Union Worker Wage Effect in the Public Sector

This study examines union wage premiums in the public sector for the 1998–2004 period. Unlike previous studies, our approach estimates union wage premiums considering differences in the rewards to education, experience, and other personal characteristics for union and non-union workers. The approach provides a larger estimated wage gap than the traditional approach, and allows for simulations of union–nonunion wage gaps for different types of workers. Moreover, we use an Oaxaca decomposition to explain the larger union–nonunion wage gap in the private sector in comparison to that in the public sector. We find that between 50% and 60% of the difference in union wage premiums between the private and public sectors is due to differences in the way unionized workers are rewarded in the private and public sectors, while the remaining portion is due to differences in personal characteristics of private and public sector workers.

Do Truly Comparable Public and Private Sector Workers Show Any Compensation Differential?

Using data from the Health and Retirement Study, we apply propensity score matching methods to examine evidence on the rent paid to public sector workers in the United States. Traditionally, wage differentials are computed assuming that workers from both public and private sectors are comparable, without actually controlling for the comparability of the units. Using this method, we are able to control for selection bias and, at the same time, select a subsample of comparable workers in terms of their conditional probability of choosing to work in the public sector on which to estimate separate wage equations.     

Public transit wage rates: Pre-Reagan and Reagan-Bush eras

This paper examines the earnings of public transit bus drivers for both the pre-Reagan and Reagan-Bush eras using Current Population Survey data. The findings show that union drivers were consistently paid a significant wage premium over nonunion drivers, a premium which also exceeded that for unionized private nontransport operatives — suggesting that special institutional features of the public transit industry have collectively conferred market power on unionized public transit workers. During the Reagan years, the earnings of public transit drivers, union and nonunion alike, rose relative to those of private and public nontransport operatives in spite of federally-spearheaded cost containment policies. In 1990, these earnings fell relative to those of private and public nontransport operatives, suggesting that the effects of these policies may be beginning to be felt. Helpful comments were provided by Don Bellante and an anonymous referee     

The Effects of Prevailing Wage Laws: A Comparison of Individual Workers'' Wages Earned on and off Prevailing Wage Construction Projects

I evaluate the effects of prevailing wage laws using a unique data set that shows the wages paid to workers on prevailing wage projects and the wages paid to the same workers during the same time period for work on projects not covered by prevailing wage regulations. The wage comparison shows that workers are generally paid more for work on prevailing wage projects than they are for work on non-prevailing wage projects. Thus, prevailing wage laws likely do increase the cost of public construction. In addition, to the extent that the quality of construction is improved, prevailing wage laws appear to be an inefficient mechanism by which to achieve additional quality, as the regulations often result in workers being paid more than they earn in the private market.     

Sexual Orientation and Wage Discrimination in France: The Hidden Side of the Rainbow

This article is the first study to present an econometric evaluation of wage discrimination based on sexual orientation in the French labor market. Having identified same-sex couples using the French Employment Survey, we estimate the wage gap related to sexual orientation in the private and public sectors, in order to analyze whether or not lesbians and gays suffer a wage penalty. The results obtained show the existence of a wage penalty for homosexual male workers, as compared with their heterosexual counterparts, in both the private and public sectors; the magnitude of this discrimination varies from about ?6.5?% in the private sector, to ?5.5?% in the public sector. In the private sector, the wage penalty suffered by gay employees is higher for skilled workers than for the unskilled, and??in both sectors??the wage penalty is higher for older workers than for younger ones. As with many other countries, we do not find any evidence of the existence of a wage discrimination against lesbians.     

The effects of prevailing wage laws: A comparison of individual workers’ wages earned on and off prevailing wage construction projects

I evaluate the effects of prevailing wage laws using a unique data set that shows the wages paid to workers on prevailing wage projects and the wages paid to the same workers during the same time period for work on projects not covered by prevailing wage regulations. The wage comparison shows that workers are generally paid more for work on prevailing wage projects than they are for work on nonprevailing wage projects. Thus, prevailing wage laws likely do increase the cost of public construction. In addition, to the extent that the quality of construction is improved, prevailing wage laws appear to be an inefficient mechanism by which to achieve additional quality, as the regulations often result in workers being paid more than they earn in the private market. This research was done originally for the Program Review and Investigations Committee of the Kentucky State Legislature. I thank the staff of the Program Review and Investigations Committee and the Legisla-tive Research Commission for assistance with data collection and Mark Berger for helpful comments. Due to confidentiality requirements, the data cannot be made available.     

The impact of unionization on labor’s share of income

This study examines the effect of unions on labor’s share of income. Because economic conditions within each industry are important in addressing this issue, this analysis incorporates a more disaggregated approach than has been previously used. Cross-sectional data for the 1950s — a period of more stable unionization — permit an examination of the long-run effect of wage increases on labor’s share. The empirical analysis suggests that higher labor prices have no long-run impact on labor’s share in manufacturing.     

