Planet earth 1984-2034: a demographic vision

In recognition of 1984 as the year of both Orwell's famous futuristic novel and the International Population Conference following up the 1974 World Population Conference, this Bulletin examines the current state of world population and presents the author's speculations on what it might be 50 years from now. World population, now close to 4.8 billion and growing at 1.8%/year, is being shaped by 3 demographic phenomena: prolonged below-replacement fertility in developed nations, perhaps partly in response to the reduced need for workers in the emerging information era; rapid growth despite failing fertility in developing nations, due to earlier rapid mortality decline; and rapid urbanization in developing nations and unprecedented migration from poor to better-off nations. The author's assumptions for nondemographic factors related to population change in the next 50 years are no world war, nuclear or otherwise; global resource adequacy; rapid scientific and technological progress shared equitably; and the demise of capitalism and communism and greatly increased economic aid from advanced to less advanced nations. For 2034 the author envisages nations divided into service/information societies (4% of global population) where immigration balances low fertility to prevent population decline; industrialized nations (38% of total), with fertility close to or at replacement level and growth slowing; developing nations (43%), in sight of replacement level fertility; and least developed nations, with still critical demographic problems but only 15% of the world population. Total population will be 8.03 billion, but growth will be down to 0.8%/year and global zero growth is possible in another 50 years. This relatively optimistic scenario for 2034 will only be possible if mankind acts to see that the stated nondemographic assumptions are borne out.     

World population beyond six billion

This world report reviews population growth pre-1900, population change during 1900-50 and 1950-2000, causes and effects of population change and projections to 2050. World population grew from 2 billion in 1900 to almost 6 billion in 2000. Population showed more rapid growth in the 17th and 18th centuries. Better hygiene and public sanitation in the 19th century led to expanded life expectancies and quicker growth, primarily in developed countries. Demographic transition in the 19th and 20th centuries was the result of shifts from high to low mortality and fertility. The pace of change varies with culture, level of economic development, and other factors. Not all countries follow the same path of change. The reproductive revolution in the mid-20th century and modern contraception led to greater individual control of fertility and the potential for rapid fertility decline. Political and cultural barriers that limit access affect the pace of decline. Population change is also affected by migration. Migration has the largest effect on the distribution of population. Bongaarts explains differences in fertility by the proportion in unions, contraceptive prevalence, infertility, and abortion. Educational status has a strong impact on adoption of family planning. Poverty is associated with multiple risks. In 2050, population could reach 10.7 billion or remain low at 7.3 billion.     

Declining world fertility: trends,causes, implications

This Bulletin examines the evidence that the world's fertility has declined in recent years, the factors that appear to have accounted for the decline, and the implications for fertility and population growth rates to the end of the century. On the basis of a compilation of estimates available for all nations of the world, the authors derive estimates which indicate that the world's total fertility rate dropped from 4.6 to 4.1 births per woman between 1968 and 1975, thanks largely to an earlier and more rapid and universal decline in the fertility of less developed countries (LDCs) than had been anticipated. Statistical analysis of available data suggests that the socioeconomic progress made by LDCs in this period was not great enough to account for more than a proportion of the fertility decline and that organized family planning programs were a major contributing factor. The authors' projections, which are compared to similar projections from the World Bank, the United Nations, and the U.S. Bureau of the Census, indicate that, by the year 2000, less than 1/5 of the world's population will be in the "red danger" circle of explosive population growth (2.1% or more annually); most LDCs will be in a phase of fertility decline; and many of them -- along with most now developed countries -- will be at or near replacement level of fertility. The authors warn that "our optimistic prediction is premised upon a big IF -- if (organized) family planning (in LDCs) continues. It remains imperative that all of the developed nations of the world continue their contribution to this program undiminished."     

A demographic perspective on the Muslim world

A demographic perspective is relevant to understanding the position of Muslims in today’s world. This paper examines the size and growth of Muslim populations, and whether most Muslims live in overwhelmingly Muslim countries. It also examines indices of poverty and human development for Muslimmajority countries, and the growth of the youth population; finally, it examines the key components of population growth: mortality and fertility. Mortality has declined sharply over the past 15 years in many Muslim countries, though not in all, and Muslim countries are no longer prominent among the ‘outliers’ with higher mortality than expected on the basis of their income levels. Fertility rates are also declining sharply in a number of major Muslim-majority countries, raising interesting issues about attitudes of different schools of Islamic jurisprudence, village-level religious leaders and ordinary Muslims towards contraception and abortion, as well as the role of socio-economic development and family planning programs in fertility declines. Despite these declines, past high fertility in many Muslim-majority countries leaves as a legacy a rapidly growing adolescent population and a burgeoning, inadequately educated labour force.     

