Newcomb's paradox

This note proposes a new solution to the problem based on the information states available to the two opponents. The demon or predictor has two possible states on which to choose his course of action. These states are his predictions of the agents choice. The agent has only one state on which to make his choice. It is shown that unless the reward is small, the agent should make his choice probabilistically, using the same odds as the demon's chances of correct prediction.     

Learning in the Allais paradox

Whereas both the Allais paradox, the first empirical challenge of the classical rationality assumptions, and learning have been the focus of many experimental investigations, no experimental study exists today into learning in the pure context of the Allais paradox. This paper presents such a study. We find that choices converge to expected utility maximization if subjects are given the opportunity to learn by both thought and experience, but less so when they learn by thought only. To the extent that genuine preferences should be measured with proper learning and incentives, our study gives the first pure demonstration that irrationalities such as in the Allais paradox are less pronounced than often thought. Paul Anand and Stefan Trautmann made helpful comments.     

Survival through the Allais paradox

This paper investigates the allegation that behavior such as the Allais Paradox reduces the probability of survival. Examples are demonstrated where maximizing probability of survival in two choice situations imply a set of choices that add up to the Allais Paradox.     

Avoiding the Pitfalls of Politicized Psychology

This article provides two arguments for using caution when interpreting the results of a Global Change Game simulation indicating that people high in right-wing authoritarianism are particularly likely to bring the world to ruin. First, we review research that demonstrates that extremists on both the political left and right share characteristics likely to be associated with poor performance in the Global Change Game (e.g., lower levels of integrative complexity) and that there are reasons to be cautious about letting political extremists on either the left or right inherit the earth. Second, we caution that political psychologists need to be aware of how their own values shape the types of research they conduct and the inferences they draw from that research and that the same results can be construed very differently depending on the lens through which they are viewed.     

The chain-store paradox revisited

The rationality of predatory practices has been extensively debated among economists and lawyers. Selten (1978) considered a fictitious chain-store confronted with potential entrances of local competitors. In his formal analysis via an extensive game with complete and perfect information predatory behavior is precluded by the unique sequential (and perfect) equilibrium. Kreps and Wilson (1982b) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982) established in modified models with incomplete information that predation against early entrants may be rational since it creates a reputation to the effect that later potential entrants are deterred. The present paper offers a modification of Selten's model with complete but imperfect information which renders possible reputation and deterrence.     

Notes on Ostrogorski's paradox

Conclusion This note has investigated the necessary conditions for the existence of Ostrogorski's Paradox, and it showed that the paradox depends on the sizes of the groups taking each possible set of stands on the salient issues. By revising its positions on relevant issues, the majority party can avert the paradox. With increased emphasis on single-issue voting observed in the United States and other Western democracies, the analysis of the paradox should guide the understanding of parties' responses to coalition formation processes among special interest groups. Indeed, the Apex conditions characterizing the paradox provide clues as to the strategy to be followed by the majority party in selecting its platform: the party should generally follow positions advocated by the largest group while presenting a coalition of all other groups.The helpful comments of Howard Tamashiro on an earliar draft of this paper are greatfully acknowledge.     

The chain store paradox

The chain store game is a simple game in extensive form which produces an inconsistency between game theoretical reasoning and plausible human behavior. Well-informed players must be expected to disobey game theoretical recommendations.The chain store paradox throws new light on the well-known difficulties arising in connection with finite repetitions of the prisoners dilemma game. Whereas these difficulties can be resolved by the assumption of secondary utilities arising in the course of playing the game, a similar approach to the chain store paradox is less satisfactory.It is argued that the explanation of the paradox requires a limited rationality view of human decision behavior. For this purpose a three-level theory of decision making is developed, where decisions can be made on different levels of rationality. This theory explains why insight into the rational solution of a decision problem does not necessarily mean that the corresponding course of action will be taken.     

Avoiding the curves: Direct elicitation of time preferences

We propose and test a new method for eliciting curvature-controlled discount rates that are invariant to the form of the utility function. Our method uses a single elicitation task and obtains individual discount rates without knowledge of risk attitude or parametric assumptions about the form of the utility function. We compare our method to a double elicitation technique in which the utility function and discount rate are jointly estimated. Our experiment shows that these methods yield consistent estimates of the discount rate, which is reassuring given the wide range of estimates in the literature. We find little evidence of probability weighting, but in a second experiment, we observe that discount rates are sensitive to the length of the front-end delay, suggesting present bias. When the front-end delay is at least two weeks, we estimate average discount rates to be 11.3 and 12.2% in the two experiments.     

Alternative libertarian claims and Sen's paradox

One of the ways of escaping from Sen's impossibility of a Paretian liberal is to weaken Sen's libertarian condition imposed on the collective choice rule. This paper compares three different versions of a revised libertarian claim: (1) Gibbard's theory of alienable rights (1974), (2) Gaertner's and Krüger's approach of self-supporting preferences (1981), and (3) a modification of Gibbard's theory which combines a weakened condition for alienating rights with the requirement of unconditional preferences. A new possibility theorem is obtained for version (3). It is shown that all three approaches are logically independent. Furthermore, it turns out that, under the original as well as the modified version of Gibbard's theory, the alienation of rights can be achieved through strategic misrepresentation of preferences by other members of society, whereas the concept of self-supporting preferences does not admit this kind of manipulation of rights. Approach (2) appears, therefore, to agree more closely with our intuitions concerning the nature of individual rights.     

The Challenges for Scientists in Avoiding Plagiarism

Although it might seem to be a simple task for scientists to avoid plagiarism and thereby an allegation of research misconduct, assessment of trainees in the Responsible Conduct of Research and recent findings from the National Science Foundation Office of Inspector General regarding plagiarism suggests otherwise. Our experiences at a land–grant academic institution in assisting researchers in avoiding plagiarism are described. We provide evidence from a university–wide multi–disciplinary course that understanding how to avoid plagiarism in scientific writing is more difficult than it might appear, and that a failure to learn the rules of appropriate citation may cause dire consequences. We suggest that new strategies to provide training in avoiding plagiarism are required.     

Promise and paradox in socioeconomic status conceptions

The author examines holistic competence and its assessment as defined in the Council for Social Work Education (CSWE’s)-EPAS 2015. Draft 3 of CSWE’s EPAS 2015 requires the use of a holistic competency model by accredited BSW and MSW social work programs. The model is an efficient way to assess student competence and overall program outcomes. Yet, this model, based on human resource concepts, is largely unfamiliar in the United States and is discussed minimally in the U.S. social work literature. This article details the goals and purposes of the model with linkage to EPAS 2015 language. Examples of methods of holistic assessment are offered to begin further professional discussion in American social work education. The strengths and limitations of this model are also identified.     

Power and size: A new paradox

An analysis of several different indices of voting power reveals that the voting power of a member of a weighted voting body may increase, rather than decrease, when new members are added to the original body. Real instances of this phenomenon, called the paradox of new members, are shown to have occurred when new states were added to the U.S. Electoral College and new countries to the European Community Council of Ministers. Conditions for the existence of the paradox, and probabilities of its occurrence in small and moderate-size voting bodies, are given. Efficient algorithms for the calculation of the voting power indices, based on generating functions, are also outlined.