RENT CREATION AND RENT SHARING: NEW MEASURES AND IMPACTS ON TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY

This analysis proposes new measures of rent creation and rent sharing and assesses their impact on productivity on cross‐country‐industry panel data. We find first that: (1) anticompetitive product market regulations positively affect rent creation and (2) employment protection legislation boosts hourly wages, particularly for low‐skill workers. However, we find no significant impact of this employment legislation on rent sharing, as the hourly wage increases are offset by a negative impact on hours worked. Second, using regulation indicators as instruments, we find that rent creation and rent sharing both have a substantial negative impact on total factor productivity. (JEL E22, E24, O30, L50, O43, O47, C23)     

REDUCING PUBLIC‐PRIVATE SECTOR PAY DIFFERENTIALS: THE SINGLE SPINE PAY POLICY AS A NATURAL EXPERIMENT IN GHANA

Empirical studies have documented the existence of the public‐private pay differentials in both developed and developing countries. The implementation of policies aiming to reduce this gap has however been mitigated or inconclusive. This paper exploits the Single Spine Pay Policy (SSPP) in Ghana as a natural experiment to examine the effectiveness of wage policies in developing countries. The SSPP was implemented in 2010 by the Government of Ghana to address the public‐private sector wage gap and improve productivity in the public sector. Using a quantile treatment effect approach based on a difference‐in‐difference estimation, we show that the SSPP has yet to reduce the wage gap between the public and private sectors across the entire distribution of earnings in Ghana. The improvement observed is only at the lower tail of the distribution of earnings. However, the SSPP has a larger effect on the earnings of female workers than that of males in the education and health services sectors while male workers have benefited more in the administration sector, suggesting that the policy was successful in reducing the gender wage gap in the education and health services sectors but has widened this gap in the administration sector. Moreover, the SSPP has decreased the productivity of workers across the distribution of earnings, mainly due to a decrease in the effort of female public sector workers in the education and health sectors and male workers in the administration sector. (JEL C31, G15, J24, J31, J45)     

Intangibles and the Gender Wage Gap: An Analysis of Gender Wage Gaps Across Occupations in the Finnish Private Sector

The paper compares the gender wage differentials of two occupation groups—innovation and non-innovation workers—separately for manufacturing and services using Finnish private-sector data. We apply a decomposition method based on unconditional quantile regression techniques to identify key factors underlying the gender wage gaps observed along the whole wage distribution, as well as changes in these wage gaps between 2002 and 2009. This more nuanced approach provides important new insights. We find conspicuous differences in average gender wage gaps, in gender wage-gap profiles across the wage distribution and also in the evolution of gender wage differentials over time between sectors and occupation groups. Our results imply that sector-specific factors are a more important driving force behind these differences in patterns and trends of gender wage gaps, although occupation-specific factors cannot be totally dismissed. Hence, comparisons of gender wage gaps, including their underlying sources, of innovation and non-innovation workers for too broadly defined segments of the labour market may result in misleading conclusions concerning the factual role of intangible capital.     

Comparative advantage and the welfare effects of uniform wage policies

This paper analyzes the theoretical impact of a commonly cited union goal — the elimination or reduction of wage differentials within occupations. By dropping the usual assumption of homogeneous labor, we show how, and under what market conditions, workers will receive rents due to individual comparative advantage. In competitive labor markets a union-imposed uniform wage may lower the earnings of workers holding a productive advantage, causing a reduction in employment and a welfare loss of comparative advantage rents. The implications of a strict uniform wage rule imply that unions may be forced to adapt their wage policy to allow more productive workers to receive wage differentials. This consideration helps explain some common trade union institutions.     

The minimum wage and productivity differentials

A firm’s ability to adjust its production process to economize on low-skilled labor when faced with a minimum wage increase will differ greatly depending on industry or occupation. For example, more capital-intensive means of cleaning hotel rooms or serving customers at restaurants may not be readily available without degrading service quality. In such situations, the productivity of labor is essentially capped, and firms have few options when the minimum wage increases. This simple observation has implications for studies that rely on microdata to examine the effects of minimum wage increases. If firms only increase prices in response to a minimum wage increase, employment effects are likely small. If the goal of the minimum wage is to redistribute income from firms and consumers to workers, minimum-wage increases targeted at industries and occupations where such rigidities result in an inelastic demand for labor may achieve the desired goal at a lower cost than across-the-board increases. However, such a scheme causes an inefficient allocation of labor and would be subjected to substantial political pressures that may lead to anomalous results. Additionally, it is unreasonable to conclude that policy makers have the necessary information to skillfully set the minimum wage. I thank Brian E. Chezum and Jeff Waddoups for helpful comments. All mistakes, of course, are my own.     

Testing rent sharing using individualized measures of rent: evidence from domestic helpers

The market for resident domestic helpers offers a rare opportunity where the surplus from employment relationship can be quantitatively measured for each individual employee. Using the difference between employer's cost of time and employee's wage as a measure of rent, it is found that wages for domestic helpers are positively related to rent. However the apparent sharing of rent is better explained by matching than by efficiency wage models. Rent sharing is observed even in households where monitoring or turnover costs are low. Rent sharing is not observed among newly arrived foreign domestic helpers, whose ability remains to be revealed.     

