Commitment and weakness of will in game theory and neoclassical economics

This paper draws on theoretical and experimental studies in game theory and on the neoclassical concept of intertemporal inconsistency in choice to argue that the motivational theory shared by neoclassical economics and noncooperative game theory is mistaken in assuming that commitment never takes place in human decisions. The paper first gives two parallel examples, one of intertemporal inconsistency in a financial decision, and the other of noncooperative (subgame perfect) equilibrium in a game in extensive form. So far as one decision-maker is concerned, the two decisions are isomorphic, and both can be associated with weakness of will. By contrast, the cooperative analysis of the game (along the lines originally suggested by von Neumann and Morgenstern) predicts a different decision associated with commitment to a particular conditional sequence of “behavior strategies”, i.e. a particular pure strategy. In effect the cooperative analysis assumes perfect strength of will. The paper then argues that strength of will and rationality of decisions are independent dimensions of a decision process and reviews some experimental evidence that suggests that both traditions are mistaken in their extreme assumptions about commitment or strength of will: neoclassical economics and noncooperative game theory in assuming that commitment never takes place, and cooperative game theory in assuming that it always does. The evidence indicates moreover that commitment is more likely in at least one context of value judgments than in its absence. The value context is reciprocity. It is suggested that a focus of research on the circumstances that favor commitment – rather than on modifications of an assumed utility function to accommodate non-self-regarding motivations – might lead to a more fruitful behavioral economics and behavioral game theory.     

The Presentation of Self: Dramaturgical Theory and Generations in Organizations

While interest in intergenerational phenomena has been growing in organizations, academic research in the field of organizational studies has questioned the existence of generational differences. However, despite this questioning, generational stereotypes are known and enacted in the workplace. Using a dramaturgical approach as suggested by Goffman (1959), the purpose of this theory article is to advocate a simple model of generational stereotype reinforcement in organizations in which individuals enact (or do not enact) prototypical generational traits and behaviors when doing so allows them to appear in a positive light to a particular generational group.     

Trust,Social Capital,and the Coordination of Relationships Between the Members of Cooperatives: A Comparison Between Member-Focused Cooperatives and Third-Party-Focused Cooperatives

In recent years, nonprofit scholars have increasingly studied the phenomenon of social enterprises which has become a generic term describing a wider reorientation among third sector organizations. The emergence of social enterprises has also led to a dynamic of hybridization and broadening in the cooperative sector, similar to an earlier dynamic of “economization”, but this time on the other end of the organizational spectrum. This paper aims at developing a fine-grained conceptual understanding of how this organizational dynamic is shaped in terms of member coordination, thus contributing to a more comprehensive theoretical understanding of different organizational forms of cooperatives. Specifically, to highlight the difference to traditional member-focused cooperatives, the paper introduces the term third-party-focused cooperatives for those social enterprises which emphasize economic goals as well as control and ownership by a particular community (typically place-based). The key result of the paper is that with the shift from member- to community-focus in cooperatives, the main coordination mechanism becomes one of norm-based trust on the basis of generalized reciprocity. In contrast to traditional maxim-based trust member coordination on the basis of relation-specific reciprocity, this enables third-party-focused cooperatives to mobilize bridging and linking social capital, facilitating collective action aimed towards the community interest. The findings suggest that this identity shift requires a mutual re-positioning between the cooperative and the nonprofit sector, in terms of umbrellas as well as regulatory and legislative bodies.     

Producing and Reducing Gender Inequality in A Worker‐Recovered Cooperative

Decades of feminist scholarship documents the persistence of gender inequality in work organizations. Yet few studies explicitly examine gender inequality in collectivist organizations like worker cooperatives. This article draws on the “theory of gendered organizations” to consider how gender operates in a worker‐recovered cooperative in contemporary Argentina. Based on ethnographic and archival research in Hotel B.A.U.E.N., this article finds that although gender remains a salient feature of the workplace, the cooperative has also adopted policies that take steps toward addressing gender inequality. It concludes by offering an updated theoretical framework for the future study of “gendered organizations.”     

Rethinking incentive problems in cooperative organizations

Many students of cooperative organizations have underscored that cooperatives are plagued by substantial incentive problems, so that members do not bear the full impact of their individual choices. It is argued that incentive problems are inherent in the cooperative form. I claim that the critique needs further clarification. The idea to be advanced here is that the validity of the critique raised from agency theory and property right theory rest with their ex ante assumptions about the nature of cooperative membership. The pivotal point is whether members are essentially ascribed the properties, reasoning and strategies of a rational investor or a rational user.     

The partnered core of a game with side payments

An outcome of a game is partnered if there are no asymmetric dependencies between any two players. For a cooperative game, a payoff is in the partnered core of the game if it is partnered, feasible and cannot be improved upon by any coalition of players. We show that the relative interior of the core of a game with side payments is contained in the partnered core. For quasi-strictly convex games the partnered core coincides with the relative interior of the core. When there are no more than three partnerships, the sums of the payoffs to partnerships are constant across all core payoffs. When there are no more than three players, the partnered core satisfies additional properties. We also illustrate our main result for coalition structure games.     

