“Roll Back Malaria,Roll in Development”? Reassessing the Economic Burden of Malaria

Recent efforts to mobilize support for malaria control have highlighted the economic burden of malaria and the value of malaria control for generating economic development. These claims have a long history. Beginning in the early twentieth century, they became the primary justification for malaria‐control programs in the American South and in other parts of the globe, including British India. Economists conducted none of these studies. Following World War II and the development of new anti‐malarial drugs and pesticides, including DDT, malaria control and eradication were increasingly presented as instruments for eliminating economic underdevelopment. By the 1960s, however, economists and demographers began to raise serious substantive and methodological questions about the basis of these claims. Of particular concern was the role of rapid population growth, resulting in part from the decline of malaria mortality, in undermining the short‐term economic gains achieved through malaria control. Despite these concerns, malaria continues to be presented as an economic problem in the work of Jeffrey Sachs and others, justifying massive investments in malaria control. The methodological basis of these claims is examined. The paper concludes that while malaria takes a dreadful toll in human lives and causes significant economic losses for individuals, families, and some industries, the evidence linking malaria control to national economic growth remains unconvincing. In addition, the evidence suggests that there are potential costs to justifying malaria‐eradication campaigns on macroeconomic grounds.     

The Gender‐Gap Reversal in Education and Its Effect on Union Formation: The End of Hypergamy?

Newly released census microdata reveal the nearly worldwide and substantial decline in educational hypergamy (women marrying men with higher educational attainment) across 56 countries from the 1970s to the 2000s. We examine the extent to which the observed decrease in hypergamy is connected to the worldwide rise in female educational attainment. Our results show that educational hypergamy is an enduring form of gender inequality in union formation across the countries examined but that it has been decreasing over the last few decades and in some countries has reversed in recent years. Overall, we find a strong association between hypergamy and gender differences in educational attainment. Societies in which the female educational advantage is greater tend to have lower levels of educational hypergamy. There is a tendency toward a joint increase in women's educational levels and a decrease in educational hypergamy. This article underlines the influence of women's educational opportunities on the increase in gender symmetry in assortative mating, which leads us to predict the end of educational hypergamy.     

China's Below‐Replacement Fertility: Government Policy or Socioeconomic Development?

The article challenges the notion that below-replacement fertility and its local variation in China are primarily attributable to the government's birth planning policy. Data from the 2000 census and provincial statistical yearbooks are used to compare fertility in Jiangsu and Zhejiang, two of the most developed provinces in China, to examine the relationship between socioeconomic development and low fertility. The article demonstrates that although low fertility in China was achieved under the government's restrictive one-child policy, structural changes brought about by socioeconomic development and ideational shifts accompanying the new wave of globalization played a key role in China's fertility reduction.     

Why the Total Fertility Rate of 2010 Population Census is so Low?

The total fertility rate of 2010 population census hits a new low record.Careful analysis shows that such a new low fertility rate is mainly resulted from the declined fertility rate in first parity despite the slightly increased fertility rates in second order and over.The total fertility rate at first parity has fallen the most among the rural residents due to remarkably postponed age of marriage or child-bearing,so ever large percentage of unmarried women in their bearing age helps to depress the fertility rate at first parity.After excluding the parity structural effect of women,measured with the progressive fertility rates,the levels of the 2010census have kept almost the same as those in year 2005.Therefore,fertility decline in the latest census cannot be simply attributed to under-reported births.In addition,the latest census turns out that the life fertility rate is around 1.5,almost reaching to the requirement of current fertility policy.     

The rising share of nonmarital births: Fertility choice or marriage behavior?

Much of the sharp rise in the share of nonmarital births in the United States has been attributed to changes in the fertility choices of unmarried and married women-in response, it is often argued, to public policy. In contrast, we develop and test a model that attributes the rise to changes in marriage behavior, with no necessary changes infertility. A variety of empirical tests strongly support this conclusion and invites focused attention to issues related to marriage behavior as well as to the interactions between marriage and fertility.     

The Effect of Urbanization on China’s Fertility

The relationship between urbanization and fertility decline is known to be inverse in developed countries. However, the nature of this relationship in developing countries that already have relatively low fertilities is not well-understood. This study aims to illustrate how much urbanization contributed to China’s fertility decline between 1982 and 2008 and forecasts how much it can contribute to future reductions in fertility. The study examines changes in the total fertility rate (TFR) at both the national and provincial levels, given regional differences in the urbanization rate. The results show that changes in rural fertility behavior accounted for most of the decline in the national TFR between 1982 and 2008. This finding suggests that official birth control policies were instrumental in curbing China’s population growth. However, urbanization was responsible for about 22% of the decrease in TFR during this period, and its effect was especially important during the latter years (2001–2008). In most provinces, urbanization associated with a decline in provincial-level fertility. The forecasts indicate that urbanization will become the primary factor behind future declines in national fertility. Given the negative effect of urbanization on the TFR, it is possible to relax the one-child policy without having adverse implications for population growth.     

