Report of the Global Commission on International Migration

In December 2003, “acting on the encouragement of UN Secretary‐General Kofi Annan,” the Global Commission on International Migration was established as an independent body, consisting of 19 Commissioners co‐chaired by Jan O. Carlsson, former Minister for Migration and Development, Sweden, and Mamphela Ramphele, formerly the World Bank's Managing Director, from South Africa. The mandate of the Commission was to “provide the framework for the formulation of a coherent, comprehensive and global response to the issue of international migration.” The work of the Commission was assisted by a Geneva‐based Secretariat and a “Core Group of States,” eventually including 32 governments from all world regions, that acted as an informal consultative body to the Commission. (The United States, the most important host country to immigrants, was not among the 32.) In October 2005, in New York, the Commission presented its Report to Kofi Annan, the UN member states, and other interested bodies. The Report is also intended as an input to intergovernmental discussion of international migration issues at the UN General Assembly in the Fall of 2006. The Report, an 88‐page document, is accessible at « http://www.gcim.org ». That web site also provides access to extensive background materials on selected topics concerning international migration, regional studies of international migration prepared for the Commission, and reports of the regional hearings, consultations with “stakeholders,” and expert meetings held by the Commission. Reproduced below are three sections of the Report: its Introduction (titled “Dimensions and dynamics of international migration”) and two of its four Annexes: “Principles for Action and Recommendations,” and a compendium of data: “Migration at a glance.” Under the impact of globalization, international migration, long an important element of demographic change as experienced by individual states, has acquired increasing salience in international relations and in domestic politics. National sovereignty in deciding about immigration policy (probably the key determinant of contemporary international migration flows) remains an established principle in international law, subject only to treaty obligations to admit bonafide refugees. Increasingly in recent years, however, demands have surfaced to treat such policies as matters to be decided bilaterally between sending and receiving countries, or even to be regulated by an international or supranational body. (For earlier voices discussing this topic see the Archives section of this issue and the Archives section of the December 1983 issue of PDR:“On the international control of migration.”) Unexpectedly to some observers, the Report of the Global Commission fell short of recommending establishment of a new, WTO‐like, international organization within the UN system with responsibility for international migration. It recommends, instead, steps to be taken toward an Inter‐agency Global Migration Facility. Whether or not such arrangements will materialize and be influential, the Commission clearly sees international migration flows, primarily from less developed to more developed countries, as increasing in the future. While not quantified, this vision contrasts with the assumptions incorporated in the often‐cited projections of the UN Population Division, which envisage future net migratory flows as either constant in size or even decreasing. The Report's argument rests primarily on the perceived economic benefits of migration to both receiving and sending countries, fueled by persisting income differentials and by contrasting demographic configurations between migrants' places of origin and destination. It gives short shrift to arguments that question the economic gains of mass migration to receiving countries, or that see such gains at best as minor and likely to be counterbalanced by noneconomic considerations. Nor does the Report gauge the likelihood that heeding its strictures for a more welcoming treatment of migrants would increase the incentives to migrate.     

