THE DEGRADATION OF THE SACRED: APPROACHES OF COOLEY AND GOFFMAN

Charles Horton Cooley and Erving Goffman both have provided similar, although usually overlooked, contributions to a sociology of religion and culture, namely, their analysis of the process whereby sacred representations of the self-transcending aspect of human nature frequently devolve into fragmented or distorted cultural symbols that increasingly provide legitimation for self-interest alone. Cooley's writings revolve around the dynamic whereby the cultural symbols of Christian mysticism degenerate into the liberal models of economic man. Goffman's work centers around the manner in which sacred rituals, originally emblematic of the social, are degraded and distorted by the onset of self-interested motivations.     

Parts and Wholes: Goffman and Cooley

This essay begins with an outline of the part‐whole method, a way of relating particular instances to general concepts or propositions. This method is illustrated by seven propositions extracted from Cooley’s work that seem to be illustrated by concrete examples from Goffman’s writing. This method weds qualitative study with theory in a preliminary way, and ultimately, qualitative and quantitative methods. Since Goffman’s examples breathe life into our enterprise, it may be fruitful to use every one of them, connecting them not only with Cooley’s theses, but generating others as well.     

Durkheim's cult of the individual as civil religion: Its appropriation by Erving Goffman

The purpose of this article is to provide a systematic analysis of the place of Durkheim's “cult of the individual” in Erving Goffman's sociology.¹ I have reviewed the most pertinent aspects of Durkheim's sociology of religion. This article discusses and/or analyzes the development of the cult of the individual primarily within the context of Durkheim's (1951) monograph on suicide; Durkheim's notions of sacred, profane, and ritual; Goffman's two‐pronged intellectual heritage; and Goffman's “Communication Conduct in an Island Community” (1953) with respect to several key Durkheimian concepts. Also discussed are several important secondary analyses—primarily those of Jurgen Habermas and Stanford Lyman—which help to further delineate the conditions of the Durkheim‐Goffman link. The final section applies Goffman's sociology to the case of Evangelicalism and “political civility.”     

Shame in Self and Society

This article proposes that shame is the master emotion of everyday life but is usually invisible in modern societies because of taboo. A review of shame studies suggests a taboo that results in denial and silence. The studies by Cooley, Freud, Elias, Lynd, Goffman, Lewis, and Tomkins have been largely ignored. Their work suggests a vital connection between shame and social life: shame can be seen as a signal of a threat to the bond. If so, understanding shame would be necessary for the study of social systems. The taboo on shame in English still holds: current usage, for the most part, assigns an intense and narrow singular meaning. This meaning offends, on the one hand, and misses the everyday function of shame, on the other. Perhaps the problem can be approached, as it is in traditional societies, by the use of a broader term, such as “bond affect” or “Shame.” Such a concept could lead to discovery of the emotional/relational world.     

Charles Horton Cooley,Pragmatist or Belletrist? The Complexity of Influence and the Decentering of Intellectual Traditions

This essay treats recent attempts to identify symbolic interaction (SI) founding theorist Charles Horton Cooley as a pragmatist sociologist exemplifying, and even influenced by, the pragmatism of Charles Saunders Peirce, as an example of the American exceptionalist character of SI. Beginning with Cooley's creative approach to conceptualizing the social, these attempts are scrutinized and measured against the contention that Cooley's thought can be equally if not more understood as a product of influence of the literary essay tradition. A close reading is given of the concordance of his personal journal with a selection of his published writings concerning the influence of members of Cooley's essayistic “genre matrix” – Emerson, Montaigne, and Walter Pater – on the development of his intellectual self and thought. Further substantiation is supplied by an analysis of the essayistic influence on Cooley's rigorous treatment of qualitative methodology. It is concluded that a decentered positioning of Cooley's work is preferable to a single‐origin one.     

Emerson,Cooley, and the American Heroic Vision*

Willful leaders and mindless masses are governing images in Carlyle's and Nietzsche's romantic conception of political domination. In contrast, the nineteenth century American notion of heroic leadership was inspired by liberal sentiment and drew mainly on classical republican definitions of greatness. These sentiments and definitions supplied the basis for Ralph Waldo Emerson's theory of heroes and hero worship. The first part of this paper shows how the tension between elitist and democratic conceptions of the hero permeated Emerson's early work, and how this tension was finally resolved in his essays on representative men. The second part of the paper deals with Charles Horton Cooley's admiration of Emerson, and the affinity between Emerson's mature ideas and Cooley's studies of genius, emulation, fame, and leadership. Cooley's political sociology, like Emerson's, was based on a profound attachment to democratic principles. Cooley also believed, as did Emerson, that these intangible principles only remain secure as long as society emulates the great men who personify them. Building upon Emerson's conception of the heroic figure as a symbol rather than a source of social order and social change, Cooley passed on to later generations of American sociologists a conception of heroic leadership that differs sharply from the romantic visions which prevailed in Europe from Emerson's time to Cooley's own day.     

