Recent trends in public support for unions in Canada

This paper investigates trends in public support for unionism during the 1980s. Comparing data from two western Canadian cities in 1981 and 1987, we examine the impact of the recession of the early 1980s on public perceptions of the role of unions, whether the differences between cities documented during 1981 had increased or decreased by 1987, and if “hard times” had resulted in more nonunion employees expressing a willingness to join a union. There is little evidence of growing support for negative “big labor” opinions about unions in the two cities. Despite a well-publicized labor dispute involving the use of strikebreakers in one city, there was no increase in support for legislation restricting the practice. Residents in the same city, however, were significantly more likely to agree with “business unionism” sentiments, an opinion trend accompanied by a growing willingness to join a union. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meetings of the Western Association of Sociology & Anthropology, February 1988, Edmonton. We thank the Population Research Laboratory at the University of Alberta and Dr. Raymond Currie, Department of Sociology, University of Manitoba, for making available results of the 1981 and 1987 Edmonton and Winnipeg Area Studies. We also acknowledge the research assistance provided by Alan Law and Mary Thompson, and the word processing done by Linda Abbott.     

Codetermination: Union style

Many European countries have instigated a form of “industrial democracy” by legislating codetermination schemes. However, codetermination may also be accomplished without legislation. We show that unionizing an industry’s labor supply will also achieve much the same results as mandatory codetermination as long as unions are exempt from antitrust legislation. The value of “union codetermination” will yield returns beyond what economists have previously predicted.     

Public sector union democracy: A comparative analysis

A congressional subcommittee held “union democracy” hearings in 1998 and 1999 to debate the impact and effectiveness of the union-democracy protections provided by the Land rum-Griffin Act which provides union members in the private sector and U.S. Postal Service certain democratic rights and protections. What was not resolved at that hearing was whether state sector or public employee union members should also enjoy the same democracy protections. We survey the existing 28 state sector collective bargaining laws and find that the majority of state legislation falls considerably short of the protections provided by the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. Moreover the consequences of limited state-enacted union-democracy protections are discussed and assessed to determine whether LMRDA jurisdiction should also cover public sector union members.     

The future of public sector collective bargaining in Canada

Conclusion Looking to the future of Canadian public sector labor relations, the glass is half full. Despite regular intervals when government fiscal and economic policy “trump” public sector bargaining rights through legislation, public sector unions and collective bargaining will survive. Public sector compensation and job security will likely continue to be at least comparable to the unionized private sector, and public sector union density should remain stable, at or near its currently high levels.     

The Ross-Dunlop debate revisited

An alternative interpretation of the Ross-Dunlop debate of the 1940s is provided, which reveals little difference in the opinions of these two theorists on the role of optimizing behavior and of economic factors in explaining trade union behavior. Importantly, both saw theories of union activity based on simple economic maximands as unable to incorporate some “political” features of those unions. The recent wave of economic analyses of trade unions however seems to have answered such criticism to a large extent. A survey of this work is provided to show how many of Ross’s “unanswered questions” can be explained by models where rational trade unions maximize relatively straightforward objective functions. This work is based on chapter 1 of the author’s M.A. thesis at the University of Melbourne. Many thanks are due to Ian McDonald for his generous help, and to Greg Whitwell for his comments on an earlier draft of this paper. The author is presently a graduate student at Yale University.     

The “Helper” controversy in the construction industry

Helpers, whose role is to assist craftsmen, have been a subject of controversy in the construction industry for nearly a century. The AFL-CIO construction unions have attempted in various ways to control the work of helpers so that helpers cannot “pick up” the trade and then compete with craftsmen for jobs. With the help of the U.S. Department of Labor’s administration of the Davis-Bacon Act, these unions succeeded in almost eliminating the use of helpers on government-financed construction and most union jobs. This has meant that much unskilled and semiskilled work has been done by journeymen at skilled labor wages. The result has hurt union members and unionized contractors by aiding open-shop contractors, who use helpers extensively, to underbid their competitors and win increasing market share. This article examines the ramifications of the helper issue and related training problems from the turn of the century to the present, discusses various union policies, court decisions, and legislation affecting the issues, and concludes that the economies of utilizing helpers are sufficient to cast doubt on the efficacy or future success of current union attempts to limit narrowly the training and use of helpers. Professor Emeritus of Management; formerly, Director, Industrial Research Unit, and Chairman, Labor Relations Counsel.     

