Increases in childlessness in New Zealand

New Zealand’s fertility fell below the theoretical replacement level (2.1 births per woman) for the first time in recorded history in 1978. It has hovered at or below replacement level ever since. The result, an impression of relative stability, belies changes taking place. Data from the 1981, 1996 and 2006 censuses show a pattern of delayed childbearing and increased childlessness. In a little over 30 years, childlessness has shifted from being almost entirely a consequence of a couple’s infecundity to being as frequently a result of a woman’s life choices. The steady rises in childlessness recorded by successive cohorts suggest that childlessness is already having a significant effect on New Zealand fertility. Patterns in characteristics of those women choosing not to start families, as well as subtle differences in these patterns between New Zealand and other developed nations, suggest that there is a significant potential for childlessness to cause a more dramatic shift in New Zealand’s total fertility rate. This analysis examines growth in childlessness in relation to marital status, country of birth, ethnicity, regional and urban differentials, religion, and educational attainment of women who were childless at the 1981, 1996 and 2006 censuses.

Bargaining over family size: The determinants of fertility in Brazil

Understanding how households make fertility decisions is important to implementing effective policy to slow population growth. Most empirical studies of this decision are based on household models in which men and women are assumed to act as if they have the same preferences for the number of children. However, if men and women have different preferences regarding fertility and are more likely to assert their own preferences as their bargaining power in the household increases, policies to lower fertility rates may be more effectively targeted toward one spouse or the other. In this paper, we test the relevance of the single preferences model by investigating whether men and women's nonwage incomes have the same effects on the number of children in the household. We find that while increases in both the man and woman's nonwage income lower the number of children in the household, an equivalent increase in the woman's income has a significantly stronger effect than the man's. In addition, we find that increases in women's nonwage transfer income have the strongest effects on the fertility decisions of women with low levels of education. The most important policy implication of our results is that policies aimed at increasing the incomes of the least-educated women will be the most effective in lowering fertility rates.     

What are the determinants of delayed childbearing and permanent childlessness in the United States?

This paper presents estimates of delayed childbearing and permanent childlessness in the United States and the determinants of those phenomena. The estimates are derived by fitting the Coale-McNeil marriage model to survey data on age at first birth and by letting the parameters of the model depend on covariates. Substantively, the results provide evidence that the low first birth fertility rates experienced in the 1970s were due to both delayed childbearing and to increasing levels of permanent childlessness. The results also indicate that (a) delayed childbearing is less prevalent among black women than among nonblack women; (b) education is an important determinant of delayed childbearing whose influence on this phenomenon seems to be increasing across cohorts; (c) education is positively associated with heterogeneity among women in their age at first birth; (d) the dispersion of age at first birth is increasing across cohorts; (e) race has an insignificant effect on childlessness; and (f) education is positively associated with childlessness, with the effect of education increasing and reaching strikingly high levels for the most recent cohorts.     

A narrowing gap? Trends in the childlessness of professional women in Australia 1986–2006

This paper examines whether the gap in fertility between women with higher education and in professional occupations and other women has narrowed or widened over time in Australia. Using data from the Australian Census of Population and Housing 1986, 1996 and 2006, the paper focuses on levels of childlessness. Both working women (using occupational categories) and all women (using educational attainment) aged between 20 and 44 were examined. Focusing particularly on women working in, or qualified for, some selected high-prestige professions (doctors, lawyers, dentists and vets), as well as on women with other tertiary qualifications and working in other professional or managerial occupations, the findings suggest that, between 1986 and 2006, childlessness has grown at a slower rate for women with tertiary education than for all women, although women with tertiary education continue to have the highest proportion of childlessness. Our findings for working women were similar, with women working in selected prestigious occupations having the highest rates of childlessness of all working women, but with this growing at a slower rate than was the case overall.     

Fertility trends in Australia

Using published data from the Australian vital registration and census systems, several time series are compiled: crude birth rates from the 1860s; fertility rates from the 1880s; age-specific and parity-specific measures from the 191Os; cumulative fertility measures by birth year of parent beginning with the 1890s; and cumulative fertility measures for marriages by year contracted from the 1910s.The decline in fertility to the 1930s, the upswing to 1961, and declines thereafter revealed by annual fertility measures show far more variation than do measures of total generation fertility—2.7 children per woman born in 1893–95, 2.3 1906–10, 2.8 1921–25, and perhaps 3.0 for women born in the 1930s. Both annual and generation measures show a younger age at parenthood, a decrease in childlessness, and progressively fewer large families. In the light of present experience, it seems not unreasonable to project generation fertility of 2.5 children, implying a crude birth rate of about 20 per thousand for the next fifteen years or so.     

