Demographic Change and Fiscal Sustainability in Asia

Changes in the population age structure can have significant effects on fiscal sustainability since they can affect both government revenue and expenditure. In this paper, we project government revenue, expenditure, and fiscal balance in developing Asia up to 2050 using a simple stylized model and the National Transfer Accounts data set. Rapidly aging countries are likely to suffer a tangible deterioration of fiscal sustainability under their current tax and expenditure system. On the other hand, rapid economic growth can improve fiscal health in poorer, relatively young countries with still-growing working-age populations. Overall, our results indicate that Asia’s population aging will adversely affect its fiscal sustainability, pointing to a need for Asian countries to further examine the impact of demographic shifts on their fiscal health.     

Public expenditures,population aging and economic dependency in Canada, 1921–2021

The slowing population growth and consequent aging of the population in Canada and elsewhere have raised questions of the ability of such populations to provide support to their non-working or dependent, particularly their aged, members. Previous discussions have often been focussed on demographic measures of dependency, but more recent research has shown that, in North American society, the per capita costs of providing public programmes to an elderly member are between two and three times higher than those to a younger member of society. However, these measures have made no attempt to take into account changing labour market conditions. This paper develops measures of dependency to incorporate these latter effects. Calculations with Canadian data (1921–2021) show that demographic and economic dependency in Canada are currently at historically low levels. The numerical results also suggest that the effects of the general increases in labour force participation rates, that have characterized the past two decades, have more than offset the effects of the general increases in unemployment rates, and that future increases in participation rates and, perhaps, decreases in unemployment rates could provide a significant alleviation of the impacts of population aging on government expenditures in the years ahead.     

State and local fiscal impacts of US immigrants: Evidence from New Jersey

This paper uses a household-level estimation strategy to develop new evidence on the state and local fiscal impacts of US immigration. The methodology is applied to 1980 census microdata for New Jersey, a state that now ranks fifth in the nation in the size of its foreign-born population. All New Jersey households combined in 1980 imposed a net fiscal burden on state government of more than US$2.1 billion, and a net burden on the aggregate of all local governments totaling nearly $ 690 million. Both native- and immigrant-headed households received government benefits worth more than they paid in taxes. The typical immigrant-headed household imposed an average fiscal burden of $ 350 on local governments throughout New Jersey, versus roughly $ 225 for each native-headed household. At the state level, however, net fiscal impacts of immigrants and natives were similar: an average annual deficit of $ 841 for immigrants compared with $ 846 for native households. There are larger disparities among the foreign-born population than between native-headed and immigrant-headed households. Latin American households have the most unfavorable fiscal implications of any immigrant subgroup. Taken together, our findings illustrate the overriding importance of household income and number of school-age children as determinants of taxes paid, benefits received and, ultimately, of net fiscal impacts.     

Social security in a general equilibrium model with endogenous government behavior

In this paper attention is focused on the economic and political effects of an aging population. For that purpose, a general equilibrium model is used that allows for an endogenous analysis of decisionmaking on government policies. We concentrate here on the effects of an aging population on expenditures and levels of social security benefits, the provision of public goods and services, the private output and intergenerational conflicts. Special attention will be paid to the effects of changes in the retirement age and in capital endowments. Furthermore, the effects of issues related to aging, as changes in the political influence structure and the motive of other-directedness by others, are investigated.The authors are grateful to the participants of the ISPE conference. They wish to thank in particular the discussants Jean Frijns, Pierre Pestieau and Harry van Dalen for their helpful comments.     

Competitive structure and fiscal policy

Using new measures to compare both the 48 states and 52 upstate New York counties, this research reformulates V. O. Key's hypothesis that noncompetitive systems benefit upper socioeconomic groups while competitive systems favor the lower classes. In designing these tests, we returned to Key's original conceptualization, which, contrary to the subsequent research that claimed to test his hypothesis, did not separate and oppose the political and economic sectors. In line with Key's formulation, we find that competitive political structure goes hand in hand with competitive economic structure and together they determine an array of fiscal policies that are different from those of noncompetitive political-economic systems. This return to the original sense of the hypothesis resolves many of the puzzling findings that have been generated in the last several decades. Democratic party affiliation and urban differentiation also affected revenues and expenditures. These same characteristics were previously shown to affect poverty and social pathology. That they now affect public policy for dealing with these problems means that those caught in the web of poverty are in double jeopardy.     