A noncooperative marriage model with remarriage

I propose a noncooperative marriage model that explicitly accommodates the possibility of endogenous exit and remarriage, and where marriages are of variable quality. The fundamental innovation is that the remarriage decision is infinitely repeated and the problem is fully stationary, reflecting the contemporary reality in marriage markets. I show that cooperative behavior within marriage is possible in subgame perfect equilibrium both in a setting where marriage quality is independently drawn and in a setting with persistent spouse-specific characteristics and an evolving marriage market quality. I show that spouses engage in cooperative behavior most easily when they have intermediate patience levels, which is a non-standard but intuitive game theoretic result in this setting. This model also contributes to the game theory literature by proposing another avenue for sustained cooperation in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma with endogenous exit: randomness in payoff streams.     

浅析博弈论在商务谈判中的应用

由于商务谈判活动中冲突与合作性并存的特点,导致博弈论在商务谈判中得到广泛应用。非合作博弈理论更多体现在谈判双方对各自获得的最大利益的争夺上,而合作博弈则在谈判双方合作共赢并对共同利益的分配问题上有广泛应用。     

Reconstructing Granovetter's network theory

We employ concepts from graph theory and cooperative game theory to reconstruct Granovetter's famous thesis concerning ‘the strength of weak ties’. In contrast to existing formal models related to this thesis, our approach captures the mechanisms Granovetter invokes in the derivation of his thesis. Notably, our model allows for an analytical distinction between the strength of ties and the value of ties – a distinction empirical research on the labor market has shown to be of great importance. We use our model to test the theoretical validity of Granovetter's thesis and to evaluate its robustness if implicit assumptions in Granovetter's argumentation are dropped.     

Du Pont and Greenpeace: The Dynamics of Conflict Between Corporations and Activist Groups

Public relations makes organizations more effective by building relationships with stakeholders in the environment that have the potential to constrain or enhance the mission of the organization. When stakeholders become activist groups, they become particularly troublesome to organizations because they appeal to the media, government, and other stakeholders to force the organization to change when the organization's response does not satisfy them. Few public relations practitioners have found successful strategies for dealing with activists, but this research on the conflict between Greenpeace and Du Pont suggests that Axelrod's (1984) concept of "Tit for Tat" games from game theory may be effective. Conflicts are resolved most efficiently when the participants develop compatible ground rules. In our case history, however, Du Pont and Greenpeace used incompatible approaches to dispute resolution, dictated by their constituencies. As a result, there was little hope that the two sides could agree on ground rules for discussing the conflict, much less for resolving the issues. Although Du Pont used a "Tit for Tat" strategy in the conflict, Greenpeace followed a pure zero-sum model that hampered its effectiveness in fostering change. We conclude that both parties may have met their objectives by not resolving the conflict in the end.     

The Social Economy in Bolivia: Indigeneity,Solidarity, and Alternatives to Capitalism

The social economy (SE) is alternatively conceptualized as a third sector (between the private and public sector); or by a typology of the organizations involved (such as cooperatives, non-profit organizations and social enterprises); or by the principles and values driving such activities (such as cooperation, mutual benefit, and democracy). One important consideration is often overlooked, namely that the SE emerges in different forms and with varied emphases depending on location. The SE is ‘place-based’—rooted in specific geographic, historical, cultural, and socioeconomic settings. This article explores the conceptualization of the SE in the Bolivian context from the perspective of government and civil society actors. The research took place after the country recognized the importance of the social, cooperative and community economy in their new constitution and found that the understanding of the SE in Bolivia relates strongly to the country’s indigenous and colonial heritage.     

The Chilean economic miracle revisited

This article examines some basic principles of socioeconomics and communitarianism as exhibited in the case of Chile. The socioeconomic hypothesis o of primary concern is the argument that the market economy functions best when contained within a properly structured social capsule. The communitarian hypothesis of principal interest is that, in purely Humean terms, modern societies achieve “refinement” when they possess a strong network of community organizations which compete for dominance over the political system without undermining the fragile democratic rules of the game.Chile is used as a case study for two reasons. First, between 1965 and 1995 it experienced two extremes of socioeconomic organization and then achieved what appears to be a viable balance. Second, Chile is often cited as an example of the superiority of the neoliberal approach over the more balanced approach of socioeconomics. The article concludes that Chile's experience provides stronger support for the socioeconomic and communitarian views than for the neoliberal model.     

Sequential legislative lobbying

In this paper, we analyze the equilibrium of a sequential game-theoretical model of lobbying, due to Groseclose and Snyder (Am Polit Sci Rev 90:303–315, 1996), describing a legislature that vote over two alternatives, where two opposing lobbies compete by bidding for legislators’ votes. In this model, the lobbyist moving first suffers from a second mover advantage and will make an offer to a panel of legislators only if it deters any credible counter-reaction from his opponent, i.e., if he anticipates to win the battle. This paper departs from the existing literature in assuming that legislators care about the consequence of their votes rather than their votes per se. Our main focus is on the calculation of the smallest budget that the lobby moving first needs to win the game and on the distribution of this budget across the legislators. We study the impact of the key parameters of the game on these two variables and show the connection of this problem with the combinatorics of sets and notions from cooperative game theory.     

