Social security,social welfare and the aging population

This study examines the effects of pay-as-you-go social security programs in aging economies when the middle-aged both educate their dependent children and subsidize the retirement of the old. Using an overlapping generations framework in which agents are three-period lived but timing of death in the third period is uncertain, we analyze the effects of social security tax schemes, under various demographic assumptions, on capital accumulation, education expenditures, social welfare, and economic growth. We find that in many cases social security crowds out education, and reduces economic growth and social welfare. Received: 29 April 1998/Accepted: 3 March 1999     

The old age security hypothesis and optimal population growth

The old age security approach is used to study the relationship between the rate of growth of the population and capital accumulation, within a Samuelson-Diamond overlapping generations framework. It is shown that a decentralized economy will fail, in general, to achieve the Pareto optimal path. However, a pay-as-you-go social security scheme in which the old get transfers which are proportional to the number of their children may restore optimality. On the other hand, child support systems or subsidies to capital can guarantee the optimal capital: labor ratio, but not the optimal population growth rate, while a lump sum social security system can guarantee the optimal population growth rate, but not the optimal capital: labor ratio. Finally, in a monetary economy any policy aimed at correcting the interest rate will restore full optimality.An earlier version of this paper was written during a visit to the University of California, San Diego. The paper benefited from the comments of two referees.     

Fertility, child care outside the home, and pay-as-you-go social security

We examine the long-run effects of the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security scheme on fertility and welfare of individuals in an overlapping generations model, assuming that child-care services are available in the market. We show that the impact of a tax increase on fertility depends on the relative magnitudes of the standard intergenerational redistribution effect through the social security system, the (implicit) subsidy effect through tax-exemption of child rearing at home, and the price effect through changes in the relative price of market child care, and that if parental child-rearing time is inelastic, a tax cut could bring about a Pareto-improving allocation.

Uncertain lifetime, fertility and social security

Investigating the effects of population aging on fertility and economic growth, we show that an increase in life expectancy lowers the fertility rate and raises life-cycle savings, and that a pay-as-you-go social security does not reverse the effect on fertility. Received: 10 March 2000/Accepted: 28 April 2000     

Social security, public education, and growth in a representative democracy

This paper studies the relationship between public education and pay-as-you-go social security in a representative democracy, where the government reacts both to voting and lobbying activities of workers and pensioners. While an intergenerational conflict prevails concerning actual social security contributions, workers may prefer public education for its positive effect on later pension benefits. Population aging diminishes the relative lobbying power of pensioners, leading to a higher contribution rate, educational expansion, and higher per capita income growth. Received: 05 April 1999/Accepted: 20 December 1999     

Pay-as-you-go social security in a changing environment

In this paper, we examine the optimal pay-as-you-go social security scheme which reallocates resources across generations in a changing environment, that is, with fluctuations in population growth rates and in productivity levels. We use an overlapping generations model along with a social welfare function consisting of the sum of generational utilities either unweighted or weighted by population size and a discount factor. We show how intergenerational resource sharing can be used to improve social welfare even though the extent of intergenerational redistribution is hampered by payroll tax deadweight losses in the spirit of the optimal taxation literature. Also it appears that resource sharing is much more restricted in a closed economy that in an open economy, which is not subject to a national resource constraint at each period of time. This paper was presented at the 1990 ISPE-Conference on the Fiscal Implications of an Ageing Population, Vaalsbroek Castle, Netherlands. The authors wish to thank the participants and particularly B. van Praag and W. Peters for their comments. They also thank the two referees and Philippe Michel for very helpful comments and discussions. The financial support of CIM during his sabbatical year is greatly acknowledged by the second author.     

Variety expansion and fertility rates

To investigate how fertility rates interrelate with the modern economy, we construct a simple model in which variety expansion of consumption goods reduces fertility rates. In our model, variety expansion reduces the relative price of a composite of differentiated goods compared to child-rearing costs. Thus, parents raise the expenditure share for differentiated goods and lower the number of children. We show that this model can be applied to a growth model in which economic growth progresses with variety expansion of consumption goods and fertility rates decrease with economic growth. Thus, we show a new mechanism for fertility decline, and this mechanism can be applied to a growth model.     

