Population Projections and Demographic Knowledge in France and Great Britain in the Postwar Period

This study examines how official national population projections—a key mechanism for the production and dissemination of demographic knowledge—contributed to differing interpretations of population and fertility trends in France and Great Britain in the decades following World War II, despite these countries' similar fertility rates during most of this period. Projections presented different visions of the demographic future in the two countries. In France, publication of multiple variants emphasized future contingency, with low variants illustrating future population decline due to prolonged below‐replacement fertility. In Britain, publication of a single variant, assuming near‐replacement‐level fertility rates, projected moderate growth. National population projections thus created divergent representations of the two countries' demographic futures: an ever‐present threat of population decline in France, and a reassuring image of stability in Britain. Two principal mechanisms that contributed to cross‐national differences in population projections—national demographic history and institutional configurations—are discussed.     

Closing a Sociodemographic Chapter of Chinese History

At its recent Fifth Plenary Session held in Beijing, the Eighteenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China decided to abolish the one‐child policy and allow all couples to have two children, thus closing an important chapter of China's social and demographic history. Recent fertility trends make it clear why it is urgent to abandon this policy. Census and survey data show that China's TFR had already fallen below replacement in 1991. Since the mid‐1990s, TFRs in most years have been lower than 1.5 children per woman. Since 2010, even lower fertility rates have been recorded by the annual population change surveys. Since the mid‐1990s, fertility decline has been increasingly driven by generalized ideational changes resulting from the social, economic, and cultural transformation of recent decades. In recent years many couples who were entitled to have a second child have chosen not to do so. For this reason, the termination of the one‐child policy is unlikely to lead to a major upturn in fertility, but rather to the continuation of a low‐fertility regime with more diverse fertility patterns across different sub‐populations, a pattern that has been observed in many countries.     

The Emergence of Lowest‐Low Fertility in Europe During the 1990s

Lowest‐low fertility, defined as a period total fertility rate at or below 1.3, has rapidly spread in Europe during the 1990s. This article traces the emergence of this new phenomenon to the interaction of five factors. First, tempo and compositional distortions reduce the total fertility rate below the associated level of cohort fertility. Second, socioeconomic changes—including increased returns to human capital and high economic uncertainty in early adulthood—have made late childbearing a rational response for individuals and couples. Third, social interaction effects reinforce this behavioral adjustment and contribute to large and persistent postponement in the mean age at birth. Fourth, institutional settings favor an overall low quantum of fertility. Fifth, postponement–quantum interactions amplify the consequences of this institutional setting when combined with ongoing delays of child‐bearing. The article concludes with speculations about future trends in current and prospective lowest‐low‐fertility countries.     

Stalled Fertility Decline in Egypt,Why?

After experiencing rapid decline since the 1980s, fertility in Egypt seemed to be stalling during the second half of the 1990s. In an effort to identify the population segment(s) responsible for the stalling, this study considers fertility trends of women from three standard of living strata (low, middle, and high). Using data collected by the 1988, 1992, 1995, and the 2000 Egypt Demographic and Health Surveys, the study indicates that the reproductive behavior of women from high and middle standards households is largely responsible for stalling of the fertility decline during recent years, and that prospects for a lower fertility in the future is limited, once the gap between the three groups closes. This means that the expectation of achieving replacement fertility Egypt within the next 15 to 20 years is in doubt if the current trends in the both actual and desired fertility of the middle and high strata continued. The key for future decline in fertility is the decline in desired number of children below the current level of 3 children by at least one segment of the population. The fact none of the three population segments expressed a desired fertility below 3 children deprived the society of a vanguard group that leads the rest of the society to replacement level fertility.     

The End of the Fertility Transition in the Developed World

By the late 1990s the average period total fertility rate in the developed world had declined to 1.6, a level substantially lower than projected in the 1970s and 1980s. This article examines recent trends and patterns in fertility in the developed world with particular emphasis on the effects and implications of changes in the timing of childbearing. The main objective is to demonstrate that while fertility in these countries is indeed low, women's childbearing levels are not as low as period measures such as the total fertility rate suggest. To obtain a full understanding of the various dimensions of fertility change. several indicators are examined, including period and cohort fertility by birth order and childbearing preferences. An analysis of these indicators demonstrates that period fertility measures in many developed countries are temporarily depressed by a rise in the mean age at childbearing. The distortion of the TFR is as great as 0.4 births per woman in Italy and Spain. These effects have been present in many developed countries since the 1970s and could continue for years into the future. But tempo effects are temporary, and once the postponement of childbearing ends—as it eventually must—the corresponding fertility‐depressing effect stops, thus putting upward pressure on period fertility. Countries with very low fertility and substantial tempo effects may well experience rises in fertility in the near future if the timing of childbearing stabilizes. Even if this happens, however, it seems unlikely that fertility will rebound to the replacement level.     