Exclusive representation in public employment: A public choice perspective

Public sector unionization has grown rapidly in recent years, and research has suggested that among the reasons for such growth is legislation granting special privileges to public employee unions. This paper examines one form of legislative privilege, exclusive representation, from a public choice perspective. It is shown that exclusivity reduces employees’ freedom of choice, increases the welfare of union leaders at the expense of union members, limits employment opportunities to “outsiders,” entrenches the monopoly provision of public services, and generates conflict and instability in labor relations.     

Outsourcing and union power

The outsourcing of union work and jobs either diffuses or diminishes union membership, depending on perspective and situation. The correlation of trends in union membership to trends in union power, while less than perfect, has until recently been relatively strong over the past sixteen years. The fact that as diverse a sample of unions as AFSCME, SEIU, and UAW have chosen to make outsourcing a prominent labor/public relations issue suggests that the correlation continues to be perceived by the union movement to be significant, notwithstanding the efforts of the “new” leadership of the AFL-CIO to break that link with respect to union political power by “taxing” member unions and their members to contribute both money and militancy to the 1996 election cycle. Although outsourcing may lead only to the diffusion of union membership either within or between unions, as opposed to the diminution of union membership, this fact has not received a great deal of attention. The net effect on total union membership of outsourcing from one union employer to another union employer is unclear, although the effect on the membership of the union at the outsourcing employer is not. The redistribution of membership within a union as a result of outsourcing is likely to have little immediate impact on union power. However, as even the best case scenario presented above suggests, it may have significant long-run deleterious effects on union bargaining power by taking labor out of a sheltered market and putting it into potentially competitive market. This is particularly likely to be the case when outsourcing (1) places the outsourced work into a different industry or wage contour and (2) creates the possibility of moving from sole-source to multiplesource supplier arrangements. The redistribution of membership between unions as a result of outsourcing is unlikely to have a major impact on union power broadly defined. It can have, however, serious deleterious effects in terms of the power of an individual union, as suggested in my “competitive case” scenario. The fact that one union’s losses due to outsourcing may be another union’s gain is of little consolation to the losing union. That act, in and of itself, may make the threat of outsourcing a potential union “Achilles heel” at the bargaining table by placing it into competition with some other, perhaps unknown, union as well as possibly nonunion competition. The most obvious threat to union power comes from outsourcing that diminishes union membership overall by transferring jobs from union to nonunion employers. The willingness and ability of employers to move work/jobs entirely out of the orbit of union control constitutes, in terms of power and particularly union bargaining power, a revisitation of the phenomenon of the “runaway shop.” It may also be viewed as a proactive form of hiring permanent replacements for (potentially) striking workers. The union options in dealing with such a challenge are to endeavor to preclude outsourcing through legislation or collective bargaining or to chase the work by organizing the unorganized, hopefully with the help of the unionized outsourcing employer. Neither option may be easy, but as the 1996 auto industry negotiations suggest, the former may be less difficult than the latter. The possibility that outsourcing from union to nonunion employer may provide unions with the power to organize from the top (outsourcer) down (outsourcee) cannot be entirely ignored as the issue of supplier “neutrality” reportedly was raised in the 1996 auto negotiations. The adverse effects of outsourcing on union political and financial power, by virtue of its impact on the level or distribution of union membership, can and may well be offset by an increase in union activism—as measured by dues levels, merger activity, organizing commitment, and political action. The adverse effects of outsourcing on union bargaining power are more problematical from the union standpoint. The effect of outsourcing, whatever its rationale or scenario, appears to be to put union labor back into competition. Thus, outsourcing constitutes yet another challenge to the labor movement in its ongoing and seemingly increasingly unsuccessful battle to take and keep U.S. union labor out of competition by proving itself able and willing to organize to the extent of the market and standardizing wages in that market.     