An Italian Statement on International Migration

Increasing realization of the implications of persisting below‐replacement fertility in Europe—shrinking absolute numbers combined with a rising proportion of the elderly—is giving new salience to policy considerations regarding immigration in the countries most affected by low fertility. The recent United Nations report on “replacement migration” (see the Documents section in the June 2000 PDR) highlighted the issue through illustrative calculations showing the size of immigrant streams that would be needed for achieving specified demographic targets in selected lowfertility countries, given continuation of present fertility and mortality trends. For example, the UN report suggested that in Italy—which has one of the lowest fertility rates in the world—maintaining a constant population over time would require a net influx of some 12.6 million immigrants during the next 50 years, and maintaining a constant labor forceage population (ages 15–64) would require a net inflow of 18.6 million. Yet immigration policy in Western Europe has become increasingly restrictive during the last quartercentury, and the official policy stance that regulating immigration is strictly within the domain of a country's sovereign right has been assiduously maintained. (International treaty obligations qualify that right in the case of bona fide asylum seekers; however, the definition of that category is also subject to the discretion of the receiving countries.) Thus, although within the European Union national borders are open to EU citizens, the power of regulating immigration from outside the EU is retained by the individual countries rather than subject to EU‐wide decisions. Suggestions coming from the developing countries to follow up the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development with an intergovernmental conference on international migration and development were set aside by the potential immigrant‐receiving countries as overly contentious. A statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy, Lamberto Dini, delivered at the 55th General Assembly of the United Nations, 13 September 2000, may be a sign of a notable shift in official approaches to immigration policy by at least one EU member state. The statement, in a departure from the practice of touching lightly upon a wide range of issues in international affairs, typical in high‐level ministerial speeches given at that UN forum, is devoted essentially to a single topic: international migration. It characterizes migration “between or within continents” as an international problem and advocates “coordinated and integrated” instruments in seeking a solution. It suggests that “today, with a declining birth rate and an aging population, Europe needs a strategy that embraces the complex process of integrating people from different regions of the world.” The rules for international migration, the statement claims, should be set in a global framework, such as provided by the United Nations. In the “age of globalization,”“a solidarity pact is needed to find the best and most effective way of balancing the supply and demand of labor.” With the omission of opening and closing ceremonial passages and a brief comment on the problem of debt relief, the statement is reproduced below.     

International migration: a global challenge

Trends in international migration are presented in this multiregional analysis. Seven of the world's wealthiest countries have about 33% of the world's migrant population, but under 16% of the total world population. Population growth in these countries is substantially affected by the migrant population. The migration challenge is external and internal. The external challenge is to balance the need for foreign labor and the commitment to human rights for those migrants seeking economic opportunity and political freedom. The internal challenge is to assure the social adjustment of immigrants and their children and to integrate them into society as citizens and future leaders. Why people cross national borders and how migration flows are likely to evolve over the next decades are explained. This report also presents some ways that countries can manage migration or reduce the pressures which force people to migrate. It is recommended that receiving nations control immigration by accelerating global economic growth and reducing wars and human rights violations. This report examines the impact of immigration on international trade, aid, and direct intervention policies. Although migration is one of the most important international economic issues, it is not coordinated by an international group. The European experience indicates that it is not easy to secure international cooperation on issues that affect national sovereignty. It is suggested that countries desiring control of their borders should remember that most people never cross national borders to live or work in another country, that 50% of the world's migrants move among developing countries, and that countries can shift from being emigration to immigration countries. The author suggests that sustained reductions in migration pressure are a better alternative than the "quick fixes" that may invite the very much feared mass and unpredictable movements.     

A Gendered Assessment of Highly Skilled Emigration

Although women form a large and increasing proportion of international migrants, women's mobility has generally been overlooked in the literature. Quantifying and characterizing female migration should lead to a better understanding of the forces that shape international migration. We build an original data set providing gender‐disaggregated indicators of international migration by educational attainment for 195 source countries in 1990 and 2000. We find that women represent an increasing share of the immigration stock in the OECD countries and exhibit higher skilled emigration rates than men.     

当今永久性国际人口迁移现状及其特点

永久性国际移民是国际人口迁移的重要组成部分。与其他几类国际人口迁移相比 ,永久性国际移民具有移民的合法性和在移入国居住时间的长久性。从移民分布看 ,北美洲和大洋洲一直是永久性国际移民的主要目的地。 80年代末以后 ,欧洲一些国家也相继变成了大批永久性移民的目的地。从移民特点看 ,90年代初曾是宗教回归和民族回归移民的高潮时期 ;而传统移民国家则以接受家庭团聚移民为主。对于所有移民国家 ,他们均对技术移民和投资移民表示欢迎     

