A refinement of the uncovered set in tournaments

Theory and Decision - We introduce a new solution for tournaments called the unsurpassed set. This solution lies between the uncovered set and the Copeland winner set. We show that this solution is...     

Ordinal equivalence of power notions in voting games

In this paper, we are concerned with the preorderings (SS) and (BC) induced in the set of players of a simple game by the Shapley–Shubik and the Banzhaf–Coleman's indices, respectively. Our main result is a generalization of Tomiyama's 1987 result on ordinal power equivalence in simple games; more precisely, we obtain a characterization of the simple games for which the (SS) and the (BC) preorderings coincide with the desirability preordering (T), a concept introduced by Isbell (1958), and recently reconsidered by Taylor (1995): this happens if and only if the game is swap robust, a concept introduced by Taylor and Zwicker (1993). Since any weighted majority game is swap robust, our result is therefore a generalization of Tomiyama's. Other results obtained in this paper say that the desirability relation keeps itself in all the veto-holder extensions of any simple game, and so does the (SS) preordering in all the veto-holder extensions of any swap robust simple game.     

Meaningful learning in weighted voting games: an experiment

In April 2013, all of the major academic publishing houses moved thousands of journal titles to an original hybrid model, under which authors of accepted papers can choose between an expensive open access (OA) track and the traditional track available only to subscribers. This paper argues that authors might now use a publication strategy as a quality signaling device. The imperfect information game between authors and readers presents several types of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria, including a separating equilibrium in which only authors of high-quality papers are driven toward the open access track. The publishing house should choose an open-access publication fee that supports the emergence of the highest return equilibrium. Journal structures will evolve over time according to the journals’ accessibility and quality profiles.     

Bribes,power, and managerial control in corporate voting games

Proxy fights have received comparatively little attention relative to the more popular methods for corporate control transfer: merger and tender offers. This paper presents an analytic model of the proxy contest as a cooperative game with four players: management, passive shareholders, insurgent shareholders and a trust fund. The power of the players and the effectiveness of certain managerial actions is discussed.     

The Pareto rule and strategic voting

This paper uses a particular choice rule over sets of alternatives under the Pareto rule. Starting from the sincere situation every strategic misrevelation of preference is shown to be an improvement for all voters. The existence of an equilibrium under successive misrepresentations by sincere voters is demonstrated.     

Presidential voting in the west

Voters in the western United States are becoming more Republican than the rest of the country in their presidential choices. The Solid West has replaced the Solid South as a reality of presidential campaigns. This is in spite of a long term national trend away from strong party loyalties. This article examines the ten states of the Interior West at the county level during the eight presidential elections from 1956 through 1984. All parts of the region did not simultaneously embrace the Republican Party from the onset of the New Western Normal Vote episode. Those areas that lagged were characterized by sizable employment in forestry and mining, large Hispanic or Native American populations, or were among the region's few large urban concentrations. Some of these areas still remain outside the Republican fold in presidential elections. The overall magnitude of change in Republicanism in the 549 counties was not uniform, but rather impacted some areas such as Nevada and Idaho to a much larger degree than others such as Montana and the Dakotas. This article generally confirms Archer and Taylor's assertion that the Western Periphery constitutes a new Republican heartland. But some Indian and Hispanic populations continue to vote for Democratic presidential candidates. Rural areas with strong organized labor such as the mining and forestry areas of Montana, and big cities like Denver are only weakly Republican. Hence, the conversion to strong and unwaivering Republicanism is not total and may never occur.     

The real uncovered interest parity: The case of Canada and the USA

The aim of this paper is to re-assess the real uncovered interest parity (RUIP) in the light of including domestic demand shocks as possible determinants of the real exchange rate. We use annual data for two close trading partners, namely Canada and the USA. Using cointegration analysis we find evidence in favour of RUIP. In addition, empirical support is provided to show that discretionary fiscal policy actions have a spillover effect to the real exchange rate via real interest rates.     