百万以上少数民族老龄化程度的分层测算

老龄化是当今面临的一大社会问题。通常老龄化的界定主要采用老年人口占比这一指标来量化。以发展的视角与人口年龄结构划分标准而言．单一指标的老龄化论断削弱了学术的严谨性和对现实的指导性。为精确各个族群老龄化的差异,以发展的视角分析出台减缓老龄化进程的相关策略．使区域经济发展与老龄化进程趋向协调．本文基于第四、五、六次人口普查数据资料．对百万以上18个少数民族的老龄化程度进行新的分层测算。在分析其老龄化现状的基础上。给出1990年、2000年、2010年三个时段的年龄结构类型．分层测算了18个民族20年间年龄结构类型或老龄化进程的速度和差异．为国家制定分层策略提供数据化支撑,     

Alan Greenspan on the Economic Implications of Population Aging

At the 2004 annual symposium of central bank leaders sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the US Federal Reserve Board, devoted his opening remarks on 27 August to a discussion of the economic implications of population aging. The full text of his remarks is reproduced below. Greenspan's high prestige and great influence on US economic policy lend special interest to his views on this much-discussed subject (see also the next Documents item in this issue). He outlines the coming demographic shift in the United States in language that is characteristically cautious and qualified. (The elderly dependency ratio will “almost certainly” rise as the baby boom generation retires, Greenspan says, although elsewhere he terms the process, more accurately, inexorable.) The main factor responsible for population aging he identifies as the decline of fertility. Immigration is an antidote, but, to be effective, its size would have to be much larger than is envisaged in current projections. Greenspan's assessment of the economic consequences of the changing age structure highlights the prospect of a deteriorating fiscal situation in the United States: chronic deficits in the Social Security program over the long haul, assuming that existing commitments for benefits per retiree are met, and even greater difficulties for the health care system for the elderly—Medicare—in which the effects of increasing numbers in old age are amplified by advances in medical technology and the bias inherent in the current system of subsidized third-party payments. The sober outline of policy choices imposed by population aging—difficult in the United States, but less so, Greenspan notes, than in Europe and Japan—underlies the need for counteracting the declining growth of the population of labor force age through greater labor force participation and later retirement. Beyond that, growth of output per worker can provide the key “that would enable future retirees to maintain their expected standard of living without unduly burdening future workers.” This requires continuation of policies that enhance productivity, such as deregulation and globalization, and greater investment. In turn, the latter presupposes greater domestic saving, both personal and by the government, as the United States cannot “continue indefinitely to borrow saving from abroad.” Demographic aging requires a new balance between workers and retirees. Curbing benefits once bestowed is difficult: only benefits that can be delivered should be promised. Public programs should be recalibrated, providing incentives for individuals to adjust to the inevitable consequences of an aging society.     

Fiscal impacts of immigration to the United States

"The purpose of this paper is to fill a gap in the demographic literature by reviewing previous fiscal studies of immigration in the United States. Each study is introduced by describing the data it uses, the methodologies employed in calculating costs and revenues, and the resulting estimates of fiscal consequences. Evaluative comments are also stressed. Seventeen studies are included in this review, divided into those that emphasize national fiscal impacts (these studies aggregate the effects of immigrants across all levels of government), state fiscal impacts, and fiscal effects on local governments."     

The Fiscal Cost of Refugee Immigration: The Example of Sweden

The world currently has more refugees and internally displaced persons than it has had since World War II. Yet the readiness of many wealthy countries to provide asylum to these refugees is waning, and a major reason for this is the fiscal burden that would result from larger refugee intakes. To evaluate the size of this fiscal burden, this study estimates the net fiscal redistribution to the total refugee population in Sweden, the country with the largest per capita refugee immigration rate in the Western world since the early 1980s. The total redistribution in 2007 corresponds to 1.0 percent of Swedish GDP in that year. Four‐fifths of the redistribution is due to lower public per capita revenues from refugees compared with the total population, and one‐fifth to higher per capita public costs.     

移民是否鸠占鹊巢?——来自迁入地公共品供给的经验证据

20世纪80年代中期以来,劳动力跨地区迁移为中国经济增长做出了突出贡献,但移民进入可能"挤占"迁入地居民享有的公共品也令许多人深感忧虑.事实上,移民进入对迁入地公共品供给的影响同时存在负向的竞争效应和正向的财政效应,而移民进入对迁入地公共品供给的净影响取决于竞争效应和财政效应规模的相对大小.使用2000-2012年地级市数据的研究发现,移民进入显著增加了迁入地医疗卫生、基础教育、道路交通、人居环境等公共品的供给,说明移民进入影响迁入地公共品供给的财政效应大于竞争效应.进一步基于回归的财政效应估计显示,在控制了财政支出及其他变量之后,移民人口占比每增加10%,迁入地财政收入占GDP的比重将会提高约1.01个百分点.     

