Risk preferences and the timing of marriage and childbearing

The existing literature on marriage and fertility decisions pays little attention to the roles played by risk preferences and uncertainty. However given uncertainty regarding the availability of suitable marriage partners, the ability to contracept, and the ability to conceive, women's risk preferences might be expected to play an important role in marriage and fertility timing decisions. By using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), I find that measured risk preferences have a significant effect on the timing of both marriage and fertility. Highly risk-tolerant women are more likely to delay marriage, consistent with either a search model of marriage or a risk-pooling explanation. In addition, risk preferences affect fertility timing in a way that differs by marital status and education, and that varies over the life cycle. Greater tolerance for risk leads to earlier births at young ages, consistent with these women being less likely to contracept effectively. In addition, as the subgroup of college-educated, unmarried women nears the end of their fertile periods, highly risk-tolerant women are likely to delay childbearing relative to their more risk-averse counterparts and are therefore less likely to become mothers. These findings may have broader implications for both individual and societal well-being.     

Fertility Differences between the Majority and Minority Nationality Groups in China

There is an extensive sociological and demographic literature about why racial and ethnic minority groups in the U.S. have different levels of fertility, usually higher, than the majority white group. The four major hypotheses are the subcultural hypothesis, the social characteristics hypothesis, the minority group status hypothesis, and the economic hypothesis. In this paper we focus on fertility patterns of the majority Han and the larger minority groups in China and examine the degree to which the above hypotheses may be useful in articulating the reasons why the fertility of the Han majority differs from that of the minorities. We first present a brief historical review of the genesis and development of the majority and minority nationalities in China. We next present short vignettes of each of the eight minority nationalities we will be examining. We then review the Western literature on fertility differentials between majority and minority nationalities, and summarize the theoretical expectations behind the four prominent hypotheses to be tested. Finally, we present the results of the analysis, and draw out the implications of our work.     

Minority status and family size: A comparison of explanations

Summary In this study, the family sizes of Chinese, Japanese and Filipino Americans are compared with those of whites, using data from the 1970 public use samples for California and Hawaii. The two hypotheses derived from the 'minority status' hypothesis are tested; the latter states that minorities experience tensions and anxiety which lead to lower fertility compared with native whites of Anglo-Saxon ancestry under certain conditions. We also examine the effect of assimilation in terms of variables known to affect fertility, and control for several age and acculturation variables. Analysis, based on a regression decomposition model, gives some support to the argument that the family size of minority groups differs from that of native whites because of incomplete assimilation and because independent variables affect fertility differently. However, since the independent effect of minority status per se is generally to raise fertility for Japanese and Chinese Americans, and lower it for Filipinos, we reject this version of the minority status hypothesis. Our general conclusion is that family size differentials in a pluralistic society may be part of a persisting pattern of sub-cultural differentiation, and do not necessarily reflect any 'tensions and anxiety' of minority status.     

Population development and changes of China's minority nationalities]

The People's Republic of China (PRC) is a nation composed of many ethnic groups. After the Communist victory of 1947, the government announced that there were 55 minority nationalities. The 1982 census provides demographic statistics concerning the position of those minorities within the population of the PRC. Since 1964, minority population has increased more rapidly than the population of the Han majority. Between 1953 and 1982, China's population increased 73.2%. The Han population increased 71.2%, the minorities, 90.4%. According to the 1982 census, the total fertility rate of the village-dwelling minorities in 1981 was 5.1%, while the fertility rate of the majority was 2.7%. The mortality rate of the various minorities decreased to the level of that of the Han. Consequently, the percentage of minorities in the total population also increased, from 5.8% of the total population in 1964 to 6.7% in 1982. The reasons for this increase include the following: the change in population reproduction brought about by democratic and socialist reform; the identification of minorities; improvement in health and medical facilities; the reinstatement of and change in racial minority policy promulgated in 1978; and intermarriage between minorities and Han Chinese. Although the minorities account for only 6.7% of China's total population, their distribution constitutes 62.5% of the nation's total area. In the past, the minorities have scattered to the various parts of the country and mingled with other ethnic groups. The high density of minorities is concentrated in the plains where the climate is mild and agricultural produce, such as wheat, rice, and corn, are cultivated. The lowest density areas with respect to the minorities are the inland highlands, deserts, and cold pastoral areas. The age structure of the minorities is young; the marriageable population is numerous; and the fertility rate is high. The educational standard of the minorities has been greatly enhanced, but is still lower than that of the Han Chinese.     