Relative cohort size: source of a unifying theory of global fertility transition

Using United Nations estimates of age structure and vital rates for 184 countries at five‐year intervals from 1950 through 1995, this article demonstrates how changes in relative cohort size appear to have affected patterns of fertility across countries since 1950—not just in developed countries, but perhaps even more importantly in developing countries as they pass through the demographic transition. The increase in relative cohort size (defined as the proportion of males aged 15–24 relative to males aged 25–59), which occurs as a result of declining mortality rates among infants, children, and young adults during the demographic transition, appears to act as the mechanism that determines when the fertility portion of the transition begins. As hypothesized by Richard Easterlin, the increasing proportion of young adults generates a downward pressure on young men's relative wages (or on the size of landhold‐ings passed on from parent to child), which in turn causes young adults to accept a tradeoff between family size and material wellbeing, setting in motion a “cascade” or “snowball” effect in which total fertility rates tumble as social norms regarding acceptable family sizes begin to change.     

Relative income and fertility

The present study examines the relationship between relative income (i.e., actual income in relation to the expected income of one’s socioeconomic group) and fertility, using data collected by the 1967-1968Canadian Family Growth Study (Balakrishnan et al., 1975). We broaden the tests of relative income beyond cumulative fertility to spacing behavior and then examine some of the assumptions included in the relative income model of fertility. Results of the tests, in brief, are as follows: (a) Relative income is found to be more closely related to spacing than to cumulative fertility; and (b) the relationship between relative income and fertility is strongest among those couples who plan their life ahead and have a high level of education and occupation, and when temporal alignment is brought between the measures of relative income and fertility. For the relative income model to receive confirmation, it was specified that the following hypotheses must be confirmed: (a) that fertility behavior would vary positively with relative income but the fertility norm would show no relationship with relative income; and (b) that consumption norms and behavior would show no relationship with relative income. The outcome of these tests are in the expected direction, giving support to the relative income model. In addition, there is some evidence of predictive capability of the relative income model for correlative behavior.     

Absolute Income,Relative Income,and Happiness

This paper uses data from the World Values Survey to investigate how an individual’s self-reported happiness is related to (i) the level of her income in absolute terms, and (ii) the level of her income relative to other people in her country. The main findings are that (i) both absolute and relative income are positively and significantly correlated with happiness, (ii) quantitatively, changes in relative income have much larger effects on happiness than do changes in absolute income, and (iii) the effects on happiness of both absolute and relative income are small when compared to the effects several non-pecuniary factors.

Relative Income and Happiness in Asia: Evidence from Nationwide Surveys in China, Japan, and Korea

This study attempts to examine relative income effects on perceived happiness in three major Asian countries—China, Japan, and Korea—in comparison with the United Sates, on the basis of largely comparable nationwide surveys in these countries. Consistent with the results from previous studies in Western countries, comparisons with an individual’s own income and average income of the reference group are significantly associated with the individual’s perceived happiness in Asia. The associations between relative income and happiness are stronger for individual income than family income in China, while the opposite is true in Japan and Korea. Even after controlling for the subjective assessment of family income or personal class identification within the society as a whole, income comparisons within the reference group matter for assessing happiness, especially when using family income for comparisons. Moreover, relative deprivation within the reference group, which is measured by the Yitzhaki index, is negatively related to happiness, providing more evidence for the validity of the relative income hypothesis.     

Family planning and fertility decline: a global overview

Family planning and development policy concerns are not incompatible. The emphasis on development policies at the 1974 World Population Conference at Bucharest did not mean that world governments had lost interest in the population and family planning issue. Although worldwide attitudes toward family planning have become more and more favorable, this has not yet meant great impact on world demographic trends. The "inertia factor," i.e., the effects of high birthrates in the previous generation, will camouflage declining birthrates for some time to come. The trend of fertility reduction which was perceptible only among small populations a few years ago is also becoming manifest in larger Third World countries. Mortality rate declines have slowed down but there is no rising mortality due to starvation in any country. At present, food demand exceeds availability for 80% of the Third World population. It is predicted that the food deficit will increase 70% by the year 2000.     