How Far Has Fertility in China Really Declined?

According to births in the last year as reported in China's 2000 census, the total fertility rate (TFR) in the year 2000 in China was 1.22 children per woman. This estimate is widely considered to be too low, primarily because some women who had out‐of‐quota births according to China's one‐child family policy did not report those births to the census enumerator. Analysis of fertility trends derived by applying the own‐children method of fertility estimation to China's 1990 and 2000 censuses indicates that the true level of the TFR in 2000 was probably between 1.5 and 1.6 children per woman. A decomposition analysis of change in the TFR between 1990 and 2000, based on our best estimate of 1.59 for the TFR in 2000, indicates that about two‐fifths of the decline in the conventional TFR between 1990 and 2000 is accounted for by later marriage and less marriage, and three‐fifths by declining fertility within marriage. The analysis also applies the birth history reconstruction method of fertility estimation to the two censuses, yielding an alternative set of fertility estimates that are compared with the set derived by the own‐children method. The analysis also includes estimates of trends in fertility by urban/rural residence, education, ethnicity, and migration status. Over time, fertility has declined sharply within all categories of these characteristics, indicating that the one‐child policy has had large across‐the‐board effects.     

Population Policy Dilemmas in Europe at the Dawn of the Twenty‐First Century

The article discusses issues raised by persistent below‐replacement fertility in Europe. The continent's demographic predicament is highlighted by comparing age structures and relative population sizes between populations in and outside Europe—such as those of Russia and Yemen and those of an enlarged 25‐country European Union and a 25‐country hinterland to the EU in North Africa and West Asia—during the past 50 years and prospectively up to 2050, based on United Nations estimates and projections. Potential geopolitical aspects of the population shifts are considered. European policy responses to them are found largely wanting. With respect to the key demographic variable, fertility, explicit pronatalism is rejected by most European governments. A set of policy measures that commands wide support, with the hoped‐for side effect of raising birth rates, seeks to make women's participation in the formal labor force compatible with childrearing. The effectiveness of such measures, however, is likely to be limited. Continued below‐replacement fertility, higher immigration from outside Europe, negative population growth, and loss of demographic weight within the global population are safe predictions for the Europe of the twenty‐first century.     

生殖健康与中国人口发展

生殖健康概念自提出以来,已引起各国的广泛关注。中国自70年代实行计划生育,90年代引入生殖健康概念,对中国人口发展产生了深刻影响。但生殖健康不等于计划生育,只有正确理解二者的关系,才能在不断提高广大人民群众的生殖健康前提下,促进中国人口的健康发展。     

Conflicting Preferences: A Reason Fertility Tends to Be Too High or Too Low

Fertility has often seemed to be too high or too low, relative not only to social and economic goals, but also to reproductive preferences. In developing countries actual fertility has often been higher than desired family size, while in developed societies fertility tends to be below replacement level even though people generally say that they want at least two children. In explanations of fertility extremes, or of the discrepancies between desired and actual fertility, the effect of partners' holding different preferences has tended to be overlooked. Individual preferences expected to lead to replacement‐level reproduction may in combination generate substantially higher or lower fertility. In explaining such outcomes, a crucial question is what happens when spousal preferences diverge. Given that personal practices or social norms may systematically favor high or low preferences in the event of disagreement, chance alone will ensure that desired and actual fertility do not coincide.     

Is Low Fertility a Temporary Phenomenon in the European Union?

This article addresses two questions: (i) will the mere end of further postponement of fertility in the EU-countries lead to an appreciable rise in European fertility and bring total fertility rates closer to replacement level, as witnessed in the United States? and (ii) what are the chances that such a stop to postponement is imminent? The answer to the first question is positive, but only if there is enough recuperation of fertility at older ages. Translated in the Bongaarts–Feeney framework, this condition means that the birth-order-specific TFRs would indeed remain constant. In the absence of full recuperation at older ages, the induced rise in the national TFRs would be trivial and by no means restore period and cohort TFRs to replacement levels. Hence, caution is needed when using the Bongaarts–Feeney adjusted TFRs for pro-jective purposes. With respect to the second question, female education and employment trends in tandem with ideational and family disruption data are used to speculate about the prospects for such an end to further fertility postponement and for fertility increases at older ages. Strikingly, EU-countries that have the greatest potential for still later fertility are also the ones with very low TFRs (below 1.5) at present. The overall conclusion is that low to very low fertility in the EU is unlikely to be a temporary phenomenon     

The spread of primary schooling in Sub-Saharan Africa: implications for fertility change

In 1980 Caldwell hypothesized that the time of the onset of the fertility transition in developing countries would be linked with the achievement of “mass formal schooling.” This article applies Demographic and Health Survey data to assess schooling patterns and trends for 23 sub‐Saharan African countries, using the percentage of 15–19‐year olds who have completed at least four years of schooling as an indicator of progress in education. As background to that assessment, the article includes a review of the sparse literature on the links between children's schooling and fertility decline. The analysis strongly supports Caldwell's hypothesis with empirical evidence of the much stronger negative relationship between fertility decline and grade 4 attainment in those countries that have attained mass‐schooling levels than in those that have not yet achieved such levels.     