Shifting shares of the population and U.S. fertility

American fertility, as measured by the total fertility rate, apparently has been climbing since 1988 and could approach replacement level in 1990. Three possible explanations are explored: incorrect denominators, actual fertility increase, and changing ethnic proportions of the population. Using California data as a surrogate for the nation, it is found that at least part of the gain in fertility is attributable to what is called "shifting shares." Given that minorities have higher fertility than the majority, as these groups increase their share of the population, the nation's fertility can be expected to continue climbing. Any attempt to attain zero population growth must therefore be postponed indefinitely.     

Minority status and family size: A comparison of explanations

In this study, the family sizes of Chinese, Japanese and Filipino Americans are compared with those of whites, using data from the 1970 public use samples for California and Hawaii. The two hypotheses derived from the ‘minority status’ hypothesis are tested; the latter states that minorities experience tensions and anxiety which lead to lower fertility compared with native whites of Anglo-Saxon ancestry under certain conditions. We also examine the effect of assimilation in terms of variables known to affect fertility, and control for several age and acculturation variables.

Analysis, based on a regression decomposition model, gives some support to the argument that the family size of minority groups differs from that of native whites because of incomplete assimilation and because independent variables affect fertility differently. However, since the independent effect of minority status per se is generally to raise fertility for Japanese and Chinese Americans, and lower it for Filipinos, we reject this version of the minority status hypothesis. Our general conclusion is that family size differentials in a pluralistic society may be part of a persisting pattern of sub-cultural differentiation, and do not necessarily reflect any ‘tensions and anxiety’ of minority status.     

Transitional stages and identity boundaries: the case of ethnic minorities in China

At the advent of the Republic in China in 1911, the minority issue took on its real dimension. Its founder Sun Yat Sen, aware of the fragility of the new Nation-State, and turning a deaf ear to the statistical evidence, tried to minimize the influence of the minorities and to enhance, in his writings and speeches, the demographic supremacy of the Hans. On the contrary, the communist regime since the very start (1949) made a full-fledge recognition (including religion as a criterionr of ethnic minorities. There are now 55 minority groups, amounting to 120 million inhabitants, almost 10% of the population. This article explores the relationship between fertility trends since 1970, as depicted in the single age and sex structures in the 1990 census, and socio-economic, cultural and religious factors. Most sinicized minorities (Manchu, Mongols, Koreans …) have more or less followed the same pace of fertility transition as the Hans, under the yoke of the tough restrictive population policy. On the other hand, fertility trends among the less sinicized groups (Tibetans, Uigurs, Kazakhs and Kirgiz), have been largely at odds with the mainstream Han group. Their fertility remained high at the very moments when it was sharply reduced among Hans and decreased when Han fertility was remaining almost stable. This reflcts the fact that the Chinese authorities have conceded substantial privileges to their minorities, especially in the frontiers by relaxing the family planning policy. Religion as such does not emerge as a key explanatory variable explaining fertility differences. Hence, fertility among Moslem minorities has diverged to a great extent among the more integrated Hui minority, on the one hand, and the Turkic ones (Uigurs, Kazakhs and Kirgiz), on the other. Whereas the patterns of the Hui fertility were always in line with those of the Hans, the Xinjiang populations have displayed a higher than expected fertility, which might be a demographic response to the ambitions of the central government, whose aim was to strenghten its buffer-zone in the Turkic regions by drowning them under the masses of Han immigrants. The proportion of ethnic Chinese in Xinjiang has thus increased from a mere 7% in 1953 to some 40% today. However, this proportion is unstable and likely to decrease in the near future under the impact of the higher natural growth of the Turkic populations.     

