Education Gains Attributable to Fertility Decline: Patterns by Gender,Period, and Country in Latin America and Asia

We investigate the heterogeneity across countries and time in the relationship between mother’s fertility and children’s educational attainment—the quantity-quality (Q-Q) trade-off—by using census data from 17 countries in Asia and Latin America, with data from each country spanning multiple census years. For each country-year, we estimate micro-level instrumental variables models predicting secondary school attainment using number of siblings of the child, instrumented by the sex composition of the first two births in the family. We then analyze correlates of Q-Q trade-off patterns across countries. On average, one additional sibling in the family reduces the probability of secondary education by 6 percentage points for girls and 4 percentage points for boys. This Q-Q trade-off is significantly associated with the level of son preference, slightly decreasing over time and with fertility, but it does not significantly differ by educational level of the country.     

Education and Physical Health Trajectories in Later Life: A Comparative Study

The cumulative (dis)advantage hypothesis states that health disparities between education groups increase with age. The present study examined this hypothesis in a comparative analysis of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Sweden. These countries offer sharp contrasts in the social conditions that may intensify or inhibit processes of cumulative (dis)advantage. Using harmonized panel data from the HRS, ELSA, and SHARE, the study applied Poisson multilevel regression models to trace changes in the number of chronic conditions and functional limitations of people aged 50–76 (N = 16,887 individuals; 71,154 observations). The four countries showed a clear gradient in levels of physical health and in the extent to which health trajectories were shaped by education. Across all ages and cohorts, health problems were most prevalent in the United States, less prevalent in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, and least prevalent in Sweden. A similar cross-national gradient was found for the size of health gaps between education groups and for the extent to which these gaps widened with age. Gaps were largest in the United States, smaller in the United Kingdom and in the Netherlands, and smallest in Sweden.     

Latin America and the Social Contract: Patterns of Social Spending and Taxation

This article analyzes the incidence of social spending and taxation by income quintile for seven Latin American countries, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Absolute levels of social spending in Latin America are fairly flat across income quintiles, a pattern similar to that in the United States and differing from the more progressive pattern of spending in the United Kingdom. The structure of taxation in Latin America is also similar to that of the United States. Because of high income inequality in Latin America and the US, the rich bear of most the burden, whereas the United Kingdom taxes the middle class to a greater extent. The analysis suggests that many Latin American countries are trapped in a vicious cycle in which the rich resist the expansion of the welfare state (because they bear most of its tax burden without receiving commensurate benefits), and their opposition to its expansion in turn maintains long‐term inequalities.     

Union Formation Implications of Race and Gender Gaps in Educational Attainment: The Case of Latin America

We use census microdata to assess the levels of educational homogamy in six Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador and Mexico. This paper contributes to the literature on homogamy in three ways. First, by conducting a comparative analysis between countries belonging to the still little-studied region of Latin America, which is still undergoing intense and varied processes of demographic, economic, social, and political modernization. Second, by simultaneously including variables of structural and individual nature. Finally, by making progress with respect to the interactions between educational homogamy and other important variables associated with high levels of social inequality in the region: race, ethnicity and birthplace.     

Population change in Meso-America: The Tip of the demographic Iceberg

This paper examines the demographic situation in Mexico and Central America (Meso-America) and looks at the momentum for growth implied by recent population shifts. Despite successes in reducing fertility levels in many Meso-American countries, the dramatic declines in mortality among infants and children have given rise to a "death dearth" that is contributing to a new "baby boom" in these countries; thus our subtitle, "The Tip of the Iceberg."The impacts of such population growth on education, the economy and migration are considered in some detail. The anticipated inability of country economies to provide jobs for the thousands of young adults entering the labor force in future years could result in significant increases in the number seeking to migrate in a northerly direction. Thus, the United States is also vitally interested in the demographic shifts taking place south of its border.The need for a more unified regional approach to some of the social and economic problems facing these nations is pointed out as is the need for a more rational immigration policy on the part of the United States in light of the potential increase in immigration in future years.     