R. F. Harrod on Reviving the Birth Rate

Continuing below‐replacement fertility and projected declines in population size are demographic features of many European countries and Japan. They are variously met with complacent acceptance, calls for higher rates of immigration, or—often last and least—proposals for increasing the birth rate. Fertility was also low in the 1930s, and some of the policy debate from that period resonates today. In England and Wales, fertility then had been declining for half a century. Over the decade 1931–40, it averaged 1.8 children per woman—moreover, with net emigration. Worries over this situation and its likely consequences led to the setting up in 1944 of a Royal Commission on Population, charged with considering “what measures, if any, should be taken in the national interest to influence the future trend in population.” In a memorandum submitted to the Commission in that year, the economist R. F. Harrod set out a detailed proposal to encourage childbearing through a scheme of family endowments. Part of the introductory section of Harrod's submission, arguing the case for state intervention and for material rather than ‘spiritual’ measures, is reproduced below. An evident problem in offering economic incentives for childbearing is that, to induce a given behavioral change, well‐off families would require much larger incentives than the poor. Hence child endowments that aspire to effectiveness across the income distribution have to be skewed toward the upper end. Harrod argues that this is as it should be, that policy should establish neutrality between large and small family sizes, and that this is a conceptually separate issue from poverty alleviation. ‘We should seek a re‐distribution of national income favourable to the parents of larger families and the plan should be put into effect whether or not another re‐distribution as between rich and poor is proceeding at the same time.’ He remarks on the implausibility of the government's being able to ‘talk up’ fertility— thereby generating some kind of costless ideational change, a ‘spiritual aufklärung.’ Later pans of the submission not reprinted here cover the specific details of the proposal. The proposed annual benefit per child (intended for every child after the second, with half‐rates payable for the second child) is paid for 18 years. It is substantial and increases with the child's age—at ages 13–18, for most of the income range it amounts to 20–30 percent of the father's income (or mother's, if hers is higher). Harrod also discusses further the rationale for making the endowments (and the compulsory contributions—a flat 5 percent of income—that finance them) proportional to income. To make his case Harrod draws on the dysgenic and population‐quality arguments popular at the time: worry about ‘race decline’ and ‘a general lowering of standards and of efficiency if the parents who are best equipped in experience, knowledge and culture are relatively infertile.’ In the event, the Commission recommended a flat schedule of family allowances, together with tax exemptions for dependent children calculated to provide some income‐based benefit. These were justified on population as well as equity and welfare grounds, ‘since the handicaps of parenthood have played a large part in the fall of average family size below replacement level.‘ Population quality issues—the subject of several other submissions—were sidestepped by calling for further research. By the time the Commission's report was finally published, in 1949, the baby boom was well underway: average fertility over 1946–50 was 2.4. Roy Forbes Harrod (1900–78) was one of the foremost economists of his day. His career was largely spent at Christ Church College, Oxford. A student and sometime colleague of Keynes, his best‐known early work was centered on identifying a dynamic equilibrium growth path for the economy—building on Keynes's static equilibrium analysis. As stylized (by others), this came to be called the Harrod‐Domar growth model, a formulation basic to growth theory. Harrod was editor of the Economic Journal for the period 1945–66. He was active in politics and as an economic adviser to both Labour and Conservative governments. He was knighted in 1959. The extract is reprinted from volume 5 of the Papers of the Royal Commission on Population (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1950), pp. 80–85.     

Accounting for Recent Fertility Swings in Cuba

In 2006, Cuba's TFR had declined to 1.39, a level nearly comparable to those found in ultra‐low‐fertility but far richer European and Asian countries. Given the vast economic differences, Cuba's very low fertility was anomalous. Since 2006, and in tandem with what has occurred in many other low‐fertility countries, the Cuban TFR has increased. This article contends that the TFR increase largely was a response to improvements in the welfare of individual households—and thus, in their financial ability to have children. These improvements were the result of considerable permanent and temporary labor emigration, which together with US and Cuban policy changes, led to a surge in remittances and contributed to easing Cuba's perennial housing shortage.     

The emergence of Sub-Replacement Family Size Ideals in Europe

Period fertility started to drop significantly below replacement in most Western European countries during the 1970s and 1980s, while most fertility surveys, value studies and opinion polls have found that the number of children considered ideal for society or for one's own family has remained above two children per woman. These surveys have led to the expectation that, sooner or later, period fertility would recover in Europe. The most recent data from the Eurobarometer 2001 survey, however, suggest that in the German-speaking parts of Europe the average ideal family sizes given by younger men and women have fallen as low as 1.7 children. This paper examines the consistency and the credibility of these new findings, which – if they are indeed indications of a new trend – may alter the current discussion about future fertility trends in Europe.     

