公司治理强度、审计力度与审计质量

自安然事件以来,公司治理和外部审计的重要性得到了前所未有的重视.本文构建了一个公司所有者与外部审计师之间的博弈理论模型,以分析均衡状态下公司治理强度、审计力度与审计质量之间的关系,并讨论所有者和审计师赔偿责任对博弈均衡的影响.我们特别引入了公司治理成本函数和审计成本函数,并同时考虑了公司所有者和审计师的赔偿责任.在本模型中,公司所有者对公司治理强度的决策和外部审计师对审计力度的决策共同影响审计报告对外部投资者的信息有用性(即审计质量),并最终影响了公司的成交价格.研究得到的主要结论是:(1)均衡状态下公司治理强度的增加有助于提升审计力度和审计质量;(2)所有者赔偿责任的增加只会提高公司成交价格,但不会影响博弈均衡和均衡状态下的审计质量;(3)审计师赔偿责任的增加并不一定导致所有者降低公司治理强度,且只有在特定情况下才能提升审计力度和审计质量.     

三层委托-代理结构中允许或制止合谋的最优性分析

考察一个由委托人、审计人员和经理组成的三层委托一代理结构,因为审计人员可能是诚实的也可能是不诚实的并且有和经理合谋的倾向,所以委托人必须决定是允许还是制止合谋.无论允许还是制止合谋都是有成本的,通过模型分析和论证得出了一个允许和制止合谋的最优范围并且得到以下结论如果审计人员诚实的概率比较大,委托人应该允许不诚实的审计人员和经理合谋;只要审计人员提供信息的可靠性大于一定的数值,雇佣审计人员对委托人来说总是有用的;当惩罚pm足够高时,允许合谋总是最优的.     

审计合谋生成及治理研究

人们形象地将注册会计师对上市公司财务报告的审计称为防范财务舞弊、保护中小投资者利益的最后一道防线，然而层出不穷的审计合谋警示我们应该重新审视应对审计合谋的策略。本文分析了我国审计市场供求现状，认为审计市场过度竞争是导致审计合谋的重要因素，分析了上市公司经营者与会计人员之间进行合作与举报的动态博弈过程，提出了扶持有实力的事务所进行合并重组，通过奖励会计人员治理审计合谋等建议。     

监察合谋：惩罚、激励与合谋防范

通过一个P-S-A三层代理硬信息模型来分析公共领域的监察合谋行为,重点考察了有成本的合谋惩罚机制对防合谋合约结构的影响.发现防合谋合约并非如既有文献中那样单纯是让渡租金的问题,而是在监察者激励报酬和惩罚机制之间进行权衡的问题:存在一个临界值,如果反合谋成本系数高于这个值,则对监察者支付激励报酬就是必须的;如果反合谋成本系数低于这个值,则没有必要对监察者支付激励报酬.文章还证明,即便防合谋合约是严格的,它对不知情的委托人来说也是有价值的.     

博弈论在计划生育政策执行过程中的应用

计划生育是我国长期坚持的一项基本国策。本文通过基层政府监督与居民超生行为选择之间的动态博弈分析,发现只有基层政府认真监督才能扼制超生行为。又通过基层政府罚款与居民超生行为选择之间的博弈分析,得出限制超生的策略如下:对基层政府采取财政拨款,降低其监督成本,加大认真履行监督职能的奖励和监督不力的惩罚;减少居民超生的超常收益,加大对居民超生的惩罚力度及对居民不超生的奖励力度等结论。     

基于我国中期财务报告的自愿审计动机研究

上市公司的外部审计可分为强制审计和自愿审计.企业自愿聘请外部审计师进行审计,目前主要有3个理论假说:代理假说、信号假说和保险假说.本文利用审计需求理论并结合我国的中报审计制度的背景,分析了我国上市公司的自愿审计动机很可能是企图向财务信息的使用者发送信号,与审计需求的信号假说相符.并提出自愿审计需求并不一定是对高质量审计服务的需求,自愿与否也不是影响审计质量的真正原因,更深层次的原因应当是上市公司的审计动机,上市公司对审计服务质量的需求影响了审计服务质量的供给.     