Strict proportional power in voting bodies

It is a widely known fact among game theorists as well as political scientists that the distribution of voting weights in a voting body is generally a poor proxy for the distribution of voting power within the body. It has been proposed to equate the distribution of a priori voting power and actual seat distribution by randomizing the decision rule of the voting body over various majority rules. In this paper, some implications of this procedure will be discussed.     

The potential of iterative voting to solve the separability problem in referendum elections

In referendum elections, voters are often required to register simultaneous votes on multiple proposals. The separability problem occurs when a voter’s preferred outcome on one proposal depends on the outcomes of other proposals. This type of interdependence can lead to unsatisfactory or even paradoxical election outcomes, such as a winning outcome that is the last choice of every voter. Here we propose an iterative voting scheme that allows voters to revise their voting strategies based on the outcomes of previous iterations. Using a robust computer simulation, we investigate the potential of this approach to solve the separability problem.     

Strategic voting in the 1984 democratic presidential primaries

When casting their ballots in primary elections, voters usually vote in a straight-forward manner for the candidate of their preference. But sometimes sophisticated voters vote for a second or third choice who has a better chance of winning in the general election or even cross over to the opposition party to vote for a candidate who will be easier to defeat in the general election. This article assesses the amount and importance of such strategic voting in Democratic presidential primaries in 1984 using discriminate analysis.     

Rational beliefs in extensive games

Given an extensive game, with every node x and every player i a subset k _i (x) of the set of terminal nodes is associated, and is given the interpretation of player i's knowledge (or information) at node x. A belief of player i is a function that associates with every node x an element of the set K _i (x). A belief system is an n-tuple of beliefs, one for each player. A belief system is rational if it satisfies some natural consistency properties. The main result of the paper is that the notion of rational belief system gives rise to a refinement of the notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium.     

Staying power in sequential games

Staying power is the ability of a player to hold off choosing a strategy in a two-person game until the other player has selected his, after which the players are assumed to be able to move and countermove sequentially to ensure their best possible outcomes before the process cycles back to the initial outcome and then repeats itself (rational termination). These rules of sequential play induce a determinate, Paretosuperior outcome in all two-person, finite, sequential games in which the preferences of the players are strict.In 57 of the 78 distinct 2 × 2 ordinal games (73 percent), it makes no difference who the (second-moving) player with staying power is, but in the other 21 games the outcome is power-dependent. In all but one of these games, staying power benefits the player who possesses it.If no player has staying power, the outcomes that result from sequential play and rational termination are called terminal; they coincide with staying power outcomes if they are Pareto-superior. Normative implications of the analysis for rationally justifying cooperation in such games as Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken, and implementing Pareto-superior outcomes generally, are also discussed.We are grateful to D. Marc Kilgour for very valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper, causing us to rethink and redefine staying power. The earlier version was presented at the Seventeenth North American Conference, Peace Science Society (International), University of Pennsylvania, November 9–11, 1981.     

Hierarchies achievable in simple games

A previous work by Friedman et al. (Theory and Decision, 61:305–318, 2006) introduces the concept of a hierarchy of a simple voting game and characterizes which hierarchies, induced by the desirability relation, are achievable in linear games. In this paper, we consider the problem of determining all hierarchies, conserving the ordinal equivalence between the Shapley–Shubik and the Penrose–Banzhaf–Coleman power indices, achievable in simple games. It is proved that only four hierarchies are non-achievable in simple games. Moreover, it is also proved that all achievable hierarchies are already obtainable in the class of weakly linear games. Our results prove that given an arbitrary complete pre-ordering defined on a finite set with more than five elements, it is possible to construct a simple game such that the pre-ordering induced by the Shapley–Shubik and the Penrose–Banzhaf–Coleman power indices coincides with the given pre-ordering.     

