Employer-sponsored long-term care insurance: best practices for increasing sponsorship

Behind the enthusiasm of policymakers for long-term care (LTC) insurance is the belief that increased ownership of private LTC insurance will reduce the government's future liability for financing the nation's LTC needs, currently projected by the Congressional Budget Office to increase by 2.6 percent annually between 2000 and 2040. Some observers say that sustained economic growth could keep these increased expenditures at the same share of total GDP; others argue that current federal expenditure trends will become unsustainable without large tax increases. The potential of the employer-sponsored group LTC market to stave off a national LTC financing crisis has recently started to receive popular notice in the news media. However, for the potential of the group LTC market to be realized, there must be widespread employer sponsorship of group LTC plans and significant participation levels among eligible employees in these plans. The present analysis of industry data estimates the LTC plan sponsorship rate for all U.S. employers with 10 or more employees at 0.2 percent. The sponsorship rate among large employers is significantly higher (8.7 percent). The greatest growth opportunities are projected to lie in the smaller employer market, because it is enormous and virtually untapped. Nonsponsors cite a variety of barriers to employer sponsorship of LTC plans. For many nonsponsors, the most important obstacles are the intrinsic characteristics of their work forces: employees are too young, transient, part-time, and/or low-income to be suitable for LTC insurance. For many others, lack of awareness and low priority are the primary obstacles. Because group LTC insurance has been widely available for only 10 years, many benefits managers view it as "too new and untested." Prior to the passage of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), in August 1996, the tax treatment of long-term care insurance premiums was unclear because Congress had not addressed the issue and the Internal Revenue Service had not issued clear guidance. In essence, HIPAA served to clarify the tax status of LTC insurance and establish product criteria for tax qualification. The interventions contained in HIPAA appear to have been insufficient to stimulate coverage growth rates that will meaningfully reduced the future burden on government financing of LTC. Although employment-based LTC insurance appears to be the best mechanism for mass expansion of coverage at affordable rates, the data suggest that employer sponsorship of LTC plans is relatively rare, especially among smaller employers, and that sponsorship rates may not dramatically increase without significant investments in employer education and new incentives.     

Voluntary long-term care insurance: best practices for increasing employee participation

This is the second of two Issue Briefs (April and May 2000) on long-term care (LTC) insurance. The previous Issue Brief addressed the problem of increasing sponsorship, while this report addresses the issue of increasing employee participation. Participation rates in group LTC insurance plans tend to be low. A potential watershed event for the development of the employment-based group LTC market is the proposed LTC program for federal employees and retirees (a program that would have to be enacted by Congress). The perception of a successful offering to federal employees could provide an enormous boost to the group LTC insurance market. Employee communication and education are seen as critical to the success of LTC enrollments. The importance of support shown by an employer for a new LTC plan offering cannot be overstated. Unlike 401(k) plan participation trends, LTC participation rates are highest among large companies. Insurers tend to view the 40-60 age range as the primary target for group LTC insurance, and employee salary as the best predictor of LTC insurance enrollment. Higher educational levels also are associated with higher levels of LTC participation. Perceived need for LTC insurance is perhaps the biggest barrier to the purchase of LTC insurance by employees due to competing financial priorities and the fact that LTC issues are generally off the "radar screens" of younger employees. Plans with skilled nursing home and home care benefits experience higher participation rates than plans lacking these benefits. The availability of lower-cost and long duration benefit options can be an important factor in determining participation. Most sponsors have chosen to offer noncontributory (i.e., fully employee-paid) LTC plans. Employer reluctance to make contributions may be caused by HIPAA's prohibition on the inclusion of LTC insurance in cafeteria plans. One of the major advantages of group LTC plans is the availability of guaranteed issue (i.e., issuing coverage without requiring evidence of insurability) for employees, which is not available in the individual LTC market. It is easy for enrollment to be derailed by the presence of any of a number of harmful conditions, such as employer-sponsors who distance themselves from the offer, ineffective communications, or difficult enrollment processes. Achieving consistently strong levels of participation in LTC plans will require employer-sponsors and their insurance carriers to form strong partnerships, with worker participation as their primary stated goal.     