Has East Germany Overtaken West Germany? Recent Trends in Order‐Specific Fertility

Some 20 years after reunification, the contrast between East and West Germany offers a natural experiment for studying the degree of persistence of Communist-era family patterns, the effects of economic change, and fertility postponement. After reunification, period fertility rates plummeted in the former East Germany to record low levels. Since the mid-1990s, however, period fertility rates have been rising in East Germany, in contrast to the nearly constant rates seen in the West. By 2008, the TFR of East Germany had overtaken that of the West. We explore why fertility in East Germany is higher than in West Germany, despite unfavorable economic circumstances in the East. We address this and related questions by (a) presenting an account of the persisting East/West differences in attitudes toward and constraints on childbearing, (b) conducting an order-specific fertility analysis of recent fertility trends, and (c) projecting completed fertility for the recent East and west German cohorts. In addition to using the Human Fertility Database, perinatal statistics allow us to calculate a tempo-corrected TFR for East and West Germany.     

The More the Merrier? The Causal Effect of High Fertility on Later-Life Loneliness in Eastern Europe

Levels of later-life loneliness are high in Eastern Europe. We assess whether having more children is protective against later-life loneliness for Eastern-European mothers and fathers. Drawing on Generations and Gender Surveys data of 25,479 parents aged 50–80 from eight Eastern-European countries, we adopt an instrumental approach exploiting parents’ preference for mixed-sex offspring to estimate the causal effect of having additional children on feelings of loneliness. We find that having an additional child has a causal protective effect against loneliness for mothers. Ordinary least squares regression models also show a weak but statistically significant negative association between number of children and later-life loneliness among fathers. However, results of the instrumental variable analyses are inconclusive for this group. We thus do not find statistically significant causal evidence that having an additional child is protective against loneliness for fathers. Our results underline the importance of addressing reverse causality and selection bias when investigating the links between number of children and later-life loneliness, particularly among women. The causal evidence presented here suggests that the trend towards families with fewer children noted in several Eastern-European countries may place new cohorts of older Eastern-Europeans, and in particular Eastern-European women, at risk of stronger feelings of loneliness.

     

Two Is Best? The Persistence of a Two‐Child Family Ideal in Europe

How persistent and universal has the two child family ideal been in Europe during the last three decades? We analyze responses of women of reproductive age from 168 surveys conducted in 37 countries in 1979–2012. A two‐child ideal has become nearly universal among women in all parts of Europe. Countries that used to display higher ideal family size have converged over time toward a two‐child model. Six out of ten women in Europe consider two children as ideal, and this proportion is very similar in different regions. The mean ideal family size has become closely clustered around 2.2 in most countries. Gradual shifts can be documented toward more women expressing an ideal of having one child (and, quite rarely, having no children) and a parallel decline in an ideal of three or more children. An increasing number of European countries saw their mean ideal family size falling to relatively low levels around 1.95–2.15. However, with the exception of one survey for eastern Germany and two of the surveys not included in our study owing to high nonresponse or low sample size, none of the analyzed surveys suggests a decline in mean ideal family size to levels considerably below replacement, i.e., below 1.9 children per woman.     

Is the Association Between Education and Fertility Postponement Causal? The Role of Family Background Factors

A large body of literature has demonstrated a positive relationship between education and age at first birth. However, this relationship may be partly spurious because of family background factors that cannot be controlled for in most research designs. We investigate the extent to which education is causally related to later age at first birth in a large sample of female twins from the United Kingdom (N = 2,752). We present novel estimates using within–identical twin and biometric models. Our findings show that one year of additional schooling is associated with about one-half year later age at first birth in ordinary least squares (OLS) models. This estimate reduced to only a 1.5-month later age at first birth for the within–identical twin model controlling for all shared family background factors (genetic and family environmental). Biometric analyses reveal that it is mainly influences of the family environment—not genetic factors—that cause spurious associations between education and age at first birth. Last, using data from the Office for National Statistics, we demonstrate that only 1.9 months of the 2.74 years of fertility postponement for birth cohorts 1944–1967 could be attributed to educational expansion based on these estimates. We conclude that the rise in educational attainment alone cannot explain differences in fertility timing between cohorts.     

