging from 2005 to 2013 in the Gallup World Poll and the World Income Database, this study examines the relationship between top income share and different dimensions of subjective wellbeing. The results are mixed, with the negative relationship between top income shares and average life ladder being driven largely by the European sub-sample. For the European countries, we also document evidence that top income is statistically significantly associated with lower average enjoyment and being well-rested yesterday, and higher average stress and sadness yesterday. Overall, our findings suggest that, at least for individuals in Europe, an economic policy that increases national incomes may have significant crowding-out effect on aggregate evaluative wellbeing if it only increases the share of income at the very top of income distribution. More generally, our results highlight the complex relationships between income inequality and subjective wellbeing across different countries.     

ACCOUNTING FOR URBAN CHINA'S RISING INCOME INEQUALITY: THE ROLES OF LABOR MARKET,HUMAN CAPITAL,AND MARRIAGE MARKET FACTORS

This paper analyzes China's rising family income inequality since the early 1990s when the urban labor market started its transformation from a centrally controlled to a market‐driven one. We document the trends in income inequality over the period of 1992–2009 using the Urban Household Survey data, and adopt the approach recently proposed by Eika et al. (2014) to decompose changes in income inequality. We find that labor market factors accounted for about three‐quarters of the overall increases in income inequality while falling marriage rate contributed the other quarter. Changes in human capital levels and marital assortativeness have not contributed to the rising inequality. (JEL D31, I26, J12)