Safety culture: Key theoretical issues

Abstract

The organizational preconditions to major systems failures are seen as increasingly important for risk management. However, existing empirical attempts to study safety culture and its relationship to organizational outcomes have remained fragmented and underspecified in theoretical terms. This is despite the existence of a number of well-developed theories of organizationally induced accidents and disasters. Reasons for this disfunction of theory and practice are first considered. The paper then outlines four key theoretical questions for safety culture researchers: the fact that culture acts simultaneously as a precondition both for safe operations and for the oversight of incubating hazards (the paradox of ‘safety’ culture); the challenge of dealing with complex and ill-structured hazardous situations where decision makers are faced with deep forms of uncertainty represented by incompleteness of knowledge or ignorance; the need to consider the construction of risk perceptions in workgroups, and to view risk acceptability as the outcome of a process of social negotiation; and the fact that institutional politics and power are critical for determining the achievement of safety culture goals, and in particular that of organizational learning.     

Safety culture: under-specified and overrated?

Is the measurement of ‘safety culture’ a valid management tool in the effort to reduce accident rate and improve safety performance, or is it a fuzzy academic concept, lacking empirical validation? The answer to this question seems to depend on whom one asks. The UK Health and Safety Commission has encouraged companies to improve their safety performance through the development of a ‘positive safety culture’. However, academic discussions in this area suggest that the concept remains vague, lacks empirical validation and is used as an ‘umbrella term’ for all the social and organizational factors that affect accident rate. This paper reviews the existing literature on safety culture and provides some clarification in terms of definition, empirical evidence and theoretical development. A theoretical framework of the mechanisms by which safety culture affects safety behaviours in organizations is proposed. The implications for practical management issues are discussed and future challenges and areas for further research are identified.     

Safety culture: under-specified and overrated?

Is the measurement of 'safety culture' a valid management tool in the effort to reduce accident rate and improve safety performance, or is it a fuzzy academic concept, lacking empirical validation? The answer to this question seems to depend on whom one asks. The UK Health and Safety Commission has encouraged companies to improve their safety performance through the development of a 'positive safety culture'. However, academic discussions in this area suggest that the concept remains vague, lacks empirical validation and is used as an 'umbrella term' for all the social and organizational factors that affect accident rate. This paper reviews the existing literature on safety culture and provides some clarification in terms of definition, empirical evidence and theoretical development. A theoretical framework of the mechanisms by which safety culture affects safety behaviours in organizations is proposed. The implications for practical management issues are discussed and future challenges and areas for further research are identified.     

Ethical leadership supports safety voice by increasing risk perception and reducing ethical ambiguity: Evidence from the COVID-19 pandemic

Misconduct by business and political leaders during the pandemic is feared to have impacted people's adherence to protective measures that would help to safeguard against the spread of COVID-19. Addressing this concern, this article theorizes and tests a model linking ethical leadership with workplace risk communication—a practice referred to as ‘safety voice’ in the research literature. Our study, conducted with 511 employees from UK companies, revealed that ethical leadership is positively associated with greater intention to engage in safety voice regarding COVID-19. We also find that this association is mediated by relations with the perceived health risk of COVID-19 and ambiguity about ethical decision making in the workplace. These findings therefore underscore the importance of good ethical conduct by leaders for ensuring that health and safety risks are well understood and communicated effectively by organizational members particularly during crises. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of our study and highlight further opportunities for future research to address the ethical dimensions of leadership, risk management, and organizational risk communication.     

The structure of employee attitudes to safety: A European example

This paper concerns organizational safety culture and the structure or architecture of employee attitudes to safety as part of that culture. It begins by reviewing the somewhat scant literature relevant to this area, and then reports a study, conducted in a European company, which collected and factor analysed data on employee attitudes to safety. The framework provided for the study was that offered by Purdham (1984), and the results suggested that employees' attitudes to safety, within this company (across occupation/occupational level and country), could be mapped By five orthogonal factors: personal scepticism, individual responsibility, the safeness of the work environment, the effectiveness of arrangements for safety, and personal immunity. The theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed, and attention is drawn to their subsequent use in an intervention to enhance safety culture within the organization by attacking supervisors' attitudes to safety.     

