The effect of remittances on emigration intentions in Egypt, Morocco, and Turkey

Are remittances determined by altruism or enlightened self-interest, and do they trigger additional migration? In this paper these two questions are examined empirically in relation to data from Egypt, Turkey, and Morocco for households with family members living abroad. It is shown, firstly, that one cannot argue exclusively either for altruism or self-interest as motives, since for each country the data tell a different story and both motives can be identified as driving forces behind remittance behaviour. The general conclusion of this study is that the family ties and the net earnings potential of migrants have stronger effects on the flow of remittances than the net earnings potential of the households in the country of origin. Secondly, because the receipt of remittances has a positive effect on the emigration intentions of household members still living in the country of origin, the receipt of remittances may contribute to new flows of migration, particularly in the case of Morocco.     

Endogenous division rules as a family constitution: strategic altruistic transfers and sibling competition

Based on the notions of parental altruism, sibling competition, and family constitution, we present a self-enforcing model where heterogeneous children have economic incentives to supply family-specific merit goods (e.g., companionship) to their parents for securing inheritable wealth and the altruistic parents decide on division rules according to an optimizing behavior. In our analysis of intergenerational cooperation and intragenerational competition, the altruistic parents care about the efficiency of the children-provided merit goods and the equity of the children’s incomes. For an optimal allocation of wealth, the parents strategically partition it into two pools: one to be distributed equally whereas the other unequally according to their children’s supply of merit goods. We look at motivation of the parents in allocating their wealth to the two different pools. The analysis of endogenous division rules has implications for the compatibility between equal postmortem transfers and unequal inter vivos gifts, both of which are consistent with parental altruism.     

Private provision of public goods between families

We consider a two-stage voluntary provision model where individuals in a family contribute to a pure public good and/or a household public good, and the parent makes private transfers to her own child. We show not only that Warr’s neutrality holds, regardless of the different timings of parent-to-child transfers, but also that there is a continuum of Nash equilibria which individuals’ contributions and parental transfers are indeterminate, although the allocation of each’s private consumption and total public good provision is uniquely determined. Furthermore, impure altruism or productivity difference in supplying public goods may not break our results above.     

Endogenous fertility,altruistic behavior across generations,and social security systems

The present paper explores the impact of an intergenerational externality on private fertility decisions, under a pay-as-you-go social security system. The analysis is performed in the framework of a steady state growth model, with overlapping generations. To explain why households have children, altruism between parents and children is assumed. Surprisingly, the effects of altruism are not symmetric. The private fertility decisions are optimal only if children love their parents, because children then make private transfers at exactly the right level.Comments of participants of a seminar on economic theory of Prof. K. Jaeger at Free University of Berlin at July 20, 1989, are gratefully acknowledged. I am indebted to Alessandro Cigno, Frank Klanberg and Elmar Wolfstetter for many helpful suggestions.     

Altruism and international labour migration

This paper investigates the effect of altruism on the pattern of labour migration in a two-country overlapping generations model. We show that differences in degrees of altruism across countries lead to bilateral migration flows. Starting from the autarkic steady-state equilibrium, restrictions on labour migration are relaxed. In temporary post-migration equilibrium factor prices are equal across countries. We then characterize the unique stable steady-state equilibrium: both countries are populated and this equilibrium is not a Pareto improvement. Some individuals prefer to live in autarky, others in an integrated world economy. Received: 6 July 1998/Accepted: 11 February 1999     

Happiness and altruism within the extended family

We propose a direct measure of altruism between parents and adult children, using survey data on happiness from the German Socio-Economic Panel for the years 2000–2004. The question of altruism within families has policy relevance, for example, to understand whether public transfers crowd out private ones. Previous empirical evidence, based on observed transfer behavior, has failed to establish a clear consensus. Using various cross section, panel data, and instrumental variable estimators, we find a robust association between the happiness of parents and that of their adult children. A 1 standard deviation increase in a child’s happiness is associated with the same increase in own happiness as that of a 20–45% increase in household income, depending on specification.     

Climate change and internal migration intentions in the forest-savannah transition zone of Ghana

Migration is at the centre of demographic research on the population–environment nexus. Increasing concerns about the impacts of environmental events on human population are fuelling interest on the relationship between migration and environmental change. Using data from the Climate Change Collective Learning and Observatory Network Ghana project, we employ binary logistic regression to examine migration intentions of households in response to major community stressors including climate-related ones. The results indicate that the type of community stressor that affects households most does not differentiate migration intentions in Ghana’s forest-savannah transition zone: Even though the majority of the respondents mentioned climate-related events as the stressor that affects them the most, such events do not appear to directly explain migration intentions. However, socio-demographic factors such as age, household size and current migration status are significant predictors of migration intentions, with younger household heads, heads of migrant households and heads of smaller households being relatively more likely to have migration intentions than other household heads. We conclude that migration drivers are multifaceted and deserve further research because even in areas with perceived environmental stress, climate-related events may not be the primary motivation for migration intentions.     