The UN Population Division on Replacement Migration

The most salient demographic trend pictured by the influential set of population projections prepared by the Population Division of the United Nations (a unit in the UN's Department of Economic and Social Affairs) is the continuing substantial increase—albeit at a declining rate—of the global population during the coming decades. According to the “medium” variant of the most recent (1998) revision of these projections, between 2000 and 2050 the expected net addition to the size of the world population will be some 2.85 billion, a figure larger than that of the total world population as recently as the mid‐1950s. All of this increase will occur in the countries currently classified as less developed; in fact, as a result of their anticipated persistent below‐replacement levels of fertility, the more developed regions as a whole would experience declining population size beginning about 2020, and would register a net population loss of some 33 million between 2000 and 2050. A report prepared by the UN Population Division and released on 21 March 2000 addresses some of the implications of the changes in population size and age structure that low‐fertility countries will be likely to experience. The 143‐page report, issued under the eyecatching title Replacement Migration: Is It a Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations?, highlights the expected magnitude of these changes by the imaginative device of answering three hypothetical questions. The answer to each of these questions is predicated on the assumption that some specified demographic feature of various country or regional populations would be maintained at the highest level that feature would exhibit, in the absence of international migration, in the United Nations' medium population projections (as revised in 1998) during the period 1995–2050. The selected demographic features are total population size, the size of the working‐age population (15–64 years), and the so‐called potential support ratio: the ratio of the working‐age population to the old‐age population (65 years and older). The illustrative device chosen for accomplishing the specified feats of preserving the selected demographic parameters (i.e., keeping them unchanged up to 2050 once their highest value is attained) is international migration. Hence the term “replacement migration.” Given the low levels of fertility and mortality now prevailing in the more developed world (and specifically in the eight countries and the two overlapping regions for which the numerical answers to the above questions are presented in the report), and given the expected future evolution of fertility and mortality incorporated in the UN population projections, the results are predictably startling. The magnitudes of the requisite compensatory migration streams tend to be huge relative both to current net inmigration flows and to the size of the receiving populations; least so in the case of the migration needed to maintain total population size and most so in the case of migration needed to counterbalance population aging by maintaining the support ratio. Reflecting its relatively high fertility and its past and current record of receiving a large influx of international migrants, the United States is a partial exception to this rule. But even for the US to maintain the support ratio at its highest—year 1995—level of 5.21 would require increasing net inmigration more than tenfold. The country, the report states, would have to receive 593 million immigrants between 1995 and 2050, or a yearly average of 10.8 million. The extreme case is the Republic of Korea, where the exercise calls for maintaining a support ratio of 12.6. To satisfy this requirement, Korea, with a current population of some 47 million, would need 5.1 billion immigrants between 1995 and 2050, or an average of 94 million immigrants per year. (In the calculations, the age and sex distribution of migrants is assumed to be the same as that observed in the past in the main immigration countries. The fertility and mortality of immigrants are assumed to be identical with those of the receiving population.) The “Executive Summary” of the report is reproduced below, with the permission of the United Nations. Chapters of the full report set out the issues that prompted the exercise; provide a selective review of the literature; explain the methodology and the assumptions underlying the calculations; and present the detailed results for the eight countries and two regions selected for illustrative purposes. A brief discussion of the implications of the findings concludes the report. As is evident even from the figures just cited, immigration is shown to be at best a modest potential palliative to whatever problems declining population size and population aging are likely to pose to low‐fertility countries. The calculations, however, vividly illustrate that demographic changes will profoundly affect society and the economy, and will require adjustments that remain inadequately appreciated and assessed. The criteria specified in the UN calculations—maintenance of particular demographic parameters at a peak value—of course do not necessarily have special normative significance. Past demographic changes, with respect notably to the age distribution as well as population size, have been substantial, yet they have been successfully accommodated under circumstances of growing prosperity in many countries. But the past may be an imperfect guide in confronting the evolving dynamics of low‐fertility populations. As the report convincingly states, the new demographic challenges will require comprehensive reassessments of many established economic and social policies and programs.     

