The empowerment of women,fertility, and child mortality: Towards a theoretical analysis

This paper examines one avenue through which female autonomy impinges on fertility and child mortality in developing countries. A simple model is set out in which couples are motivated to have children for old age security purposes. The decisions of a couple regarding fertility and allocation of resources for the healthcare of their children are made within a bargaining framework. An increase in female autonomy translating into an increase in the relative bargaining power or the threat point utility of mothers is shown to reduce fertility and also to reduce child mortality rates. Paradoxically, the increase in female autonomy within a household may increase the disadvantage suffered by female children in that household with respect to survival. Received: 4 August 1999/Accepted: 7 September 2000     

Bargaining over family size: The determinants of fertility in Brazil

Understanding how households make fertility decisions is important to implementing effective policy to slow population growth. Most empirical studies of this decision are based on household models in which men and women are assumed to act as if they have the same preferences for the number of children. However, if men and women have different preferences regarding fertility and are more likely to assert their own preferences as their bargaining power in the household increases, policies to lower fertility rates may be more effectively targeted toward one spouse or the other. In this paper, we test the relevance of the single preferences model by investigating whether men and women's nonwage incomes have the same effects on the number of children in the household. We find that while increases in both the man and woman's nonwage income lower the number of children in the household, an equivalent increase in the woman's income has a significantly stronger effect than the man's. In addition, we find that increases in women's nonwage transfer income have the strongest effects on the fertility decisions of women with low levels of education. The most important policy implication of our results is that policies aimed at increasing the incomes of the least-educated women will be the most effective in lowering fertility rates.     

Gender discrimination and efficiency in marriage: the bargaining family under scrutiny

We consider a repeated family bargaining model that links the topics of employment and households. A key aspect of the model is that marital bargaining power is determined endogenously. We show that: (1) the efficiency of household decisions is sometimes inversely related to the prevailing degree of gender discrimination in labor markets; (2) women who are discriminated against have difficulty enforcing cooperative household outcomes because they may be extremely limited to credibly punish opportunistic behavior by their male partners; (3) the likelihood that sharing rules such as “equal sharing” are maintained throughout a marriage relationship is highest when men and women face equal opportunities in labor markets. Responsible editor: Deborah Cobb-Clark     

Daddy months

We consider a bargaining model in which husband and wife decide on the allocation of time and disposable income, and fertility. Since her bargaining power would go down otherwise more strongly, the wife agrees to have a child only if the husband also leaves the labor market for a while. The daddy months subsidy enables the couple to overcome a hold-up problem and thereby improves efficiency. However, the same ruling harms other types of couples and may also reduce welfare in an endogenous taxation framework.     

Dads, disease, and death: determinants of daughter discrimination

Existing evidence suggests that girls are differentially affected by income shocks and changes in bargaining power. Most studies, however, ignore household production and confound differential opportunity costs with changes in income or bargaining power. I disentangle these determinants of gender discrimination??preferences, income and time allocation??by comparing households with varying degrees of parental involvement. Results indicate that, controlling for household fixed effects, reducing the time available for household production has a disproportionately negative effect on daughters. But, for a transitory income shock, daughters?? education is less income-elastic. Increasing mothers?? bargaining power is most effective in narrowing the gender gap.     

Dads, disease, and death: determinants of daughter discrimination

Existing evidence suggests that girls are differentially affected by income shocks and changes in bargaining power. Most studies, however, ignore household production and confound differential opportunity costs with changes in income or bargaining power. I disentangle these determinants of gender discrimination—preferences, income and time allocation—by comparing households with varying degrees of parental involvement. Results indicate that, controlling for household fixed effects, reducing the time available for household production has a disproportionately negative effect on daughters. But, for a transitory income shock, daughters’ education is less income-elastic. Increasing mothers’ bargaining power is most effective in narrowing the gender gap.     

Landholding and Fertility: A Rejoinder

In this paper the relative time cost of children compared to other types of household tasks, and the relative time cost of producing quantity rather than quality of children is examined. These propositions lie at the heart of much of the literature on the economics of fertility, but they have rarely been examined directly. We employ household time-use data from a study of a large metropolitan area in the United States. Our results cast doubt on the notions that: (a) child-services are more time-costly than other household tasks; (b) that quantity of child-services is more time-costly than quality of child-services. Moreover, there appear to be strong complementarities between child-services and other household tasks, and time spent on child care does not seem to act as an obstacle to working outside the home. Finally, we suggest another economic interpretation of the fertility transition centred not on changes in objective factors exogeneous to the household, but, instead, on the internal economic power structure of the household itself.     

Optimal prevention when coexistence matters

We study the optimal subsidy on prevention against premature death in an economy composed of two-person households, where the survival of the spouse matters, either because of self-oriented coexistence concerns or because of altruism. Under a noncooperative household model, the laissez-faire prevention levels are shown to be lower than the first-best levels, to an extent that is increasing in self-oriented coexistence concerns and decreasing in spousal altruism. The decentralization of the social optimum thus requires a subsidy on prevention depending on the precise type of coexistence concerns. Our results are shown to be globally robust to the introduction of imperfect observability of preferences, life insurance, imperfect marriage matching, and myopia. We conclude by studying the optimal prevention in a cooperative household model with unequal bargaining power.     