人口老龄化的经济学再审视

人口学所界定的老年人口和人口老龄化不利于研究人口老龄化对经济发展的影响。通过对人口老龄化的经济学再审视,我们发现人口老龄化并不一定可怕。从经济老年人的标准出发,改革现行的以日历年龄为唯一标准的退休制度,实行灵活的退休制度,并采取加快发展老年科学教育事业、加大公共医疗卫生事业建设的力度、合理开发老年人才资源等措施,延长老年人转变为经济老年人的时间间隔,发挥老年人口在生产中的作用,是可以缓解并防止人口老龄化带来的经济冲击。     

发展慈善事业,破解老龄化困境

随着用于弥补养老金缺口的财政补贴逐年增大,我国未来财政不足将严重制约老龄事业的发展。受公共物品非效率性和道德风险的双重制约,仅靠政府独立负担养老金的政策已无法有效应对我国日趋严重的老龄化问题。结合慈善事业发展的特点和趋势,从"政民结合"视角探讨发展慈善事业对于解决我国老龄财政困境的可行性和必要性,并提出相应的对策建议。     

Alvin Hansen on Economic Progress and Declining Population Growth

The driving forces of economic growth, according to the mainstream of classical economic thinking, are threefold: technological innovations, the opening up of new territories and discovery of new resources, and increase in population. In interaction, in an entrepreneurial market economy, these forces generate growth not only in the aggregate but also per capita. Evidence of their power was seen in the long stretch of rising living standards in the West over the nineteenth century, despite the ups and downs of the business cycle. However, the economic experience of the interwar years, and in particular the Great Depression of the 1930s, suggested that the forces were largely spent and hence that future economic prospects were gravely imperiled. The Keynesian revolution in economics was a response to the evident malfunctioning of the capitalist economic system, although the policy recipes it offered (for increasing demand and investment to levels capable of generating an equilibrium consistent with full employment of productive resources, especially labor) by no means commanded unanimity. The most prominent American contributor to and spokesman for the new line of economic analysis—often called “the American Keynes”—was Alvin H. Hansen (1887–1975), who took up his professorship of political economy at Harvard in 1937, just after the appearance of Keynes's General Theory. In that post, which he held until his retirement in 1956, he was one of the most influential economists of the era as a theorist, policy adviser, and teacher. Hansen interpreted the economic problems of the 1930s not just as the manifestation of a particularly sharp cyclical downturn, but as evidence of secular stagnation caused by the closing of the economic frontier, sluggishness in technological innovation, and, not least, “a drastic decline in population growth.” This “stagnation thesis” is most succinctly set out in his presidential address to the American Economic Association, delivered in Detroit, 28 December 1938, under the title Economic Progress and Declining Population Growth. The address is re‐produced below from the March 1939 issue of the American Economic Review. (The opening paragraphs of the address, and two paragraphs, immediately preceding the closing paragraph, in which Hansen discusses changes in US national income in the 1930s, have been omitted.) Hansen's analysis of the effects of declining population growth in many ways echoes the thesis set out by Keynes in his seminal Galton Lecture delivered to the Eugenics Society in 1937 (reprinted in the Archives section of PDR 4, no. 3): a demographic slowdown decreases opportunities for profitable investments and increases levels of attempted saving, hence pushes the economy toward a low‐growth equilibrium at which resources are underutilized and unemployment is high. Hansen puts special emphasis on demographically induced shifts in the composition of output. He suggests that, beyond its direct positive effect on investment and output, population growth also has an indirect enhancing effect on these factors by facilitating technological progress–contrary to the “older Malthusian view.” In his policy proposals Hansen was more interventionist than Keynes, advocating a more intrusive government role in the economy as a possible means of escaping the vicious cycle of low demand and high unemployment. As to government action to reverse demographic trends seen as deleterious, neither Keynes nor Hansen argued for policies to increase fertility, presumably because they saw them as both inappropriate and, in comparison to remedial economic policy measures, inefficient or unfeasible. The demands of the war economy in the years following Hansen's address took care of the employment problem, and the immediate postwar decades brought the stimuli of pent‐up consumer demand, an outpouring of technological innovations, a reopening of the economic frontier produced by a more liberal trade regime, and, also, an acceleration of population growth. The result was rapid overall economic growth and increasing levels of per capita income. Keynesian demand management played some role in this economic success story: by the end of the 1960s even US President Richard Nixon pronounced himself a Keynesian. But it offered no remedy for the stagflation that eventually followed. The growth‐promoting recipes favored in the last decades of the century (especially in the most successful developing economies) were anything but Keynesian: limited government, fiscal restraint, and globalization. Yet recent and anticipated demographic trends, especially in Europe—notably fertility decline and population aging—make Hansen, once again, interesting reading. Commitments of the modern welfare state for health care, retirement pensions, and job security command wide approval, but they have boosted governments' weight in the economy and made labor markets inflexible, unemployment high, and retirement early—developments that may increasingly impose a brake on economic growth and on improvements of living standards. Reform measures to ease these burdens are, in principle, straightforward, but their immediate social costs are heavy and their rewards are delayed, hence resistance to reform is strong and growing. This is likely to stimulate the search for alternative policies that offer politically more palatable tradeoffs—some of which may turn out to have an unmistakably Hansenian flavor. As to future population trends, Hansen, despite his reference to a “drastic decline in population growth” based on a comparison of nineteenth‐ and twentieth‐century Western demographic change, envisaged a convergence to a stationary population or a tendency toward very slow decrease. Yet some economies are already locked into a demographic pattern that augurs sharper declines and more rapid population aging, enhancing the relevance of the issues posed by Hansen. In Germany, for example, in the absence of immigration, the population between ages 20 and 40 will decline from 21.6 million in 2005 to 16.3 million in 2025—a drop of 23 percent. Over the same time period, the population aged 60 and older will grow from 20.5 million to 25.8 million—an increase of 26 percent. Serious efforts to slow population decline and retard population aging by stimulating fertility would of course add another major burden to government budgets.     

