Changes in assortative mating: The impact of age and education, 1970–1890

Data from the U.S. Census and Current Population Survey are used to examine trends in the propensity to marry or to cohabit by the age and educational attainment of potential partners. Marriage rates declined sharply across all age and educational combinations between 1970 and 1980 and declined more sharply for less-educated persons between 1980 and 1990. The rise in cohabitation compensated somewhat for the decline in marriage rates, but the compensation was unequally spread among age and educational combinations. Highly educated men were more likely, and highly educated women were no more or less likely, to marry than to cohabit with less-educated partners in 1970 and 1980. By 1990, however, educational assortative-mating patterns between these two types of unions were similar. In 1990, marriages and cohabitations involving women who were better educated than their partners were more common than those involving women who were less educated than their partners. In addition, men and women in their early 20s tend to have partners better educated than themselves, but persons in their 30s tend to cross the less-than-high-school/ more-than-high-school educational barrier when partners differ in educational attainment.     

Catholicism and marriage in the united states

This study examines the effects of a Catholic background on age at first marriage, the odds of never marrying, and the odds of ever divorcing. Estimates using Catholic upbringing are compared with estimates using Catholic at the time of the survey. A case is made that if the latter measure of Catholicism is used, serious selection bias problems occur in some cases because this measure excludes defectors and includes converts. Further, it is shown that a Catholic upbringing generally has no effect on men’s age at first marriage and has a positive effect on the age when women marry. It is also shown that older Baptist men are substantially more likely than Catholic men to experience a divorce. Older Catholic women are somewhat less likely to experience a divorce than non-Baptist Protestant women. There is no Catholic effect on the odds that younger men and women will divorce.     

中国女性初婚模式变动趋势研究

20世纪80年代以来我国女性的初婚模式发生了显著的变化。本文使用人口普查资料、全国1%人口抽样调查数据、人口变动情况抽样调查数据以及IPUMS数据,通过女性平均初婚年龄、曾婚比例、年龄别初婚概率、终身结婚期待率和预期单身寿命等指标探究我国女性自20世纪80年代以来的初婚模式变动情况。研究发现30多年来我国女性平均初婚年龄在波动中上升,到2017年女性平均初婚年龄已经达到25.60岁,而教育程度的提高会推迟女性进入婚姻的时间,接受过高等教育的女性平均初婚年龄明显高于未受过高等教育的女性;另外,通过对各教育程度平均初婚年龄标准化与分解看到随着时间的推移,教育对女性的平均初婚年龄影响作用增大;20-30岁年龄段女性婚姻推迟明显,曾婚比例不断降低,但女性终身未婚比例很低,其中受过高等教育的女性婚姻推迟现象最为明显,但其自身的结婚意愿并未降低,大部分女性只是推迟结婚时间,并不是不结婚。对净婚姻表各指标进行计算发现1982-2010年女性的年龄别初婚概率下降,尤其在20-30岁年龄段下降明显,初婚峰值年龄推迟,结婚年龄集中现象减弱。终身结婚期待率下降速度趋缓,随着女性初婚年龄的推迟,2010年27岁之后的终身结婚期待率要高于1990年与2000年,29-35岁女性的预期单身寿命也较前30年低,较大年龄未婚女性结婚等待时间缩短。     