Expanding health insurance for children: examining the alternatives

This Issue Brief examines the issue of uninsured children. The budget reconciliation legislation currently under congressional consideration earmarks $16 billion for new initiatives to provide health insurance coverage to approximately 5 million of the 10 million uninsured children during the next five years. Proposals to expand coverage among children include the use of tax credits, subsidies, vouchers, Medicaid program expansion, and expansion of state programs. However, these proposals do not address the decline in employment-based health insurance coverage--the underlying cause of the lack of coverage, to the extent that a cause can be identified. What is worse, some proposals to expand health insurance among children may discourage employers from offering coverage. Between 1987 and 1995, the percentage of children with employment-based health insurance declined from 66.7 percent to 58.6 percent. Despite this trend, the percentage of children without any form of health insurance coverage barely increased. In 1987, 13.1 percent were uninsured, compared with 13.8 percent in 1995. Medicaid program expansions helped to alleviate the effects of the decline in employment-based health insurance coverage among children and the potential increase in the number of uninsured children. Between 1987 and 1995, the percentage of children enrolled in the Medicaid program increased from 15.5 percent to 23.2 percent. Some questions to consider in assessing approaches to improving children's health insurance coverage include the following: If the government intervenes, should it do so through a compulsory mechanism or a voluntary system? Is the employment-based system "worth saving" for children? In other words, are the market interventions necessary to keep this system functioning for children too regulatory, too intrusive, and too cumbersome to be practical? In addition to reforming the employment-based system, what reforms are necessary in order to reach those families who have no coverage through the work place? Which approaches are both efficient and politically acceptable? Employment-based coverage of children will likely continue. The challenge for lawmakers is to find a way to cover more uninsured children without eroding employment-based coverage. Several current legislative proposals attempt to avoid this problem by excluding children who have access to employment-based coverage. Without such a requirement, the opportunity to purchase coverage at a discount would create incentives for some low-income employees to drop dependent/family coverage, which in turn could lead some employers to drop their health plans.     

Trends in health insurance coverage

This Issue Brief presents data on trends in health insurance coverage between 1987-1995. In 1995, 70.7 percent of the nonelderly population had private health insurance coverage, compared with 75.9 percent in 1987. During this period, the percentage of the nonelderly population with employment-based health insurance declined from 69.2 percent to 63.8 percent, while the percentage covered by Medicaid program increased from 8.6 percent to 12.5 percent. The percentage of the nonelderly population without any form of health insurance increased from 14.8 percent in 1987 to 17.4 percent, or 40.3 million individuals, in 1995. The percentage of nonelderly Americans with employment-based coverage fell for both individuals with coverage in their own name and those with coverage as dependents. In 1995, 32.7 percent of the nonelderly population had coverage in their own name, compared with 33.8 percent in 1987. Similarly, 31.1 percent of the nonelderly population had employment-based health insurance as dependents in 1995, compared with 35.4 percent in 1987. One of the most important determinants of health insurance coverage is work status and hours of work. While employment-based health insurance received directly from worker's employer decreased between 1987 and 1995 from 66.2 percent of 63.2 percent among full-time workers, the percentage of part-time workers with employment-based health insurance coverage in their own name increased from 17.2 percent to 20.1 percent. The percentage of workers with dependent coverage fell for both full-time and part-time workers, as did the percentage of nonworkers with dependent coverage. Workers in the manufacturing industry are most likely to have employment-based health insurance; they are also the workers most likely to have experienced a decrease in employment-based coverage between 1987 and 1995. In contrast, workers employed in most of the service sectors, experienced an increase in employment-based health insurance, self-employed workers experienced a decrease, and government workers experienced a slight increase. Cost is one of the primary factors contributing to the decline in employment-based health insurance coverage. While health insurance premium cost increases have slowed during the past three years, many health care analysts are predicting an increase in health insurance premiums during the next few years. Inflationary pressure may come from health care providers, health insurers, consumers, and/or policymakers. If inflationary pressure increases health insurance premiums, we are likely to see a continued decline in employment-based health insurance and a subsequent increase in both Medicaid and uninsured populations.     