Does female circumcision affect infertility and fertility? A study of the central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, and Tanzania

This study explores the association between female circumcision and infertility and fertility, using information from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS). In Côte d’Ivoire and Tanzania, circumcised women had lower childlessness, lower infertility by age, and higher total fertility rates than women who were not circumcised; the reverse pattern prevailed in the Central African Republic. In all three countries, however, circumcised women grouped by age at circumcision did not have significantly different odds of infertility nor of having a child than did uncircumcised women, when the effects of covariates were controlled. Thus we find evidence suggesting that the practice of female circumcision does not have a statistically discernible effect on women’s ability to reproduce.     

Costs and benefits of children: implications for population policy

Family size preferences are strongly affected by parents' perceptions of the value, economic contributions, and costs of children. Better understanding of these factors can help policy-makers to improve the effectiveness of population IEC campaigns, design strategies to persuade couples to have smaller families, assess the relationship between economic development and family size preferences, and devise national population policies and family planning programs that reflect individual choices. Parents in high-fertility countries are more likely to perceive children as productive investments than those in low-fertility countries. Parents in the former countries maintain children are an economic advantage or provide practical assistance in the household; they are less likely to emphasize the psychological advantages of children. As economic development occurs, and parents no longer value children for their economic contributions, psychological and social reasons become more important. Changing fertility preferences is more complex than providing couples with family planning services. Similarly, efforts to persuade families that large families are a burden are successful only when families are already interested in reducing their family size. Efforts to persuade couples to have smaller families are likely to be more successful if there are alternative sources of old-age support available, for example, from increased household savings, public or private pensions, or greater contributions from 1st and 2nd children. Investments in education and training, especially for women and children, would also support these goals.     

Involuntary childlessness and voluntary fertility control during the fertility transition: Evidence from men who graduated from an American college

Abstract. Influences on the fertility of men during the American fertility decline are examined using a sample of about 1700 married men born between 1830 and 1880, all of whom attended Amherst College, Massachusetts. We consider two types of reduced fertility: involuntary childlessness as a function of health in early adulthood, and voluntary fertility control as a function of access to contraceptive technology. The relation between health, as measured by body mass index, and childlessness was nonlinear, with average sized men significantly more likely ever to father children than thin or bulky men. Among men who ever fathered a child, physicians fathered significantly fewer children while having probabilities of childlessness that were statistically indistinguishable from those of other men. Physicians may have had greater access to relatively new contraceptive technologies, which suggests a role for voluntary fertility control.     

Comparing characteristics of voluntarily childless men and women

Voluntary childlessness among women has been well researched, but the theories derived from that work may not apply to men. In this paper, we test whether or not female-derived explanations of voluntary childlessness are applicable to voluntarily childless men. We use US data from the National Survey of Family Growth to compare voluntarily childless men to other men and to voluntarily childless women in an effort to determine the distinctions between groups. We examine four long-held explanations of female voluntary childlessness and test their application to men: demographic, socialization, economic, and attitudinal differences. We find that demographic and socialization variables predict voluntary childlessness in both men and women similarly. Traditional sex role belief decreases the probability of being voluntarily childless for both men and women, though the effect is slightly stronger for women. However, variables associated with economic theory do not predict voluntary childlessness for men. Most importantly, education is not a significant predictor of voluntary childlessness for men, while it greatly increases the chances of being voluntarily childless among women. We conclude that new theories of voluntary childlessness need to be developed or existing theories refined to take into account the gendered routes to childlessness—especially theories explaining the different effect of education on men’s and women’s childlessness.     

Fertility patterns of college graduates by field of study,US women born 1960–79

Building on recent European studies, we used the Survey of Income and Program Participation to provide the first analysis of fertility differences between groups of US college graduates by their undergraduate field of study. We used multilevel event-history models to investigate possible institutional and selection mechanisms linking field of study to delayed fertility and childlessness. The results are consistent with those found for Europe in showing an overall difference of 10 percentage points between levels of childlessness across fields, with the lowest levels occurring for women in health and education, intermediate levels for women in science and technology, and the highest levels for women in arts and social sciences. The mediating roles of the following field characteristics were assessed: motherhood employment penalties; percentage of men; family attitudes; and marriage patterns. Childlessness was higher among women in fields with a moderate representation of men, less traditional family attitudes, and late age at first marriage.     

