政治理性与政治学

政治理性的本质特征是 :在形态上 ,它是系统解释世界的理论体系──意识形态 ;在性质上 ,它是以认定阶级利益、国家利益等集体利益为特征的集体理性 ;在功能上 ,它是价值理性、理论理性、形而上理性、实践理性、工具理性等多种理性功能的辩证统一。要在政治行为分析基础上分析政治问题 ,就必须对政治理性的价值性质做出判断。就是说 ,政治学不仅需要建立政治理性理论──意识形态理论 ,还需要建立一种价值理论 ,一种能够为其价值判断提供价值标准的价值理论。     

The epistemic structure of a theory of a game

This paper is a contribution to the systematic study of alternative axiom-sets for theories of (normal-form, complete-information) games. It provides an introduction to epistemic logic, describes a formulation in epistemic logic of the structure of a theory of a game (the broad theory of that game), and applies methods of epistemic logic to define strategies for dealing with two disturbing features of game theory, its hyperrationality assumptions and its indeterminacy. The analysis of these problems is conducted in terms of two principles which impregnate much game theory, Cleverness and Cloisteredness (the principles that players know respectively all, and only, the logical consequences of their assumed knowledge). Broad theories allow us to formulate and revise these principles despite their metatheoretical character. It is shown how Cleverness may be weakened by using logics which restrict the Rule of Epistemization, and Cloisteredness by using default logic or autoepistemic logic; the latter is used to characterize Nash equilibrium beliefs as parts of certain autoepistemic extensions of players' knowledge bases, but these particular extensions are rejected as ungrounded.I am grateful for most helpful comments to Robin Cubitt, Joe Halpern, Ernest Geffner, Philippe Mongin, David Squires, Elias Thijsse and Tim Williamson.     

Distributive justice of bargaining and risk sensitivity

In this paper we will point out some possibilities and limitations of the discussion of distributive justice by bargaining in the classical bargaining models.We start by considering a kind of bargaining situation where two persons with different risk aversions have to distribute a given quantity of a certain good. Then we define a model in which two bargaining situations are compared. In both situations two persons divide a quantity of a certain good; in the second situation one of the persons, say person 2, is replaced by a more risk averse person. From a well-known theorem of Kihlstrom, Roth and Schmeidler it follows that in the Nash solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution and the Maschler-Perles solution person 1 prefers the situation with the more risk averse opponent.In both classes of problems the judgement of distributive justice is impossible because of an informational poverty of the classical bargaining model. We propose to integrate changes in the economic situation of the persons into the model.Therefore, in a third step, we compare two distributive situations, where differences in the situations are implied by changes in the initial endowments of the persons. Under the assumption that each person has a decreasing local risk aversion, we show that every reallocation of the initial endowments is enlarged or at least preserved by risk sensitive bargaining solutions. This fact has some significance for the discussion of distributive justice in social decision making by bargaining.     

诸神之争的再阐释:一个社会学的结构视角

世俗化及逆世俗化范式的对立其实蕴含着更大的连续性,即如何理解宗教多元主义背后的诸神之争,总的来说,韦伯之后那些解释宗教变迁的理论范式均未突破韦伯对宗教的比较研究范畴,难以在当前复杂而多元的文化环境下为个人提供总体指导,但是二者共同揭露了诸神之争条件下西方宗教工具理性和价值理性交互作用所促成的理性化的动力机制,即西方宗教维护自身价值理性的方式从中世纪教会主导的政治性垄断过渡到现代性条件下宗教多元主义的市场化竞争。     

The Evolution of Coding in Signaling Games

Signaling games with reinforcement learning have been used to model the evolution of term languages (Lewis 1969, Convention. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Skyrms 2006, “Signals” Presidential Address. Philosophy of Science Association for PSA). In this article, syntactic games, extensions of David Lewis’s original sender–receiver game, are used to illustrate how a language that exploits available syntactic structure might evolve to code for states of the world. The evolution of a language occurs in the context of available vocabulary and syntax—the role played by each component is compared in the context of simple reinforcement learning.     