Population Aging and the Rising Cost of Public Pensions

Rapid population aging is raising concerns about the sustainability of public pension systems in high‐income countries. The first part of this study identifies the four factors that determine trends in public pension expenditures: population aging, pension benefit levels, the mean age at retirement, and the labor force participation rate. The second part presents projections to 2050 of the impact of demographic trends on public pension expenditures in the absence of changes in pension benefits, labor force participation, and age at retirement. These projections demonstrate that current trends are unsustainable, because without reforms population aging will produce an unprecedented and harmful accumulation of public debt. A number of projection variants assess the potential impact of policy options aimed at improving the sustainability of public pension systems. Although the conventional responses are considered, particular attention is given to the demographic options of encouraging higher fertility and permitting more immigration. This analysis is illustrated with data from the seven largest OECD countries.     

保障和激励:建立支撑我国城市家庭养老健康发展的有效机制

传统西方社会经济理论将养老方式的变革与工业化发展水平之间划上必然的联系。事实上 ,养老问题是一个与经济、文化、政治、人口等多方面因素密切相关的社会问题。在我国城市家庭养老功能趋于弱化的今日 ,政府应在保障和激励家庭养老方面有所作为 ,使家庭养老这一最为经济的养老方式在迎接人口老龄化的挑战中发挥更为出色的作用     

Soil and its influence on rural drought migration: insights from Depression-era Southwestern Saskatchewan, Canada

This article investigates linkages between soil conditions, farm-level vulnerability, adaptation, and rural migration during periods of drought. It begins by reviewing existing literature on climate adaptation in agricultural populations and on relationships between soil and rural migration. This is followed by a detailed case study of rural migration patterns that emerged in the Swift Current district of Saskatchewan, Canada, during a period of extended droughts and severe economic conditions in the 1930s. Using a combination of secondary literature, interviews with surviving first-hand observers and GIS modeling, the study shows how the interacting effects of household indebtedness, social capital, government relief programs, and farm-level soil quality helped stimulate population loss in many rural townships across the study area. The study focuses particularly on the role played by differential soil quality across the Swift Current district and how farms situated on sandier soils were typically more sensitive and vulnerable to drought than those situated on clay soils. Higher-than-average rates of population loss were associated with townships containing areas of poorer quality agricultural soils, an association replicable using GIS software and existing soil and population datasets. The findings from the case study are discussed within the context of the broader existing literature, and suggestions are provided on future directions for research, planning, and modeling to assist planners and policymakers concerned with rural adaptation and migration.     

