Declining fertility and policy intervention in Europe: Some lessons for Australia?

The contemporary fertility situation in Europe is outlined with emphasis on trends in the late 1990s. It is shown that while most European countries have lower fertility levels than Australia there is wide variation between countries with respect to both their levels of fertility and their rate of fertility decline. While almost all countries are experiencing fertility decline the rate of decline is higher and the fertility is lower in countries where the male-breadwinner model is strongest. Attempts to influence fertility in European nations are discussed, particularly those involving the introduction of family-friendly policies. It is clear that despite popular beliefs to the contrary, societies where male-breadwinner models influence policy most are those with lowest fertility. The lesson for Australia is that family-friendly policies not only are desirable from the perspective of moving toward gender equality but are likely to stabilize or perhaps even marginally increase fertility.     

Intermediate fertility variables and marital fertility rates

Summary Using relatively simple mathematical techniques, an analysis is made of a comprehensive reproductive model that describes the relationships between a set of intermediate fertility variables and the marital fertility rate. Two types of intermediate fertility variables are distinguished: (1) biological parameters and (2) control variables. A homogeneous model is outlined first. Next, this version is extended to include heterogeneity with respect to fecundability and coital rates. Tests of the model with data from two historical populations (i.e. Crulai, 1674-1742, and Tourouvre au Perche, 1665-1765) demonstrate that the model is, indeed, consistent with observed reproductive behaviour in actual populations.     

Support for new mothers and fertility in the United Kingdom: Not all support is equal in the decision to have a second child

Low fertility across Europe highlights the need to understand reproductive decisions in high-income countries better. Availability of support may be one factor influencing reproductive decisions, though within high-income countries availability varies between environments, including socio-economic environments. We test whether receiving higher levels of support, from different sources (informal and formal) and of different types (practical and emotional), is positively correlated with second births in the United Kingdom (UK) Millennium Cohort Study, and whether these relationships differ by socio-economic position (SEP). Our hypothesis is only partially supported: receiving emotional support correlates with higher likelihood of second birth, but the opposite is true for practical support. Availability of different types of support varies across SEP, but relationships between support and fertility are similar, with one exception: kin-provided childcare increases the likelihood of birth only among lower-SEP women. Our results highlight that not all support is equal in the decision to have a second child.     

Fecundability and its relation to age in a sample of Taiwanese women

Abstract In this paper reliable estimates of mean fecundability at marriage for a sample of heterogeneous Taiwanese women are obtained by using a set of data collected retrospectively. The effects of 'truncation bias' and 'memory bias' are estimated by studying the relationships between mean fecundability and the duration of marriage. Then the variations in fecundabilities by age at marriage are studied. The data are taken from an intensive fertility survey of married women between the ages of 20 and 39 conducted in Taichung city of Taiwan towards the end of 1962 prior to a year-long family planning action programme. Fecundability, the probability of conception in the absence of contraception, is estimated by using a Type I geometric model and is estimated from the observed distribution of first pregnancy intervals-the period between the onset of marriage and the beginning of first conception. The estimated fecundability level relatively free from truncation and memory bias is 195±3 per 1.000 women. The fecundability level increases with wife's age at marriage (up to 25) independently of its association with the duration of marriage.     

The Effects of Breastfeeding and Nutrition on Fecundability in Rural Bangladesh: A Hazards-Model Analysis

Data taken from the ‘Determinants of Natural Fertility’ study, Bangladesh, are used with multivariate hazard models to study variations in fecundability between women, especially the relationship between nutritional status, breastfeeding practices, and the monthly probability of conceiving. It is found that fecundability varies both between women of a given age and, for a particular woman, by age. The variation is related to four variables: separation, which affects coital frequency; age, which represents biological changes; lactation practices; and the duration of amenorrhoea. Nutrition above famine or starvation levels is not a significant determinant of fecundability. The most surprising finding is the effect of the pattern of breastfeeding on fecundability: as a menstruating woman begins to wean her child, her probability of conceiving increases as her serum prolactin, which inhibits ovulation, decreases. Thus, those menstruating women who are most likely to conceive are those who have completely weaned their infants in the very recent past.     

