Rethinking the “early” decline of marital fertility in the united states

In this article, I rely on new estimates of nineteenth-century mortality and the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series to construct new estimates of white fertility in the nineteenth-century United States. Unlike previous estimates that showed a long-term decline in overall fertility beginning at or before the turn of the nineteenth century, the new estimates suggest that U.S. fertility did not begin its secular decline until circa 1840. Moreover, new estimates of white marital fertility, based on "own-children" methods, suggest that the decline in marital fertility did not begin in the nation as a whole until after the Civil War (1861-1865).     

Mortality–fertility synergies during the demographic transition in the developed world

The classic theory used to explain the demographic transition assumes that mortality is the key explanatory variable influencing the decline in fertility. However, the empirical results obtained in what is known as the Princeton European Fertility Project have led many specialists to question this assumption. Using both national and provincial aggregated data for 25 countries over a long time span, the analysis reported in this paper found that mortality does indeed play a fundamental role in accounting for the main demographic changes that occurred both before and during the transitional period. Others’ research based on individual data has shown clearly that the number of surviving children was indeed an important factor for reproductive decisions. My analysis, using aggregated data, reached largely similar conclusions regarding the role of mortality in changing reproductive trends, via its impact on nuptiality and marital fertility at different stages of the demographic transition.     

Incomplete reporting of men’s fertility in the united states and britain: A research note

We evaluate men's retrospective fertility histories from the British Household Panel Survey and the U.S. Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Further, we analyze the PSID men's panel-updated fertility histories for their possible superiority over retrospective collection. One third to one half of men's nonmarital births and births within previous marriages are missed in estimates from retrospective histories. Differential survey underrepresentation of previously married men compared with previously married women accounts for a substantial proportion of the deficits in previous-marriage fertility. More recent retrospective histories and panel-updated fertility histories improve reporting completeness, primarily by reducing the proportion of marital births from unions that are no longer intact at the survey date.     

By what measure? family time devoted to children in the united states

We argue that previous research on time devoted to child care has paid insufficient attention to the conceptualization of care time. Three separate problems are evident. First, the conventional focus on explicit activities with children distracts attention from the larger responsibilities of "passive" care, which ranges from time when children are sleeping to time when they are in the same general area but are not engaged in an activity with parents. Second, the empirical analysis of activity time focuses almost exclusively on parents, overlooking the role of relatives such as grandmothers and siblings. Third, the measurement of active care time often ignores the impact of overlaps among both care providers and recipients. Our analysis of the Child Development Supplement of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics sheds light on these three problems and presents new measures of passive and active care time.     

AIDS, “reversal” of the demographic transition and economic development: evidence from Africa

Using country- and region-level data, I investigate the effect of HIV/AIDS on fertility in Africa during 1985–2000. Results differ depending on the variation used and the estimation method. Between estimates that exploit cross-sectional variation suggest a positive significant effect of HIV/AIDS on fertility, whereas within estimates that are identified of off time-series variation show both positive and negative results depending on the HIV/AIDS variable used. These within estimates are insignificant in most of the specifications.     

Determinants of morbidity and disability trends in the united states, 1958–77

Macrodynamic structural-equation models are presented that show how changes in annual levels of aggregate indexes of several morbidity and disability conditions for the United States over the years 1958 to 1977 affect each other and are affected by other aggregate demographic and socioeconomic changes. After reviewing the record of annual changes in these indexes based on data from the National Health Interview Survey, patterns of temporal covariation in the time series are discussed and some tentative structural-equation models are constructed to account for their behavior. Statistically, the analyses reveal considerable variation in levels of year-to-year variance explained for these indexes-from 35 percent explained for days of school loss to 97 percent for all acute conditions. Substantive findings imply that a decreasing proportion of preschool children in the population contributes to a decline in the incidence of infective and parasitic diseases, and an increasing proportion of the population at the older ages results in increases in the prevalence of chronic conditions, days of bed disability, and days of restricted activity. Further, increases in economic prosperity lead to an increase in the incidence of injuries and a decrease in the incidence of viral conditions, while higher levels of unemployment produce more injuries and restricted activity days. These inferences corroborate, for the most part, results of prior studies that have been restricted to crosssectional analyses. In addition, however, they provide a basis for making explicit quantitative projections of future levels of morbidity and disability in the American population on the basis of exogenous demographic and socioeconomic conditions.     