Safety sans Frontières: An International Safety Culture Model

The management of safety culture in international and culturally diverse organizations is a concern for many high‐risk industries. Yet, research has primarily developed models of safety culture within Western countries, and there is a need to extend investigations of safety culture to global environments. We examined (i) whether safety culture can be reliably measured within a single industry operating across different cultural environments, and (ii) if there is an association between safety culture and national culture. The psychometric properties of a safety culture model developed for the air traffic management (ATM) industry were examined in 17 European countries from four culturally distinct regions of Europe (North, East, South, West). Participants were ATM operational staff (n = 5,176) and management staff (n = 1,230). Through employing multigroup confirmatory factor analysis, good psychometric properties of the model were established. This demonstrates, for the first time, that when safety culture models are tailored to a specific industry, they can operate consistently across national boundaries and occupational groups. Additionally, safety culture scores at both regional and national levels were associated with country‐level data on Hofstede's five national culture dimensions (collectivism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, and long‐term orientation). MANOVAs indicated safety culture to be most positive in Northern Europe, less so in Western and Eastern Europe, and least positive in Southern Europe. This indicates that national cultural traits may influence the development of organizational safety culture, with significant implications for safety culture theory and practice.     

A Discourse on the Incorporation of Organizational Factors into Probabilistic Risk Assessment: Key Questions and Categorical Review

This article presents a discourse on the incorporation of organizational factors into probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)/probabilistic safety assessment (PSA), a topic of debate since the 1980s that has spurred discussions among industry, regulatory agencies, and the research community. The main contributions of this article include (1) identifying the four key open questions associated with this topic; (2) framing ongoing debates by considering differing perspectives around each question; (3) offering a categorical review of existing studies on this topic to justify the selection of each question and to analyze the challenges related to each perspective; and (4) highlighting the directions of research required to reach a final resolution for each question. The four key questions are: (I) How significant is the contribution of organizational factors to accidents and incidents? (II) How critical, with respect to improving risk assessment, is the explicit incorporation of organizational factors into PRA? (III) What theoretical bases are needed for explicit incorporation of organizational factors into PRA? (IV) What methodological bases are needed for the explicit incorporation of organizational factors into PRA? Questions I and II mainly analyze PRA literature from the nuclear domain. For Questions III and IV, a broader review and categorization is conducted of those existing cross-disciplinary studies that have evaluated the effects of organizational factors on safety (not solely PRA-based) to shed more light on future research needs.     

An analysis of safety culture attitudes in a highly regulated environment

Culture is a complex construct in organizations, consisting of attitudes, perceptions, values and beliefs, which must necessarily be set in context. Many authors imply that culture is organization-wide and common to all employees. In terms of safety culture, the organizational context may determine its salience and likelihood of affecting behaviour, especially in a highly regulated environment such as the nuclear industry. This study investigates the components of safety culture and how it varies in a highly-regulated nuclear power plant. A 60-item questionnaire measuring safety attitudes and values was administered anonymously to 1550 employees at two plants in the UK nuclear industry, with a 64.7% mean response rate. Principal components analyses revealed six factors conceptually common to shop floor and management (supervisor/manager/professional) groups for both plants, relating to: management style and communication; responsibility and commitment; risk-taking; job satisfaction; complacency; and risk awareness. A canonical discriminant analysis of the items suggested that the data could distinguish three employee groups. The implications of these findings and the proposal that there are two or more safety cultures in the organization is discussed.     

An analysis of safety culture attitudes in a highly regulated environment

Culture is a complex construct in organizations, consisting of attitudes, perceptions, values and beliefs, which must necessarily be set in context. Many authors imply that culture is organization-wide and common to all employees. In terms of safety culture, the organizational context may determine its salience and likelihood of affecting behaviour, especially in a highly regulated environment such as the nuclear industry. This study investigates the components of safety culture and how it varies in a highly-regulated nuclear power plant. A 60-item questionnaire measuring safety attitudes and values was administered anonymously to 1550 employees at two plants in the UK nuclear industry, with a 64.7% mean response rate. Principal components analyses revealed six factors conceptually common to shop floor and management (supervisor/manager/professional) groups for both plants, relating to: management style and communication; responsibility and commitment; risk-taking; job satisfaction; complacency; and risk awareness. A canonical discriminant analysis of the items suggested that the data could distinguish three employee groups. The implications of these findings and the proposal that there are two or more safety cultures in the organization is discussed.     