Sources of health insurance and characteristics of the uninsured: analysis of the March 1997 Current Population Survey

This Issue Brief provides summary data on the insured and uninsured populations in the nation and in each state. It discusses the characteristics most closely related to individuals' health insurance status. Based on EBRI analysis of the March 1997 Current Population Survey, it represents 1996 data--the most recent data available. In 1996, 82.3 percent of nonelderly (under age 65) Americans had private or public health insurance. Seventy-one percent had private insurance, 64 percent through an employment-based plan. Sixteen percent had public health insurance. The percentage of uninsured Americans has been increasing since at least 1987. In 1987, 14.8 percent of the nonelderly population was uninsured, compared with 17.7 percent in 1996. However, the erosion of employment-based health benefits cannot fully explain this increase since 1993. Instead, the decline in public sources of health insurance would partly explain it. It may be that, while the percentage of individuals with employment-based coverage is rising, individuals previously covered by Medicaid and CHAMPUS/CHAMPVA are not being fully absorbed into the employment-based health insurance market. Between 1995 and 1996, the percentage of nonelderly Americans without health insurance coverage increased from 17.4 percent to 17.7 percent. Further examination indicates that children completely accounted for this increase. In 1995, 13.8 percent of children and 19 percent of persons ages 18-64 were uninsured, compared with 14.8 percent of children and 18.9 percent of persons ages 18-64 in 1996. With the recent passage of legislation designed to reduce the number of uninsured children, the next focal point for health care reform could be early retirees and unemployed persons. President Clinton and some members of Congress have expressed an interest in improving access to and affordability of coverage for these groups. Currently, health care cost inflation is at its lowest point in years, but there are signals indicating that it is about to rise above current levels. The federal government's recent announcement that health insurance premiums will rise for federal employees an average of 8.5 percent in 1998 may portend higher future health care costs. Similarly, disappointing earnings announcements from several large insurers because of higher medical costs and lower-than-expected revenues may indicate that health insurance plans will increase premiums. Employment and income play a dominant role in determining an individual's likelihood of having health insurance. Age, gender, firm size, work hours, and industry are also important determinants; however, these variables are also closely linked to employment status and income. Some of the widest variations involve factors that are not always looked at in traditional demographic assessments, such as citizenship. However, variations by race, ethnicity, and citizenship are also closely linked to employment status and income.     

The importance of employer sponsorship in the long-term care insurance market

Medicare and Medicaid are major sources of long-term care payments and thus will bear much of the burden from the growth in long-term care service use. The large future demand for long-term care services is of great concern among policymakers due to its expense and the use of public program dollars. It is argued that the individual purchase of long-term care insurance can help alleviate the increasing financial pressure on public programs responsible for the majority of longterm care financing. However, consumers have shown little interest in insuring against the high costs of long-term care. This analysis examines the effect of several factors on the decision to purchase a long-term care insurance policy: knowledge and attitudes of long-term care insurance and the long-term care financing system, the perceived risk for longterm care, financial planning behavior, and the availability of long-term care insurance. The interim results indicate the factor most likely to affect the decision to purchase long-term care insurance is access to employer-sponsored long-term care insurance. This suggests tht the availability of affordable and high quality coverage is more important than demand-side factors such as awareness of long-term care insurance and a perceived greater risk for long-term care.     

Group long-term care insurance: decision-making factors and implications for financing long-term care

This study proposes and tests a systemic family decision-making framework to understand group long-term care insurance (LTCI) enrollment decisions. A random sample of public employees who were offered group LTCI as a workplace benefit were examined. Findings reveal very good predictive efficacy for the overall conceptual framework with a pseudo R2 value of .687, and reinforced the contributions of factors within the family system. Enrollees were more likely to have discussed the decision with others, used information sources, and had prior experience when compared to non-enrollees. Perceived health status, financial knowledge, attitudes regarding the role of private insurance, risk taking, and coverage features were additional factors related to enrollment decisions. The findings help to inform policymakers about the potential of LTCI as one strategy for financing long-term care.     