Relative cohort size: source of a unifying theory of global fertility transition

Using United Nations estimates of age structure and vital rates for 184 countries at five‐year intervals from 1950 through 1995, this article demonstrates how changes in relative cohort size appear to have affected patterns of fertility across countries since 1950—not just in developed countries, but perhaps even more importantly in developing countries as they pass through the demographic transition. The increase in relative cohort size (defined as the proportion of males aged 15–24 relative to males aged 25–59), which occurs as a result of declining mortality rates among infants, children, and young adults during the demographic transition, appears to act as the mechanism that determines when the fertility portion of the transition begins. As hypothesized by Richard Easterlin, the increasing proportion of young adults generates a downward pressure on young men's relative wages (or on the size of landhold‐ings passed on from parent to child), which in turn causes young adults to accept a tradeoff between family size and material wellbeing, setting in motion a “cascade” or “snowball” effect in which total fertility rates tumble as social norms regarding acceptable family sizes begin to change.     

The perplexing links between contraceptive sterilization and (dis)advantage in ten low-fertility countries

This study investigated the association between contraceptive sterilization and socio-economic status (measured by educational attainment) in ten countries, using data from the 2006–10 National Survey of Family Growth and the 2004–10 Generations and Gender Surveys. The findings confirm that a long-standing association between socio-economic status and sterilization persists in the contemporary United States: female sterilization is associated with economic disadvantage, whereas male sterilization is associated with economic advantage. The latter association is found to be unique to the United States, but female sterilization is associated with disadvantage in most of the other countries studied. While basic demographic background factors such as early childbearing and parity can explain the observed associations in most of the countries, a strong gendered association between sterilization and socio-economic status remains in the United States and Belgium even after adjusting for these factors.     

Migration and Father Absence: Shifting Family Structure in Mexico

Despite many changing demographic processes in Mexico—declining adult mortality, rising divorce, and rising nonmarital fertility—Mexican children’s family structure has been most affected by rising migration rates. Data from five national surveys spanning three decades demonstrate that since 1976, migration has shifted from the least common to the most common form of father household absence. Presently, more than 1 in 5 children experience a father’s migration by age 15; 1 in 11 experiences his departure to the United States. The proportions are significantly higher among those children born in rural communities and those born to less-educated mothers. The findings emphasize the importance of framing migration as a family process with implications for children’s living arrangements and attendant well-being, particularly in resource-constrained countries. The stability of children’s family life in these regions constitutes a substantial but poorly measured cost of worldwide increases in migration.     

CDC on Vaccines and Children's Health: United States 1900–98

During the twentieth century, the health and life expectancy of persons residing in the United States—as in most other countries of the globe—have improved greatly. (For a discussion of some aspects of that improvement, see the article in this issue by Kevin White assessing the effects of changes in cardiovascular and tuberculosis mortality in the United States since 1900.) A considerable share of this change is attributable to advances in public health. To highlight these advances the Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR) of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (an agency of the US Department of Health and Human Services) is issuing a series of reports profiling ten great public health achievements in the United States during the present century. The first of these reports discusses vaccination: “Impact of vaccines universally recommended for children—United States, 1900–1998,” MMWR 48 (12), 2 April 1999. It is reproduced below in full. The improvements chronicled in the report are especially great with respect to morbidity. In many developing countries mortality resulting from vaccine-preventable causes is, however, still very high. Recent international initiatives, involving UN agencies, bilateral aid agencies, foundations, and the vaccine industry, aim at accelerating the outreach of immunization in developing countries. A meeting discussing an expanded program of vaccination (Bellagio, March 1999) estimated that global immunization, at a cost of approximately $3 billion per year, could save some 40 million lives over the next ten years.     

Population Index to cite publicly available machine-readable data files

The author discusses the increased availability of demographic data stored in machine-readable files. She describes the types of MRDF produced in the United States, Canada, Europe, Latin America, and Asia and Oceania. The final section of the paper presents examples of citations to MRDF     

The nature and effects of Latin America’s non-western trend in fertility

A study by historical comparison of the fertility trends related to mortality levels is made between Latin America and Europe. The purpose of such study is to show why Latin America did not repeat the European mortality-fertility pattern during 1930–1960. Differences between the two areas are established, and an explanation is given about the particular Latin America mortality-fertility model. The effects of such a Latin America trend are pointed out, principally in relation to population growth, city growth and labor force. Hypothetical Latin American populations are calculated under the assumption that the area has repeated the European pattern. A comparison between these hypothetical populations with the actual ones shows how different the situation of the area has actually been. Nevertheless, an analysis of the necessary fertility changes in order to reproduce the European model shows that it was impossible for Latin America to repeat the European mortality-fertility experience during 1930–1960.     