National cultures and safety orientation: A study of seafarers working for Norwegian shipping companies

Up to now, little work has been conducted on safety in relation to national culture. This paper examines the association between national culture and the safety orientation of seafarers on Norwegian-owned vessels. Safety orientation is the result of cultural, organizational, and contextual factors that create attitudes and behaviours that in turn influence safety. In this study a safety culture/orientation questionnaire was designed and used to determine risk and safety characteristics. Survey data was collected from 2,558 seafarers from 27 countries. The sample used consisted of seafarers from the 10 countries for which there were more than 10 respondents. Five national (cultural) characteristics were calculated using Hofstede's Value Survey Model 94. Multivariate analysis of variance revealed that (a) the number of nationalities represented on a vessel was related to their attitude towards safety issues, such that two-nation vessels obtain relatively negative scores regarding these issues, and (b) national culture was related to safety culture, such that high power distance, high uncertainty avoidance, and high individualism were positive for safety. The implications of these findings for practice and future research are discussed.     

企业跨部门心理安全、知识分享与组织绩效间关系的实证研究

知识分享是组织学习研究领域中的一个热点话题,本研究旨在探讨跨部门心理安全对组织内部知识分享以及组织绩效的影响机制。本文实证研究发现,组织跨部门心理安全与组织知识分享、组织绩效之间均存在"倒U"关系,而知识分享会对组织绩效的提升产生正向影响,知识分享在跨部门心理安全对组织绩效的作用中扮演中介角色。研究发现有助于加深我们对跨部门心理安全与组织知识分享、组织绩效间作用关系的深入了解,为企业管理实践提供有益的借鉴和启示。     

Exploring the Effects of Cultural Variables in the Implementation of Behavior-Based Safety in Two Organizations

Abstract

The present case study examines how culture can influence behavior-based safety in different organizational settings and how behavior-based safety can impact different organizational cultures. Behavior-based safety processes implemented in two culturally diverse work settings are described. Specifically, despite identical implementation plans, similarities and differences in the actual implementation of the two behavior-based safety processes are presented with an emphasis on the effects of employee-driven decisions. Data on both implementations and outcome measures are provided. The results are discussed with respect to the potential impact of specific cultural variables.     

Complements or Substitutes? Culture–Technology Interactions in Healthcare

The U.S. government recommends that hospitals adopt Computerized Provider Order Entry (CPOE) systems to improve the quality problems that plague U.S. hospitals. However, CPOE studies show mixed results. We hypothesize that CPOE effectiveness depends on the prevalence of patient safety culture within a hospital. Using organizational information processing theory, we describe how patient safety culture and CPOE enable healthcare organizations to better process information. Specifically, we posit that CPOE complements some aspects of patient safety culture and substitutes for others. Using ridge regression, we empirically test this proposition using data from 268 hospitals and multiple data sources. Results show that while CPOE complements the patient safety dimensions of handoffs and transitions, feedback and communication about error, and organizational learning, CPOE substitutes for the dimension of management support for safety, in the context of our dependent variable. As organizations work to implement new systems, this research can help decision‐makers understand how culture impacts such initiatives and account for culture when anticipating effects.     

More than a Metaphor: Organizational Identity Makes Organizational Life Possible

Recent papers by Cornelissen (2002a, 2002b) and Gioia, Schultz and Corley (2002a, 2002b ) have debated the utility of organizational identity as a metaphor for understanding organizational life. In the present paper we argue that this debate is limiting because it frames issues of organizational identity purely in metaphorical terms and fails to explore the social psychological basis and consequences of the discontinuity between personal and organizational identity. Extending this debate, we argue that the power of organizational identity as a theoretical and applied construct derives from the fact that it has the capacity to be both an externally shared and negotiated product and an internalized aspect of the collective self. Consistent with recent research informed by the social identity approach to organizational psychology, we discuss how an appreciation of the identity‐based dynamic between the social facts of organizations and the socially‐structured psychology of organizational members is essential for both theoretical and practical understanding of organizational life.     