Does Global Fertility and Cultural Transition Affect Human Development? The Neglected Role of the Demographic Transition

This study approaches the potential influence of the demographic transition on outcomes of human development. By re-conceptualizing demographic transition as global fertility and cultural transition and combining all distal macro forces including modernization, techno-economic heritage, and economic dependency, an integrated model for explaining human development outcomes can be theoretically formulated and subjected to empirical test. A panel regression analysis of available data from all developing countries supports the influence of the distal macro forces and the intervening role played by global fertility and cultural transition in affecting human development. In particular, a four-indicator index of global fertility and cultural transition shows the strongest effect on human development index, even controlling for the lagged dependent variable and the latest most competing explanatory variables. Following the long continuing process of the demographic transition, the empirical implication of this newly constructed index of global fertility and cultural transition for exploring alternative measures of human development and policy implications for third world human development are discussed.     

A Reversal in the Relationship of Human Development With Fertility?

Myrskylä et al. (2009) found that the relationship between the human development index (HDI) and the total fertility rate (TFR) reverses from negative (i.e., increases in HDI are associated with decreases in TFR) to positive (i.e., increases in HDI are associated with increases in TFR) at an HDI level of 0.86. In this article, we show that the reversal in the HDI-TFR relationship is robust to neither the UNDP’s recent revision in the HDI calculation method nor thedecomposition of the HDI into its education, standard-of-living, and health subindices.     

The Decline of Fertility in Los Angeles,California, 1880–1900

Data from the 1900 U.S. Census of Population show that fertility in Los Angeles California, declined by more than 50 per cent between 1880 and 1900. Women's mean age at first marriage, which rose by approximately three years, contributed to the decline, but change in marital fertility was more important than change in nuptiality. Although the fertility of in-migrating U.S.-born women was lower than that of California-born women, the decline was not explained by in-migration. The emergence of a class differential in fertility, with couples of higher status having fewer children than those of lower status, and the simultaneous weakening of class differentials in secondary-school attendance, together suggest that the rise of universal secondary schooling probably did not account for the marital fertility decline experienced in middle- and upper-status families.     

On Development,Demography and Climate Change: The End of the World as We Know it?

This paper comments on the issue of global warming and climate change, in an attempt to provide fresh perspective. Essentially, five main arguments are made. First, that the process of modern economic development has been based on the burning of fossil fuels, and that this will continue to apply for the foreseeable future. Second, that in large part due to momentum in economic and demographic processes, it is inevitable that there will be a major rise in atmospheric CO₂ during the present century. Third, that available data on global temperatures suggest strongly that the coming warming will be appreciably faster than anything that humanity has experienced during historical times. Moreover, especially in a system that is being forced, the chance of an abrupt change in climate happening must be rated as fair. Fourth, that while it is impossible to attach precise probabilities to different scenarios, the range of plausible unpleasant climate outcomes seems at least as great as the range of more manageable ones. The consequences of future climate change may be considerable; indeed, they could be almost inconceivable—with several negative changes occurring simultaneously and to cumulative adverse effect. There is an urgent need to improve ways of thinking about what could happen. Fifth, the paper maintains that the human response to other difficult ‘long’ threats—such as that posed by HIV/AIDS—reveals a broadly analogous sequence of social reactions (e.g. denial, avoidance, recrimination) to that which is unfolding with respect to carbon emissions and climate change. Therefore the view expressed here is that major behavioral change to limit world carbon emissions is unlikely in the foreseeable future, and that the broad sway of future events is probably now set to run its course.This paper is a personal assessment of what is occurring with respect to the subject of global warming and climate change. Nevertheless it is an attempt to examine the topic objectively. The paper tries to concentrate on the essentials—from both the social and the environmental sciences—and, quite deliberately, it presents basic data on the subject for the reader's own consideration. The paper's subtitle is taken from a television program broadcast in January 2005 as part of UK Channel Four's War on Terra season. I thank Tim Forsyth, Chris Wilson, and especially Brian O'Neill for their help and advice. However, and most certainly, the usual disclaimer applies.     

Global Demographic Convergence? A Reconsideration of Changing Intercountry Inequality in Fertility

This research challenges the notion that the second half of the twentieth century was a period of global demographic convergence. To be sure, fertility rates fell substantially during the period, but with considerable un‐evenness. The declines in total fertility across population‐weighted countries were sufficiently disproportionate that intercountry fertility inequality, estimated using standard measures of inequality, did not begin to decline until at least 1995. Regression analysis also shows that only very recently did lagging countries begin to catch up with countries that began the transition to low fertility earlier. Contrary to findings on changing intercountry health inequality, sub‐Saharan Africa has had a greater impact on changes in fertility inequality than China. The trend in fertility inequality, where convergence is a relatively new phenomenon, stands in contrast to trends in inequality in other domains, such as income, education, and health.