The population and economic issues in West Asia after WW II]

Using statistical data, this report analyzes population and economic issues in West Asia after World War II. The high rate of development as witnessed in West Asian countries after their gaining of political independence following World War II was accompained by an accelerated population growth. This population growth spead unevenly among different areas. Based on surveys of 17 countries in West Asia, the socioeconomic development and rapid rate of population growth have largely affected the population age, sex, urban and rural residential, and economic sector employment structures. With the help of indicators and mathematical methods to plot population development, these countries can be divided into 3 categories based on population development features. The semiindustrial countries demonstrate a gradually slowing population growth rate, most of these countries having experienced a peak period in the growth rate during the time of population transition. The agricultural countries show a natural population growth rate which is generally considered low. The 3rd category, the oil-producing countries, are currently experiencing a peak in population growth. In general, the popuation growth rate has dramatically accelerated in West Asia since World War II. Between 1950-1960 this rate was 2.58%; between 1960-1970, 2.75%; and between 1970-1980, 2.92%. This rate shows an increase of 6.6% between 1950-1960 and 6.2% between 1960-1970. It surpasses the average world population growth rate and most of the developing country growth rates. It has been augmented by post-World War II economic and social developments.     

A summary analysis of the 3rd inquiry

20 ESCAP member countries responded to the "Third Population Inquiry among Governments: Population policies in the context of development in 1976." The questionnaire sent to the member countries covered economic and social development and population growth, mortality, fertility and family formation, population distribution and internal migration, international migration, population data collection and research, training, and institutional arrangements for the formulation of population policies within development. Most of the governments in the ESCAP region that responded indicate that the present rate of population growth constrains their social and economic development. Among the governments that consider the present rate of population growth to constrain economic and social development, 13 countries regarded the most appropriate response to the constraint would include an adjustment of both socioeconomic and demographic factors. 11 of the governments regarded their present levels of average life expectancy at birth "acceptable" and 7 identified their levels as "unacceptable." Most of the governments who responded consider that, in general, their present level of fertility is too high and constrains family well-being. Internal migration and population distribution are coming to be seen as concerns for government population policy. The most popular approaches to distributing economic and social activities are rural development, urban and regional development and industrial dispersion. There was much less concern among the governments returning the questionnaire about the effect of international migration than internal migration on social and economic development.     

The World Social Situation: Development Challenges at the Outset of a New Century

World social development has arrived at a critical turning point. Economically advanced nations have made significant progress toward meeting the basic needs of their populations; however, the majority of developing countries have not. Problems of rapid population growth, failing economies, famine, environmental devastation, majority-minority group conflicts, increasing militarization, among others, are pushing many developing nations toward the brink of social chaos. This paper focuses on worldwide development trends for the 40-year period 1970–2009. Particular attention is given to the disparities in development that exist between the world’s “rich” and “poor” countries as well as the global forces that sustain these disparities. The paper also discusses more recent positive trends occurring within the world’s “socially least developed countries” (SLDCs), especially those located in Africa and Asia, in reducing poverty and in promoting improved quality of life for increasing numbers of their populations.     

Declining birth rates and growing populations

Excitement over declining fertility in the Third World needs caution for several reasons. First, it is now too late to solve the world's population problem. Second, the common belief that the birth decline is widespread and is affecting virtually all developing nations goes beyond the data. Third, the notion that birth rates are declining with great speed is not true when the rate is measured against either urbanization or mortality decline. Fourth, a sample of countries indicates that the decline is now slowing rather than accelerating. Fifth, the idea that the declines are due mainly to family planning, and can therefore be assured of continuance in the future, seems unwarranted.Revised version of a paper given at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco, September 7, 1982.     

Interregional differences in fertility in Brazil, 1950–1970

Trends and interregional differences in the birth rate in Brazil between 1950 and 1970 are examined. Estimates are based on data from the 1950 and 1970 censuses. Regional differences in birth measures (crude and general rates) were found to widen between 1950 and 1970 despite a decline in fertility at the national level and a narrowing of regional differences in important socioeconomicvariables like income and urbanization, The substantial interregional migration flows which occurred in Brazil between 1950 and 1970 are examined for their possible impact on differentials. The effects are mixed, but the conclusion is that migration contributed to widening differences.     