MAXIMUM PRINCIPLE FOR AGE AND DURATION STRUCTURED SYSTEMS: A TOOL FOR OPTIMAL PREVENTION AND TREATMENT OF HIV

Age and duration since infection are considered in a model of optimal control of the spread of Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) in countries with high prevalence. Prevention and medical treatment are selected so as to maximize an economic objective function.The model extends the classical McKendrick equation. Necessary optimality conditions in the form of Pontryagin's global maximum principle and numerical solution based on them are presented. “Critical” initial prevalence is established numerically for which there are two optimal medical treatments: one intense and another less demanding. It is shown that treatment alone can be counterproductive: increase in treatment must be accompanied by increase in prevention.     

Health, widowhood, and family support in the North and South Pacific: a comparative study

This paper compares the impacts of health and widowhood on the level of support received by elderly women living in small island communities within the Philippines and Fiji. Using a theoretical perspective of ongoing reciprocal exchange as opposed to altruistic support within household economies, this paper reviews the impacts of disability and economic contributions on the level of support an elderly female receives. It is hypothesized that as the health of the widow declines her access to care will also diminish due to an inability to contribute to the household economies of the extended family. This paper extends existing work on health and family support of widowed females in the developing world by performing a cross-national comparative analysis as well as by explicitly testing the assumptions of altruism that are a central assumption of most models of long-term care in underdeveloped nations.     

Normative evaluation of tax policies: from households to individuals

We simulate a hypothetical family tax credit on a sample of French couples, using jointly a collective model of labor supply and a tax-benefit calculator. Work behaviors represent here a general concept of “effort,” and hence, individual productivities cannot be assimilated with wage rates. They are retrieved by inversion of the optimal household program under simple assumptions on household preferences and bargaining rules. The calibrated model is used to predict incentive effects of the reform and distributive impacts on individuals and households. The desirability of the reform depends on which of these two welfare units is used for normative evaluation.      

Private transfers with incomplete information: A contribution to the “altruism-exchange motivation for transfers” debate

We examine the role of altruism in determining optimal transfers from a principal (a mother) to selfish agents (her children) in return for attention services. Transfer-attention contracts are studied in a setting in which informational asymmetries arise from the inability of a parent to determine the extent of her children's selfishness. We find a predominating exchange motive for transfers in the symmetric informational regime we study. However, both altruism and exchange are important motives under asymmetric information. We show that altruism facilitates transfer-attention exchange arrangements with certain trade partners under incomplete information, but diminishes trade with others. Received: 19 November 2000/Accepted: 17 May 2001 The paper was written while Edward Seiler was a fellow at the department of Agricultural Economics and Management at the Hebrew University. The authors wish to thank Elad Aharoni for research assistance, and Judith Rivlin, Yacov Tsur, two anonymous referees and seminar participants at the Hebrew University for helpful comments. Responsible editor: Alessandro Cigno.     

Household size and the poisson distribution

Household size distributions for 104 countries are examined. It is shown that a Poisson distribution truncated at zero can be used to derive models of household size distribution. An improved fit is obtained by adding a linear term to the truncated Poisson model. This distribution depends only on average household size which in turn is shown to be related to modified dependency ratios. This method can be used for comparisons of household size distributions across nations and for long-term forecasting.     

Rawlsian optimal population size

In this paper, I examine the implications of the Rawlsian maximin criterion for optimal population size and intergenerational allocation of resource when fertility is endogenous. I show that whenever children are better-off than their parents in laissez-faire, then the size of the population and parental bequests are also optimal according to the Rawlsian criterion. Otherwise, laissez-faire leads to overpopulation and suboptimal bequests. I then show that by using proper price-based corrective policies, society can achieve a Rawlsian optimal allocation. These policies involve either a combination of a subsidy to aggregate future consumption and a per-capita tax on children, or a subsidy to average future consumption.For their comments, I thank two anonymous referees. I also thank Assaf Razin and Efraim Sadka for their comments on an earlier draft.     

Relational contracts for household formation,fertility choice and separation

This paper applies the theory of relational contracts to a model in which a couple decides upon fertility and subsequently on continuation of the relationship. We formalize the idea that within-household-cooperation can be supported by selfinterest. Since the costs of raising children—a household public good—are unequally distributed between partners, a conflict between individually optimal and efficient decisions exists. Side-payments can support cooperation but are not legally enforceable and thus have to be part of an equilibrium. This requires stable relationships and credible punishment threats.Within this framework, we analyze the effects of separation costs and post-separation alimony payments on couples’ fertility decisions. We derive the predictions that higher separation costs and higher alimony payments facilitate cooperation and hence increase fertility. We present empirical evidence based on a recent German reform that reduced rights to post-divorce alimony payments. We find that this reform reduced in-wedlock fertility.     

First-generation effects on second-generation fertility

The number of children born to the second generation is shown to be inversely related to the predicted income of the first generation (father's father) and to the number of siblings in the second generation. This is true even when second-generation characteristics are taken account of. This long-term effect may be the result of parental influences on the tastes, opportunities or genes of their children. They do get an empirical expression because of the imperfect and partial measurement of second-generation characteristics.     