Delayed Marriage and Very Low Fertility in Pacific Asia

The general decline in fertility levels in Pacific Asia has in its vanguard countries where fertility rates are among the lowest in the world. A related trend is toward delayed marriage and nonmarriage. When prevalence of cohabitation in European countries is allowed for, levels of “effective singlehood” in many countries of Pacific Asia have run ahead of those in northern and western Europe. This raises questions about the extent to which delayed marriage has been implicated in fertility declines, and whether the same factors are leading both to delayed marriage and to lowered fertility within marriage. The article argues that involuntary nonmarriage is likely to be more common in Pacific Asia than in Western countries, and that resultant involuntary childlessness plays a substantial role in the low fertility rates currently observed.     

A Multistate model of fecundability and sterility

This paper develops a multistate hazards model for estimating fecundability and sterility from data on waiting times to conception. Important features of the model include separate sterile and nonsterile states, a distinction between preexisting sterility and sterility that begins after initiation of exposure, and log-normally distributed fecundability among nonsterile couples. Application of the model to data on first birth intervals from Taiwan, Sri Lanka, and the Amish shows that heterogeneity in fecundability is statistically significant at most ages, but that preexisting sterility and new sterility are unimportant before age 40. These results suggest that sterility may not be an important determinant of natural fertility until later reproductive ages.     

When the grass is greener: Fertility decisions in a cross-national context

In research and policy discourse, conceptualizations of fertility decision-making often assume that people only consider circumstances within national borders. In an integrated Europe, citizens may know about and compare conditions across countries. Such comparisons may influence the way people think about and respond to childrearing costs. To explore this possibility and its implications, we present evidence from 44 in-depth interviews with Polish parents in the United Kingdom and Poland. Explanations of childbearing decisions involved comparisons of policy packages and living standards across countries. Individuals in Poland used richer European countries as an important reference point, rather than recent conditions in Poland. In contrast, migrants often positively assessed their relatively disadvantaged circumstances by using the Polish setting as a reference. The findings could help explain why, despite substantial policy efforts, fertility has remained at very low levels in poorer European countries, while migrants from those countries often have higher fertility abroad.     

Why do English-speaking countries have relatively high fertility?

In broad terms, the division in Europe between countries with very low fertility and countries with sustainable fertility matches Esping-Anderson’s classification of the same countries into ‘conservative’ and ‘social democratic’ (Esping-Anderson 1990). A central difference between these two types relates to their preferred models of the family. The conservative countries hold more to the ‘breadwinner’ model of the family while the social democratic countries seek higher levels of gender equity within the family and in the workplace. State support in both conservative and social democratic countries is designed to be consistent with these differing views of the family. Would we then not expect fertility to be very low in Esping-Anderson’s third group of countries, the ‘liberal’ countries, essentially English-speaking countries? By the Esping-Anderson definition, liberal countries are notable for their lack of support for families from public sources. Instead, according to Esping-Anderson, families must rely upon market provision for the services that they may need to combine work and family and they must rely on market employment to generate the income required to support their children. Contrary to this theory, whether measured by contemporary cross-sectional fertility or completed cohort fertility, with the exception of Canada, English-speaking countries now have the highest fertility rates among the countries that were classified by Esping-Anderson. Given the strength of theoretical explanation that arises from comparative studies of fertility in Europe, the paper examines why fertility in English-speaking countries seems not to follow expectation.     

A Model of Age-specific Fecundability

A new model of the behavioural and physiological causes of age-specific variation in marital fecundability is presented. Total fecundability is decomposed into a series of susceptibility factors (the length of ovarian cycles, the length of the fertile period within each cycle, the probability that a cycle is ovulatory, and the likelihood that an act of unprotected intercourse within the fertile period results in conception) and an exposure factor reflecting the effect of duration of marriage on coital frequency. The impact of intra-uterine mortality on effective fecundability is also modelled. Data on western women, from which standard age curves of fecundability are estimated, suggest that any decline in fecundity between ages 30 and 40 is attributable to changes, not in the ability to conceive, but in the capacity to carry a pregnancy to term. Sensitivity tests suggest that the most important potential sources of inter-population variation in fecundability are intra-uterine death and the incidence of anovulatory cycles.     