How does social security affect economic growth? Evidence from cross-country data

This paper investigates how social security interacts with growth and growth determinants (savings, human capital investment, and fertility). Our empirical investigation finds that the estimated coefficient on social security is significantly negative in the fertility equation, insignificant in the saving equation, and significantly positive in the growth and education equations. By contrast, the estimated coefficient on growth is insignificant in the social security equation. The results suggest that social security may indeed be conducive to growth through tipping the trade-off between the number and quality of children toward the latter.All correspondence to Junsen Zhang. We would like to thank the editor, two anonymous referees, Jim Davies, Frank Denton, Se-Jik Kim, and Mike McAleer for helpful comments and suggestions. Any remaining omissions and errors are the authors responsibility. Responsible editor: Alessandro Cigno.     

Effects of public education and social security on fertility

Introducing a fertility decision and child care cost into an overlapping generations model with public education and social security, we examine the effects of these public policies on fertility. We show that an increase in income tax, which finances social security benefits and public investment in education, increases fertility. On the other hand, with a constant tax rate, a change in the allocation from social security benefits to public investment in education decreases fertility and, with a constant social security tax, the effect of education tax on fertility is neutral.      

Intergenerational redistribution in a small open economy with endogenous fertility

For pay-as-you-go financed pension systems, claims may be calculated according to individual contributions (income) or the number of children of a family. We analyse the optimal structure of these parameters in a model with endogenous fertility. It is shown that for both structural determinants there exists no interior solution of the problem of intragenerational utility maximisation. Thus, pure systems are always welfare maximizing. Furthermore, children-related pension claims induce a fiscal externality that tends to be positive. The determination of the optimal contribution rate shows that the widely accepted Aaron-condition is in general a misleading indicator for the comparison of fully funded and pay-as-you-go financed pension systems. Received March 12, 1996 / Accepted January 27, 1997     

Aging, fertility, social security and political equilibrium

We analyze the effect of population aging on the political choice of the size of a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security system, incorporating the heterogeneity of individuals in their preference for having children, and hence the endogenous fertility choices of individuals, into a simple overlapping generations model. We show that population aging may result in an increase in the contribution rate, increasing the share of the retired population who prefer a higher contribution rate; and that, if the system involves redistribution between retirees with different contributions, the increased contribution rate raises the number of individuals who have children, i.e., future contributors.     

Population growth and social security financing

By allowing the population growth to be flexible, this paper analyzes the effect of a tax reform that involves an introduction of consumption taxation for social security financing. It is found that population growth and labor supply play an important role in determining the effect of the tax reform. If population growth and labor supply are exogenous, then an introduction of a consumption tax for social security financing, with the payroll tax rate being endogenous, decreases the interest rate and increases capital accumulation. However, if population growth and labor supply are endogenous, then an introduction of a consumption tax for social security financing increases the interest rate and reduces capital accumulation. Received: 26 February 2001/Accepted: 26 August 2001     

Effects of capital taxation on economies with different demographic changes: short term versus long term

We examine the effect of source-based capital taxation on capital accumulation in countries with endogenous fertility and free international capital mobility. When fertility is constant, a tax cut accelerates domestic capital accumulation through international arbitrage and exerts negative influences on the welfare of a foreign country. In contrast, with endogenous fertility, a tax cut by an economy with a higher tax rate and exporting capital may deter capital accumulation and hence lower the welfare in not only domestic but also foreign economies in the long term, although the tax cut may accelerate domestic capital accumulation in the short term.     

Private versus public old-age security

We directly compare two institutions, a family compact—a parent makes a transfer to her parent in anticipation of a possible future gift from her children—with a pay-as-you-go, public pension system, in a life cycle model with endogenous fertility wherein children are valued both as consumption and investment goods. Absent intragenerational heterogeneity, we show that a benevolent government has no welfare justification for introducing public pensions alongside thriving family compacts since the former is associated with inefficiently low fertility. This result hinges critically on a fiscal externality—the inability of middle age agents to internalize the impact of their fertility decisions on old-age transfers under a public pension system. With homogeneous agents, a strong-enough negative aggregate shock to middle-age incomes destroys all family compacts, and in such a setting, an optimal public pension system cannot enter. This suggests the raison d’être for social security must lie outside of its function as a pension system—specifically its redistributive function which emerges with heterogeneous agents. In a simple modification of our benchmark model—one that allows for idiosyncratic frictions to compact formation such as differences in infertility/mating status—a welfare-enhancing role for a public pension system emerges; such systems may flourish even when family compacts cannot.     

