FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC REGULATION: THE CASE OF THE 1969 COAL MINE HEALTH AND SFNETY ACT

How does government regulation influence the structure of industries? In the coal mining industry increased sfnety can be provided with personal protection devices or with engineering controls; but the type of sfnety standard imposed is important because larger producers have a comparative advantage complying with engineering controls. Time series evidence indicates that the 1969 Coal Mine Health and Sfnety Act, by imposing engineering controls, drove out smaller, less sfne mines, thereby shifting production toward larger mines.     

REGIONAL HOUSE PRICE DYNAMICS AND VOTING BEHAVIOR IN THE FOMC

This paper examines the impact of house price gaps in Federal Reserve districts on the voting behavior in the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) from 1978 to 2010. Applying a random effects ordered probit model, we find that a higher regional house price gap significantly increases (decreases) the probability that this district's representative in the FOMC casts interest rate votes in favor of tighter (easier) monetary policy. In addition, our results suggest that Bank presidents react more sensitively to regional house price developments than Board members do. (JEL E31, E58, R31)     

AN EXPRESSIVE VOTING THEORY OF STRIKES

Union members may vote for a strike even if they do not expect to thereby increase their wages. For under majority voting any one member's vote for a strike is unlikely to be decisive. A union member who obtains a non-infinitesimal emotional benefit from the act of voting for a strike may therefore vote in its favor. This hypothesis can explain the existence of strikes and the conditions which make strikes especially likely.     

AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF WORKAHOLICS AND ALCOHOLICS

This paper considers the role of alcohol in agency problems in order to provide an economic rationale for alcoholics and workaholics. In our model, alcohol reduces productivity, but also can make imbibers blurt private information. We show that in the optimal contract, low‐productivity workers are compelled to over‐indulge in alcohol, while high‐productivity workers overproduce output. Thus, workers are made into “alcoholics” and “workaholics” depending on their productivity. We conclude that excessive drinking (working) may be the result, not the cause, of low (high) productivity of workers. (JEL D82, VSOP)     

THE DEVELOPMENT AND DECLINE OF MEDIEVAL VOTING INSTITUTIONS: A COMPARISON OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE

This paper argues that in the middle ages voting institutions emerged as mechanisms that allowed rulers to cooperate with subjects on mutually profitable projects. In spite of their utility, many of these voting institutions eventually declined. We test the model on the English parliament and the French estates general. The historical evidence strongly supports our view that these institutions declined in France, but not in England, due to increases in the heterogeneity of voters' interests and the insecurity of French rulers, since these factors made cooperation between French rulers and their subjects more difficult.     

EXPROPRIATION OF MULTINATIONAL FIRMS: THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC MARKET CONDITIONS AND DOMESTIC RIVALRIES

The causes of expropriation of Multinational Firms (MNFs) by their host governments are investigated, based on social welfare analysis and also on public choice theory. A key feature is the presence of Cournot-Nash rivalry with domestic firms. Thus, the likelihood of expropriation differs according to whether or not a domestic rival exists. The likelihood also depends on the MNF's initial technological superiority over domestic technology, the host country's demand structure, the type of control to be exercised over the expropriated firm (private vs. state) and the strategic behavior of the MNF, ex anti, when under threat of expropriation.     

OWNERSHIP AND THE REGULATION OF WILDLIFE

The use of wildlife resources is governed by a combination of private contracts and public regulations. Most often, private landowners control access rights, and government agencies regulate hunting and other uses. This paper shows that these institutions depend on wildlife values and the ability of private landowners to control access to species that inhabit their land. Logit regressions and literary sources are used to test implications about private hunting rights and state regulations. The data support the view that private, legal, and political forces have led to institutions that vary in ways consistent with wealth maximization.     

THE CALCULUS OF VOTING RECONSIDERED

A rational economic hypothesis of the citizen's decision tovote or not vote in U. S. presidential elections has been citedas an example of the replacement of social-psychologically oriented"empirical generalizations" by axiomatically based deductivepropositions in political science. However, close scrutiny showsthat the rational (or political) economic paradigm is no moreaccurate a theory than previously popular systems analysis orfunctional paradigms. The claimed verification of the originalhypothesis was based on an apparently imprecise, adhoc, ordinalprocedure that could not distinguish between the intimatelyrelated rational economic and social-psychological hypotheses.A more powerful technique resolves the issue in favor of thelatter model for the data used by the original authors.     

AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF APARTHEID

Apartheid is a regulatory system designed to effect redistributions in favor of white workers and farmers at the expense of black workers and white capitalists. This paper uses a competitive interest group theory of the apartheid state to formulize a collective choice analysis of apartheid as endogenous policy. The "level" of apartheid is conceived as a continuous variable that is determined by the relative influence of competing interest groups within the white polity and by the costs of maintaining and defending apartheid institutions. Some empirical implications of this approach are explored.     

INTEGRATING MARKET ALTERNATIVES INTO THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF OPTIMAL DETERRENCE

Leading economic models of crime assume that potential criminals achieve their ends by criminal means or not at all. We develop a framework in which potential criminals can also attain their objectives through voluntary trade. Our framework helps explain several features of the legal system that have proven to be problematic for the canonical approach: why optimal sanctions should be increasing in an individual's criminal history, and why necessity may be a partial defense in some situations. Finally, the inclusion of a voluntary trade option makes the maximization of a utilitarian welfare function identical to minimizing the costs of crime, implying that a long‐standing controversy in the literature is, in part, an artifact of the assumption that criminals face a binary choice set. (JEL K42, D60, H00)     

VOTING BEHAVIOR, DISCRIMINATION AND THE NATIONAL BASEBALL HALL OF FAME

We investigate whether black, Latin, and white major league baseball players receive the same consideration by the Baseball Writers' Association of America in voting for membership into The National Baseball Hall of Fame. The first stage of Heckman's two-step procedure indicates that the probability a black player will ever receive at least one vote is significantly lower than that for his white counterpart. The second stage suggests that race or ethnicity sometimes matter in determining the number of votes a candidate receives for Hall of Fame membership. (JEL J7, D72)     

TOWARD AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF FASHION

Competition for rank within animal societies is an innate drive recognized in sociobiological and evolutionary theory. In human societies, fashion signals social rank or status. We extend standard economic theories of competitive and noncompetitive markets to analyze fashion by including the status-seeking incentive. In the competitive case, the conditions under which fashion cycles occur are examined. In the noncompetitive case, producers of fashion services discriminate between customers intertemporally to sustain the fashionability of their services. Unlike the standard models of fashion that populate marketing textbooks, our theory of fashion does not require that demand curves slope upward.     

ATTRIBUTION ERROR IN ECONOMIC VOTING: EVIDENCE FROM TRADE SHOCKS

This article exploits the international transmission of business cycles to examine the prevalence of attribution error in economic voting in a large panel of countries from 1990 to 2009. We find that voters, on average, exhibit a strong tendency to oust the incumbent governments during an economic downturn, regardless of whether the recession is home‐grown or merely imported from trading partners. However, we find important heterogeneity in the extent of attribution error. A split sample analysis shows that countries with more experienced voters, more educated voters, and possibly more informed voters—all conditions that have been shown to mitigate other voter agency problems—do better in distinguishing imported from domestic growth. (JEL E3, E6)     

VOTING IN FIRMS: THE ROLE OF AGENDA CONTROL, SIZE AND VOTER HOMOGENEITY

Voting is a common feature of most firms. Unrestricted voting, however, can lead to unstable decision making. We find that firms make tradeoffs among collective decision making, production scale, firm structure, and voter characteristics that are consistent with efforts to economize on the costs of voting. Firm responses include agenda control, restrictions to obtain a homogeneous voting population, and limits on firm size. We consider three long-surviving producer cooperatives, representing extreme cases of collective decision making, and find that their organization is sensitive to the costs of voting and to the employment of mechanisms to constrain those costs.     

ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: THE FRENCH CASE

This article provides a test of the secularization hypothesis, which argues that economic growth, industrialization, increased literacy, and low fertility decrease religiosity. It focuses on the elections of the secular politicians who voted in favor of the separation between Church and State in the French Parliament in 1905. If the secularization hypothesis is correct, these secular politicians should have been elected in the most developed areas of France at the turn of the twentieth century. Contrary to the predictions of the secularization hypothesis, we find that the support for secular politicians originated in the rural areas of France. (JEL Z12, D72, N43)