The UN Population Division on Replacement Migration

The most salient demographic trend pictured by the influential set of population projections prepared by the Population Division of the United Nations (a unit in the UN's Department of Economic and Social Affairs) is the continuing substantial increase—albeit at a declining rate—of the global population during the coming decades. According to the “medium” variant of the most recent (1998) revision of these projections, between 2000 and 2050 the expected net addition to the size of the world population will be some 2.85 billion, a figure larger than that of the total world population as recently as the mid‐1950s. All of this increase will occur in the countries currently classified as less developed; in fact, as a result of their anticipated persistent below‐replacement levels of fertility, the more developed regions as a whole would experience declining population size beginning about 2020, and would register a net population loss of some 33 million between 2000 and 2050. A report prepared by the UN Population Division and released on 21 March 2000 addresses some of the implications of the changes in population size and age structure that low‐fertility countries will be likely to experience. The 143‐page report, issued under the eyecatching title Replacement Migration: Is It a Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations?, highlights the expected magnitude of these changes by the imaginative device of answering three hypothetical questions. The answer to each of these questions is predicated on the assumption that some specified demographic feature of various country or regional populations would be maintained at the highest level that feature would exhibit, in the absence of international migration, in the United Nations' medium population projections (as revised in 1998) during the period 1995–2050. The selected demographic features are total population size, the size of the working‐age population (15–64 years), and the so‐called potential support ratio: the ratio of the working‐age population to the old‐age population (65 years and older). The illustrative device chosen for accomplishing the specified feats of preserving the selected demographic parameters (i.e., keeping them unchanged up to 2050 once their highest value is attained) is international migration. Hence the term “replacement migration.” Given the low levels of fertility and mortality now prevailing in the more developed world (and specifically in the eight countries and the two overlapping regions for which the numerical answers to the above questions are presented in the report), and given the expected future evolution of fertility and mortality incorporated in the UN population projections, the results are predictably startling. The magnitudes of the requisite compensatory migration streams tend to be huge relative both to current net inmigration flows and to the size of the receiving populations; least so in the case of the migration needed to maintain total population size and most so in the case of migration needed to counterbalance population aging by maintaining the support ratio. Reflecting its relatively high fertility and its past and current record of receiving a large influx of international migrants, the United States is a partial exception to this rule. But even for the US to maintain the support ratio at its highest—year 1995—level of 5.21 would require increasing net inmigration more than tenfold. The country, the report states, would have to receive 593 million immigrants between 1995 and 2050, or a yearly average of 10.8 million. The extreme case is the Republic of Korea, where the exercise calls for maintaining a support ratio of 12.6. To satisfy this requirement, Korea, with a current population of some 47 million, would need 5.1 billion immigrants between 1995 and 2050, or an average of 94 million immigrants per year. (In the calculations, the age and sex distribution of migrants is assumed to be the same as that observed in the past in the main immigration countries. The fertility and mortality of immigrants are assumed to be identical with those of the receiving population.) The “Executive Summary” of the report is reproduced below, with the permission of the United Nations. Chapters of the full report set out the issues that prompted the exercise; provide a selective review of the literature; explain the methodology and the assumptions underlying the calculations; and present the detailed results for the eight countries and two regions selected for illustrative purposes. A brief discussion of the implications of the findings concludes the report. As is evident even from the figures just cited, immigration is shown to be at best a modest potential palliative to whatever problems declining population size and population aging are likely to pose to low‐fertility countries. The calculations, however, vividly illustrate that demographic changes will profoundly affect society and the economy, and will require adjustments that remain inadequately appreciated and assessed. The criteria specified in the UN calculations—maintenance of particular demographic parameters at a peak value—of course do not necessarily have special normative significance. Past demographic changes, with respect notably to the age distribution as well as population size, have been substantial, yet they have been successfully accommodated under circumstances of growing prosperity in many countries. But the past may be an imperfect guide in confronting the evolving dynamics of low‐fertility populations. As the report convincingly states, the new demographic challenges will require comprehensive reassessments of many established economic and social policies and programs.     

The impact of international migration upon the timing of marriage and childbearing

Experiences of 1500 native-born Australians and 1000 foreign-born immigrants to Australia, surveyed in Melbourne in 1971, reveal that immigration delayed marriage for migrants arriving between age 15 and marriage, and delayed first, second, third and fourth births for immigrants arriving during each birth interval. This migration effect was clearly finite in its influence, affecting only proximate vital events rather than persisting through several successive events. The temporary nature of the migration effect highlights the adaptability of international migrants.     