大型基建工程项目业主等方合谋的博弈分析

本文按照我国的大型基建工程项目建设管理体制,针对大量的业主、施工方和监理方合谋以套取国家资金的现象,利用博弈理论进行了建设各方的博弈分析,提出了各方参与合谋的条件,并得到了合谋行为发生的条件.然后,对如何防止合谋行为的发生,提出了一些制度措施和政策建议.     

企业经营者“道德风险“激励的博弈分析

现代企业因所有权和经营权的分离,企业由众多的股东占有,企业经营者不具有剩余索取权,在这种情况下不可避免地产生委托-代理关系,而且委托人与代理人之间的信息不对称致使股东对经营者的监督难以完全实施.因此,需要一套良好的激励机制,这涉及监督成本问题,而企业对其监督成本的控制受到种种因素的影响.该研究基于博弈理论,借用完全信息静态博弈、完全信息动态博弈、不完全信息静态博弈、不完全信息动态博弈等不同类型模型,分析发现,在完全信息的条件下,经营者不道德的最优选择取决于所有人监督的概率;在不完全信息的条件下,经营者不道德时对所有者采取策略的最佳反应.     

节能减排补贴政策下的企业与政府信号博弈模型

我国对节能减排实施了范围较广的补贴政策。本文在考虑政府节能减排补贴政策的情况下,构建了企业与政府补贴信号博弈模型以分析两方策略的选择机制及影响因素,研究表明:由于信息的不对称性和不完全性,政企博弈将出现市场部分成功、完全成功、完全失败三种均衡,且市场均衡效率受到作假的伪装成本和期望风险成本的影响,故实现市场完全成功均衡的关键条件是提高企业造假的伪装成本和期望风险成本,由此得出相应的解决对策应聚焦于进一步细化政策、标准,并提高检查复查效率、设置较大的惩罚力度、建立基础性数据库等方面;通过对政府与企业合谋情形进行分析,认为建立更全面、多维度的考核指标,发挥社会公众、媒体第三方的质询和监督权可有效约束政企合谋行为。     

所有权、公司治理与财务报表重述

本文选取了2002-2006年间的465家发生了与盈余相关的会计差错更正和1147家未曾发生会计差错更正的非金融上市公司为样本,考察了与盈余相关的会计差错的发生同公司治理的关系,发现在治理会计错报行为方面,证监会所提倡的独立董事制度是有效的,外部独立审计的质量也是保证公司财务信息质量的重要一环,审计委员会的作用内生于其它公司治理机制.此外,外部股东的监管也是降低管理者机会主义行为的有效措施.由于国有控股的公司更可能发生与盈余相关的会计错报现象,所以,应该强制国有企业建立有效的公司治理,提高独立董事在董事会中的比重,保证董事会的独立性,加强外部审计师的监督作用.     

我国上市公司独立审计质量的博弈模型刻画及其分析

本文分析了我国上市公司独立审计中会计师事务所、公司管理当局、独立董事、监管部门在审计行为中的博弈关系,应用博弈经济理论研究了在信息不对称条件下四方互动博弈策略的选择,并针对多方博弈的影响因素提出了提高独立审计质量的策略,以期对改进我国上市公司独立审计质量有所裨益.     

审计在基金会治理中能够有效发挥作用吗?

本文以2005年至2009年中国全国基金会为样本,研究基金会捐赠收入与外部审计师选择之间的关系,即在中国慈善市场上,外部监督机制之一的外部审计是否具有治理效应及治理职能如何有效实现。实证结果表明:当基金会选择百强事务所审计时,能够有效实现审计的治理职能,吸引更多的捐赠者进行捐赠;当基金会选择民政部中标事务所审计时,不能有效实现审计的治理职能,从而不能显著增加捐赠收入。上述结论在一定程度上验证了在慈善市场中,外部审计具有治理效应,其有效治理效应依赖于高质量的审计。     