The path to lowest-low fertility in Ukraine

The phenomenon of lowest-low fertility, defined as total fertility below 1.3, is now emerging throughout Europe and is attributed by many to postponement of the initiation of childbearing. Here an investigation of the case of Ukraine, where total fertility--1.1 in 2001--is one of the world's lowest, shows that there is more than one pathway to lowest-low fertility. Although Ukraine has undergone immense political and economic transformations in the past decade, it has maintained a young age at first birth and nearly universal childbearing. Analyses of official national statistics and the Ukrainian Reproductive Health Survey show that fertility declined to very low levels without a transition to a later pattern of childbearing. Findings from focus-group interviews are used to suggest explanations of the early fertility pattern. These include the persistence of traditional norms for childbearing and the roles of men and women, concerns about medical complications and infertility at a later age, and the link between early fertility and early marriage.     

Tibetan Fertility Transitions in China and South Asia

The own‐children method, an indirect technique, is used to estimate fertility rates for two populations of Tibetans during the 1980s and 1990s: a sample of rural villages in the Tibet Autonomous Region of China and exiles living in India and Nepal. The analysis provides evidence that these two populations underwent remarkably similar fertility transitions in both timing and magnitude. In both cases total fertility rates declined from over six births per woman to below the level of replacement in a span of 15 years. The parallel nature of these fertility transitions is intriguing given that, although the populations share a common ethnic identity, they have lived under sharply differing political, economic, and social conditions since the 1960s.     

Armed Conflict and the Timing of Childbearing in Azerbaijan

Research on fertility changes in former Soviet states of the South Caucasus is scant and has overlooked the role of armed conflicts. This study contributes to filling these gaps by providing the first detailed account of fertility changes in Azerbaijan since independence and by exploring them in relation to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Armenia. Estimates from retrospective birth history data from the 2006 Demographic and Health Survey show that since 1991 period fertility declined to almost below-replacement levels, essentially as a result of stopping behavior, and, only recently, slight birth postponement. While the conflict seems to have little influence on aggregate trends, discrete-time logit models accounting for unobserved heterogeneity reveal a 42–45 percent higher risk of transitioning to the second birth for women who have been exposed to conflict violence—whether in the form of forced migration or because of residence in the conflict-torn Karabakh region—than for nonexposed women. Never-migrant women from Karabakh have also significantly higher probability of having a first child. Further positive effects on fertility are observed for women who lost a child during peak conflict years. Risk-insurance and replacement effects are possible mechanisms explaining such fertility responses.     

China's New Demographic Reality: Learning from the 2010 Census

China conducted its sixth modern census in 2010, recording a total of 1.34 billion people. This article presents an overview of the early census results. The data are of reasonable quality but contain some apparent defects where adjustments may be required. The census confirms that China has entered the era of demographic modernity and depicts the vast transformation of the country's rural‐urban distribution. Life expectancy has risen by 3–4 years in the decade since the last census, while fertility remains well below replacement—probably as low as 1.5 births per woman—and the sex ratio at birth is still significantly elevated. Low fertility and falling old‐age mortality are leading to continued and rapid population aging. Several coastal provinces grew by as much as 40 percent in the last decade, while a number of inland provinces have recorded population decline. China has reached an overall urban proportion of 50 percent.     

The roles of individuals' socioeconomic characteristics and the government family planning program in China's fertility decline

This paper explores answers to the following two questions: first, did individuals' socioeconomic characteristics play any role in the rapid fertility decline that occurred in China during the 1970's? Secondly, if the rapid fertility decline during the 1970s is mostly a result of the government policy, as many have perceived, to what extent was the government policy effective? Using the 1982 Chinese 1/1000 fertility survey data for Hebei province of China, this paper examines variation in fertility among women of two age cohorts by linking their fertility outcome with their socioeconomic background and earlier reproductive experiences. In addition, this paper assesses the effect of government policy by comparing the determinants of fertility outcome between two cohorts of women and by studying the factors affecting their current contraceptive use. The findings reveal that the individual's socioeconomic background was important in explaining earlier fertility variation. Government policy, although powerful enough to override most of the effect of socioeconomic factors on fertility, was not able to eliminate differences in contraceptive behavior among Chinese women.     

An assessment of China’s fertility level using the variable-<Emphasis Type="Italic">r</Emphasis> method

The fertility level in China is a matter of uncertainty and controversy. This paper applies Preston and Coale's (1982) variable-r method to assess the fertility level in China. By using data from China's 1990 and 2000 censuses as well as annual population change surveys, the variable-r method confirms that Chinese fertility has reached a level well below replacement.