A Profile of the World's Young Developing Country International Migrants

Individual‐level census and household survey data are used to present a rich profile of young developing country international migrants around the world. They are found to comprise a large share of the flow of migrants, particularly among migrants to other developing countries, with the age distribution of migrants peaking in the late teens or early twenties. Detailed data are presented on the age and sex composition of migrants, on whether young migrants move alone or with a parent or spouse, on their participation in schooling and work in the destination country, on the types of jobs they have, and on the incidence and age of return migration. The results suggest a high degree of commonality in the youth immigrant experience across a number of destination countries. Recent developing country young migrants tend to work in similar occupations and are more concentrated in these occupations than recent older migrants or young immigrants who arrived at an earlier age. Nevertheless, there is also considerable heterogeneity among young immigrants with respect to school attendance and work in their destination country. The potential of international migration for building human capital is significant but far from being fully used.     

Should International Migration Be Encouraged to Offset Population Aging? A Cross-Country Analysis of Public Attitudes in Europe

Concerns about population aging in Europe have occupied the attention of policy makers and demographers for over a decade. Some policy makers have proposed increased immigration to offset the aging of the population (i.e., replacement migration). However, demographers have estimated that a very high (and likely untenable) level of immigration would be required, and little is known about whether the national publics of Europe would support international migration as a potential solution to population aging. Using Eurobarometer data from 2006 and concurrent country-level measures from Eurostat, this study examines individual- and contextual-level factors related to public attitudes toward immigration as an effective solution to the problem of population aging in the current 27 member countries of the European Union. Results from multilevel logit analyses indicate that urban, university-educated, and childless individuals are consistently more likely than others to endorse replacement migration. Countries with more prosperous economies and proportionally fewer foreign-born residents also show more supportive attitudes. Such results echo research on anti-immigrant sentiment, suggesting considerable public resistance to population policies that might encourage large-scale immigration. At the same time, these findings show consistent patterns of endorsement despite demographers’ criticism of the concept of replacement migration and concerns about developing alternative long-term strategies.     

Paul Fauchille on the Rights of Emigration and Immigration

International migration is squarely on the present‐day agenda of the international community, as attested by the newly released report of the Global Commission on International Migration (see the Documents section of this issue) and by recurrent controversy over proposals to establish a migration analogue to the World Trade Organization. Conventional assumptions about the prerogatives of national sovereignty come up against universalist views of human rights, the logic of globalization, and, in some measure, the regulative ambitions of international organizations. The last period in which this subject aroused comparable ferment was in the 1920s. At that time the main sources of migrants were not countries of the global “South” but self‐described overpopulated countries in Europe. In May 1924 one such country, Italy, convened what became known as the First International Emigration and Immigration Conference. Held in Rome, the meeting was attended by delegates from 57 countries and the League of Nations. Among its resolutions was an “Emigrants' Charter,” recognizing rights to emigrate and immigrate but with strong provisos. Thus the right to immigrate was subject to restrictions “imposed for economic and social reasons based in particular on the state of the labour market and the necessity of safeguarding the hygienic and moral interests of the country of immigration” (see the Notes on Migration section in Industrial and Labour Information [Geneva], Vol. XI, July‐Sept. 1924, pp. 54–68). A more systematic discussion of these putative rights appeared in an article published a few months earlier by a prominent French jurist, Paul Fauchille, which is excerpted below. The rights to emigrate and to immigrate are seen as broad and fairly symmetrical, able to be limited by a state only by appeal to its own right of self‐preservation. Circumscribing the right to emigrate may seem dated in the light of the blanket provision in Article 13 of the (1948) Universal Declaration of Human Rights that “everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.” (In Fauchille's extreme case, a state can seek to prohibit the wholesale flight of its population.) However, on immigration, about which the Universal Declaration is silent, “self‐preservation” yields a longer list of grounds for restriction. An issue with contemporary resonance is whether those grounds can include the wish by a state “to prevent a fusion of races which might alter its ethnic character or obliterate its national culture.” Restriction on such a basis would be justified, says Fauchille, only where the intending migrants “belonged to an absolutely different civilisation” and were large in number. Paul Fauchille (1858–1926) was an expert in international law, author of the four‐volume Traité de Droit International Public (8th ed., Paris, 1921–26). He was the founding editor of Revue générale du droit international public and founding director (from 1921) of the Institut des Hautes Études Internationales within the University of Paris. The excerpt below is the major part (subtitled “State and Individual Rights in Theory”) of Fauchille's article “The rights of emigration and immigration,” which appeared in the International Labour Review (Geneva), vol. IX, no. 3 (March 1924), pp. 317–333.     