Prisoner's dilemma from a moral point of view

In a recent issue of this journal, C. L. Sheng claims to havesolved andexplained the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) by studying it from a moral point of view - i.e., by assuming that each player feels sympathy for the other. Sheng does not fully clarify this claim, but there is textual evidence that his point is this: PD's arise only for agents who feel little or no sympathy for each other; they cannot arise in the presence of a high degree of reciprocal sympathy. A high degree of such sympathysolves the PD in that it prevents PD's from arising, and a low degree of itexplains the PD in that it provides an essential condition for the occurrence of that game. This thesis is false, as some examples show. These examples are important; they prevent us from underestimating the problem posed by the PD.     

走向文章之士的心路历程--从汉代的三篇不遇赋谈起

汉代大一统政权的建立 ,使得战国时激扬的主体精神难以再现 ,士人因此产生“不遇”之感。士人在解释“不遇”处境的同时 ,试图重新体认并适应外在环境。基于不同的时势和对自身处境的不同认识 ,士人先后尝试了几种可能的立身方式。这一过程中士人角色意识的转换 ,显示出由策士到文章之士的心路历程     

社会成本规避中的政策选择悖论——以济南市前屯居“旧村改造”为个案

旧村改造是城市化土地扩张的政策推进过程。由于土地、产权等相关制度建构的先天缺陷,开发主体行为能力的不足,地方政府与企业常常对改造的社会成本采取规避的态度。社会成本规避与转嫁带来了一系列的不良后果,从而形成了政策选择上的悖论。     

The Bicameral Postulates and Indices of a Priori Voting Power

If K is an index of relative voting power for simple voting games, the bicameral postulate requires that the distribution of K -power within a voting assembly, as measured by the ratios of the powers of the voters, be independent of whether the assembly is viewed as a separate legislature or as one chamber of a bicameral system, provided that there are no voters common to both chambers. We argue that a reasonable index – if it is to be used as a tool for analysing abstract, uninhabited decision rules – should satisfy this postulate. We show that, among known indices, only the Banzhaf measure does so. Moreover, the Shapley–Shubik, Deegan–Packel and Johnston indices sometimes witness a reversal under these circumstances, with voter x less powerful than y when measured in the simple voting game G₁ , but more powerful than y when G₁ is bicamerally joined with a second chamber G₂ . Thus these three indices violate a weaker, and correspondingly more compelling, form of the bicameral postulate. It is also shown that these indices are not always co-monotonic with the Banzhaf index and that as a result they infringe another intuitively plausible condition – the price monotonicity condition. We discuss implications of these findings, in light of recent work showing that only the Shapley–Shubik index, among known measures, satisfies another compelling principle known as the bloc postulate. We also propose a distinction between two separate aspects of voting power: power as share in a fixed purse (P-power) and power as influence (I-power).     

The Developmental Progression of Understanding of Mind during a Hiding Game

In this longitudinal study, 52 typically developing preschoolers engaged in a hiding game with their mothers when children were 42‐, 54‐, and 66‐months old. Children's understanding of mind, positive affect, and engagement with the task were rated, and mothers' utterances were coded for role and content. Analyses confirmed that some facets of children's understanding of mind developed sequentially; specifically, they expressed an understanding of knowledge access before an understanding of deception and false beliefs, and expressed an understanding of deception before an understanding of false beliefs. Children's understanding of mind increased across visits and positively correlated with false belief task performance. Results suggest that mothers may tailor the content of their utterances to the child's growing expertise, but the role of mothers' utterances did not change. Observing preschoolers engaged in a playful hiding game revealed that children's understanding of mind not only increased with age but also developed sequentially.     

“风起于青蘋之末”——孟子性善论探析

作为《孟子》一书的灵魂,性善论的影响至深至远。孟子的人性论建立在人的主体精神日益自觉、人们对人性的探讨日渐深入的基础之上,是对孔子的人性观念的发展。孟子认为,人的善性是一种先天的资质与倾向,通过心的感受与省思得以培养,通过本性来完成天的意志。性善论虽未能有效地行诸当世,却深刻地影响了后世政治,并为社会锻造出一个士人阶层,最终沉淀于儒家的基本品格之中。性善论还是士人阶层乌托邦精神的根底所在,作为士人价值观的核心,乌托邦精神体现为“道”对“势”的制衡,并在个体人格领域以审美自由的方式获得彰显。     

The effect of newspaper feature articles on referrals to a child guidance clinic 1