Group Long-Term Care Insurance: Decision-Making Factors and Implications for Financing Long-Term Care

This study proposes and tests a systemic family decisionmaking framework to understand group long-term care insurance (LTCI) enrollment decisions. A random sample of public employees who were offered group LTCI as a workplace benefit were examined. Findings reveal very good predictive efficacy for the overall conceptual framework with a pseudo R² value of .687, and reinforced the contributions of factors within the family system. Enrollees were more likely to have discussed the decision with others, used information sources, and had prior experience when compared to non-enrollees. Perceived health status, financial knowledge, attitudes regarding the role of private insurance, risk taking, and coverage features were additional factors related to enrollment decisions. The findings help to inform policymakers about the potential of LTCI as one strategy for financing long-term care.     

Sources of health insurance and characteristics of the uninsured: analysis of the March 1999 Current Population Survey

This Issue Brief provides summary data on the insured and uninsured populations in the nation and in each state. It discusses the characteristics most closely related to an individual's health insurance status. Based on EBRI estimates from the March 1999 Current Population Survey (CPS), it represents 1998 data--the most recent data available. In 1998, 194.7 million nonelderly Americans--81.6 percent--had some form of health insurance. More than 64 percent had it through an employment-based health plan; 6.5 percent purchased it on their own; and 14.3 percent were covered by a public program, mostly through Medicaid (10.4 percent). In 1998, 18.4 percent of the nonelderly population was uninsured (43.9 million people), compared with 14.8 percent in 1987. The percentage of uninsured Americans has generally been increasing since at least 1987, although the percentage uninsured in 1998 was not statistically different from the percentage uninsured in 1997 (18.3 percent). The increase in the uninsured prior to 1993 can be attributed to the erosion of employment-based health insurance. However, since 1993, the percentage of nonelderly Americans covered by an employment-based health plan has increased from 63.5 percent to 64.9 percent. The decline in public sources of health insurance would mostly explain the recent increase in the uninsured. For example, between 1994 and 1998 the percentage of nonelderly Americans covered by CHAMPUS/CHAMPVA declined from 3.8 percent to 2.9 percent, in large part due to downsizing in the military. Similarly, between 1993 and 1998, the percentage of nonelderly Americans covered by Medicaid declined from 12.7 percent to 10.4 percent as people left welfare. The increase in employment-based coverage since 1994 was due mainly to a higher likelihood that children were covered by an employment-based health plan. Between 1994 and 1998, the percentage of children covered by an employment-based health plan increased from 58.1 percent to 60.2 percent. For adults, it increased less than one percentage point, from 66.1 percent to 66.9 percent. Adults started to realize gains in employment-based health insurance between 1997 and 1998. Between 1994 and 1997, the percentage of working adults with employment-based health insurance coverage held steady at roughly 72.3 percent. During this period, health care cost inflation was essentially nonexistent. However, between 1997 and 1998, the percentage of working adults with employment-based health insurance increased from 72.2 percent to 72.8 percent, despite the apparent return of health care cost inflation in 1998. It is likely that the changing composition of the labor force accounted for some of the increase in employment-based coverage.     

Defined contribution health benefits

This Issue Brief discusses the emerging issue of "defined contribution" (DC) health benefits. The term "defined contribution" is used to describe a wide variety of approaches to the provision of health benefits, all of which have in common a shift in the responsibility for payment and selection of health care services from employers to employees. DC health benefits often are mentioned in the context of enabling employers to control their outlay for health benefits by avoiding increases in health care costs. DC health benefits may also shift responsibility for choosing a health plan and the associated risks of choosing a plan from employers to employees. There are three primary reasons why some employers currently are considering some sort of DC approach. First, they are once again looking for ways to keep their health care cost increases in line with overall inflation. Second, some employers are concerned that the public "backlash" against managed care will result in new legislation, regulations, and litigation that will further increase their health care costs if they do not distance themselves from health care decisions. Third, employers have modified not only most employee benefit plans, but labor market practices in general, by giving workers more choice, control, and flexibility. DC-type health benefits have existed as cafeteria plans since the 1980s. A cafeteria plan gives each employee the opportunity to determine the allocation of his or her total compensation (within employer-defined limits) among various employee benefits (primarily retirement or health). Most types of DC health benefits currently being discussed could be provided within the existing employment-based health insurance system, with or without the use of cafeteria plans. They could also allow employees to purchase health insurance directly from insurers, or they could drive new technologies and new forms of risk pooling through which health care services are provided and financed. DC health benefits differ from DC retirement plans. Under a DC health plan, employees may face different premiums based on their personal health risk and perhaps other factors such as age and geographic location. Their ability to afford health insurance may depend on how premiums are regulated by the state and how much money their employer provides. In contrast, under a DC retirement plan, employers' contributions are based on the same percentage of income for all employees, but employees are not subject to paying different prices for the same investment.     