Support for new mothers and fertility in the United Kingdom: Not all support is equal in the decision to have a second child

Low fertility across Europe highlights the need to understand reproductive decisions in high-income countries better. Availability of support may be one factor influencing reproductive decisions, though within high-income countries availability varies between environments, including socio-economic environments. We test whether receiving higher levels of support, from different sources (informal and formal) and of different types (practical and emotional), is positively correlated with second births in the United Kingdom (UK) Millennium Cohort Study, and whether these relationships differ by socio-economic position (SEP). Our hypothesis is only partially supported: receiving emotional support correlates with higher likelihood of second birth, but the opposite is true for practical support. Availability of different types of support varies across SEP, but relationships between support and fertility are similar, with one exception: kin-provided childcare increases the likelihood of birth only among lower-SEP women. Our results highlight that not all support is equal in the decision to have a second child.     

Bargaining over family size: The determinants of fertility in Brazil

Understanding how households make fertility decisions is important to implementing effective policy to slow population growth. Most empirical studies of this decision are based on household models in which men and women are assumed to act as if they have the same preferences for the number of children. However, if men and women have different preferences regarding fertility and are more likely to assert their own preferences as their bargaining power in the household increases, policies to lower fertility rates may be more effectively targeted toward one spouse or the other. In this paper, we test the relevance of the single preferences model by investigating whether men and women's nonwage incomes have the same effects on the number of children in the household. We find that while increases in both the man and woman's nonwage income lower the number of children in the household, an equivalent increase in the woman's income has a significantly stronger effect than the man's. In addition, we find that increases in women's nonwage transfer income have the strongest effects on the fertility decisions of women with low levels of education. The most important policy implication of our results is that policies aimed at increasing the incomes of the least-educated women will be the most effective in lowering fertility rates.     

The Relevance of the 'Easterlin hypothesis' and the 'new home economics' to fertility movements in Great Britain

Summary The hypothesis that a family's economic status relative to its aspirations (relative economic status) is an important determinant of its fertility behaviour has been developed and applied to the explanation of swings in American fertility by R. A. Easterlin. However, a recent application by Butz and Ward of a model derived from the 'new home economics' (pioneered by Becker and Mincer) strongly suggests that relative economic status is not the dominant factor in explaining fertility movements in the U.S.A. Rather, both current men's and women's wages operate independently in explaining the movement in fertility, and in particular the decline in fertility is attributed to rising women's wages. In this paper we explore the relevance of both the Easterlin hypothesis and the hypotheses derived from the 'new home economics' to the 1955-75 fertility swing in Great Britain. We find that we must reject the Easterlin hypothesis on the basis of the measures of relative economic status suggested by Easterlin and Wachter. A variant of the Easterlin hypothesis suggested by Oppenheimer does receive some support from the available evidence, and the evidence provides strong support for the model of fertility behaviour derived from the 'new home economics', which emphasizes the distinction between the effects of changes in men's and women's real wages on fertility decisions. The cause of the fertility decline is attributed to rising women's wages and employment opportunities through their direct effect on the opportunity cost of time and children among working wives and through their effect on the labour force participation of married women of childbearing age. The test of this model and the estimates of its parameters are not definitive, however, because of deficiencies in the data and problems of statistical estimation. We nevertheless conclude that both this model and the Oppenheimer variant of the Easterlin hypothesis, as well as other elements of a more comprehensive economic theory of fertility, point to a continuation of low fertility and the possibility of a secular decline with fertility approaching some lower asymptote.     

Risk, uncertainty and family formation: The social context of poverty groups

Abstract Despite the assumptions of many demographers that the net returns from children for non-elite groups in underdeveloped areas are likely to be negative, high fertility persists in most of these societies. Both cultural and institutional explanations have been proposed to account for this. We attempt to provide some mediation between these competing models, by introducing the elements of risk and uncertainty as factors likely to induce poverty and lead works to opt for the 'high fertility, low quality' pattern of investment of time and money in family formation. Drawing upon the work of Wharton in subsistence agriculture practices, several alternative decision-making models are proposed to account for both the persistence of high fertility, and the declines that have been registered in selected areas, such as Taiwan and perhaps China. The empirical work of Mueller on Taiwanese expectations of returns on children and the concomitant variation in family-size preferences is consistent with the models proposed. Some implications for uncertainty and risk-reduction strategies in family planning and other social welfare programmes are drawn.     