The effects of the age and structure of population on family change]

The age structure of a population is one basic factor of population research. It is not only affected by birth, death, immigration, and marriage, but it also reflected in changes of family size. The article analyzed it from two aspects: (1) the age structure of population acts on the size and structure of the family. The younger the age structure, the larger the family size. Otherwise, it is the opposite. According to the 1982 census, 35.4% of the population was 0-14 years in rural areas, and average family size was 4.6; but in urban areas 26.0% of the population was 0-14 years and family size was 3.9. The family was characterized as a nuclear family as industrialization in economic development increased and the population aged. In the 1982 census, 64.7% were nuclear family and 6% were aging population in China. Three- generation families (or more) have decreased dramatically. The change of family size and structure is affected by change of internal family age structure. The younger population (0-14 years) is dependent and 90% live with their parents. The adult population (15-59) years are more affected by marriage, birth and social economic action. Families are established in this age period and give much more effect to fertility. The aging population (over 60) years is facing changes. They appear to be a "Defect" family because the wife or husband has passed away. They change from independent to dependent. 78.3% population over 60 years were dependent on children or social welfare, only 21.7% were independent according to the survey in Beijing Changping County.     

人口老龄化背景下的养老金危机--基于四维的视角

进入21世纪,人口老龄化作为一种全球性趋势正在给世界各国带来巨大的负担和成本,尤其是老龄化带来养老金的收支不平衡以及养老金模式的不可持续,给养老保险体系带来巨大挑战。而深层次的养老金危机深刻地影响着每个国家的财政收支、经济发展,甚至造成对政府的信任危机。以往的研究一般把养老金收支不平衡作为衡量养老金危机的一个重要标准。这种仅仅注重财务、而忽视其安全、公平和信任等因素的分析不利于我们把握养老金改革的重点,也不利于我们对于我国现行人口政策的反思。本文从养老金的财务、安全、公平和信任四个角度去分析我国的养老金危机,并进一步提出了对未来养老金改革应该要注意的一些原则性问题。     

Toward a national population policy

Canada has notexplicit national population policy although various policies do have an effect on the size, rate of growth, distribution, and composition of the nation's population. Traditionally, Canada has been pronoatalist, particularly favoring immigration. In response to the 1974 Bucharest World Population Conference, the Canadian government solicited public testimony regarding a population policy for the nation. Environmentalists urged population limitation with a view to maintaining the ecosystem. Social justice and reallocation of resources were urged by an 2nd group. The quality of life argument was used by both proponents and opponents of population limitation. Canada has increased its world assistance for economic and population activities. With 1 of the highest growth rates of the developed countries, (in 1976-1977, 1.3% vs. .8% for the U.S. and .4% for France), Canada needs to propound a slow growth ethic. With future fertility at replacement level, Canada will look to immigration for population input.     

Immigration to the U.S.: the unfinished story

Annual totals of new immigrants and refugees in the US may now be up to the record highs of over a million immigrants counted in 6 years between 1905 and 1914. Since 1979, legal immigrants have averaged 566,000 a year (570,009 in 1985), newly arrived refugees and asylees approved have averaged 135,000, and the "settled" illegal immigrant population is growing by up to 1/2 million a year, according to some estimates. 1/2 of illegal immigrants are persons who entered the US legally but then overstayed the terms of temporary visas. Immigration and Naturalization Service apprehensions of illegal aliens, projected at a record 1.8 million for fiscal year 1986, indicate a sharp increase in illegal border crossers, driven by Mexico's and Central America's mounting population and economic pressures and lured by the prospect of jobs with employers who through a loophole in US immigration law can hire illegal aliens without penalty. The Census Bureau estimates that net immigration now accounts for 28% of US population growth and will account for all growth by the 2030's if fertility stays at the current low 1.8 births per woman. Public opinion strongly favors crubs on illegal immigration and legalization of illegal aliens long resident in the US, and in 1986 Congress enacted legislation to reduce illegal immigration to the US. Asians and Latin Americans now make up over 80% of legal immigrants and Latin Americans comprised 77% of illegal immigrants counted in the 1980 census. Asians far outstrip Latin American immigrants in education, occupational status, and income and might be expected to assimilate in the same manner as earlier immigrant group did. Hispanic immigrants so far appear to favor cultural pluralism, maintaining their own culture and the Spanish language. Research in California indicates that recent Hispanic immigrants (legal and illegal) have helped preserve low-wage industries and agriculture. Illegal immigrants appear to draw more on public health and education services than they pay back in taxes. With or without immigration reform, population and economic pressures in Mexico and the Caribbean Basin ensure that the numbers of people seeking to enter the US are only likely to increase.