Relative Deprivation,Satisfying Rationality,and Support for Redistribution

Why do individuals support redistribution? Many studies have investigated the factors that influence support for redistribution; however, none have confirmed the role of income satisfaction. The aim of this study is to explore the role of income satisfaction in its support of the mechanism for redistribution. In this study, I suggest relative deprivation theory and the concept of satisfying rationality , as both give income satisfaction a theoretical position. Based on this framework, I argue that income satisfaction could be an indicator of relative deprivation and is understood as the basis of rational action. Specifically, I suggest the mechanism of relative deprivation that a feeling of unfairness weakens income satisfaction, and deterioration in income satisfaction leads individuals to support redistribution. To support this argument, I conduct multilevel path analysis using World Value Survey 6 waves focusing on the OECD countries. I first examine the direct effect of income satisfaction on support for redistribution and find a statistical association between income satisfaction and support for redistribution. Then, I check the relationship between income satisfaction and feeling of unfairness to validate income satisfaction as an indicator of relative deprivation. These findings imply that scholars need to pay more attention to the substantial role of individuals’ subjective reaction to the objective economic conditions.     

The Middle East population puzzle

An overview is provided of Middle Eastern countries on the following topics; population change, epidemiological transition theory and 4 patterns of transition in the middle East, transition in causes of death, infant mortality declines, war mortality, fertility, family planning, age and sex composition, ethnicity, educational status, urbanization, labor force, international labor migration, refugees, Jewish immigration, families, marriage patterns, and future growth. The Middle East is geographically defined as Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Gaza and the West Bank, Iran, Turkey, and Israel. The Middle East's population grew very little until 1990 when the population was 43 million. Population was about doubled in the mid-1950s at 80 million. Rapid growth occurred after 1950 with declines in mortality due to widespread disease control and sanitation efforts. Countries are grouped in the following ways: persistent high fertility and declining mortality with low to medium socioeconomic conditions (Jordan, Oman, Syria, Yemen, and the West Bank and Gaza), declining fertility and mortality in intermediate socioeconomic development (Egypt, Lebanon, Turkey, and Iran), high fertility and declining mortality in high socioeconomic conditions (Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates), and low fertility and mortality in average socioeconomic conditions (Israel). As birth and death rates decline, there is an accompanying shift from communicable diseases to degenerative diseases and increases in life expectancy; this pattern is reflected in the available data from Egypt, Kuwait, and Israel. High infant and child mortality tends to remain a problem throughout the Middle East, with the exception of Israel and the Gulf States. War casualties are undetermined, yet have not impeded the fastest growing population growth rate in the world. The average fertility is 5 births/woman by the age of 45. Muslim countries tend to have larger families. Contraceptive use is low in the region, with the exception of Turkey and Egypt and among urban and educated populations. More than 40% of the population is under 15 years of age. The region is about 50% Arabic (140 million). Educational status has increased, particularly for men; the lowest literacy rates for women are in Yemen and Egypt. The largest countries are Iran, Turkey, and Egypt.     

The Impact of Exposure to Other Countries on Life Satisfaction: An International Application of the Relative Income Hypothesis

The cause of international differences in life satisfaction is usually ascribed to differences in living standards. Yet, despite improving living standards in a lot of middle-income countries, significant differences in life satisfaction between middle- and high-income countries remain. This paper examines if there is an international comparison effect and assesses to what extent the relative income hypothesis can be applied to explain international differences in life satisfaction. We test this by analyzing how exposure to other countries impacts life satisfaction. It is hypothesized that higher exposure to other countries in low- and middle-income countries has a negative effect due to increased aspirations and relative deprivation, while the opposite holds true for rich countries. We draw on data from the World Value Survey, the World Bank and the KOF Globalization index to perform a multilevel analysis. The results suggest that an international comparison effect indeed exists and is capable of partially explaining international differences in life satisfaction. Additional analyses reveal that people in lower income classes, in all countries, are affected more by exposure to other countries, indicating that individual characteristics are important when assessing the impact of exposure on life satisfaction. We demonstrate the robustness of these findings by showing that both sub-indicators of exposure, informational flow and international contact, have an impact on life satisfaction that is similar to that of our overall exposure-index.     

Relative Income,Race, and Fertility

If a white husband's income is higher than expected for men of his age, race, education, job characteristics, and region, economic theory predicts higher complete fertility for his wife. In the present study one per cent public use samples from the 1970 Census for California and Hawaii were used to examine the effect of relative income on Japanese, Chinese, and black fertility. Relative income was defined in two ways: (1) with regard to earnings of husbands of the same race, education, employment, and state; (2) with regard to earnings of white husbands of the same education, employment, and state. High relative incomes defined in each way were associated with increased completed fertility of Japanese and Chinese in Hawaii, where Orientals form a majority. Neither definition of high relative income was associated with the completed fertility of Japanese, Chinese, or blacks in California, where non-whites form a minority. The results suggest that the effect of relative income on fertility for a racial group will be positive only where there are few racial barriers to their attainment of high incomes.