Proximate determinants of Philippine fertility: 1983 levels and patterns

Data from the 1983 National Demographic Survey are used to analyze the proximate determinants of Philippine fertility in each of the 3 stages of family formation and to identify all of the direct and indirect factors affecting fertility levels and trends. 10,843 ever-married women and 12,771 children were included. The analysis pertains first to the starting patterns of family formation, the age at first birth, and the proximate determinants (age at menarche, age at first marriage/union, conception before first birth, fetal wastage first birth, interval between first marriage and first birth). Further analysis examines birth spacing patterns including the postpartum nonsusceptible period, the exposure interval and stopping patterns. Almost all births occur within marriage, and childbearing begins late at 22.5 years. However, 15.4% of first births are conceived premaritally. The mean age at first birth increases from younger to older cohorts. Urban women were slightly older (23.0 years) at the birth of their first child. Those with education below the 4th grade had first births 3.5 years earlier. Contraceptive use was low at 1.8% before first birth. Younger cohorts were more likely to use birth control and urban wives were more likely to use it than rural wives. 6.4% reported a first pregnancy ending in nonlive births, which were primarily spontaneous abortions (5.2%), stillbirths (1.0%), and induced abortions (.2%). 5.8% report never having been pregnant and 1.1% never having given birth to a live-born child. 20.4% were childless between the ages of 15-24 years, and 4.6% between 25-34 years. Childlessness was slightly higher among urban women (7.1%) than rural women (6.7%). A decreasing age at menarche has appeared; i.e., 13.6 years for the cohort 15-24 years, and 14.0 for the oldest cohort. By age 15, 82.9% had begun menstruating. The mean age at marriage is early at 20.7 years, and older cohorts tended to marry later at 21.4 years. Urban women marry a year later (21.4 years) than rural women. Lower educated women marry 4 years earlier. The mean length between first marriage and first birth was 18.4 months. In the younger cohorts, spacing patterns are shorter. Postpartum susceptibility is short. Return to sexual relations after a birth occurred at 2.8 months. The exposure time required to conceive is fairly long at 16.6 months and is attributed to contraceptive use, since coital frequency is high and temporary separation is infrequent. The average age at last birth is late at 37.6 years.     

How Does the Age Gap Between Partners Affect Their Survival?

I use hazard regression methods to examine how the age difference between spouses affects their survival. In many countries, the age difference between spouses at marriage has remained relatively stable for several decades. In Denmark, men are, on average, about three years older than the women they marry. Previous studies of the age gap between spouses with respect to mortality found that having a younger spouse is beneficial, while having an older spouse is detrimental for one’s own survival. Most of the observed effects could not be explained satisfactorily until now, mainly because of methodological drawbacks and insufficiency of the data. The most common explanations refer to selection effects, caregiving in later life, and some positive psychological and sociological effects of having a younger spouse. The present study extends earlier work by using longitudinal Danish register data that include the entire history of key demographic events of the whole population from 1990 onward. Controlling for confounding factors such as education and wealth, results suggest that having a younger spouse is beneficial for men but detrimental for women, while having an older spouse is detrimental for both sexes.     

Demography of the marriage market in the United States

In this paper, a new index designed to measure the relative availability of unmarried men and women is introduced. Termed the "Availability Ratio," the measure is defined as the number of suitable persons divided by the average competition. Suitability, in turn, is defined in terms of race, age and education. After various experimental tests, particular age and eeducational constraints were empirically derived from marriage data. Persons of opposite sex sharing living quarters are tested as unavailable. Estimates are also made of those presumed to be unsuitable on the basis of the % of persons aged 45-74 who have never married. Adjustments for the census undercount are given. 1980 and 1970 estimates are presented for the US population. Subsequent analyses will focus on metropolitan areas, which are more likely to function as actual marriage markets in contrast to the nation as a whole. The substantive evidence indicates that women under 25 are in a good position to find a mate, but that after this age, their prospects deteriorate rapidly. The outlook is especially poor for the more educated women at older ages, especially black women. At ages 40-49, for example, there are fewer than 3 suitable men available for every 10 college-educated women. The results suggest that the combination of preferences of women for older men (or men's tastes for younger women), combined with higher survival rates for women at older ages, results in a very unbalanced market situationn for all but the youngest cohorts of men and women.     

Turning back the ticking clock: the effect of increased affordability of assisted reproductive technology on women’s marriage timing

This paper exploits variation in the mandated insurance coverage of assisted reproductive technology (ART) across US states and over time to examine the connection between increased access to ART and female marriage timing. Since ART increases the probability of pregnancy for older women of reproductive age, greater access to ART will make marriage delay less costly for younger single women of reproductive age. Linear probability models are estimated to investigate the effects of ART state insurance mandates on changes in marital status of women in different age groups using the 1977–2010 Current Population Survey. Results show that greater access to ART is associated with marital delay for white (but not for black) women: white women in states with an ART insurance mandate are significantly less likely to marry between the 20–24, 25–29, and 30–34 age ranges, but significantly more likely to marry between the 30–34 and 35–39 age ranges.     