Back to the Future: a Sensitivity Analysis to Predict Future Fertility Rates Considering the Influence of Family Policies—The Cases of Spain and Norway

This article analyzes the relationship between family policies focused on childcare for children under the age of three and fertility levels. In the current context of very low European fertility, it is important to understand whether public support for families can help increase fertility or if, on the contrary, existing fertility levels are the exact reflection of the reproductive desires of families, regardless of the family-support of the policies that may exist in each country. This analysis was carried out through a stochastic dynamic mathematical model that incorporates both demographic variables and family policy variables. A sensitivity analysis was carried out on Spain and Norway, two countries that have very different models of family policies. This sensitivity analysis allows establishing a relationship between the existing family policies and the total fertility rate and also the expected evolution of fertility rates in the future, if the current family policies remain constant. The results showed that the models which lead to an increase in fertility are those which are most generous and which also incorporate a gender perspective, so they allow the identification of good practices and maximum levels of policy efficiency in regards to different objectives such as increase fertility and advances towards gender equality. By contrast, models with erratic and insufficient support clearly contribute to maintaining fertility at very low levels and perpetuate unequal gender relationships. There is, therefore, space for state agency to develop more effective public policies in both dimensions.

     

Cohort disaggregation analysis of fertility data from a sample survey

Social differentials in cumulative fertility revealed by field surveys in a number of countries typically have been interpreted with the implicit assumption that the timing of childbearing within the reproductive period remains constant. However, the reproductive histories that have been collected in such surveys provide a largely unexploited source of data for the analysis of trends in timing. An analysis by birth cohort of the fertility experience of 592 ever-married women surveyed in San Juan, Puerto Rico, in 1966 shows that significant changes in timing have occurred. Women in the more recent birth cohorts are distinguished by earlier childbearing and sustained higher fertility in consecutive age periods. The inter-cohort differences remain when adjustments are made for duration of time in legal and consensual unions.     

Birth rates decline as neighbors learn from one another how to control fertility

This article refers to a recent article (by Population Council demographer John Bongaarts and University of Pennsylvania sociology professor Susan Cotts Watkins) on strategies for promoting future global fertility decline. The article emphasizes the importance of the process of social interaction as a powerful force that accelerates the pace of demographic transition. The force of social interaction is frequently overlooked. Social interaction operates through personal networks that connect individuals; national channels of interaction connecting social and territorial communities within a country; and global channels connecting countries. Empirical evidence finds that the most important interaction for fertility change occurs in exchanges between personal networks of small communities. When innovative fertility behavior is adopted by a group within a community, then changes are communicated in an ever widening band. It is expected that countries with multiple channels of linked transportation and communication networks and extensive media facilities would experience more rapid fertility decline. Bongaarts and Watkins argue that the extent of a country's links with a global society help determine the timing of its transition to lower fertility. All countries are connected to some extent by ideas, information, or social influence and are at some level of development. When some countries in a region begin their fertility transition, neighboring countries soon follow. Fertility transition occurs even at low levels of development. Fertility decline can occur rapidly, even if socioeconomic development is modest, once the onset of the transition has occurred.     

Findings and implications of a correlation analysis of the closed and the open birth intervals

A correlation analysis of data on four fertility variables viz. closed birth interval, open birth interval, age and parity, collected in a survey of about 2,000 married women in the reproductive ages in rural India, is carried out in order to study the interrelationships among these variables. Two hypotheses are formulated governing the relationship of the closed and open birth intervals with the fecundability distribution of fertile women, and Parity Progression Ratios which are largely influenced by the proportion of women becoming sterile after each parity. The data lend support to the hypothesis that while the closed intervals are influenced mainly by the distribution of fecundability of women of non-zero fecundability, the open birth intervals are influenced mainly by Parity Progression Ratios or the proportion of women becoming secondarily sterile after each parity. The analysis suggests that we can use the mean open intervals of women classified by parity as indices of fertility, and such an index is comparable to the index of average age of women of given parity. In areas where it is difficult to ascertain the correct age of women this might be of practical value.     

Childbearing within Marriage and Consensual Union in Latin America, 1980–2010

This article compares the fertility patterns of women in consensual union and marriage in 13 Latin American countries, using census microdata from the four most recent census rounds and a methodological approach that combines the own‐children method and Poisson regression. Results show that in all these countries, fertility is slightly higher within consensual union than marriage and that the age pattern of fertility is very similar in marital and non‐marital unions. Further analyses show that over the period considered, childbearing within a consensual union has changed from rare to increasingly common, although not yet mainstream, for highly educated women in most countries examined. Results show that in Latin America, at least since the 1980s, women's childbearing patterns depend on their age and on their being in a conjugal relationship, but not on the legal nature of this relationship. The similarities in reproductive behavior between marital and non‐marital unions are not confined to the socially disadvantaged groups, but apply as well to the better off.     