On private incentives to acquire household production skills

In non-cooperative family models, being good at contributing to family public goods like household production may reduce one's utility, since it tends to crowd out contributions from one's spouse. Similar effects also arise in cooperative models with non-cooperative threat point: improved contribution productivity entails loss of bargaining power. This strategic effect must be traded against the benefits of household production skills, in terms of increased consumption possibilities. Since cooperation involves extensive specialization, incentives to acquire household production skills are strikingly asymmetric, with the one not specializing in household production having strong disincentives for household skill acquisition. Received: 06 July 1999/Accepted: 08 June 2000     

Women’s land ownership and participation in decision-making about reproductive health in Malawi

Given the centrality of land to rural livelihoods and the high rates of fertility in Africa, there is a need for more research that explores the intersection between gendered patterns of land ownership and reproductive health outcomes. Drawing on a household bargaining framework, I hypothesize that women’s land ownership should be associated with increases in women’s decision-making in multiple domains in the household including financial decision-making (the focus of bargaining literature), but also decision-making about reproductive health. Using the 2010 Malawi Demographic Health Survey (DHS), I find women’s ownership of land (sole or joint) is associated with increases in women’s participation in financial decision-making in the household and women’s sole ownership of land is associated with increases in women’s participation in reproductive health decision-making. However, women’s joint ownership of land with spouses is negatively associated with participation in reproductive health decision-making, perhaps because of backlash or intra-household conflict.     

Time Use and Household Division of Labor in India—Within-Gender Dynamics

Household allocation of labor is an important area of scholarship in developing countries where women's well-being is affected by the heavy load of unpaid work within the household. This study extends nuclear household-centric research on labor allocation by drawing attention to bargaining between female in-laws in multigenerational households in India. This paper empirically tests two competing theories based on the impact of a daughter-in-law's education on household division of labor in multigenerational households. First is Caldwell's thesis that contends that increasing education would increase the bargaining power of daughter-in-law, thereby tilting the distribution of household labor in her favor, and the second is patriarchal bargain theory that makes an opposite claim. Both these theories are tested using time-use data, and the latter is found to have higher explanatory power. Further layers are added to the analysis by tracing the effects of caste, class, and religion. Findings show that these mediate and determine the division of housework and bargaining outcomes between female in-laws. This study emphasizes the need for an intersectional understanding of gender norms that are inextricably tied to factors such as religion, caste, class, and family structure. Findings also underline the need to study within-gender dynamics systematically.     

Capability and Health Functioning in Ethiopian Households

From a recent Ethiopian representative household survey this paper empirically operationalizes concepts from the capability approach to shed light on the relationship between conversion factors, capability inputs and health functionings. The subjects of the study are women in partnership. The results suggest their health functionings are responsive to specific household bargaining power conversion factors and capability inputs. The paper also tests the extent to which women who take more decisions achieve better health functioning. The model offers evidence that decision-making and health functionings follow a complex pattern as women who took more decisions were not always better off. The conclusion of the paper is that health functioning may be improved by inducing changes to household decision-making patterns.     

Optimal fertility under age-dependent labour productivity

In the so-called Rapport Sauvy (1962), the French demographer Alfred Sauvy argued that Wallonia’s fertility rate was socially suboptimal, and recommended a 20 % rise of fertility, on the grounds that a society with too low a fertility leads to a low-productive economy composed of old workers having old ideas. This paper examines how Sauvy’s intuition can be incorporated in the Samuelsonian optimal fertility model (Samuelson, Int Econ Rev 16:531–538, 1975). We build a four-period OLG model with physical capital and with two generations of workers (young and old), the skills of the latter being subject to some form of decay. We characterize the optimal fertility rate and show that this equalizes, at the margin, the sum of the capital dilution effect (Solow effect) and the labour age-composition effect (Sauvy effect) with the intergenerational redistribution effect (Samuelson effect). Numerical simulations show that it is hard, from a quantitative perspective, to reconcile Sauvy’s recommendation with facts. This leads us to examine other potential determinants of optimal fertility, by introducing technological progress and a more general social welfare function.     

中国的家庭结构转变--来自居住方式与人口因素的作用

基于历次人口普查数据,利用SOCSIM微观模拟方法将家庭转变的关键影响因素分解为人口因素和居住方式因素两个方面,并进一步将人口因素分解为人口惯性、生育率、死亡率和结婚率四个层面进行计量分析.结果发现,当前人口变动相对稳定,较小的波动使其在家庭转变中的贡献率相对较小,而居住方式的影响相对较大;对人口因素的进一步分解还发现,人口惯性及生育率水平的作用相对更大,生育率水平、结婚率水平带来的影响与人口因素的总影响方向是一致的,均提高了一人户、一代户、二代户的人口比重,降低了三代及以上户的人口比重.与之相反,死亡率的影响与人口因素的总影响方向是相反的.     

