The role of intergenerational transfers,land, and education in fertility transition in rural Kenya: the case of Nyeri district

This qualitative study reveals how population pressures, land availability, inheritance norms, and educational opportunities intertwine to influence fertility decline in rural Kenya. Focus group discussions with men and women whose childbearing occurred both before and after the onset of rapid, unexpected fertility transition in Nyeri, Kenya allowed individuals who actually participated in, or witnessed, the fertility transition to “voice” their perceptions as to the mechanisms underlying the transition. Findings suggest that, since land inheritance is a cultural norm, land scarcity and diminishing farm size often influence fertility decision-making and behavior via preferences for fewer children. Further, education does not appear to be the driving cause of fertility behavior change, but rather is adopted as a substitute for land inheritance when land resources are scarce. These findings have implications for our understanding of fertility behavior as well as for improving predictions of fertility transition in other rural sub-Saharan African contexts.     

Contradictions in Nigeria's Fertility Transition: The Burdens and Benefits of Having People

Nigeria appears to be experiencing a transition to lower fertility. Based on ethnographic research, this article shows how Nigerians navigate a paradoxical political‐economic and cultural context, wherein they face powerful pressures both to limit their fertility and to have relatively large families. The main argument advanced here is that Nigerians' fertility behavior must be understood in the context of the ways that parenthood, children, family, and kinship are inextricably intertwined with how people survive in a political economy organized around patron‐clientism. Despite the fact that fertility transition is widely associated with broad processes of modernization and development, ordinary Nigerians experience the pressures to limit fertility in terms of a failed economy, development disappointments, and personal hardship–even while they see relatively smaller families as essential if they are to educate their children properly and adapt to a changing society.     

Below-repiacement fertility in Tropical Africa? Some evidence from Addis Ababa

In the past few years there has been a gradual but progressive shift away from the long held scepticism about the prospect of reproductive change in Tropical Africa. Consequendy, the question is now not so much whether Tropical Africa remains a spectator of fertility transition, but whether and how soon fertility in the region will decline to level attained in other parts of the world. Using data from a series of censuses and surveys conducted in Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, a country which itself has high fertility, this study explores emerging evidence of fertility levels below two children per woman in an African city. Postponement of marriage and increased incidence of non-marriage, as well as a decline in marital fertility recorded across all birth orders and all age group, are the routes by which the observed transition to below-replacement fertility has been achieved. The paper outlines some tentative institutional and cultural factors that may have contributed to these changes. Revised version of an essay awarded the W.D. Borrie prize (postgraduate section), 1998.     

Perspectives on family and fertility in developing countries

Abstract Two aspects of the family in relation to fertility in developing countries are discussed: set stratification within the family and extended family networks. As both these are central to J. C. Caldwell's theory of fertility transition, the paper is structured as a critique of his position. Drawing on examples and data from Asia, it is argued that the causal significance of sex stratification for fertility lies in the economic risks it imposes on women, deriving from their dependence on men, rather than, as Caldwell suggests, in the disproportionate gain that men derive from their dominant position within families. While Caldwell and others associate strong extended family networks of mutual obligation and support with persistent high fertility, it is argued here that such systems should, instead, facilitate fertility decline. Close-knit and strong kin networks can be viewed as alternatives to children as sources of insurance, and may facilitate fertility decline by preventing children from becoming the focal point of parental concerns for security.     