Effects of public transit policies on taxi drivers’ wages

We investigate the effects of two public transit policies, subsidization and privatization, on the wages of taxi drivers. In theory, transit operating subsidies benefit transit firms at the expense of the taxi industry and its employees. By contrast, the privatization policy of contractingout transit service to lower cost private providers is potentially beneficial to taxi firms and their drivers. Estimated wage equations confirm that transit operating subsidies have negatively affected taxi driver wages even as they have bolstered transit drivers’ wages. Transit privatization has had the predicted positive effect on taxi driver wages, all else held constant. These results suggest that a more accurate assessment of the effect of transit operating subsidies on labor costs must encompass their net effects on the labor costs of the entire urban transportation sector, not just the public transit industry.     

Parenthood wage penalties in a double income society

We estimate how parenthood affects hourly wages using panel data for Norwegian employees in the years 1997–2007. Though smaller than for most other OECD countries, we find substantial wage penalties to motherhood, ranging from a 1.2 % wage reduction for women with lower secondary education to 4.9 % for women with more than four years of higher education. Human capital measures such as work experience and paid parental leave do not explain the wage penalties, indicating that in the Norwegian institutional context, mothers are protected from adverse wage effects due to career breaks. We do however find large heterogeneity in the effects, with the largest penalties for mothers working full time and in the private sector. Contrary to most studies using US data and to previous research from Norway, we find a small wage penalty also to fatherhood. Also for men, the penalty is greater for those who work full time and in the private sector. A substantial share of the fatherhood wage penalty is explained by paternity leave.     

Privatisation in Developing Countries: Performance and Ownership Effects

Over the last twenty years, privatisation, defined as the transfer of public assets (firms) from the government to private investors, has been on the reform agenda of more than 120 developing countries. The switch of ownership induces major changes in the corporate governance of firms, and in their incentives to restructure and improve efficiency and performance. This article evaluates this experience, focusing on its impact on corporate performance and governance, identifying several issues yet to be resolved.     

DIVIDEND POLICY IN REGULATED NETWORK INDUSTRIES: EVIDENCE FROM THE EU

We study the dividend policy of firms in regulated network industries, focusing on the impact of different regulatory regimes and government control. We link payout and smoothing decisions to different regulatory mechanisms (cost‐based vs. incentive regulation) and state versus private ownership. We test our predictions on a panel of listed European electric utilities, accounting for potential endogeneity of the choice of regulatory and ownership patterns. We find that incentive‐regulated firms smooth their dividends less than cost‐based regulated firms and that they report higher target payout ratios. Consistent with the interest group theory of regulation, we find that incentive regulation schemes are less likely when the state is still an important shareholder in the sector. Additionally, our results show that government control undermines the efficiency‐enhancing effects of incentive regulation on dividend policy, for example, lower smoothing is only due to private firms. (JEL G35, L51, L32, L9)     

Verteilungseffekte von Finanzialisierung

Financialisation is often associated with rising income inequality. The article describes the major aspects of financialisation in the foreign, financial, business and household sector, and identifies several hypotheses how financialisation affects functional income distribution. We discuss enhanced exit options of firms, rising financial overhead costs for businesses, increased competition in capital markets, and weakened bargaining power of workers due to indebtedness. The different hypotheses are operationalised through empirical measures and their effect on the wage share is tested econometrically by means of a panel data set of 14 OECD countries over the period 1992–2014. We find statistically significant negative effects of financial payments of firms and financial openness on the wage share.     

Does Public or Not-for-Profit Status Affect the Earnings of Hospital Workers?

This paper examines the earnings differentials among hospital workers in the public, private nonprofit, and private for-profit sectors. Utilizing data from the 1995 through 2007 Current Population Surveys, unadjusted earnings are highest in the private nonprofit sector and lowest in private for-profit firms. Once measurable characteristics are accounted for, health practitioners in for-profit and nonprofit hospitals earn similar wages while public sector workers earn small but significant wage penalties. Nonprofit hospitals tend to attract workers with higher levels of skill as measured by schooling and potential experience. This could be explained in part by worker sorting and lower cost containment incentives in nonprofit hospitals. Wage change analysis using pooled 2-year panels constructed from the CPS indicate no significant differences in earnings between the three sectors of employment. Whatever the role of the sector of employment on the overall earnings of hospital workers, there is sufficient worker mobility within the industry to largely eliminate systematic wage differences across type of hospital.

Membership and wage impact of right-to-work laws

This paper examines the effects of “Right-to-Work” laws on union membership and on the earnings of union and nonunion members. Using regression analysis, we find that once the simultaneous equations bias between the degree of unionization and RTW laws is eliminated, RTW laws have no statistically significant influence on union membership. Similarly, using a human-capital earnings model, we find that RTW laws have no significant influence on the wages of all workers, union workers, or nonunion workers. However, we did find evidence that such laws may promote aggressive union wage policies resulting in a larger union/nonunion relative wages advantage in RTW states than in non-RTW states.