An Analysis of Fertility Differentials by Religion in Kerala State: A Test of the Interaction Hypothesis

In a revelation of overall decline to below replacement fertility in the Kerala state of India, it was generally found that fertility among Muslims is higher and contraceptive prevalence lower than among Hindus and Christians. This paper examines the interaction between religion and other socioeconomic factors, that is, whether the effect of religion on fertility remains constant across other factors. The analysis is based on the data from the National Family Health Survey-1 in Kerala. The analysis found that large Hindu-Muslim fertility differences at a low level of education do not persist at higher levels. For contraceptive use, wider gaps are found at a middle level of education and at a medium level of standard of living than at lower and higher levels. This indicates that couples at different socioeconomic settings make different decisions in spite of belonging to the same religion. The fact that fertility of Muslims at higher levels of socioeconomic status is low, and not much different than the fertility of other religions, suggests that the observed fertility gap between Hindus/Christians and Muslims is a passing phenomenon.     

The Bangladesh fertility decline: an interpretation

The claim has been made, notably in a 1994 World Bank report, that the Bangladesh fertility decline shows that efficient national family planning programs can achieve major fertility declines even in countries that are very poor, and even if females have a low status and significant socioeconomic change has not occurred. This article challenges this claim on the grounds that Bangladesh did experience major social and economic change, real and perceived, over the last two decades. This proposition is supported by official data and by findings of the authors' 1997 field study in rural southeast Bangladesh. That study demonstrates that most Bangladeshis believe that conditions are very different from the situation a generation ago and that on balance there has been improvement. Most also believe that more decisions must now be made by individuals, and these include decisions to have fewer children. In helping to achieve these new fertility aims, however, the services provided by the family planning program constituted an important input.     

Relational contracts for household formation,fertility choice and separation

This paper applies the theory of relational contracts to a model in which a couple decides upon fertility and subsequently on continuation of the relationship. We formalize the idea that within-household-cooperation can be supported by selfinterest. Since the costs of raising children—a household public good—are unequally distributed between partners, a conflict between individually optimal and efficient decisions exists. Side-payments can support cooperation but are not legally enforceable and thus have to be part of an equilibrium. This requires stable relationships and credible punishment threats.Within this framework, we analyze the effects of separation costs and post-separation alimony payments on couples’ fertility decisions. We derive the predictions that higher separation costs and higher alimony payments facilitate cooperation and hence increase fertility. We present empirical evidence based on a recent German reform that reduced rights to post-divorce alimony payments. We find that this reform reduced in-wedlock fertility.     

Sex selection and fertility in a dynamic model of conception and abortion

This paper investigates the effect of prenatal sex selection on fertility through a stochastic dynamic model with uncertainty in conception as well as in gender, where a woman makes decisions on conception and abortion with or without gender detection tests (i.e. sex-selective or sex-unselective abortion). The paper shows that, when the cost of gender detection test falls, the sex ratio at birth rises due to more selective abortions, but fertility can rise or fall with rising sex ratio. Fertility may rise (fall) if there are more (less) women giving up unselective abortions for selective abortions than women giving up childbirths without test for selective abortions. Similarly the paper shows that the sex ratio can rise or fall, when fertility decreases as the cost of children increases. I test these propositions as well as their implications against micro survey data on the pregnancy history of Korean women.Responsible editor: Junsen Zhang.     

When the grass is greener: Fertility decisions in a cross-national context

In research and policy discourse, conceptualizations of fertility decision-making often assume that people only consider circumstances within national borders. In an integrated Europe, citizens may know about and compare conditions across countries. Such comparisons may influence the way people think about and respond to childrearing costs. To explore this possibility and its implications, we present evidence from 44 in-depth interviews with Polish parents in the United Kingdom and Poland. Explanations of childbearing decisions involved comparisons of policy packages and living standards across countries. Individuals in Poland used richer European countries as an important reference point, rather than recent conditions in Poland. In contrast, migrants often positively assessed their relatively disadvantaged circumstances by using the Polish setting as a reference. The findings could help explain why, despite substantial policy efforts, fertility has remained at very low levels in poorer European countries, while migrants from those countries often have higher fertility abroad.     