The Effect of Couple Disagreement about Child‐Timing Intentions: A Parity‐Specific Approach

Using couple data from a longitudinal study conducted in Italy, a country with persistently low fertility levels, we examined the effect of partners' discrepant child‐timing intentions on reproductive behavior. We found that the effect of couple disagreement on subsequent fertility is parity‐specific and does not depend on whether only the male or the female partner intends to have a(nother) child. The disagreement tends to produce an intermediate childbearing outcome at parities zero and one, while the outcome is shifted more toward agreement on not having a(nother) child at parity two. The empirical evidence suggests that gender equality in reproductive decisionmaking is not driven by partners' equal bargaining power or partners' equal access to economic resources. The findings indicate that the predictive power of child‐timing intentions strongly improves if both partners' views are considered in fertility models, and thus support the adoption of couple analysis in fertility research.     

亚洲女性收入对生育率影响的国际比较研究--基于劳动参与率、受教育程度、就业方式的视角

通过构建家庭效用函数模型,论证了家庭收入增长中女性收入对家庭生育决策的影响,说明了随着女性收入的提高,会降低生育率。进一步,通过引用女性劳动参与率、受教育程度及就业方式作为女性收入对生育率影响的中间变量,再运用相关数据进行实证分析,发现女性劳动参与率、受教育程度对生育率有着负向的影响,而女性非全日制就业方式对生育率有着正向的影响。再进一步,对亚洲各国生育政策的调整进行国际比较,探讨生育政策的具体措施与影响女性收入的三个因素之间的关系,最后针对中国目前的生育水平提出两方面的建议：硬政策的完善和软环境的支持,以有助于提高人口素质,优化人口结构。     

“Hard workers” and labor restrictions

This paper analyzes the effects of changes in relative bargaining power within two-member households participating in labor and product markets. The most striking effects occur when household members differ in individual preferences and enjoy positive leisure-dependent externalities. For instance, a global change in relative bargaining power where the hardworking member becomes more influential in each working class household can render the working class worse off. Moreover, we show that restrictions on labor supply can prevent hard workers from exerting too much pressure on their hedonistic partners to work more. A restriction on individual labor supply improves welfare of the working class population, which adds a new twist to the literature on why working hours are limited in many European countries.     

The Impact of Migration on Fertility under China’s Underlying Restrictions: A Comparative Study Between Permanent and Temporary Migrants

Compared with that in other countries, the issue of fertility in China is more complicated because of its restriction policy or system. Several major hypotheses have been proposed to explain and predict the impact of migration on China’s fertility regardless of China’s real situation. Therefore, this paper analyzes the impact of migration on fertility considering China’s underlying restrictions using the data from the Chinese General Social Survey carried out in 2008. The social class in this study was divided into two, namely urban class and rural class. By building the 2 × 2 mobility tables and the diagonal mobility model, the study determined the impact of migration on fertility and analyzed the influence of some restrictions, such as family planning, traditional fertility concept, and household registration system. Results show that migration greatly affects fertility: upward migration (i.e., from rural to urban) may decrease the fertility, whereas downward migration (i.e., from urban to rural) may increase it. The degree of decline on fertility is greater than that of increase. Family planning still plays a role in fertility decline. Traditional concepts on fertility, for example, bringing up sons to take care of parents in their old age and preferring boys to girls, are anchored on the people’s mind, which is detrimental to the stability of the fertility rate. Moreover, the household registration system primarily influences the fertility behavior of temporary migration, with a negative relationship between them.     

Normative evaluation of tax policies: from households to individuals

We simulate a hypothetical family tax credit on a sample of French couples, using jointly a collective model of labor supply and a tax-benefit calculator. Work behaviors represent here a general concept of “effort,” and hence, individual productivities cannot be assimilated with wage rates. They are retrieved by inversion of the optimal household program under simple assumptions on household preferences and bargaining rules. The calibrated model is used to predict incentive effects of the reform and distributive impacts on individuals and households. The desirability of the reform depends on which of these two welfare units is used for normative evaluation.      

On the relationship between household composition and population age distribution

Summary Composition of households by age of head and by age of other household members has recently been presented in a convenient algebraic expression, the household composition matrix. It has been shown that this matrix operates as a linear transformation from the vector of household distribution by age of head to the vector of population age distribution. A further analysis will show that the first row of the matrix may be interpreted as representing a vector of average household fertility rates. If the linear relationship between household and population distributions is fully implemented, then a relationship between household fertility and the size of the youngest age group can be derived. If w is the population age distribution and w (1) is the number of persons in the youngest age group, then: where α is the first row of the household composition matrix with its first element eliminated, C is the household composition matrix with its first row and first column eliminated, and Ψ is the vector w with its first element, w (1) eliminated. Extension of this result will enable simultaneous projection of population and households, suitable for computer application to conventional five-year age groups.