Economic opportunities,marriage squeezes and the propensity to marry: An economic analysis of period marriage rates in England and Wales

An economic model of the decision to marry has been developed by Gary Becker and is now part of the ‘new home economics’. From it one can deduce that the propensity to marry is a function of the relative earning capacities of men and women, the relative scarcity of unmarried persons of the opposite sex and real income. The effects of changes in these variables on the annual first marriage rates of men aged 16–19, 20–24 and 25–29 and women aged 16–19 and 20–24 respectively are estimated over the post-war period. It is found that women's earning capacity relative to men's has a particularly strong negative effect on marriage rates, and that the decline in first marriage rates during the 1970s was primarily attributable to the growing economic opportunities for women. As demographic studies have suggested, the relative numbers of bachelors and spinsters of particular ages (‘marriage squeezes’) also have a significant impact, and there is evidence of substitution in the ages of marriage partners in response to such ‘squeezes’. The income elasticity of marriage is only found to be significant among men below age 25 and women below age 20, and it increases as we move down the age distribution. This suggests the ‘liquidity constraints’ influence the timing of marriage among young people. In sum, this economic model is able to account for over 90 per cent of the post-war variation in young persons' marriage rates.     

How female education affects reproductive behavior in urban Pakistan

Although Pakistan remains in a pretransitional stage (contraceptive prevalence of only 11.9% among married women in 1992), urban women with post-primary levels of education are spearheading the gradual move toward fertility transition. Data collected in the city of Karachi in 1987 were used to determine whether the inverse association between fertility and female education is attributable to child supply variables, demand factors, or fertility regulation costs. Karachi, with its high concentration of women with secondary educations employed in professional occupations, has a contraceptive prevalence rate of 31%. Among women married for less than 20 years, a 10-year increment in education predicts that a woman will average two-fifths of a child less than other women in the previous 5 years. Regression analysis identified 4 significant intervening variables in the education-fertility relationship: marriage duration, net family income, formal sector employment, and age at first marriage. Education appears to affect fertility because it promotes a later age at marriage and thus reduces life-time exposure to the risk of childbearing, induces women to marry men with higher incomes (a phenomenon that either reduces the cost of fertility regulation or the demand for children), leads women to become employed in the formal sector (leading to a reduction in the demand for children), and has other unspecified effects on women's values or opportunities that are captured by their birth cohort. When these intervening variables are held constant, women's attitude toward family planning loses its impact on fertility, as do women's domestic autonomy and their expectations of self-support in old age. These findings lend support to increased investments in female education in urban Pakistan as a means of limiting the childbearing of married women. Although it is not clear if investment in female education would have the same effect in rural Pakistan, such action is important from a human and economic development perspective.     

The reversal of the gender gap in education and relative divorce risks: A matter of alternatives in partner choice?

Recent evidence from the United States suggests that the reversal of the gender gap in education was associated with changes in relative divorce risks: hypogamous marriages, where the wife was more educated than the husband, used to have a higher divorce risk than hypergamous marriages, where the husband was more educated, but this difference has disappeared. One interpretation holds that this may result from cultural change, involving increasing social acceptance of hypogamy. We propose an alternative mechanism that need not presuppose cultural change: the gender-gap reversal in education has changed the availability of alternatives from which highly educated women and men can choose new partners. This may have lowered the likelihood of women leaving husbands with less education and encouraged men to leave less educated spouses. We applied an agent-based model to twelve European national marriage markets to illustrate that this could be sufficient to create a convergence in divorce risks.     