Differences in facilities' acceptance of patients under long-term care insurance in Japan

OBJECTIVES: In April 2000, Japan launched a public, long-term care insurance (LTCI) plan for elderly people who need support. This study describes how medical support for the elderly is delivered at LTCI care facilities in Japan now and gaps between system goals and current activity. Recommendations are made for enhancing the implementation of LTCI. METHODS: We mailed questionnaires to all health service facilities for the elderly (HSF) and special nursing homes for the elderly (SNH) located in the Kyushu area of Japan, asking whether they would accept patients with nine specific conditions. RESULTS: We found that HSFs, which are required to employ a full-time doctor and are reimbursed at a higher rate, accept significantly fewer patients with four conditions that need medical support than are accepted by SNHs, which are not required to employ a full-time doctor. DISCUSSION: In this study, we find discrepancies between system goals and current activities at LTCI care facilities. For the Japanese LTCI system to work well in the limitation of medical resources, we must understand how it really works and to reform the system continuously.     

Issues in mental health care benefits: the costs of mental health parity

This Issue Brief discusses issues in mental health care benefits. It describes the current state of employment-based mental health benefits and discusses studies and issues regarding full mental health parity. It also includes an analysis of the effect of full mental parity on the uninsured population and the effects of the limited mental health parity provision contained in the VA-HUD appropriations bill. The final section discusses the implications of mental health parity for health plans and health insurers. When employers began to provide health insurance benefits to their employees and their families, they extended coverage to include mental health benefits under the same terms as other health care services. Many employers continued to add mental health benefits through the 1970s and early 1980s until cost pressures required employers to re-examine all health care benefits that were offered. They quickly found that, while only a small proportion of the beneficiaries used mental health care services, the costs associated with this care were very high. As a result, employers placed limits on mental health benefits in an attempt to make the insurance risk more manageable. The general strategies employers have used to manage their health care costs are cost sharing, utilization review, managed care, and the packaging of provider services. Employers' cost management strategies may be restricted, however. Five states have mental health parity laws, but three of the states--Rhode Island, Maine, and New Hampshire--apply these laws only to the seriously mentally ill. In addition, 31 states mandate that mental health benefits be provided. However, state mandates apply only to insured plans, not to self-insured employer plans, which are exempt from state regulation of health plans under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). A number of recent studies have examined the effect of mental health parity on health insurance premiums in a "typical" preferred provider organization and on the uninsured. In general, the studies concluded that mental health parity could increase health insurance premiums, decrease health insurance coverage for non-mental health related illnesses, and increase the number of uninsured individuals. All studies of mental health parity, and mandated benefits in general, assume that there is a strong likelihood that increased health benefit costs would be passed along to workers in the form of higher cost sharing for health insurance, lower wage growth, or lower growth in other employee benefits.     

Long-Term Care Policy: Singapore’s Experience

Singapore, like many developed countries, is facing the challenge of a rapidly aging population and the increasing need to provide long-term care (LTC) services for elderly in the community. The Singapore government’s philosophy on care for the elderly is that the family should be the first line of support, and it has relied on voluntary welfare organizations (VWOs) or charities for the bulk of LTC service provision. For LTC financing, it has emphasized the principles of co-payment and targeting of state support to the low-income population through means-tested government subsidies. It has also instituted ElderShield, a national severe disability insurance scheme. This paper discusses some of the challenges facing LTC policy in Singapore, particularly the presence of perverse financial incentives for hospitalization, the pitfalls of over-reliance on VWOs, and the challenges facing informal family caregivers. It discusses the role of private LTC insurance in LTC financing, bearing in mind demand- and supply-side failures that have plagued the private LTC insurance market. It suggests the need for more standardized needs assessment and portable LTC benefits, with reference to the Japanese Long-Term Care Insurance program, and also discusses the need to provide more support to informal family caregivers.     