Measuring safety climate on offshore installations

The human and organizational factors affecting safety were examined on 10 offshore installations using the Offshore Safety Questionnaire. The questionnaire contained scales measuring work pressure and work clarity, job communication, safety behaviour, risk perception, satisfaction with safety measures and safety attitudes. A total of 722 UK offshore workers (33% response rate) from a range of occupations completed and returned the questionnaire. The 'safety climates' on the various installations were characterized by most respondents feeling 'safe' with respect to a range of offshore hazards and expressing 'satisfaction' with safety measures. Respondents reported little risk-taking behaviour and felt positive about levels of work clarity and job communication. There was a wider diversity of opinions on the safety attitudes scale, indicating a lack of a positive, concerted 'safety culture' and more evidence for a range offragmented 'safety subcultures', which varied mainly as a function of seniority, occupation, age, shift worked and prior accident involvement. It is suggested that the interaction between these differing subcultures partly determines the prevailing 'safety climate' on any given installation. The UK oil and gas industry is now trying to improve its safety culture through the 'Stepchange' initiative, which hias set itself three main targets for the year 2000 : a 50 YO improvement in the industry's safety performance; safety performance contracts demonstrating leadership's personal concern for safety as an equal to business performance and encouraging industry members to work together to improve sharing of safety information and good practice. It is suggested that the existence of a strong, cohesive culture with respect to safety is not necessarily beneficial, possibly leading to 'dry rot' and complacency. A healthy culture may be represented by a range of assumptions, values, norms and expectations as reflected in employees' differing experiences of safety climate.     

Explicit and Implicit Trust Within Safety Culture

Safety culture is an important topic for managers in high-hazard industries because a deficient safety culture has been linked to organizational accidents. Many researchers have argued that trust plays a central role in models of safety culture but trust has rarely been measured in safety culture/climate studies. This article used explicit (direct) and implicit (indirect) measures to assess trust at a UK gas plant. Explicit measures assessed trust by asking workers to consider and state their attitude to attitude objects. Implicit measures assessed trust in a more subtle way by using a priming task that relies on automatic attitude activation. The results show that workers expressed explicit trust for their workmates, supervisors, and senior managers, but only expressed implicit trust for their workmates. The article proposes a model that conceptualizes explicit trust as part of the surface levels of safety culture and implicit trust as part of the deeper levels of safety culture. An unintended finding was the positive relationship between implicit measures of trust and distrust, which suggests that trust and distrust are separate constructs. The article concludes by considering the implications for safety culture and trust and distrust in high-hazard industries.     

(Mis)understanding Safety Culture and Its Relationship to Safety Management

Although the concept of safety culture was coined in relation to major accidents like Chernobyl and Piper Alpha, it has been embraced by the safety community at large as a cause for unsafe practice. In this article, three approaches to safety culture are discussed in terms of their underlying concepts of culture and organizational culture. Culture is an intangible, fuzzy concept encompassing acquired assumptions that is shared among the members of a group and that provides meaning to their perceptions and actions and those of others. The basic assumptions that form the essence of a culture are shared, yet tacit, convictions, which manifest themselves subtly in the visible world. As applied by safety researchers, the culture concept is deprived of much of its depth and subtlety, and is morphed into a grab bag of behavioral and other visible characteristics, without reference to the meaning these characteristics might actually have, and often infused with normative overtones. By combining the three approaches, we can resurrect the notion of safety culture and strengthen its analytical potential in understanding the development and implementation of safety management systems.     