International Migration and Educational Assortative Mating in Mexico and the United States

This paper examines the relationship between migration and marriage by describing how the distributions of marital statuses and assortative mating patterns vary by individual and community experiences of migration. In Mexico, migrants and those living in areas with high levels of out-migration are more likely to be in heterogamous unions. This is because migration increases the relative attractiveness of single return migrants while disproportionately reducing the number of marriageable men in local marriage markets. In the United States, the odds of homogamy are lower for migrants compared with nonmigrants; however, they do not vary depending on the volume of migration in communities. Migrants are more likely than nonmigrants to “marry up” educationally because the relatively small size of this group compels them to expand their pool of potential spouses to include nonmigrants, who tend to be better educated than they are. Among migrants, the odds of marrying outside of one’s education group increase the most among the least educated. In Mexican communities with high rates of out-migration, the odds of marrying outside of one’s education group are highest among those with the highest level of education. These findings suggest that migration disrupts preferences and opportunities for homogamy by changing social arrangements and normative climates.     

The marital satisfaction of differently aged couples

We investigate how the marital age gap affects the evolution of marital satisfaction over the duration of marriage using household panel data from Australia. We find that men tend to be more satisfied with younger wives and less satisfied with older wives. Interestingly, women likewise tend to be more satisfied with younger husbands and less satisfied with older husbands. Marital satisfaction declines with marital duration for both men and women in differently aged couples relative to those in similarly aged couples. These relative declines erase the initial higher levels of marital satisfaction experienced by men married to younger wives and women married to younger husbands within 6 to 10 years of marriage. A possible mechanism is that differently aged couples are less resilient to negative shocks compared to similarly aged couples, which we find some supportive evidence for.     

Impact of educational attainments on women's fertility]

The fertility rates of Chinese women of different educational backgrounds and ages were studied. The results indicate that women with higher educational backgrounds are likely to marry later in life, and have fewer children. The converse is also true; women with little or no education marry very young and have significantly more offspring. It is noted that many of the poory educated are traditionally conservative; they strongly desire at least 1 male offspring, and generally understand the least about matters related to family planning. In terms of economics and human investment, intellectuals are less likely to want more than 1 child. 2 of the most effective ways in which fertility rates may be lowered are to reduce early fertility and to improve the educational levels of women.     

The Educational Gradient in Marriage: A Comparison of 25 European Countries

Previous research has suggested that a new marriage gradient has emerged in the United States, with marriage becoming increasingly the privilege of the better-educated. This article examines whether this is true for Europe and explores differences in the marriage gradient among 25 European countries, using multilevel models. The focus is on the chances of living in a marital (or cohabiting) union during midlife (ages 40–49). Multilevel analyses show that the direction and strength of the gradient depend on the societal context. In countries where gender roles are traditional, better-educated women are less likely to be married than less-educated women; in gender-egalitarian countries, better-educated women are more likely to be married. For men, the educational effect on marriage is absent in traditional countries but becomes positive as gender roles become more equal. Inequality in a society also modifies the gradient: if the degree of economic inequality between educational groups in a society is strong, better-educated men are more likely to be married than less-educated men. In general, the results suggest that there may be an accumulation of social and economic disadvantages for the less well educated in more-developed countries.     

Economic Independence and Union Formation in Sweden

Although sociologists, demographers, and economists are generally agreed that economic independence enhances the likelihood that men will marry, there is disagreement concerning its effect on women. The view that economic independence weakens women's incentive to marry has probably been the most influential, although it has been subjected to few rigorous empirical tests with individual-level data. In the present paper we examine the predictors of forming a first cohabiting union, of progressing from this union to marriage, and of marrying without previously cohabiting by applying hazard regression to event-history data from the 1992 Swedish Family Survey, supplemented by earnings data extracted from the national taxation register. We test a battery of measures that reflect people's past, current, and potential attachment to the labour market. We find that the correlates of union formation for women are largely indistinguishable from the correlates of union formation for men, and that far from being less likely than other women to cohabit or to marry, women with a greater degree of economic self-sufficiency are more likely to do so.     