An Evolutionary Interpretation of Fertility Decline: New Evidence

This article presents new evidence that partly reinforces and partly qualifies the results of a recent article on fertility decline published in this journal by Sanderson and Dubrow. Eight panel regression analyses were carried out, four for the period between 1960 and 1990 and four more for the period of the original demographic transition, that between 1880 and 1940. The analyses for the 1960–1990 period show that Sanderson and Dubrow's original conclusion that infant mortality decline was causing fertility decline (rather than the reverse) was correct. On the other hand, Sanderson and Dubrow's conclusion that enhanced female empowerment led to fertility decline proved incorrect. The new analyses reported here show that the reverse was in fact the case: women became more empowered as a result of declining fertility. The panel analyses carried out for the 1880–1940 period showed that infant mortality decline seemed to be an important cause of fertility decline between 1880 and 1910 but not between 1910 and 1940. However, the reverse hypothesis—that fertility decline caused infant mortality decline during this period—was falsified. I conclude that the causes of fertility decline in the modern world may be different, at least to some extent, from those in the original demographic transition. This is an unsatisfying (because unparsimonious) result that suggests the need for more research.     

Effects of child mortality on subsequent fertility of women in some rural and semi-urban areas of certain Latin American countries

Abstract With the rapid decline in child mortality in developing countries there is considerable interest in understanding its effects on fertility. According to the theory of demographic transition, mortality declines are accompanied by fertility declines after a time lag, as countries go through the process of economic development. However, the immediate effects of a mortality decline on fertility have not been uniform as in many countries fertility has actually increased. For example, in many Latin American countries where mortality declines have been very rapid there have not been any appreciable changes in fertility. Only in recent years has there been a noticeable decline in the urban areas of some nations. While it is possible to examine the effects of various socio-economic factors on mortality and fertility at the macro-level, any real understanding of how mortality itself influences fertility would require information at the micro-level on couples who have experienced child mortality and who are also exposed to the risk of childbearing.     

On Postponement and Birth Intervals

Much of the literature on fertility transition presumes that birth control is practiced either to limit family size or to space births. This article argues that women also use birth control to postpone pregnancy. Postponement is not synonymous with spacing. It arises when women delay their next birth for indefinite periods for reasons unrelated to the age of their youngest child, but without deciding not to have any more children. Postponement has a distinctive impact on the shape of birth‐interval distributions that differs from the impacts of family size limitation, birth spacing, or a mixture of the two behaviors. Some populations, such as that in South Africa, have developed fertility regimes characterized by birth intervals far longer than can be accounted for by birth spacing. Postponement of further childbearing that eventually becomes permanent may be an important driver of the transition to lower fertility in sub‐Saharan Africa.     

Birth rates decline as neighbors learn from one another how to control fertility

This article refers to a recent article (by Population Council demographer John Bongaarts and University of Pennsylvania sociology professor Susan Cotts Watkins) on strategies for promoting future global fertility decline. The article emphasizes the importance of the process of social interaction as a powerful force that accelerates the pace of demographic transition. The force of social interaction is frequently overlooked. Social interaction operates through personal networks that connect individuals; national channels of interaction connecting social and territorial communities within a country; and global channels connecting countries. Empirical evidence finds that the most important interaction for fertility change occurs in exchanges between personal networks of small communities. When innovative fertility behavior is adopted by a group within a community, then changes are communicated in an ever widening band. It is expected that countries with multiple channels of linked transportation and communication networks and extensive media facilities would experience more rapid fertility decline. Bongaarts and Watkins argue that the extent of a country's links with a global society help determine the timing of its transition to lower fertility. All countries are connected to some extent by ideas, information, or social influence and are at some level of development. When some countries in a region begin their fertility transition, neighboring countries soon follow. Fertility transition occurs even at low levels of development. Fertility decline can occur rapidly, even if socioeconomic development is modest, once the onset of the transition has occurred.     