Worldwide fertility declines do not rely on stopping at ideal parities

A key demographic hypothesis has been that fertility declines rely on stopping at target parities, but emerging evidence suggests that women frequently reduce fertility without specific numeric targets. To assess the relative importance of these two paths to fertility decline, we develop a novel mixture model to estimate: (1) the proportion of women who stop at a target parity; and (2) mean completed fertility among those who do not. Applied to Demographic and Health Survey data from women aged 45–49 in 84 low- and middle-income countries, and to United States Census cohorts, the model shows considerable variation in the proportion stopping at specific parities (1–84?per cent). The estimates also show that declines in completed fertility are largely attributable to women who do not stop at target parities, suggesting that stopping at ideal parities may be less important than parity-independent decisions for a wide range of fertility transitions.     

Missing Minorities? The Phases of IRCA Legislation and Relative Net Undercounts of the 1990 vis-à-vis 2000 Decennial Census for Foreign-born Cohorts

The quality of the decennial census of the United States is compromised by population undercount, which often misses immigrants and racial/ethnic minorities, thereby diminishing federal resources allocated to such groups. Using a modified version of demographic analysis and informed by the latest contributions of emigration scholarship, this research estimates net undercount for the 1990 census relative to the 2000 census by age, sex, year-of-entry, and place-of-birth cohorts. Ordinary least squares estimates suggest that males, recent arrivals, and cohorts aged 15–44 had higher relative net undercount for 1990 compared with 2000. Much higher relative net undercount was found for cohorts from Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean (excluding Cuba and Puerto Rico) who were ineligible for amnesty under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (i.e., those fitting the profile of an undocumented immigrant). Larger implications of these findings suggest that the political climate in which a person is embedded—particularly for persons who may feel threatened or marginalized by the government and/or the public—affects that person’s willingness to respond to the census.     

A Stalled Revolution? Change in Women's Labor Force Participation during Child-Rearing Years,Europe and the United States 1996–2016

While women's labor force participation rates (LFPRs) in the United States stalled over the last quarter-century, European countries exhibited a variety of trajectories. We draw on demographic and gender theories of women's life course to understand changes in women's LFPR during their prime child-rearing years. We build expectations about how aggregate trends may be driven by shifts in the prevalence of key demographic events such as child-rearing (i.e., compositional) versus shifts in the association of these events with women's LFP (i.e., behavioral). We use data from the European Union Labour Force Surveys and the US Current Population Survey in Kitagawa–Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition models to decompose trends in women's LFPR from 1996 to 2016 across 18 countries by educational attainment, partnership status, and parental status for women aged 20–44. Compositional and behavioral shifts positively contribute to higher LFPR in most countries, but lower rates in several others. Behavioral change is not widely shared across groups of women. Partnered mothers without college degrees are the main contributors to behavioral change and show the greatest variability across countries. We suggest greater research attention to this “missing middle,” as their LFP is key to understanding change during this period.     

World population in transition

The world's population growth rate peaked at slightly over 2%/year in the late 1960s and in 1986 is down to 1.7% and falling. Annual numbers added continue to rise because these rates apply to a very large base, 4.9 billion in 1986. According to UN medium variant projections, world population growth will peak at 89 million/year in the late 1990s and then taper off until world population stabilizes in the late decade of the 21st century at about 10.2 billion. Close to 95% of this growth is occurring in less developed countries (LDCs) of Africa, Asia (minus Japan), and Latin America. LDC fertility rates are declining, except in sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Latin America and South Asia, but most have far to go to reach the replacement level of 2.1 births/woman. Fertility is below replacement in virtually all more developed countries. For LDCs, large numbers will be added before stabilization even after attainment of replacement level fertility because of the demographic momentum built into their large and young population bases. This complicates efforts to bridge gaps between living standards in LDCs and industrialized countries. From a new debate about whether rapid population growth deters or stimulates economic growth, a more integrated view has emerged. This view recognizes the complementary relationship between efforts to slow population growth and other development efforts; e.g., to improve health and education, upgrade women's status, increase productivity. Most effective in the increased contraceptive prevalence and fertility declines seen in many LDCs has been the combination of organized programs to increase access to family planning information and supplies with socioeconomic development that enhances the desire for smaller families.     