Below-repiacement fertility in Tropical Africa? Some evidence from Addis Ababa

In the past few years there has been a gradual but progressive shift away from the long held scepticism about the prospect of reproductive change in Tropical Africa. Consequendy, the question is now not so much whether Tropical Africa remains a spectator of fertility transition, but whether and how soon fertility in the region will decline to level attained in other parts of the world. Using data from a series of censuses and surveys conducted in Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, a country which itself has high fertility, this study explores emerging evidence of fertility levels below two children per woman in an African city. Postponement of marriage and increased incidence of non-marriage, as well as a decline in marital fertility recorded across all birth orders and all age group, are the routes by which the observed transition to below-replacement fertility has been achieved. The paper outlines some tentative institutional and cultural factors that may have contributed to these changes. Revised version of an essay awarded the W.D. Borrie prize (postgraduate section), 1998.     

Declining fertility and policy intervention in Europe: Some lessons for Australia?

The contemporary fertility situation in Europe is outlined with emphasis on trends in the late 1990s. It is shown that while most European countries have lower fertility levels than Australia there is wide variation between countries with respect to both their levels of fertility and their rate of fertility decline. While almost all countries are experiencing fertility decline the rate of decline is higher and the fertility is lower in countries where the male-breadwinner model is strongest. Attempts to influence fertility in European nations are discussed, particularly those involving the introduction of family-friendly policies. It is clear that despite popular beliefs to the contrary, societies where male-breadwinner models influence policy most are those with lowest fertility. The lesson for Australia is that family-friendly policies not only are desirable from the perspective of moving toward gender equality but are likely to stabilize or perhaps even marginally increase fertility.     

Economic status proxies in studies of fertility in developing countries: Does the measure matter?

This paper investigates the consequences of using different economic status proxies on the estimated impact of economic status and other determinants of fertility. Using micro survey data from Ghana and Peru, we find that the proxies for income that best predict fertility are a principal components score of the ownership of consumer durable goods and a simple sum of ownership of these durable goods. Furthermore, the choice of the proxy generally has a minor influence on the predicted effects of the control variables. We compare the results from using a restricted set of proxies, such as those available in the Demographic and Health Surveys, with the results obtained using a lengthier set of proxies. Our results suggest implications beyond fertility analyses by providing researchers with an awareness of the sensitivity of microanalyses to the treatment of economic status. Our results also suggest practical recommendations for the collection of survey data.     

Motherhood,labor force behavior,and women’s careers: An empirical assessment of the wage penalty for motherhood in britain,germany, and the united states

Using harmonized longitudinal data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), we trace career prospects after motherhood for five cohorts of American, British, and West German women around the 1960s. We establish wage penalties for motherhood between 9% and 18% per child, with wage losses among American and British mothers being lower than those experienced by mothers in Germany. Labor market mechanisms generating the observed wage penalty for motherhood differ markedly across countries, however. For British and American women, work interruptions and subsequent mobility into mother-friendly jobs fully account for mothers’ wage losses. In contrast, respective penalties are considerably smaller in Germany, yet we observe a substantial residual wage penalty that is unaccounted for by mothers’ observable labor market behavior. We interpret this finding as indicating a comparatively more pronounced role for statistical discrimination against mothers in the German labor market.     

Sex preference and fertility: what is the link?

It is argued that investment in programs for changing attitudes toward sex preference may not have the greatest impact on reducing fertility or increasing fertility control. Arnold's new method of analysis of determining sex preference was applied to data from a 1977 Egyptian survey of 36,000 rural households in Menoufia Governorate. Findings indicated that couples increased their use of modern contraceptives in direct proportion to an increase in the number of sons. Arnold determined that a large majority of all couples would have at least one boy early in their childbearing years. Thus sex preference would not have a large effect on fertility. Arnold's analysis among 27 countries found that without any sex preference, contraceptive usage would increase by an average of less than 3.7 percentage points. Arnold found that sex preference was strongest in Asia, particularly in South Korea and Taiwan that already have reduced fertility levels. In Africa, where fertility is high, the total elimination of sex preference would have only a 2.9 percentage point difference in contraceptive use. Sex preference had small effects on the percent of women who practice contraception, the percent who desire no more children, and the average number of additional children wanted. For example, in Bangladesh having no sex preference would show a percentage difference of 1.6 percentage points for contraceptive use, 4.7 percentage points difference for women desiring no more children, and -0.1 percentage point difference for the average number of additional children wanted. The effect of having no sex preference was strongest in India compared with Bangladesh, Indonesia, Nepal, the Philippines, Thailand, Ghana, Kenya, Costa Rica, Haiti, Paraguay, and Peru. The effect of no sex preference in India would have the respective percentage point effect of 3.7, 8.9, and -0.2. Public policy should be directed to information, education, and communication with other social goals.     

Does low fertility call for new policies in some Asian countries?