Improving Risk Management: From Lame Excuses to Principled Practice

The three classic pillars of risk analysis are risk assessment (how big is the risk and how sure can we be?), risk management (what shall we do about it?), and risk communication (what shall we say about it, to whom, when, and how?). We propose two complements as important parts of these three bases: risk attribution (who or what addressable conditions actually caused an accident or loss?) and learning from experience about risk reduction (what works, and how well?). Failures in complex systems usually evoke blame, often with insufficient attention to root causes of failure, including some aspects of the situation, design decisions, or social norms and culture. Focusing on blame, however, can inhibit effective learning, instead eliciting excuses to deflect attention and perceived culpability. Productive understanding of what went wrong, and how to do better, thus requires moving past recrimination and excuses. This article identifies common blame‐shifting “lame excuses” for poor risk management. These generally contribute little to effective improvements and may leave real risks and preventable causes unaddressed. We propose principles from risk and decision sciences and organizational design to improve results. These start with organizational leadership. More specifically, they include: deliberate testing and learning—especially from near‐misses and accident precursors; careful causal analysis of accidents; risk quantification; candid expression of uncertainties about costs and benefits of risk‐reduction options; optimization of tradeoffs between gathering additional information and immediate action; promotion of safety culture; and mindful allocation of people, responsibilities, and resources to reduce risks. We propose that these principles provide sound foundations for improving successful risk management.     

Transformational Leadership,Organizational Clan Culture,Organizational Affective Commitment,and Organizational Citizenship Behavior: A Case of South Korea's Public Sector

The present study examines whether transformational leadership is associated with clan culture, affective commitment, and organizational citizenship behavior and whether affective commitment is positively related to organizational citizenship behavior. The study also examines whether affective commitment mediates the effects of clan culture on organizational citizenship behavior and whether clan culture mediates the effects of transformational leadership on affective commitment. The results of this study indicate a positive relationship between transformational leadership and clan culture as well as between transformational leadership and affective commitment; no significant relationship between clan culture and organizational citizenship behavior as well as between transformational leadership and organizational citizenship behavior; and a significant positive relationship between affective commitment and organizational citizenship behavior as well as between clan culture and affective commitment . Thus, the results clearly show that affective commitment fully mediates the relationship between clan culture and organizational citizenship behavior and that clan culture partially mediates the relationship between transformational leadership and affective commitment. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings as well as interesting avenues for future research are discussed.     

战略聚焦视角下的文化特性与新产品创造力研究

 基于竞争价值框架和战略理论,在新产品开发过程中,企业文化特性与战略聚焦因素的有效适应或协同对新产品创造力有积极的影响作用。企业文化特性是指一组企业成员所共享的价值观、规范、信仰和群体性认知,能够影响并塑造组织成员的认知、动机和能力,因而在新产品研发阶段对企业产生新想法和解决创造性问题的能力均有重要影响。目前相关研究已开始探讨员工所处的企业文化环境对其新颖而有用想法的产生能力(即创造力)的影响。但鲜有研究在企业层面分析企业文化特性与企业战略的交互对新产品创造力的作用机理。        从竞争价值框架和战略聚焦视角出发,深入分析企业不同文化特性与新产品创造力之间的作用关系,建立基于战略聚焦视角的文化特性-创造力匹配模型,并实证检验新产品开发过程中两类企业文化特性对新产品创造力的影响以及战略聚焦变量在这一过程中的调节机理。为了揭示企业文化特性影响新产品创造力的作用机理,在直接检验柔性导向文化和控制导向文化与新产品创造力关系的基础上,深入分析并检验组织内外部战略聚焦变量(长期导向和企业家导向）对上述关系的调节作用。        以209家中国企业为研究对象进行实证研究,结果表明柔性导向文化和控制导向文化均正向促进新产品创造力;企业家导向正向调节柔性导向文化和控制导向文化与新产品创造力之间的关系;而长期导向对柔性导向文化和控制导向文化与新产品创造力之间关系的调节作用是非线性、倒U形的,即在新产品开发过程中,中等强度的长期导向对企业两种类型文化与新产品创造力的促进作用最强。        研究结论为探讨企业文化特性的激励效能提供了新的理论视角,并对企业在新产品开发过程中的战略聚焦规划和创造力管理有重要的实践指导意义。