The impact of U.S. immigration upon internal migration

The potential adverse effect of immigrants on job opportunities for natives continues to influence debate about immigration policy in the United States. Many studies have examined wage and employment outcomes; by contrast, we examine internal migration. We ask whether or not natives are more likely to depart from or less likely to move to metropolitan areas with high concentrations of immigrants. After controlling for other influences on migration, we find that metropolitan areas with higher concentrations of immigrants have only slightly lower rates of inmigration of natives. Such metropolitan areas also exhibit slightly lower rates of out-migration, contrary to expectation. These results suggest that the effect of immigrants on labor market redistribution of natives is modest.Research reported here was supported by a grant from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. We would like to thank Kofi Benefo for helpful comments.     

Elder Care and Migrant Labor in Europe: A Demographic Outlook

This article examines the demand for migrant labor in older‐adult care as one of the key aspects of the aging and migration nexus. It reviews the demographic determinants that have shaped demand for and provision of older‐adult care across Europe. Using the EU Labour Force Survey, new comparative estimates are generated on the employment of migrants in care occupations and the channels of entry into the European labor market. Projections on demand for and supply of care to the older population reveal a future gap in both formal and informal provision. It is shown that, owing to institutional, economic, and social constraints, the significant growth of the care workforce that will be required to meet the future needs of Europe's aging populations is unlikely to be achieved by relying exclusively on EU labor supply. The conclusions outline some implications for future immigration policies.     

Prospects for international migration: Globalization and its discontents

The paper challenges the view that the late twentieth century is the ‘age of migration’. For developing countries, flows of out-migrants are small compared with population growth, although in developed countries the stock of immigrants increased in proportion to the total population between 1965 and 1990. Despite the importance of refugee movement, the main force for international migration is economic. Why do not more people migrate (internally and internationally) to take advantage of potential economic gains? For international migration, one deterrent is institutional barriers against uncontrolled immigration. Different interest groups stand to gain or lose from increased migration. The income-enhancing effects of unhindered international labour migration, measured jointly for sending and receiving countries and by extension globally, should be very large. Even partial liberalization of immigration to industrialized countries would serve developing countries well. In industrialized countries, however, there is concern about the effect of massive labour inflows on the ethnic, religious and cultural composition of the population and its social cohesion. In some countries, migration is leading to greater ethnic mingling; in others there is a recrudescence of nationalistic aspirations for independent statehood with ethnically homogeneous populations, or to preserve the advantages of economically successful subregions.     

Explaining the Immigrant Health Advantage: Self-selection and Protection in Health-Related Factors Among Five Major National-Origin Immigrant Groups in the United States

Despite being newcomers, immigrants often exhibit better health relative to native-born populations in industrialized societies. We extend prior efforts to identify whether self-selection and/or protection explain this advantage. We examine migrant height and smoking levels just prior to immigration to test for self-selection; and we analyze smoking behavior since immigration, controlling for self-selection, to assess protection. We study individuals aged 20–49 from five major national origins: India, China, the Philippines, Mexico, and the Dominican Republic. To assess self-selection, we compare migrants, interviewed in the National Health and Interview Surveys (NHIS), with nonmigrant peers in sending nations, interviewed in the World Health Surveys. To test for protection, we contrast migrants’ changes in smoking since immigration with two counterfactuals: (1) rates that immigrants would have exhibited had they adopted the behavior of U.S.-born non-Hispanic whites in the NHIS (full “assimilation”); and (2) rates that migrants would have had if they had adopted the rates of nonmigrants in sending countries (no-migration scenario). We find statistically significant and substantial self-selection, particularly among men from both higher-skilled (Indians and Filipinos in height, Chinese in smoking) and lower-skilled (Mexican) undocumented pools. We also find significant and substantial protection in smoking among immigrant groups with stronger relative social capital (Mexicans and Dominicans).     