Unions,politics, and protectionism

Conventional models of labor relations emphasize “business unionism,” that is, collective bargaining activities and outcomes. We argue that a more realistic model of behavior incorporates the union’s role as an agent of redistribution that seeks to benefit some members and union leaders primarily at the expense of other members, nonunion employees, and consumers. Union power to redistribute wealth is obtained from the special privileges that labor organizations obtain from government. This paper demonstrates how, as political entities, unions and their employers attempt to secure government-sanctioned wealth transfers through protectionism. The authors gratefully acknowledge research support provided by the Sarah Scaife Foundation and the Earhart Foundation.     

Construction doublebreasted operations and pre-hire agreements: Assessing the issues

Labor relations in the construction industry are conducted under a legal framework that is both different and more favorable to unions than is that in industry generally. Thus, construction employers are more subject to challenge than those in other industries if they operate both union and nonunion subsidiaries; construction unions, but not those in most other industries, may enter into agreements before anyone is hired (“pre-hire agreements”), require employees to join unions after ten days of employment instead of thirty, and require the contractor to notify them of job openings. Despite these advantages, construction unions represented only 22.2 percent of all construction workers in 1987, down from 40.1 percent in 1973, while nonunion, or “open shop,” construction accounted for more than 70 percent of the construction dollar volume as early as 1984. Attempting to overcome these trends, the construction unions have sponsored legislation in the current and last two congresses which would outlaw “doublebreasting,” i.e., one company owning both unionized and open shop subsidiaries, eliminate any restrictions on pre-hire agreements, and have the effect of forcing thousands of construction workers into unions regardless of their wishes. This article examines the reasons for the decline of construction unionism, analyzes the proposed legislation, discusses its probable impact, and concludes that it is lacking in justification for the common good.     

Labor union coercion: The misuse of the grievance procedure

Labor unions provide security to workers through the use of the grievance procedure. Unions, however, may misuse their power and thereby reduce the security of workers. Such misuse has been documented through Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, which outlaws “restraint and coercion” by labor unions. Few cases involving coercion through the use of the grievance procedure were filed during the 1950s and 1960s, but the number of cases began growing in the 1970s, possibly because of the growing legal sophistication of those involved in labor relations. Such cases still number under 15 annually.     

Member support for union mergers: An analysis of an affiliation referendum

A changing labor relations climate has caused many national unions to merge with smaller independent unions in recent years. One aspect of the merger process concerns the willingness of independent union members to support affiliation with a national union (Chaison, 1986). This article examines the determinants of indivudual-level voting behavior using data gathered from members of an independent union who rejected a proposed affiliation with a national union in a membership referendum. Logistic regression results indicate that affiliation supporters perceived the affiliation as improving union effectiveness, were influenced by social support among co-workers in favor of the merger, and perceived the saliency of the independent union’s support for the affiliation proposal. Conversely, affiliation opposition was influenced by the employer’s “vote no” campaign and by perceptions that affiliation would lead to an increased probability of strikes and to future increases in dues.     

Union decline: A view from Canada

Important changes are occurring in the Canadian unions’ political and economic environments. This paper argues that such changes may be detrimental to Canadian trade unions, given their structural and institutional situation. To support this argument, private-sector union and nonunion firms in Alberta are compared. This comparison uncovers some structural (union members’ employment patterns and union firm characteristics) and institutional (union services) attributes of unions. Combined with the politico-economic environments that Alberta unions have faced since the early 1980s, these attributes have led to a decline in union membership. Because these attributes are shared by many other Canadian unions, those unions may increasingly confront some of the same hardships currently plaguing their Alberta counterparts. I am indebted to Brian Bemmels, Alan Murray, and John G. Fricke for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper, and to Mike Jones for his research assistance.     