Fertility and economic and social development in Turkey: a cross-sectional and time series study

Abstract The paper explores the impact of modernization on the fertility levels in Turkey, which started deliberate efforts at economic, social, and political transformation in the early 1920s. It is a disaggregative study using 'province' as the unit of observation. A relatively consistent series of data on population and various economic and social variables was available with quinquennial censuses starting with the 1940 Census. The technique of reverse projection is used to estimate provincial crude birth rates. Since 1955 there has been a consistent decline in the fertility level. A chain-relationship model is estimated using both cross-sectional and panel data. A major finding of the study is that in Turkey, continuing modernization and the concomitant spread of female education will result in a continuing decline in the fertility rate. This negative influence, stable and substantial over time, is largely due to factors other than the usual association between education and opportunity cost of female employment, such as changing attitudes and tastes. Also with the spread of economic and social development influencing the society's norm for average age at marriage and the proportion of women married, the marital rate, though not so significant as education, imparts a direct depressing effect on the aggregate period fertility rate at any given time.     

我国失业保险支出与城镇失业率关系研究——基于误差修正模型的分析

失业是市场经济条件下不可避免的社会风险。失业保险是解决失业所产生的不利因素的社会机制,对一国的社会保障和福利水平有重要的作用。本文通过建立误差修正模型,对我国失业保险支出与城镇失业率的相互关系进行研究。我国失业保险与城镇失业率之间存在着双向格兰杰因果关系,即失业保险支出的增加会导致城镇失业率的增加,城镇失业率的增加会引起失业保险支出的增加。另外,我国失业保险支出的变动对城镇失业率的影响是正激励与负激励并存。     

Endogenous fertility,altruistic behavior across generations,and social security systems

The present paper explores the impact of an intergenerational externality on private fertility decisions, under a pay-as-you-go social security system. The analysis is performed in the framework of a steady state growth model, with overlapping generations. To explain why households have children, altruism between parents and children is assumed. Surprisingly, the effects of altruism are not symmetric. The private fertility decisions are optimal only if children love their parents, because children then make private transfers at exactly the right level.Comments of participants of a seminar on economic theory of Prof. K. Jaeger at Free University of Berlin at July 20, 1989, are gratefully acknowledged. I am indebted to Alessandro Cigno, Frank Klanberg and Elmar Wolfstetter for many helpful suggestions.     

Re-linking fertility behaviour and old age economic security: A delayed note on demeny

Recently Paul Demeny proposed a policy to solve the problem of below-replacement fertility. His proposal is to link the old age economic security of parents to their fertility behaviour, strengthening the material position of those aged persons who have carried the financial burden of childraising by assigning some proportion of the social security contributions of children directly to their parents. I argue that in the course of constructing his proposal, Demeny undermines the fertility-facilitating effect of conventional welfare policies and ignores the class-specific effects of existing pronatalist policies. I suggest that the adoption of additional welfare policies, apart from strengthening and correcting existing measures, would not only foster the achievement and maintenance of a socially adequate fertility level but also foster social justice for the individuals more directly involved in generational reproduction.     

Optimal fertility under age-dependent labour productivity

In the so-called Rapport Sauvy (1962), the French demographer Alfred Sauvy argued that Wallonia’s fertility rate was socially suboptimal, and recommended a 20 % rise of fertility, on the grounds that a society with too low a fertility leads to a low-productive economy composed of old workers having old ideas. This paper examines how Sauvy’s intuition can be incorporated in the Samuelsonian optimal fertility model (Samuelson, Int Econ Rev 16:531–538, 1975). We build a four-period OLG model with physical capital and with two generations of workers (young and old), the skills of the latter being subject to some form of decay. We characterize the optimal fertility rate and show that this equalizes, at the margin, the sum of the capital dilution effect (Solow effect) and the labour age-composition effect (Sauvy effect) with the intergenerational redistribution effect (Samuelson effect). Numerical simulations show that it is hard, from a quantitative perspective, to reconcile Sauvy’s recommendation with facts. This leads us to examine other potential determinants of optimal fertility, by introducing technological progress and a more general social welfare function.     

Demographic change and social security

This paper gives an overview over some central aspects of the highly complex topic, pointing out, e.g. the need for more longitudinal research in understanding effects of structural changes in demography and economy on social security. Starting from challenges by an ageing population for health and pension schemes it is briefly discussed whether changes in labour force participation or restructuring public expenditure can soften financing problems. Concerning reforms in pension schemes first changing retirement ages is briefly discussed and then some of the shortcomings in the debate on capital funding versus pay-as-you-go fincancing.Revised, updated and extended version of a lecture, given at the First Annual Congress of the European Society for Population Economics, Rotterdam, September 18, 1987. Revision and extension were inspired by two referees.