Bargaining over family size: The determinants of fertility in Brazil

Understanding how households make fertility decisions is important to implementing effective policy to slow population growth. Most empirical studies of this decision are based on household models in which men and women are assumed to act as if they have the same preferences for the number of children. However, if men and women have different preferences regarding fertility and are more likely to assert their own preferences as their bargaining power in the household increases, policies to lower fertility rates may be more effectively targeted toward one spouse or the other. In this paper, we test the relevance of the single preferences model by investigating whether men and women's nonwage incomes have the same effects on the number of children in the household. We find that while increases in both the man and woman's nonwage income lower the number of children in the household, an equivalent increase in the woman's income has a significantly stronger effect than the man's. In addition, we find that increases in women's nonwage transfer income have the strongest effects on the fertility decisions of women with low levels of education. The most important policy implication of our results is that policies aimed at increasing the incomes of the least-educated women will be the most effective in lowering fertility rates.     

Gender discrimination and efficiency in marriage: the bargaining family under scrutiny

We consider a repeated family bargaining model that links the topics of employment and households. A key aspect of the model is that marital bargaining power is determined endogenously. We show that: (1) the efficiency of household decisions is sometimes inversely related to the prevailing degree of gender discrimination in labor markets; (2) women who are discriminated against have difficulty enforcing cooperative household outcomes because they may be extremely limited to credibly punish opportunistic behavior by their male partners; (3) the likelihood that sharing rules such as “equal sharing” are maintained throughout a marriage relationship is highest when men and women face equal opportunities in labor markets. Responsible editor: Deborah Cobb-Clark     

Do Household Heads Speak for the Household? A Research Note

Many recent household surveys include questions about respondents’ subjective well-being. Nearly all of them, however, pose these questions only to the household head. This paper addresses an issue with practical and methodological concerns. Can survey designers ask only household heads and expect them to accurately represent the living conditions of the entire household? Using South Africa’s 1998 October Household Survey (OHS) to estimate econometric models of subjective well-being, this paper finds that the response of household heads is determined largely by factors shared by the entire household – housing, for example – and not on those experienced primarily by the head – individual health status, for example. This suggests that South African household heads are truly reporting household well-being, rather than their individual level of satisfaction. While this result probably cannot be widely generalized, the testing methodology is replicable and could be applied to similarly structured data sets.     

Using stylized agent-based models for population–environment research: a case study from the Galápagos Islands

Agent-based models (ABMs) are powerful tools for population–environment research but are subject to trade-offs between model complexity and abstraction. This study strikes a compromise between abstract and highly specified ABMs by designing a spatially explicit, stylized ABM and using it to explore policy scenarios in a setting that is facing substantial conservation and development challenges. Specifically, we present an ABM that reflects key Land Use/Land Cover dynamics and livelihood decisions on Isabela Island in the Galápagos Archipelago of Ecuador. We implement the model using the NetLogo software platform, a free program that requires relatively little programming experience. The landscape is composed of a satellite-derived distribution of a problematic invasive species (common guava) and a stylized representation of the Galápagos National Park, the community of Puerto Villamil, the agricultural zone, and the marine area. The agent module is based on publicly available data and household interviews and represents the primary livelihoods of the population in the Galápagos Islands—tourism, fisheries, and agriculture. We use the model to enact hypothetical agricultural subsidy scenarios aimed at controlling invasive guava and assess the resulting population and land cover dynamics. Findings suggest that spatially explicit, stylized ABMs have considerable utility, particularly during preliminary stages of research, as platforms for (1) sharpening conceptualizations of population–environment systems, (2) testing alternative scenarios, and (3) uncovering critical data gaps.     

Endogenous fertility,endogenous lifetime and economic growth: the role of child policies

We examine the effects of child policies on both transitional dynamics and long-term demo-economic outcomes in an overlapping-generations neoclassical growth model à la Chakraborty (J Econ Theory 116(1):119–137, 2004) extended with endogenous fertility under the assumption of weak altruism towards children. The government invests in public health, and an individual’s survival probability at the end of youth depends on health expenditure. We show that multiple development regimes can exist. However, poverty or prosperity does not necessarily depend on the initial conditions, since they are the result of how a child policy is designed. A child tax, for example, can be used effectively to enable those economies that were entrapped in poverty to prosper. There is also a long-term welfare-maximising level of the child tax. We show that a child tax can be used to increase capital accumulation, escape from poverty and maximise long-term welfare also when (a) a public pay-as-you-go pension system is in place and (b) the government issues an amount of public debt. Interestingly, there also exists a couple child tax–health tax that can be used to find the second-best optimum optimorum. In addition, we show that results are robust to the inclusion of decisions regarding the child quantity–quality trade-off under the assumption of impure altruism. In particular, there exists a threshold value of the child tax below (resp. above) which child quality spending is unaffordable (resp. affordable) and different scenarios are in existence.