Another Child? Fertility Ideals,Resources and Opportunities

Low fertility in most developed countries has prompted policy concern in relation to labour market supply, pensions, and expenditure on health and welfare services as well as policy debate about both the cost of children and the opportunity costs of parenthood. The extent to which family policy interventions can be effective in slowing or reversing fertility decline is much debated. This paper, based on a fertility module of the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey 2005, examines the current fertility, and ideal and expected fertility of a nationally representative sample of 455 parents of reproductive age and focuses on whether they plan to have another child. It compares the characteristics of those who intend to have another child with those who do not, and how parents with one child differ from those with more children. It addresses three questions about family size: (1) fertility ideals, (2) resources and the economic implications of childbearing, and (3) opportunities for childbearing and the effects of a late start on fertility expectations. It concludes that, despite a sustained period of low fertility in Scotland, childbearing ideals are robust and explanations of low fertility must derive from difficulties in realising those ideals. Difficulties in realising fertility aspirations are associated less with resources than with opportunities for childbearing, especially the timing of first birth. Those who delay their first birth are less likely to realise their ideal family size, and their lower fertility is associated with the opportunity costs of childbearing in terms of foregone qualifications, careers and earnings.     

Some effects of spouse separation on fertility

Simple probability models incorporating an approximation first demonstrated by Menken (1979) are used to study births averted by two classes of temporary spouse separation, single and cyclic, under conditions of natural fertility. For either class of spouse separation, births averted increases disproportionately with longer separation. For a given length of separation, births prevented are more sensitive to change in length of anovulation than to change in level ofnatural fecundability or risk of spontaneous abortion. In addition, by means of the macrosimulation model REPMOD (Bongaarts, 1977), it is shown that the fertility impact of temporary spouse separation tends to decrease as couples age.     

Religiousness and Fertility among European Muslims

Based on official data on religion, national origin, and other indicators of ethnic origin, Muslim fertility in 13 European countries is higher than that for other women, but in most countries with trend data the differences are diminishing over time. Fertility varies by country of origin of immigrants. Various European survey data show that higher proportions of Muslim women are married and their commitment to traditional family values is greater than among other women. Muslim women are more religious than non‐Muslim women and religiousness is directly associated with fertility. Among Muslim women, religiousness and commitment to family values are equally important for fertility, while for non‐Muslim women religiousness is much less important.     

Fertility differentials as evidence of incipient fertility decline in a developing country

Abstract Age data from the 1960 and earlier censuses of Ghana allow the construction of child-woman ratios which appear to indicate the existence of a substantial urban-rural fertility differential. Plausible assumptions of urban-rural mortality differentials increase the apparent fertility differential. In this paper recently published data for Statistical Areas in the country's larger towns are used to demonstrate that one explanation for the fertility differential is almost certainly the enumeration of some females in the towns, while one or more of their surviving children were enumerated outside. Nevertheless, in 1960 the four largest towns exhibited birth levels which are likely to have been about 11% below those of the population in the surrounding regions. Roughly half the differential can be attributed to a general urban-rural differential and half to socio-economic differentials within the towns. It is shown that most fertility reduction within the towns may be explained by delayed female marriage, and that such delay is associated with extended education. It is also shown that amongst the higher socio-economic status groups a small part of the reduction can probably be attributed to the prevention of pregnancy within marriage, and that the making of such attempts is positively associated with extended education, urban birth, participation in first and monogamous marriages, Protestantism, and the holding of views about the harmful effect of high population growth rates on attempts to raise living standards. It is argued that these fertility differentials are evidence of some fertility decline among key groups in the population and that such declines are likely to become more widespread.     

Population and environment in the twenty-first century

In the past 50 years global population grew by 3.7 billion. There is a large unmet need for family planning and wherever women have been given the means and the information to decide if or when to have the next child, then family size has fallen, often rapidly. However, since the UN 1994 Cairo conference on population and development, support for international family has collapsed and fertility declines in many of the poorest countries have stalled. Amongst some of the most vulnerable groups family size has risen. The investment made in voluntary family planning will largely determine whether, in the next 50 years, the global population grows to something less than 8 billion or to over 10. The trajectory taking us to the higher figure could jeopardize any possibility of transitioning the global economy to a biological sustainability. Much precious time has been lost. Almost all the additional growth in population will take place in the world’s poorest countries, and it is imperative that the international community act to improve access to family planning in those countries, within a human rights frame framework.