Financing reform for long-term care: strategies for public and private long-term care insurance

The way the nation provides for the financing and delivery of long-term care is badly in need of reform. The principal options for change are private insurance, altering Medicaid, and public long-term care insurance. This article uses the Brookings-ICF Long-Term Care Financing Model to evaluate each of these options in terms of affordability, distribution of benefits, and ability to reduce catastrophic out-of-pocket costs. So long as private insurance is aimed at the elderly, its market penetration and ability to finance long-term care will remain severely limited. Affordability is a major problem. Selling to younger persons could solve the affordability problem, but marketing is extremely difficult. Liberalizing Medicaid could help solve the problems of long-term care, but there is little public support for means-tested programs. Finally, universalistic public insurance programs do well in meeting the goals of long-term care reform, but all social insurance programs are expensive and seem politically infeasible in the current political environment.     

Differences in Facilities' Acceptance of Patients Under Long-Term Care Insurance in Japan

Abstract

Objectives. In April 2000, Japan launched a public, long-term care insurance (LTCI) plan for elderly people who need support. This study describes how medical support for the elderly is delivered at LTCI care facilities in Japan now and gaps between system goals and current activity. Recommendations are made for enhancing the implementation of LTCI.

Methods. We mailed questionnaires to all health service facilities for the elderly (HSF) and special nursing homes for the elderly (SNH) located in the Kyushu area of Japan, asking whether they would accept patients with nine specific conditions.

Results. We found that HSFs, which are required to employ a full-time doctor and are reimbursed at a higher rate, accept significantly fewer patients with four conditions that need medical support than are accepted by SNHs, which are not required to employ a full-time doctor.

Discussion. In this study, we find discrepancies between system goals and current activities at LTCI care facilities. For the Japanese LTCI system to work well in the limitation of medical resources, we must understand how it really works and to reform the system continuously.     

Questions and answers on health insurance benefit issues

This Issue Brief addresses eight topics in the areas of health insurance and health care costs. Using a question and answer format, the discussion draws largely on EBRI research and the EBRI Databook on Employee Benefits, third edition. In 1993, U.S. expenditures on health care were $884.2 billion, and they are projected to reach $2,173.7 billion by 2005, increasing at a projected average annual rate of 7.8 percent. Health care spending accounted for 13.9 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1993 and is projected to reach 17.9 percent of GDP by 2005. Among the factors contributing to the increase in health care costs are the growth in the number of individuals with traditional reimbursement health insurance coverage, the rapid expansion of technology and treatment options, and demographic factors such as the aging of the population. In 1993, employers, both public and private, spent $235.6 billion on group health insurance, accounting for 6.2 percent of total compensation. Group health insurance is the fastest growing component of total compensation, increasing at an average annual rate of 13.7 percent from 1960 to 1993. An increasing number of employees are required to make a cash contribution to their health insurance plan premium. In 1993, 61 percent of full-time employees in medium and large private establishments who participated in an employee only health insurance plan were required to make a contribution to the premium, up from 27 percent in 1979. In 1993, 185.3 million persons under age 65 had health insurance coverage, while 40.9 million people--or about 18.1 percent of the nonelderly population--received neither private health insurance nor publicly financed health coverage. Of those individuals who had health insurance coverage, 60.8 percent, or 137.4 million persons, received their health insurance through an employment-based plan. In 1993, 15.2 percent of the nonelderly population without health insurance coverage were noncitizens. In six states noncitizens represented a higher proportion of the total uninsured population than individuals in the nation as a whole. An increasing number of employers are self-funding their health insurance plans. In 1994, 74 percent of employers with 500 or more employees self-funded their health insurance plans, up from 63 percent in 1993. An estimated 22 million full-time employees in private industry and state and local governments participated in a self-funded employment-based health insurance plan.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)     