Climate Change Counter Movement Neutralization Techniques: A Typology to Examine the Climate Change Counter Movement

The Climate Change Counter Movement has been a topic of interest for social scientists and environmentalists for the past 25 years (Dunlap and McCright, 2015). This research uses the sociology of crime and deviance to analyze the numerous arguments used by climate change counter movement organizations. Content analysis of 805 statements made by climate change counter movement organizations reveals that the theory Techniques of Neutralization (Sykes and Matza, American Sociological Review 22(6):664, 1957) can help us better understand the arguments adopted by these organizations. Taking two observations from two time points, the author examine not only the composition of the messaging adopted by Climate Change Counter Movement (CCCM) organization, but how these messages have changed over time. In all, there were 1,435 examples of CCCM neutralization techniques adopted by CCCM organizations across these two points in time. This examination of the movement provides valuable insight into the CCCM and the subsequent environmental harm that is partly facilitated by their actions.     

Succession planning in nonprofit organizations

Executive leadership is a critical component in the success of nonprofit organizations. An upcoming period of leadership transition is anticipated as substantial numbers of baby boomers, now at the peak of their careers, reach retirement age. With nonprofit organizations growing in both size and number, an impending leadership deficit is a concern. To help prepare for these important transition events, this study focuses on planning for executive succession. A survey exploring details of succession planning was undertaken of executive directors of 501(c)(3) charitable nonprofits and CEOs of 501(c)(4) cooperative organizations—the more business‐oriented user‐owned and controlled nonprofit organizations prominent in agricultural, utility, and finance sectors. We found that planning and preparation do not match the level of interest and concern for executive succession. Although the replacement of long‐serving leaders is acknowledged as difficult, few proactive steps are undertaken.     

SIMULTANEOUS DECISION‐MAKING IN COMPETITIVE AND COOPERATIVE ENVIRONMENTS

We experimentally investigate simultaneous decision‐making in two contrasting environments: one that encourages competition (lottery contest) and one that encourages cooperation (public good game). We find that simultaneous participation in the public good game affects behavior in the contest, decreasing sub‐optimal overbidding. Contributions to the public good are not affected by participation in the contest. The direction of behavioral spillover is explained by differences in strategic uncertainty and path‐dependence across games. Our design allows us to compare preferences for cooperation and competition. We find that in early periods, there is a negative correlation between decisions in competitive and in cooperative environments. (JEL C72, C91)     

Social dilemmas: When self-control benefits cooperation

Individuals in a social dilemma may experience a self-control conflict between urges to act selfishly and their better judgment to cooperate. Pairing a public goods game with a subtle framing technique, we test whether perception of self-control conflict strengthens the association between self-control and cooperation. Consistent with our hypothesis, cooperative behavior is positively associated with self-control in the treatment that raised the relative likelihood of perceiving conflict, but not associated with self-control in the treatment that lowered the likelihood. These results indicate that it is important to understand the role of self-control in cooperation.     

SUSTAINABILITY OF THE FRIEDMAN RULE IN AN INTERNATIONAL MONETARY POLICY GAME

This article develops a two-country monetary economy model in order to analyze the international monetary policy game between governments and the domestic monetary policy game between each government and its private sector. We prove that if governments can commit to their own private sectors, the cooperative equilibrium of the game between governments is for them to follow the Friedman rule. When governments lack such ability to commit, we find that the Friedman rule is more likely to be sustained in our open-economy model than in the closed-economy model of Ireland. ( JEL E31, E52, E61)     

新世纪中国对中东产油国的石油外交

石油需求在中国能源发展中以不以人们意志为转移的方式增长。中国的石油外交也成为新世纪中国外交的主旋律。中东石油在中国海外油源中占有特殊地位，中国非常重视发展与中东产油国的能源合作关系。国家利益是国际关系中驱动国家互动的最基本要素，中国石油外交最重要的考量亦是国家利益，中国对中东产油国的石油外交具有政治与经济利益相辅相成、互动互利的特点。石油对中国经济持续高速增长极为重要，“石油经济”成为中国经济持续增长的关键，由此凸现了石油外交对中国经济发展的重要性。     

美国与沙特准联盟外交的理论与实证研究

二战结束以来，美国与沙特特殊关系的构建主要依靠准联盟外交，这类外交具有合作载体的非正式性、解决任务的选择性、合作手段的灵活性和战略指向的模糊性等特点。美沙准联盟外交的形成具有国际层面、国家层面和单元内部层面三重原因，双方的安全共同体和利益共同体意识强化了准联盟外交。“9·11”事件后，美国在海湾地区由依靠沙特转向依靠海合会其他成员，其准联盟外交战略呈现多元化趋势；沙特则积极利用欧盟、俄罗斯、中国和印度等来平衡美国的影响力。美沙各自外交战略的调整使美沙准联盟暗藏危机。