中国离婚丧偶人口再婚差异性分析

根据对再婚率指标的考察,我国不同可再婚人口群体的再婚可能性存在一定差异性。总体而言,女性再婚可能性大于男性,低文化程度女性再婚可能高于高文化程度女性,高文化程度男性有相对较高的再婚可能。上述差异性可能与初婚市场上的婚姻挤压、再婚市场上的婚姻梯度以及高文化程度男性参与初婚市场上婚姻资源的分配有关。     

Age at marriage is rising for Asian women and men,according to new data

The social transformations in Asia are described: delayed age at marriage and the proportions marrying. Policy implications are ascertained. The norm for female age at marriage has risen from 15 years to 17-18 years in south Asia, and from 18 years to 24 years and older in east Asia. Men's marriage age has also risen but not as much. Concurrent changes have occurred with fertility declines and small family sizes and lower population growth, with changing roles for women, and with emergent youth subcultures and increased prevalence of premarital sexual behavior. The number of singles is rising and expected to continue to rise. Examples are given of marriage age changes for Nepal and Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, South Korea, and regional totals. Southeast Asian countries experienced less dramatic changes, and changes primarily in the 20-24 year old group (from 30% to 74% of single women). Change for men has been less regular and with less magnitude. In Southeast Asia, the rise in marriage age for men has risen only 1-2 years compared with women. East Asia patterns vary by country, i.e., South Korean increases of 6 years, Taiwanese increases of 4 years, and 2 years in Japan. Single males have been common in South and Southeast Asia, while in East Asia married male teens 25 years are rare. Marriage timing for men is not as closely associated as for women with social and cultural change. Downturns for men follow momentous, temporary disruptions such as happen during wars and periods of migration, while women's patterns are more reflective of structural change. The trend for never marrying is on the increase, particularly for men in Japan (1.1% in the 1920s to 18% in the early 1980s for men 50 years). Women not ever marrying are increasing in Thailand, Bangladesh, and Hong Kong. Never marrying is common in urban or educated populations, i.e., Singapore, Thailand, and Philippines. The implications are a longer gap between successive generations and a shorter period of exposure to risk of conception. Research findings have shown that a 1 year delay in age at 1st marriage reduces fertility by 20% of a child. Schooling delays marriage age as well as marriage laws, but structural and economic changes may be more important than policy changes. Policies affect the status of women and opportunities.     

From Privilege to Prevalence: Contextual Effects of Women’s Schooling on African Marital Timing

In Africa and elsewhere, educated women tend to marry later than their less-educated peers. Beyond being an attribute of individual women, education is also an aggregate phenomenon: the social meaning of a woman’s educational attainment depends on the educational attainments of her age-mates. Using data from 30 countries and 246 birth cohorts across sub-Saharan Africa, we investigate the impact of educational context (the percentage of women in a country cohort who ever attended school) on the relationship between a woman’s educational attainment and her marital timing. In contexts where access to education is prevalent, the marital timing of uneducated and highly educated women is more similar than in contexts where attending school is limited to a privileged minority. This across-country convergence is driven by uneducated women marrying later in high-education contexts, especially through lower rates of very early marriages. However, within countries over time, the marital ages of women from different educational groups tend to diverge as educational access expands. This within-country divergence is most often driven by later marriage among highly educated women, although divergence in some countries is driven by earlier marriage among women who never attended school.     

Female education and fertility in Bangladesh

Slowing the growth of the 100 million plus population of Bangladesh remains a major challenge. Fertility and mortality declined only slightly during the 1970s and the population continues to grow at an annual rate of over 2.5%, implying a doubling time of about 25 years. This article briefly reviews the theoretical link between education and fertility, the educational situation in Bangladesh, and the projects's design and its effects as evaluated by a US Agency for International Development (AID) International Science and Technology Institute team. Nearly all women are married by age 25 in Bangladesh, but more educated women marry later than the less educatted ones. Age at marriage has the greatest effect of all the variables on children ever born; given the association between age at marriage and education, it can be argued that education does indeed affect fertility. In 1982, USAID began funding a pilot project by the Bangladesh Association for Community Education to provide secondary scholarships for girls in Chandpur District. Only 30% of the secondary school completers had married by the time of the survey, in comparison to 76% of the secondary dropouts, 77% of the primary school completers, and 66% of those with no school. Clearly, there is much to be done in reducing population pressure and raising the standard of living in Bangladesh, and raising the status of women through education could be a valuable component in such efforts.