Propitious selection in insurance

The theory of propitious selection suggests that there are risk-avoiding personalities who both take physical precautions and buy financial security (insurance). Conversely, there are risk seekers who tend to do neither. Survey evidence is presented that is consistent with the theory. Individuals who obtain motor vehicle liability coverage are less likely than others to drink-and-drive, and are more likely to engage in health-beneficial (risk-avoiding) behaviors. Propitious selection may be a general phenomenon promoting favorable selection in many real world insurance markets.This research was supported by the Harvard Injury Control Center, funded by the Centers for Disease Control. Special thanks to Jennifer Carter, Sara Solnick, and also to Beth Sprinkel of the Insurance Research Council. Useful suggestions were received from Eric Latimer, Roger Davis, Marcello Pagano, and anonymous reviewers. The raw data were obtained from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research in Storrs, Connecticut.     

医疗服务机构在医疗保险逆选择中的角色扮演

医疗保险中存在的逆选择问题阻碍了我国医疗保险事业发展。从医疗保险逆选择过程的第三方即医疗服务机构角度出发探究如何解决逆选择困境,结合预期效用理论对医疗服务机构在逆选择过程的角色扮演作出阐述,指出医疗服务机构行为构成逆选择的重要制约因素,认为实施群组保险等解决逆选择困境的措施必须与医疗服务机构改革相结合才能取得成效。     

Adverse selection and equilibrium in liability insurance markets

Models of asymmetric information in insurance markets typically consider insurance buyers with Bernoulli loss distributions differing in expected loss. This article analyzes markets where buyer loss distributions are characterized by mean-preserving spreads and insurers can classify applicants in terms of expected values but not by risk. Because liability losses are characterized by skewed continuous probability distributions, both discrete and continuous loss distributions are considered. In contrast to the single separating equilibrium in the classic Rothschild-Stiglitz insurance market, multiple separating equilibria are identified in this article: three in the discrete case and four in the continuous case. The possibility of extreme discontinuities in insurer policy offers provides a new explanation for crises in liability insurance markets.The support of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners is gratefully acknowledged.     

An Evolutionary Analysis of Buyer Insurance and Seller Reputation in Online Markets

Applying an evolutionary framework, we investigate how a reputation mechanism and a buyer insurance (as used on Internet market platforms such as eBay) interact to promote trustworthiness and trust in markets with moral hazard problems. Our analysis suggests that the costs involved in giving reliable feedback determine the gains from trade that can be obtained in equilibrium. Buyer insurance, on the other hand, can affect the trading dynamics and equilibrium selection. We find that, under reasonable conditions, buyer insurance crowds out trust, and trustworthiness. Ockenfels gratefully acknowledges the support of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. Mengel’s research was supported by the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science (grant SEJ 2004-02172).