儿童照料与二孩生育意愿 ——来自上海的证据

本文围绕一项针对上海市育龄女性的生育意愿调查,分别使用二分和有序Logit方法分析儿童照顾对上海市育龄女性的二孩生育意愿的影响。研究发现当育龄女性能够从家庭内和社会中获得更多孩子照料的时间支持时,她们有更高的二孩生育意愿,也会伴有更明确的二孩生育规划;双独家庭能够从父辈获得更多的经济、时间上的帮助,因此他们要比单独家庭和双非家庭更愿意再生一个孩子;居住于上海市城区的女性从某种程度上更易获得孩子的照料资源,有更多的优质教育资源可供选择,因此她们的二孩生育意愿高于居住于郊区的女性。此外,本文通过是否采用了避孕措施对二孩生育的意愿程度做了进一步区分,结果发现当第一个孩子主要是由孩子父母承担照料工作的时候,女性存在二孩生育意愿的程度是最低的,祖辈照料对二孩生育意愿程度的积极影响也明显低于社会性照料,此现象在上海市户籍的女性中体现尤为明显。最后为纠正自选择偏差问题,本文使用倾向值匹配方法(PSM)进一步验证了与首孩性别相比,首孩的抚养成本与接受照料情况显然对二孩生育意愿的影响程度更大。因此,本文认为加大公共托育服务的供给、为育龄女性提供高质量的0-3岁婴幼儿社会照料支持是提高二孩生育意愿的最有效政策。     

Parity-specific fertility intentions and uncertainty: the United States, 1970 to 1976

A theoretical and analytic model of fertility intentions is proposed which treats “don’t know” responses and other uncertain responses as distinct from more firm intentions. Methodologically, these analyses show that “don’t know” responses need not be treated as missing data, but instead are both valid and meaningful responses. Furthermore, eliminating these uncertain respondents would have the negative effects of distorting across survey comparisons in intentions due to shifts in aggregate uncertainty, reducing the likelihood of accurately detecting shifts in fertility intentions, and lessening the representatives of the sample analyzed. Substantively, in conjunction with Morgan (1981), these results show that the sharp 1965–76 decline in the likelihood of intending more births at parities 2 through 5 occurred as women halted childbearing at minimal acceptable levels and postponed further childbearing. With time (or age), this delayed fertility became fertility about which the respondent was uncertain and, finally, fertility foregone. Since 1970, similar shifts are observed at parities 0 and 1, perhaps foreshadowing an increase in voluntary childlessness and one-child families.     

Peers and Fertility Preferences: An Empirical Investigation of the Role of Neighbours,Religion and Education

Individual fertility preference is influenced by observed social norms. The present paper investigates the effect of the observed fertility of peers on a woman’s fertility preference. We explore the role of two peer groups: neighbourhood peers and religious peers. Data from the National Family Health Surveys (1992–1993, 1998–1999 and 2005–2006) in India is employed for empirical estimations using a multinomial logit model. We find that both neighbourhood and religious peers have a significant impact on individual fertility preferences, but their relative importance changes with family size. An increase in peer fertility increases the probability of preferring more children. We further examine the roles of education and wealth as transmission channels between the fertility norms of peers to the fertility preferences of the women and find that education plays an important role in moderating peer influences. These findings can serve as vital inputs in formulating family planning and gender policies.     

Is Stepfamily Status Associated With Cohabiting and Married Women’s Fertility Behaviors?

Children from prior relationships potentially complicate fertility decision-making in new cohabitations and marriages. On the one hand, the “value of children” perspective suggests that unions with and without stepchildren have similar—and deliberate—reasons for shared childbearing. On the other hand, multipartnered fertility (MPF) research suggests that childbearing across partnerships is often unintended. Using the 2006–2010 National Survey of Family Growth and event-history models, I examine the role of stepfamily status on cohabiting and married women’s fertility and birth intendedness, with attention to union type and stepfamily configuration. Adjusting for covariates, women in stepfamily unions are more likely to have a first shared birth in a union than women in unions in which neither partner has children from past relationships, but stepfamily births are less likely to be intended than unintended. Further, this association varies by union type: married women have similar birth risks across stepfamily status, but births are less likely to be intended in marital stepfamilies. For cohabitors, women in a stepfamily are more likely to have a birth than women in nonstepfamily unions, with no differences in intendedness. Configuration (whose children and how many) also matters; for instance, women with one child from a past relationship are more likely to have a birth and to have an intended than unintended birth than women with other stepfamily configurations. It appears that children from either partner’s prior relationships influences subsequent fertility decision-making, undermining the utility of the “value of children” perspective for explaining childbearing behaviors in complex families.     