External legitimacy of unions: Trends in New Zealand

Just 5 years ago, at the pinnacle of their success, New Zealand unions negotiated collective agreements covering over 720,000 employees and were successful in persuading some 603,000 of these employees to join. In May 1991, the Employment Contracts Act, which withdrew totally any state-endorsement or sponsorship of union activity, radically altered their position. Union membership fell by around 40 percent in the four years since the enactment of the Act — from 603,000 to 376,000 members in December 1994; the overall number of unions remaining has declined to around 80; a number of unions have become insolvent and have filed for liquidation; staff retrenchments within unions has been widely reported and, in some cases, this has led to a reduction in services and capacity. Data for 1993 suggest that union decline may have “bottomed out” with unions losing fewer than 20,000 members in that year. However, decline is again apparent in the 1994 data. The removal of external legitimacy has had a significant impact on unionization rates. We review the conditions under which the restoration of legitimacy would bring about a reversal of union decline.     

To reward and punish: A classification of union political strategies

The complexity of union involvement in American politics has frequently been underestimated in the existing academic literature. For this reason, it is helpful to develop a comprehensive classification of the bargaining strategies adopted by unions as they interact with elected officeholders. This classification allows a more systematic analysis of the preconditions and associated advantages and disadvantages of various union strategies in both party nominating processes and general elections. It also shows that the decision to enter electoral politics is best seen as the beginning of a complex, ongoing, and multidimensional process rather than as the end-point of a “single-play” game. Lastly, the classification demonstrates that a wider range of political choice is available to organized labor than is commonly recognized, notwithstanding the real and continuing constraints on labor power.     

The impact of labor unions on the passage of economic legislation

This paper examines the political power of labor unions. A model of the decision of an interest group to contribute to a political campaign is developed and tested. The empirical evidence indicates that interest groups, and unions in particular, use political contributions in a systematic and coordinated manner. Unions give money to candidates with relatively little seniority (who might otherwise not be elected) and to candidates from districts with about the average number of union members. Such candidates might otherwise not vote as the union would desire. The influence of campaign contributions and of union membership on the voting of congressmen on issues of interest to unions is also investigated. Union membership is sometimes significant and campaign contributions are always significant in explaining voting on minimum wages, wageprice controls, benefits for strikers, and OSHA and CETA appropriations. The indirect economic effects of labor unions — those effects which occur because unions influence legislation — may be as important as the direct effects which occur through collective bargaining.     

Doublebreasted operations and the decline of construction unionism

Labor relations in the construction industry are conducted under a legal framework that is both different and more favorable to unions than is that in industry generally. One aspect of this favored union environment is that construction employers are more subject to challenge than other employers if they operate both union and nonunion subsidiaries (“doublebreasted operations”). For almost a decade, the construction unions have attempted to obtain legislation disallowing this practice on the erroneous claims that it is unique to the construction industry and responsible for the decline of construction unions. This article examines the facts of the case and concludes that having both union and nonunion construction subsidiaries is no different from having both union and nonunion manufacturing subsidiaries insofar as the structure and operational organization of such companies are concerned; that the initial National Labor Relation Board decision in regard to doublebreasted operations in the construction industry was merely an application of precedent of some years previous in other industries; and that construction industry doublebreasted operations are much more a result than a cause of union decline. Professor Emeritus of Management; formerly, Professor of Industry; Director, Industrial Research Unit; and Chairman, Labor Relations Council.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">What do unions do?</Emphasis>—A management perspective

conclusion Over the past 30 years, progressive human resource policies and government regulation of the workplace have improved working conditions. Today unions are no longer exercising union power to“protect the underdog” or “level the playing field” (Kaufman, 2005). Unions are using their power to pass legislation to benefit their narrow special interests. There are two groups in the workforce that may provide unions with organizing opportunities. One segment of the workforce is the growing number of nonpermanent employees or contingent workers. Another is the growing low-wage part of the service sector. The Service Employees International Union has been one of the few unions to expand membership among these employees. The aging of the baby boomers will raise the demand for service workers in health care facilities and in hotel and office maintenance which will increase organizing opportunities for unions in this industry (Kosters, 2004).