Financing Reform for Long-Term Care

The way the nation provides for the financing and delivery of long-term care is badly in need of reform. The principal options for change are private insurance, altering Medicaid, and 110 FROM NURSJNG HOMES TO HOME CARE public long-term care insurance. This article uses the Brookings-ICE Long-Term Care Financing Model to evaluate each of these options in terms of affordability, distribution of benefits, and ability to reduce catastrophic out-of-pocket costs. So long as private insurance is aimed at the elderly, its market penetration and ability to finance long-term care will remain scverely limited. Affordability is a major problem. Selling to younger persons could solve the affordability problem, but marketing is extremely difficult. Liberalizing Medicaid could help solve the problems of long-term care, but there is little public support for means-tested programs. Finally, universalistic public insurance programs do well in meeting the goals of longterm care reform, but all social insurance programs are expensive and seem politically infeasible in the current political environment. The way the nation provides for the financing and delivery of long-term care is badly in need of reform. No other part of the health care system generates as much passionate discontent as does long-term care. At the heart of the problem is the absence of any satisfactory way to help people anticipate and pay for long-term care. The disabled elderly find, often to their surprise, that the costs of nursing home and home care are not covered to any significant extent by Medicare or private insurance. Instead, they must rely on their own savings or, failing that, turn to welfare in the form of Medicaid. At a national average cost of $40,000 a year for nursing home care, long-term care is a leading cause of catastrophic out-of-pocket health care costs for the elderly. In addition, despite the strong preferences of the disabled for home and community-based services, current financing is highly skewed toward care in nursing homes. While the debate over long-term care reform has many facets, it is primarily an argument over the relative merits of private- versus publicsector approaches. Differences over how much emphasis to put on each sector partly depend on values that cannot be directly proved or disproved. Some believe that the primary responsibility for care of the elderly belongs with individuals and their families, and that government should act only as a payer of last resort for those unable to provide for themselves. The opposite view is that the government should take the lead in ensuring comprehensive care for all disabled older people, regardless of financial need, by providing comprehensive, compulsory social insurance. In this view, there is little or no role for the private sector. Between these polar positions, many combinations of public and private responsibility are possible.     

Israel's long-term care insurance law after a decade of implementation

Israel's Long-Term Care Insurance (LTCI) law has been in effect for a decade. It is timely to review the effects of this legislation with a view to identifying possible directions for reform and lessons for other countries considering the introduction of a similar social insurance scheme. The paper considers the law's effects in terms of the size and characteristics of the beneficiary population, the coverage of the scheme, its financial standing, the rate of institutionalization of the elderly, the caregiving burden, the service delivery system, and the overall scope of long-term care services for the aged. Israel's experience has lessons for financing arrangements, target efficiency, service delivery arrangements, and the construction of the burden of care.     

Employment-based health benefits: who is offered coverage vs. who takes it

This Issue Brief provides data on employment-based health insurance, with a discussion of recent trends and how sponsorship rates, offer rates, coverage rates, and take-up rates vary for different workers. Other sections examine reasons why workers do not participate in employment-based health plans, alternative sources of health insurance, and uninsured workers. In 1997, 83 percent of the 108.1 million wage and salary workers in the United States were employed by a firm that sponsored a health plan. Of those workers, 75 percent were offered coverage, and 62 percent (or 67.5 million workers) were covered by that plan. Of those workers who worked for an employer that offered them a health plan, 83 percent participated in the plan. Sponsorship rates have barely changed in the last 11 years. In 1988, 83 percent of wage and salary workers reported that their employer sponsored a health plan. This declined slightly to 82 percent in 1993 but had increased to 83 percent by 1997. Offer rates significantly changed between 1988 and 1997. In 1988, 82 percent of workers reported that they were eligible for health insurance through their employer. By 1993, the percentage of eligible workers declined to 74 percent, and it has only slightly increased since then to 75 percent in 1997. In 1997, 40.6 million American workers did not have health insurance through their own job. Forty-five percent of the workers without coverage were employed at a firm where the employer did not provide health insurance to any workers. Thirty-three percent of the workers without coverage were offered coverage but declined it. Twenty-two percent of the workers without coverage were employed in a firm that offered health insurance to some of its workers, but certain workers were not eligible for the health plan. The 13.7 million workers who were offered coverage but declined it gave a number of reasons for doing so. In the majority of cases (61 percent), the worker was covered by another health plan. Of the remainder, 20 percent reported that health insurance was just too costly. Overall, 41 percent of the 40.6 million workers who were not participating in an employment-based health plan through their own employer had coverage through a spouse. However, 42 percent of the 40.6 million workers who declined their employers' health plan or who were not offered health insurance from their employer were uninsured.