Over the past 2 decades, Japan, China, Singapore, Hong Kong, and South Korea have completed a demographic transition from high birth and death rates and runaway population growth to reduced fertility and mortality and population growth approaching replacement levels. Among the outcomes of fertility decline, 3 have particularly far reaching effects: 1) Changes in family types and structures. Marriage and family formation are postponed, childbearing is compressed into a narrow reproductive span that begins later and ends earlier, and higher-order births become rare. Large families are replaced by small ones, and joint and extended families tend to be replaced by nuclear families. 2) Shifts in the proportions of young and old. Declining fertility means that the population as a whole becomes older. Decreases in the proportion of children provides an opportunity to increase the coverage of education. Increases in the proportion of the elderly means higher medical costs and social and economic problems about care of the aged. 3) Changes in the work force. There is concern that low fertility and shortages of workers will cause investment labor-intensive industries to shift to countries with labor surpluses. Another outcome may be an increase in female participation in the work force. The potential consequences of rapid fertility decline have sparked debate among population experts and policy makers throughout Asia. Current family planning programs will emphasize: 1) offering a choice of methods to fit individual preferences; 2) strengthening programs for sexually active unmarried people; 3) encouraging child spacing and reproductive choice rather than simply limiting the number of births; 4) making information available on the side effects of various family planning methods; 5) providing special information and services to introduce new methods; and 6) promoting the maternal and child health benefits of breast feeding and birth spacing.     

Mortality and fertility: How large is the direct child replacement effect in China?

Olsen (1980) proposed a method for quantifying the fertility response to child mortality. He showed how to correct for bias in the OLS estimator. He also proposed the use of mortality rates as an instrumental variable. This method is applied here to a new Chinese microdata set. It appears that the method works well. The bias-corrected direct replacement effect based on the Chinese data is about 0.6, which is three times as large as the effects found by Olsen (1980, 1988) using data for Colombia and Malaysia. Several explanations are provided for this result.I am grateful to Frank Denton, Martin Dooley, Ronald Lee, Lonnie Magee, Byron Spencer and three anonymous referees for many helpful comments and suggestions. I would also like to thank the International Statistical Institute Research Center for supplying the data used in this study.     

Demographic transition in sub-Saharan Africa: how big will the economic dividend be?

In mid-demographic-transition, many Asian countries enjoyed a large demographic 'dividend': extra economic growth owing to falling dependant/workforce ratios, or slower natural increase, or both. We estimate the dividend, 1985-2025, in sub-Saharan Africa and its populous countries. Dependency and natural increase peaked around 1985, 20 years after Asia. The UN projects an acceleration of the subsequent slow falls but disregards slowish declines in young-age mortality and thus, we argue, overestimates future fertility decline. Even if one accepts their projection, arithmetical and econometric evidence suggests an annual, if not total, dividend well below Asia's. The dividend arises more from falling dependency than reduced natural increase, and could be increased by accelerating the fertility decline (e.g., by reducing young-age mortality) or by employing a larger workforce productively. Any dividend from transition apart, low saving in much of Africa (unlike Asia) means that, given likely natural increase, current consumption per person is unsustainable because it depletes capital per person.     

Demographic transition in sub-Saharan Africa: How big will the economic dividend be?

In mid-demographic-transition, many Asian countries enjoyed a large demographic ‘dividend’: extra economic growth owing to falling dependant/workforce ratios, or slower natural increase, or both. We estimate the dividend, 1985–2025, in sub-Saharan Africa and its populous countries. Dependency and natural increase peaked around 1985, 20 years after Asia. The UN projects an acceleration of the subsequent slow falls but disregards slowish declines in young-age mortality and thus, we argue, overestimates future fertility decline. Even if one accepts their projection, arithmetical and econometric evidence suggests an annual, if not total, dividend well below Asia's. The dividend arises more from falling dependency than reduced natural increase, and could be increased by accelerating the fertility decline (e.g., by reducing young-age mortality) or by employing a larger workforce productively. Any dividend from transition apart, low saving in much of Africa (unlike Asia) means that, given likely natural increase, current consumption per person is unsustainable because it depletes capital per person.     

Sub-replacement fertility in national populations: Can it be raised?

This paper comments on the four main functions demographers perform: fact-finding, analysis, prediction, and policymaking. Successes in the first two of these are counterbalanced by weakness in predictive ability. The focus of the comments, however, is on policy. Demographers were influential in promoting efforts to lower very high fertility but are ineffectual in proposing policies that could reverse the tendency of fertility to sink well below replacement levels. The paper argues for a break from exclusive reliance on the standard measures of modern welfare states intended to raise fertility and urges exploration of radically new approaches. Two promising innovations are briefly outlined: one would give the right to vote to all citizens regardless of age, the voting right of minors being exercised by parental proxy, and another that would reform state-administered pension schemes by arranging a direct transfer of working children’s mandatory contributions to social security funds to their retired parents.     

Unveiling the demographic ‘action’ in class-action lawsuits: Two instructional cases

Population Research and Policy Review - Population turnover, cohort survival, and intercohort transmission of effects are concepts widely applicable beyond the customary domains of demographic...