Theoretical explanation of rapid decline in China's fertility]

China's fertility decline is widely acknowledged. The 1982 census and a random survey of 1/1,000th of the nation's population set the total fertility rate at 2.6%. Bureau of statistics data collected in 1984 showed the nation's birth rate as 1.7% and total fertility rate 1.94%. Friendly observers call this a miracle; others blame the decline on forced government family planning policy. Scientific pursuit of the causes for the decline is an issue of practical and realistic value. First, favorable conditions for fertility decline have been fostered by the socialist system and are deeply rooted in the country's economic development. China's industrialization and urbanization have brought new lifestyles and liberated individuals and families from the constraints of traditional family life. Couples have chosen to limit the number of children, to enhance the quality of life and education potential of their children, thus altering the traditional high fertility in China. Education of women has played a role in raising women's consciousness; a 1982 census placed the fertility rate of women with high-school level education or above, lower than that for less or uneducated women. Neonatal mortality rate decline is also related to the spontaneous decline in fertility rate, as high fertility has historically been intended to compensate for high child mortality rates. Welfare and social security systems for the elderly have also helped change the traditional mentality of having many children as assurance of life support in old age. Social organizations have accelerated knowledge and methods of planned fertility. Later marriages are also a factor: in 1970 the average marriage age was 19 - 20 and had increased by 1976 to 22 - 23. Other favorable social factors include free birth control and the view of population planning as an essential part of national welfare.     

What do we know about the timing of fertility transitions in europe?

The Princeton project on the decline of fertility in Europe (the European Fertility Project) suggested that this historical fertility transition occurred virtually simultaneously in a wide variety of economic and social environments. This finding has been cited widely as evidence for an innovation/diffusion view of fertility transitions. We demonstrate that the demographic methods used to date the fertility transition in Europe—primarily I_g, and (to a lesser extent) the Coale-Trussell M&m indices—may fail to detect the initial stages of a fertility transition and therefore cannot be used as the basis for strong statements about the timing of transitions. We review these measurement problems and their implications for the current understanding of the European fertility transition.     

A review of the studies on fertility transition in China]

This article is a summary of papers and analysis in recent years on fertility transition and the association between fertility decline and socioeconomic development in China. These papers discuss the causes of fertility decline and the role of family planning programs in demographic transition. The major points are: 1. The demographic transition in China has the same characteristics as in the countries that have completed the transition. The transition had already started in the more developed areas or completed in a few large cities before family planning programs were implemented. 2. The role of family planning programs is to lead and to accelerate the demographic transition, which is the key idea of the "induced fertility transition". 3. The socioeconomic development and family planning programs worked together to affect the fertility decline, however socioeconomic development is the fundamental factor. Without the existence of the socioeconomic development, which included the changes in the function of family, traditional ideas on fertility, increased level of education, the status of women and social security system; the family planning program is not likely to make an impact.     

When having many children pays: a case study from Taiwan

The objective of this paper is to investigate the direct financial cost and benefit of raising children during a demographic transition in Taiwan, and to examine whether fertility decline is consistent with Caldwell??s wealth flow theory, which states that fertility decline is caused by reduced benefits of children. The paper describes a method of estimating the average economic returns of children over the entire parental lifecycle, using a 42-year span of Taiwanese household and individual economic pseudo-panel data. Results show that returns to children may turn positive and are not highly negative all the time, as found in the previous literature.     

When having many children pays: a case study from Taiwan

The objective of this paper is to investigate the direct financial cost and benefit of raising children during a demographic transition in Taiwan, and to examine whether fertility decline is consistent with Caldwell’s wealth flow theory, which states that fertility decline is caused by reduced benefits of children. The paper describes a method of estimating the average economic returns of children over the entire parental lifecycle, using a 42-year span of Taiwanese household and individual economic pseudo-panel data. Results show that returns to children may turn positive and are not highly negative all the time, as found in the previous literature.     