IPO信息披露与监管的演化博弈分析

注册制下,信息披露是IPO的核心。本文构建以发行人、保荐人和监管者为主体的三方演化博弈模型,研究IPO信息披露过程中参与人的策略选择及其博弈均衡。结果表明：监管者强力监管所获得的激励、保荐人敷衍塞责所受到的惩罚和发行人虚假披露所受到的损失显著地影响博弈均衡;如果监管者强力监管所获得的激励足够充分,或者发行人虚假披露与保荐人失责所受到的惩罚足够严厉,那么发行人将会选择真实披露信息;此外,媒体曝光概率也显著地影响博弈均衡。因此,要提高IPO信息披露质量,就必须设计充分而有效的激励与惩罚机制。     

China's Railway Transportation Safety Regulation System Based on Evolutionary Game Theory and System Dynamics

China's railways were restructured in 2013. The number of regulatory practitioners has decreased significantly, making real-time regulation more difficult. Regulatory transfers from inside to outside the railway industry increases information risks. A more reasonable regulation mechanism is needed. The article considers introducing a public supervision mechanism into the railway transportation safety regulation system, which includes two regulators and one regulatee. As the government regulator, the State Railway Administration (SRA) regulates the safety of China Railway Corporation (CR) and encourages the public to act as supervisors to expose the CR's unsafe production information. To analyze the risks and effectiveness of the system, a multiplayer evolutionary game and system dynamics-based model for railway transportation safety regulation is established. The decision processes of players under different conditions are simulated. The results show that improving the public supervision ratio is conducive to improve the CR's safe production ratio. However, there is no evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in the system. Strategies and evolutionary processes have large fluctuations, which represent high risk. Excessive penalty and reward coefficients can aggravate the amplitude and frequency of fluctuations, causing uncertainty in regulation and making it more difficult to control the actual problems. A dynamic reward and punishment mechanism is proposed to control these fluctuations. The system finally achieves an ESS that results in the lowest regulation investment for the SRA, a safe production ratio for the CR of 95%, and a public supervision ratio of 95.2%. Introducing public supervision and dynamic reward and punishment mechanisms help to stabilize and improve the CR's safe production ratio and to decrease the SRA's regulatory investment.     

第三方国际环境审计下考虑政府监管与公众监督策略选择的演化博弈研究

企业环境行为问题,特别是企业不当的环境行为对环境造成的潜在影响已成为全球迫切需要解决的问题。第三方国际环境审计能够驱动污染企业积极实施绿色环境行为,基于此文章引入第三方国际环境审计,致立于驱动企业环境行为朝着理想的状态演化,基于有限理性假设的条件,构建了政府、污染企业与公众的演化博弈模型,建立三主体的复制动态方程,得到不同情况下政府、企业与公众的演化稳定策略,探索第三方国际环境介入下的三方决策主体的演化路径和规律,进一步揭示第三方国际环境审计的应用价值。最后,通过仿真分析研究影响三主体最终策略选择的因素。研究表明,政府策略选择对企业是否加入第三方国际环境审计、公众是否参与监督企业加入第三方国际环境审计具有引导作用,公众是否监督企业加入第三方国际环境审计影响企业是否加入第三方国际环境审计;政府、企业与公众三主体的最终策略选择不仅与各主体的初始参与比例有关,同时与其余参数的初始值有关。在不同背景下,政府、企业和公众可以通过理性决策和策略选择,使得三方博弈主体的行为选择能够朝着理想方向演化联合有效遏制企业不当的环境行为,为企业绿色环境行为的积极实施提供相应的参考。     