This study investigates the key factors influencing turnover intentions of social workers, adopting a comparative approach within the two patterns. Based on planned behaviors theory, the personal attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived competences of social workers were measured to predict organizational and occupational turnover intention, with controlling variables being demographic factors, work-related factors, and professional perception. It was found that social workers from Guangzhou (as “autonomous-embedded” patterns) expressed stronger intention to leave their current organizations than did their counterparts in Beijing (as “dependent-embedded” patterns), and their attitudes played a salient role in the prediction of organizational or occupational turnover intention. However, personal attitude was not a determinant of either organizational or occupational turnover intention in Beijing. This research sheds light on the importance of subjective norms in dependent-embedded patterns, points out the dominant role of personal belief in autonomous-embedded patterns, and highlights the key role of job satisfaction in the turnover process.     

Knowing what we know about knowledge in social work: The search for a comprehensive model of knowledge production

Influenced by its historical beginnings, the production and modelling of knowledge in social work has become a small but diverse field. Ten key models exploring the nature of knowledge and its production in social work are reviewed against significant ideas from the interdisciplinary knowledge production literature beyond social work. In so doing, the place of holistic approaches to modelling the knowledge production process within social work and the human services is highlighted. It is argued that despite the number of models that attempt to describe the knowledge production process, there is scope for a more comprehensive, holistic, complex approach to modelling knowledge production in social work and the human services.     

军事发包制

在学界目前关于行政发包制及其历史根源的讨论中，尚未触及一个非常重要的历史制度：军事发包制。它是中国共产党在抗日战争和解放战争时期创建的根据地进行局部执政时所展现出来的一种组织形态，即一方面在中央层面建立起一元化的领导体制，另一方面又在各根据地军区和军分区两级分别建立起与上级的军事承包关系。这种关系具体体现为三个方面：军事决策的自由裁量权；财经的自给自足；在属地建立一元化领导，实行属地化管理、战果导向和人格化担责。军事发包制有效解决了动员和控制、集权和分权的张力问题，把分割状态下的局部执政当成铸造现代政党之军政能力的重要通道，为1949年后全面展开的国家政权建设做好了准备。军事发包制既是行政发包制的先驱，在某种意义上又可谓行政发包制的内核。     

How children tell a (prosocial) lie from an (ironic) joke: The role of shared knowledge

Understanding counterfactual utterances is a major challenge for children, because of the many ways in which they can be interpreted (pretence, errors, figures of speech, lies). In the present study, 7-year-olds and adults determined whether counterfactual utterances were prosocial lies or irony, depending on whether the counterfactuality was known only to the speaker (unshared knowledge) or to both interlocutors (shared knowledge). When the counterfactuality was shared by the interlocutors, both the 7-year-olds and the adults were less likely to interpret the speaker's counterfactual utterance as an attempted lie, and more likely to conclude that the speaker was being ironic. Adults were better than children at distinguishing irony from lies, but both age groups exhibited the same response pattern, namely a bias toward lying. This bias did not prevent the adults from deciding that the speaker was being ironic when the counterfactuality was shared, whereas children responded at chance level. In children, the association between task performance and theory-of-mind skills was nonsignificant, with a very small effect size. We discuss the possibility that, contrary to widespread belief, distinguishing irony from lies does not necessarily involve theory of mind (ToM).     

The nature of bank money,a case study of transformation in the Czech banking sector

The article examines the nature of bank money on two complementary levels. The first level deals with theoretical considerations. Here, the departure point is Social Positioning Theory, which provides a framework to investigate the nature of money. Within the theory, the paper situates bank money in credit-debt relations, that are themselves integral part of a wider productive-consumptive nexus of the economy. In this perspective, bank money is the relation, accounting economic positions of participating members, resulting from their economic activities realized within the context of the overall society. The second level uses the methods of Oral History and Memory Studies and, through semi-structured interviews, provides empirical material illustrating ideas about the nature of money in a specific historical form. The article thus explores the contrasting experiences of banking in the context of a centrally planned economy and banking in the transformation to a market economy. These two contrasting episodes are illustrative because of the significant change in the form of bank money, which brings to light various aspects of its nature. Moreover, the article utilizes interviews that present the lived experience of bankers with years of involvement in the sector, enriching the perspective on the issue under study.