Development and International Migration: The Effect of Income on Regular and Irregular Migration Intentions to Europe

In recent years, the development-migration debate has re-gained popularity in policy circles, especially after the so-called “migration crisis” in Europe and the following approval of the European Agenda on Migration. Much of the empirical literature supports the idea that the relationship between international migration and incomes at origin follows hump-shaped patterns. A growing number of studies find that increasing economic development and financial resources in developing countries would allow a greater number of individuals to afford the costs of emigrating. However, this evidence heavily relies on measures of regular migration only. Using nationally representative data from 12 Middle East and North Africa countries, this study adopts a multinomial logit model to frame migration intentions, distinguishing between regular and irregular routes. The main finding is that the level of household income is associated negatively with the demand for irregular migration to Europe. Predictive margins clearly show that higher household incomes increase the probability of planning only regular migration, while decreasing that of considering also irregular migration. The policy implications are not negligible: improving economic conditions in countries of origin may be effective at deflecting migrants from irregular to regular routes.     

Educational selectivity in U.S. Immigration: How do immigrants compare to those left behind?

Current immigration research has revealed little about how immigrants compare to those who do not migrate. Although most scholars agree that migrants are not random samples of their home countries' populations, the direction and degree of educational selectivity is not fully understood. This study of 32 U.S. immigrant groups found that although nearly all immigrants are more educated than those who remain in their home countries, immigrants vary substantially in their degree of selectivity, depending upon the origin country and the timing of migration. Uncovering patterns of immigrant selectivity reveals the fallacy in attributing immigrants' characteristics to national groups as a whole and may help explain socioeconomic differences among immigrant groups in the United States.     

International migration of professionals

Abstract Using chiefly data published by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service this paper presents a statistical summary of the trends in professional immigration into the United States. The proportion of immigrants who are professionals has been steadily increasing during recent decades, and change in immigration laws produced a sharper increase since 1965. The second trend of importance is the increasing proportion of professional immigrants who come from the less developed nations of the world. The effects of immigration on American science and medicine are discussed. Important benefits appear to have accrued to the U.S. The effects on the countries of origin are less beneficial. Finally, the reasons behind the migration of professionals are discussed.     

社会排斥视角下移民问题研究：理论发展与欧洲实践

20世纪80年代以来无论是走向统一的欧盟还是正在加速进入城市化和工业化轨道的中国,都经历着大规模的人口迁移,并引起广泛的学术界讨论。已有的研究对人口迁移的动因、方向、迁移的人口学特征、劳动力市场重组等问题进行了详尽的阐述;然而关于迁移人口的社会排斥问题分析还较少。本文系统地回顾了关于人口迁移与社会排斥的研究,以期对我国内部迁移的研究提供新的研究视野。本文主要分为四个部分。第一部分回顾欧盟人口迁移的历史背景以及移民危机的产生;第二部分提出迁移背景下的社会排斥问题;第三部分从劳动力市场和福利国家两个角度分析了迁移人口社会排斥的机制与特点;最后一部分是结论和启示。     

Migration as Development: Household Survey Evidence on Migrants’ Wage Gains

The study of the effects of migration on migrants themselves has not garnered nearly as much attention within the recent international migration literature as other topics, such as motives for migration, the effects of immigration on receiving countries, and the effects of emigration on countries of origin. Focusing instead on these effects on migrants themselves, an issue of primary importance to the discussion of international migration, I present novel data collected through household interviews in communities both in Mexico and the United States. Data gathered using an ethnosurvey approach, combining the techniques of ethnographic fieldwork with representative survey sampling in order to collect both quantitative and qualitative data, permit a careful comparison of absolute and relative wage gains for interviewees with data from existing Mexican surveys. Key findings include: (1) upon crossing the border, even given the cost of migration, migrants indeed stand to collect large net absolute gains, average incomes increasing more than fivefold immediately; (2) relative gains are large, many migrants moving from the lower deciles of origin wage distributions to the top deciles; and (3) average gains accruing to migrants surpass those of even the most successful current programs of economic development. In turn, these findings verify the importance of including consideration for the migrants themselves in any ongoing discussions of how to construct effective migration policy around the world.