Socio-economic determinants of mortality in Latin America

The characteristics and sources of socioeconomic differentials of mortality in Latin America, in so far as they are currently known, are examined in an attempt to clarify the present situation and its perspectives. Mortality in a population is a function of the frequency of illness (incidence) and the probability of dying of the sick individual (lethality). Information on the socioeconomic differentials of mortality in Latin America is systematically reviewed with attention directed to the following: differentials among Latin American countries, regional differences within countries, urban-rural contrasts in mortality, mortality and income level and level of education, and mortality and ethnic groups. Latin America shows considerable heterogeneity with respect to the risk of dying, which varies from 202/1000 births in Bolivia to 38/1000 in Uruguay. It is estimated that more than 1/2 of the children born in Latin America are exposed to a mortality rate of over 120/1000. A study of the urban and rural populations of 12 Latin American countries revealed that the risk for rural populations exceeds that for urban populations by 30-60%. There is extensive evidence showing that mortality is higher in the working class and is associated with lower levels of education and income. Mortality was also higher in certain indigenous groups. Socioeconomic differentials of mortality are more marked in Latin America than in the developed nations. The mother's level of educational attainment is the variable most significantly associated with infant and child mortality. The prospect of reducing the current mortality levels is dependent primarily upon the implementation of policies aimed at a more egalitarian distribution of the benefits of socioeconomic development among the population.     

Causes of fertility decline in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union II

Abstract The first part of this study (which appeared in the preceding issue of Population Studies) assessed the extent of the decline in fertility in the countries of the area during the last 10-15 years, and analyzed the purely demographic aspects ofthis phenomenon. Part II examines the socio-economic differentials in fertility, with regard to such variables as urban-rural residence, socio-occupational and employment status of women, educational attainment, income and housing conditions, and the consequent impact of structural changes in these characteristics of the population on observed fertility trends. The broad conclusion is that the fertility differentials usually found in western societies are also relevant to the socialist countries of eastern Europe, and that the dramatic falls in fertility in the 1950's and the 1960's have largely been the outcome ofthe deep and rapid structural changes, particularly those associated with urbanization, educational attainment and the incidence of female employment. The last part of the study is concerned with the impact on post-war fertility trends of social legislation and of general economic policies, particularly in the fields of employment and income. An appraisal of the extent of family planning is followed by a discussion of the recent pro-natalist measures introduced in most countries of the area and of their effectiveness.     

Population pressures in Latin America

In 1950 Latin America's population of 165 million was on a par with the 166 million of North America. 2 decades of growth at nearly 3% a year pushed the total to 405 million in 1985, vs. 264 million in North America. Despite substantial fertility declines since the 1960s, continued growth is ensured by the demographic momentum built into the region's large and youthful population bases. UN medium projections put the 2025 total at 779 million, compared to 345 million in North America. This Bulletin examines the main demographic changes in Latin America since World War II and their links to economic and social changes in the region as well as their implications for international and social relations. The post World War II population surge was accompanied by massive rural-ruban and international migration, rapid urbanization, large labor shifts out of agriculture into industry and services, increased education for both men and women, and higher labor force participation for females. The rural exodus was spurred by extreme land tenure inequalities and the urban bias of postwar industrialization. The labor-saving bias of this industrialization forced exploding city populations to turn to the informal sector for jobs. Population pressures on city services and housing as well as jobs have been further exacerbated by overconcentration in a few large cities and economic downturns of the 1980s. Recent fertility declines seem to be the result of both increased access to family planning and the economic and social pressures posed by the gap between young adults' aspirations and their ability to realize them. Population and economic pressures could induce faster fertility declines than now projected but in the short run are likely to mean more employment problems, continued rapid urban growth, and even larger international immigration flows within the hemisphere, particularly to the US.