Industrialization,family and fertility: A structural-psychological analysis of the Brazilian case

This paper addresses itself to some linkages between macro-social structure (industrialization, social class), social psychological variables (husband-wife decision making), psychological variables (attitudes), and fertility. A total of 726 currently mated women with proven fertility in five Brazilian communities were interviewed to determine various attitudes, their work experience, their participation in family decisions, their fertility ideals, and actual fertility. The five communities were selected along a rural-urban-industrialization continuum to include a village, two non-industrial cities, and two industrial cities (one of which was Sao Paulo). Family size in the industrial cities was small in all social strata, while in the non-industrial cities family size was large in the lower strata and declined in the upper strata. Further analysis revealed that smaller family size is associated with generally higher levels of status among women—higher educational levels, greater social contacts and more skilled employment, and equality in family decision making. Our analysis supports the hypotheses that industrialization influences fertility through shifts in the social status of women, both in their work and at home. New education and work opportunities facilitate the emergence of modern conceptions of the role of women in society and egalitarian decision making in the family. These attitudes and patterns of husband-wife interaction are related to smaller family size ideals and lower fertility.     

Child Poverty Among Hong Kong Ethnic Minorities

This paper analyzes the data from the Population Census of 2011 to identify the characteristics of poor ethnic minority groups in Hong Kong and the factors that are associated with child poverty among these ethnic minorities. The results show that the child poverty level varies between different ethnic groups and that ethnic minorities from developing nations are likely to have a higher poverty level. In particular, Pakistani children have the highest poverty rate among all ethnic groups. The results also show that Pakistani, Nepalese, and Mixed (Chinese and Asian) nationalities have a higher child poverty rate than that of Chinese individuals who constitute the majority of the Hong Kong population. The main reason for this is that, unlike their Chinese counterparts, some of these ethnic minority households have not benefited from their own human capital or their length of exposure in the local society in Hong Kong. And even if they have benefited, the positive impact of these factors on ethnic minority households was much weaker compared to that of Chinese households. These results suggest that ethnic minorities need to be categorized as a separate group in order to assess their specific needs, and assimilation policies, especially support on Chinese language learning, need to be an integral part of the government’s poverty reduction strategy to reduce child poverty among ethnic minorities.     

Exploring the influence of precipitation on fertility timing in rural Mexico

The influence of environmental conditions on fertility decision-making is becoming increasingly important in the context of contemporary climate change. Deforestation, land availability, and environmental quality may shape decisions regarding family size, particularly in regions with high levels of natural resource dependence. This research examines the relationship between fertility timing and precipitation in rural Mexico by linking household event-history data to municipal-level precipitation measures. Even after controlling for other factors that impact fertility, in historically dry areas, households are more likely to have a child following above average precipitation, using both 1-year and 2-year prior precipitation measures. Conversely, the relationship between precipitation and fertility timing in humid areas of rural Mexico is not statistically significant. Overall, the findings reveal that the fertility-environment connection is highly context-specific and differs across climate zones in Mexico, but that fertility timing is associated with recent rainfall patterns for households in dry areas of rural Mexico.     

Settlement size and fertility in the Nordic countries

While the variation in childbearing patterns across countries and between socio-economic groups within a country has been studied in detail, less is known about the differences in fertility patterns across settlements within a country. Using aggregate and individual-level register data, we examine fertility variation across settlements in Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. We observe a significant variation in fertility level by settlement size in all four of these Nordic countries - the larger the settlement, the lower the fertility. Second, the variation in fertility level has decreased over time, but significant differences in fertility between settlements of different size persist. Third, the timing of childbearing also varies across settlements - the larger the settlement, the later the peak of fertility. Fourth, our analysis of parity-specific fertility in Sweden shows that the major socio-economic characteristics of women account for only a small portion of fertility variation across settlements.