Childless or Childfree? Paths to Voluntary Childlessness in Italy

This article investigates childlessness in Italy. Trends in childlessness are presented and compared with trends elsewhere in Europe. Different paths to childlessness are outlined, using data from a survey carried out among childless women aged 40‐44 in five Italian cities in 2002. Individual characteristics of the childless and reasons for childlessness are investigated. As many as one‐third of the interviewees who live with a partner and do not suffer from any physical impediment are voluntarily childless. These women, in contrast to mothers, appear to be less religious and to have partners who are less religious; they tend to come from smaller families; to have been in a nonmarital cohabitation at least once in life; to have entered their first union later; and to have had, in the initial period of their union, temporary work and flexible work schedules and limited leisure time. In other cases, childlessness is the unintended outcome of a decision to delay having a child or the result of adverse external circumstances, particularly dissolution of partnership.     

Voluntary childlessness: A review of the evidence and implications

This paper reviews evidence on the incidence, correlates, and implications of voluntary childlessness in the United States. Overall, the evidence points toward the increasing prevalence of this phenomenon, with some analysts projecting that as much as 30 percent of recent cohorts of American women will remain permanently childless. These high rates are shown to be similar in magnitude to rates of childlessness projected for recent cohorts of women in several European countries with fertility patterns comparable to those of the United States. Explanations for the increasing prevalence of childlessness are also considered. The second half of this paper examines existing evidence on the correlates of voluntary childlessness. In this connection, special attention is paid to education, area of residence, labor force status, income, and geographic mobility. This section also explores the implications of increasing childlessness and selected ways to redistribute the cost of children.     

On the tempo of childbearing in England and Wales

Abstract The paper describes a computerized model developed to simulate the fertility of a hypothetical marriage cohort in a closed population. The model was applied to England and Wales fertility data of marriage cohorts of the years 1951 to 1970. For each of these cohorts, the computer was programmed to construct five series of tables showing birth-order probabilities, family size frequency distribution, mean length of intervals between marriage and successive births, parity progression ratios and mean family sizes of fertile women. The results showed that the fertility of the cohorts of women who married between the middle 1950s and the early 1960s was character ized by a declining trend in the frequency of childlessness and by a dramatic increase in the proportion of marriages with two or more children. Since 1964 or so, there has been a downward trend in duration-specific birth-order probabilities. The analysis suggests that the recent drop in fertility may well prove to be the effect of an upward shift in the timing of births as well as a fall in completed fertility.     

The demography of words: The global decline in non-numeric fertility preferences, 1993–2011

This paper examines the decline in non-numeric responses to questions about fertility preferences among women in the developing world. These types of response—such as ‘don’t know’ or ‘it’s up to God’—have often been interpreted through the lens of fertility transition theory as an indication that reproduction has not yet entered women’s ‘calculus of conscious choice’. However, this has yet to be investigated cross-nationally and over time. Using 19?years of data from 32 countries, we find that non-numeric fertility preferences decline most substantially in the early stages of a country’s fertility transition. Using country-specific and multilevel models, we explore the individual- and contextual-level characteristics associated with women’s likelihood of providing a non-numeric response to questions about their fertility preferences. Non-numeric fertility preferences are influenced by a host of social factors, with educational attainment and knowledge of contraception being the most robust and consistent predictors.     

A demographic study of the British ducal families

The available records of the ducal families of the British Isles have been studied in order to determine fertility and mortality among the highest social class.

The expectation of life was considerably higher for females than males, but a large part of the difference could be explained by deaths from violence. Mortality fell rather abruptly about the middle of the eighteenth century, and perhaps again in the twentieth century. At other times mortality has fallen gradually.

The mortality of the aristocracy was similar in Britain and the Continent. The differences are rather in favour of Britain, especially for children and old people.

The mean age at marriage rose from 22 to 29 for men, and from 17 to 24 for women, between the fourteenth and the eighteenth centuries. Thereafter it has scarcely varied. Eldest sons have always married at younger ages than did their brothers.

Between about 1760 and 1860, the rate of fertility was remarkbly high. To a large extent, falling mortality accounts for the sudden rise in fertility in the mid-18th century, but it does not explain all the increase. After 1860 or so, fertility fell, as in the general population, and at present ducal families are just failing to reproduce themselves.

In every period, roughly one in six of all marriages of completed fertility were childless. The decline in fertility was thus brought about by a reduction in the proportion of large families.

Especially since 1700, marriages into another peerage family produced more children than did other marriages. There is no evidence that the first child was significantly more often male than were subsequent children.