论生育控制个人成本的社会补偿:一个理论分析框架

生育控制成本的社会补偿是我国目前而临的一个非常重要的现实问题。本文将以两种不同性质生育率下降条件下的家庭效用函数为分析的逻辑基础,建立生育控制成本估算及其补偿模型。并在此基础上分析我国的生育控制成本的补偿机制、补偿内容和补偿方式等。     

Demographic transition in Arab countries: A new perspective

This paper provides a new perspective on the fertility transition in Arab countries. It shows that the story of Arab fertility must be retold: the story is of a region with the highest fertility preferences, exhibiting reluctance to change due to the stranglehold of cultural forces, and just starting to respond to development forces. The paper shows that Arab regional experience is quite comparable to that of other developing countries and that, though the fertility decline occurred at a somewhat later date, the pace of decline more than compensates for this delay. Furthermore, the probing of country level experiences and forces underlying the transition shows the diversities of these experiences and the exaggeration of the role of cultural specificity. It also demonstrates that a large part of the decline in Arab fertility is due to changes in nuptiality. For some segments of society and some countries, these changes are not paralleled by increased opportunities for women to have more fulfilling lives. For these women, the fertility decline is not necessarily improving the quality of their lives and cannot be equated with progress and development.     

Equity,Security and Fertility: A Reaction to Thomas

This paper assesses recent arguments that sustained fertility decline cannot occur in circumstances of inequality, insecurity, and injustice. Naturally, these conditions are to be abhorred. However, the empirical record suggests that none of them acts as an absolute barrier to mass adoption of birth control and subsequent fertility decline. Recent trends in Bangladesh illustrate this point most vividly. One of the greatest fallacies of many fertility theories has been the assumption that there is an economic or social imperative in underdeveloped countries for couples to have many children. To the contrary, the historic norm for all societies has been an average of only about two surviving children per woman, implying an adaptation to low, not high, net fertility.     

The economic explanation of fertility changes in the United States

Abstract It is widely assumed that fertility varies positively with economic conditions. Actually this assumption receives little support from the historical record. For a century before 1930 fertility declined while the economy expanded and real incomes rose. Then for nearly three decades fertility and incomes fell and rose together. Since 1960 they have again moved in opposite directions. Clearly, no simple generalization about their relation will hold water. More sophisticated explanations are based on relative rather than absolute incomes. Banks suggested that the downturn in English fertility in the 1870's might have occurred because standards of middle-class consumption rose faster than middle-class incomes, but he found the evidence inconclusive. To reconcile the post-war baby boom in the United States with earlier experience, Easterlin has argued that fertility is determined by the relationship between the income of couples in their twenties and the income of their parents ten to fifteen years earlier. Among the weaknesses of this theory as applied to U.S. experience are its failure to explain the sharp drop in fertility, including that of native white urban women, in the 1920's; the fact that fertility rose most in the baby boom at the higher socio-economic levels where incomes rose least; and the sharp decline of fertility after 1962 in spite of the favourable trend of incomes, including those of younger people. The broad conclusion is that while couples no doubt do consider income, employment opportunities, etc. in deciding how many children to have, such considerations have had a relatively minor influence on changes in fertility, which for the most part have been the result of changes in attitudes. Even the post-war baby boom was a result not only of higher incomes and full employment but also of a shift in attitudes toward family size, particularly among the better-educated, economically better-off sections of society.     

Happiness: Before and After the Kids

Understanding how having children influences parents’ subjective well-being (“happiness”) has great potential to explain fertility behavior. We study parental happiness trajectories before and after the birth of a child, using large British and German longitudinal data sets. We account for unobserved parental characteristics using fixed-effects models and study how sociodemographic factors modify the parental happiness trajectories. Consistent with existing work, we find that happiness increases in the years around the birth of a first child and then decreases to before-child levels. Moreover, happiness increases before birth, suggesting that the trajectories may capture not only the effect of the birth but also the broader process of childbearing, which may include partnership formation and quality. Sociodemographic factors strongly modify this pattern. Those who have children at older ages or who have more education have a particularly positive happiness response to a first birth; and although having the first two children increases happiness, having a third child does not. The results, which are similar in Britain and Germany, suggest that having up to two children increases happiness, and mostly for those who have postponed childbearing. This pattern is consistent with the fertility behavior that emerged during the second demographic transition and provides new insights into low and late fertility.