Team selection in children's games

Games provide valuable learning experiences for children. Team games in particular involve them in a variety of roles and responsibilities. This article examines team selection in spontaneous playground games in an elementary school enrolling 500. The approach is naturalistic and ethnographic. The children were very concerned about choosing teams of comparable ability so as to ensure an even and fair contest. The key was careful selection of team captains based on athletic ability. Friendship played a secondary role. These athletically skilled captains in turn chose teams according to ability. Girls and less skilled boys were not selected to lead because that would threaten the balance of the teams. Children chosen last for the team or not chosen at all felt rejected socially as well as athletically.     

Punishing greediness in divide-the-dollar games

Brams and Taylor 1994 presented a version of the divide-the-dollar game (DD), which they call DD1. DD1 suffers from the following drawback: when each player demands approximately the entire dollar, then if the least greedy player is unique, then this player obtains approximately the entire dollar even if he is only slightly less greedy than the other players. I introduce a parametrized family of 2-person DD games, whose “endpoints” (the games that correspond to the extreme points of the parameter space) are (1) a variant of DD1, and (2) a game that completely overcomes the greediness-related problem. I also study an n-person generalization of this family. Finally, I show that the modeling choice between discrete and continuous bids may have far-reaching implications in DD games.     

Independence of irrelevant alternatives in the theory of voting

In social choice theory there has been, and for some authors there still is, a confusion between Arrow'sIndependence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) and somechoice consistency conditions. In this paper we analyze this confusion. It is often thought that Arrow himself was confused, but we show that this is not so. What happened was that Arrow had in mind a condition we callregularity, which implies IIA, but which he could not state formally in his model because his model was not rich enough to permit certain distinctions that would have been necessary. It is the combination of regularity and IIA that he discusses, and the origin of the confusion lies in the fact that if one uses a model that does not permit a distinction between regularity and IIA, regularity looks like a consistency condition, which it is not. We also show that the famous example that proves that Arrow was confused does not prove this at all if it is correctly interpreted.     

The electoral consequences of alienation: Nonvoting and protest voting in the 1992 presidential race

This article focuses on the context of the 1992 national elections in order to determine why certain alienated individuals chose to stay home on election day while others responded by voting for a third party Presidential candidate. Two dimensions of alienation, internal and external political inefficacy, are linked to lower levels of voting, as is consistent with previous research on voting behavior. In addition, we find that, among those who voted, those individuals who expressed political cynicism or external inefficacy were more likely to vote for Ross Perot. We conclude that, while many alienated individuals do not vote, the Perot candidacy in 1992 led certain alienated individuals to engage in “protest” voting by casting their vote for an unlikely winner in the presidential race.     

Cycles versus equilibrium in evolutionary games

Mixed-strategy equilibria are typically rather unstable in evolutionary game theory. “Monocyclic” games, such as Rock–Paper–Scissors, have only mixed equilibria, some of which are “stable” in the sense that sequential best replies lead to them; yet, even these games are prone to stable cycles under discrete-time simultaneous best replies, giving an unusual equilibrium-selection problem. This article analyzes such games in a random-utility setting where changing strategies is costly, and the speed of the dynamic is, thus, endogenous. The stochastically stable outcome is determined by the cost of switching strategies; when switching costs are high, mixed equilibria are selected, whereas when switching costs are low, cycles are selected.     

Endogenous correlated equilibria in noncooperative games

Most of the results of modern game theory presuppose that the choices rational agents make in noncooperative games are probabilistically independent. In this paper I argue that there is noa priori reason for rational agents to assume probabilistic independence. I introduce a solution concept for noncooperative games called anendogenous correlated equilibrium, which generalizes the Nash equilibrium concept by dropping probabilistic independence. I contrast the endogenous correlated equilibrium with the correlated equilibrium defined by Aumann (1974, 1987). I conclude that in general the endogenous correlated equilibrium concept is a more appropriate solution concept for noncooperative game theory than the less general Nash equilibrium concept. I close by discussing the relationship between endogenous correlated equilibrium and the game solution concept calledrationalizability introduced by Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984).