工程质量政府监督多层次利益分配与激励协同机制探究

The implementation of the government supervision of the quality of the project is an international practice. The basic form of government supervision of engineering quality is government supervision on the quality behavior of the engineering main bodies and its results by the competent government department entrusted. Its essence is a dual principal-agent process. The frequent accidents of the engineering quality reflect the loss and failure of the government law enforcement supervision of the engineering quality to some extent. Its root lies in the lack of endogenous power in the law enforcement supervision of the project quality government supervisors in the law enforcement supervision. Therefore, the incentive coordination mechanism of the government supervision based on the multi-level interest distribution is worth explored. In views of the multi-level management system which is formed by the government departments, government quality supervision organizations, quality supervision team (or group) for the government supervision of engineering quality. The benefit distribution function between every party is constructed, and the game model of the multi-level incentive and coordination for the government supervision in engineering quality is built. To solve and deduce from the first stage of the cooperative game and the second stage of the non-cooperative game, the cooperative game can obtain the reward coefficient: . The coordination degree of the best effort can be obtained by the non cooperative game. The result shows that:the coordination degree of government engineering quality supervisor is related to the coordination costs, and had nothing to do with fixed costs. The benefit distribution coefficient not only depends on the efforts of the quality government monitors, but also on the efficiency of other parties' efforts. The quality supervisors of the project will also focus on the coordination with other parties when enhancing their management capabilities to improve the overall performance of project quality government supervision. The strategy of the incentive coordination mechanism for the supervision and cooperation of the project quality government is:the government quality supervision team should set up the supervisory team properly, improve the coordination efficiency and reduce the cost of supervision-coordination to maximize the value of self-motivation. Quality supervision team (or group) should establish the partnership to improve the coordination efficiency for achieving the maximization of their own incentive value.The model and conclusion of incentive synergy mechanism based on multi-level benefit allocation mechanism are researched. It can provide theoretical support and practice reference for the market governance and supervision of general public goods.     

IPO市场中风险投资家策略的演化博弈分析

在IPO市场中,由于风险投资家和外部投资者之间存在事前信息不对称,导致风险资本退出过程中普遍存在逆向选择问题,而声誉的激励效应和监督机制的惩罚效应可以减轻和规避此类问题.运用演化博弈理论与方法,研究了具有有限理性的不同类型风险投资家与外部投资者之间策略选择的互动机制,探讨了声誉的激励效应和监督机制的惩罚效应对不同风险投资家的有效性,及其如何引导和制约风险投资家的策略选择,并给出了相关建议,为解决风险投资中的逆向选择问题提供了理论依据.     

External audit and goodwill write-off

Building on agency theory, we investigate whether and how salient external auditor characteristics (size, audit fees, non-audit fees, tenure) impact on the reported goodwill write-off. We use a sample of US firms applying SFAS 142. We find that Big-4 auditors are more prone to limit underestimated write-offs rather than overestimated write-offs and that auditors require higher fees from companies underestimating the write-offs. The findings are consistent with the auditors’ preference for more conservative goodwill and earnings values, which reduce their litigation and reputation costs. This preference can converge with the managerial interest to use unnecessary overestimated goodwill write-offs for earnings management purposes (e.g. to smooth the income or take big baths). Our findings do not support the hypotheses that non-audit fees and tenure affect the goodwill write-off. Our paper contributes to prior literature on external audit and financial accounting choices. Our study suggests that leniently audited discretional fair value estimates are likely to compromise the role of auditing (and of financial reporting) as an external control mechanism. Our study can contribute to the current policy debate around goodwill accounting.     

Capacity Sharing and Cost Allocation among Independent Firms with Congestion

We analyze the benefit of production/service capacity sharing for a set of independent firms. Firms have the choice of either operating their own production/service facilities or investing in a facility that is shared. Facilities are modeled as queueing systems with finite service rates. Firms decide on capacity levels (the service rate) to minimize delay costs and capacity investment costs possibly subject to service‐level constraints on delay. If firms decide to operate a shared facility they must also decide on a scheme for sharing the capacity cost. We formulate the problem as a cooperative game and identify settings under which capacity sharing is beneficial and there is a cost allocation that is in the core under either the first‐come, first‐served policy or an optimal priority policy. We show that capacity sharing may not be beneficial in settings where firms have heterogeneous work contents and service variabilities. In such cases, we specify conditions under which capacity sharing may still be beneficial for a subset of the firms.