Telling Others How You Live—Refining Goffman's Stigma Theory Through an Analysis of Housing Strugglers in a Homeowner Nation

This article revisits Goffman's stigma theory from the perspective of housing studies. We elaborate on Goffman's approach by exploring how housing tenure can work as a proxy for moral character. We interviewed twenty‐seven people who are excluded from access to homeownership in two cities in Norway, which is a “homeowner nation.” These individuals are unable to enter the dominant “homeowner class” for different reasons, including drug‐dependency, mental illness, refugee background, low socioeconomic status; thus, they must access housing through other tenures; private renting or social housing. To many of them, housing becomes a stigma, in Goffman terms, an “undesired differentness.” Social housing is known to carry stigma in Norway. It was thus a paradox, that those with the softest differentness—private rental—were most likely to practice (Goffman:) “information control” over their housing situation. Goffman's theoretical apparatus, and his distinction between the discreditable and the discredited in particular, helped us make this paradox comprehensible. Through this analysis, refinements to Goffman's theory were discovered. We suggest that “multiple stigmas,” which was not seen clearly by Goffman himself, should be a key notion in stigma studies. We use this notion to distinguish between possible sub‐types to the discredited‐discreditable distinction.     

Park,Doyle, and Hughes: Neglected Antecedents of Goffman's Theory of Ceremony1

Erving Goffman's writings on etiquette and front are read in the context of a tradition of Chicago school studies on such topics. Robert E. Park formed this tradition from two strains of thought: one based on the writings of Herbert Spencer, and the other on that of Georg Simmel. A review of writings by Park, and by his students Bertram W. Doyle and Everett C. Hughes, provides a basis for analyzing Goffman's original contributions to the tradition, a synthesis of the two strains. Goffman both advanced the line of study and shared in its biases. These limitations must be overcome if future research in the tradition is to proceed.     

More than a Façade: Somatic and Structural Determinants in Erving Goffman's Theory of the Perduring Self

This paper argues that Erving Goffman endorses the veracity of a perduring self. Culling the corpus of his work, recent findings in neurophysiology and cognitive science surrounding the autonomy and mutual determination of emotion, cognition, and social structure are drawn upon when unpacking his highly composite theory. Isolating Goffman's claims about the psychobiological underpinning of the emotionally sentient body and those pertaining to macro and micro‐structural determinants, the former, it is argued, champion the coherence of the self insofar as they link cathected feelings to individual desires and inclinations. The latter, conversely, complicate the picture by accentuating the social construction of emotions and the relationship between episodic cognitive operations and multifarious interpretive frames. In the end, however, it is shown that Goffman's macro‐structural account, far from being residual, discloses the consistency, and unity of the self occasioned by social proximity and general social norms.     

Editor's Choice: An Interview with Hans Joas

The interview explores multiple aspects of social theory, most of them directly related to Joas's theory and others to symbolic interactionism and Goffman. The first part delves into Joas's theory in three respects. First, a clarifying note on a common misunderstanding about his book The Creativity of Action. Second, a clarification on the scope of his theoretical endeavor, and third, a look into his coming books to have a better grasp of the course that his theory is taking. The second part is dedicated to symbolic interactionism and Goffman. Firstly, Joas's opinion about the theoretical relationship between symbolic interactionism and macrosociology is emphasized, secondly, his opinion about the pertinence of locating Goffman within symbolic interactionism is stated, and thirdly, a brief commentary about the relationship between Joas's theory and Goffman's is introduced.     

Shame and the Social Bond: A Sociological Theory

Emotion has long been recognized in sociology as crucially important, but most references to it are generalized and vague. In this essay, I nominate shame, specifically, as the premier social emotion. First I review the individualized treatment of shame in psychoanalysis and psychology, and the absence of social context. Then I consider the contributions to the social dimensions of shame by six sociologists (Georg Simmel, Charles Cooley, Norbert Elias, Richard Sennett, Helen Lynd, Erving Goffman) and a psychologist/psychoanalyst (Helen Lewis). I show that Cooley and Lynd, particularly, made contributions to a theory of shame and the social bond. Lewis's idea that shame arises from threats to the bond integrates the contributions of all six sociologists, and points toward future research on emotion, conflict, and alienation/integration.     

A Guide to Training Your Own Horses: The Flaneur Appproach and Erving Goffman's Uninhibited Research Practices in Sociology

While Erving Goffman's sociology has enjoyed great popularity and is cited often, the career of his work has been largely confined to other scholars reaping, adapting, and utilizing his concepts. Goffman was opposed to science that just reproduces and orders concepts, and opposed to his students using his concepts as easy tools. Instead, he recommended they train their own horses: While there is much to use in Goffman's work, there is little scholarship that continues the genius of his practical approach. As valuable as Goffman's categories are, his collection practice and his analytical scheme may be even more valuable. On the one hand, they offer an intricate framework for research that is as open as it is directed; on the other hand, they allow researchers to argue freedom from the ever more imposing bad imitations of natural scientific method that threaten to overgrow the social sciences. Together, they allow Goffmanesque work without merely parroting his concepts. This article attempts to outline Goffman's eclectic way of collecting material and his technique for fashioning this material into analyses, reordering this material around different metaphors that make Goffman's contribution distinct. I call Goffman's practical research a flaneur approach, and outline it. The paper then makes an argument for its continuation.     

Little naked pangs of the self: the real performance of the self and the function of trust in Goffman's action theory

The aim of this article is to discuss some of the leading features of Erving Goffman's action theory as an alternative to the ‘orthodox’ paradigms of sociology, viewed as a structuralist and functionalist science that defines social constructs by their shared rules and values, and as a drifting of action, in the sense of intention, toward an individualistic version. The author examines Goffman's shift of the focus of attention from the boundaries of a social sense of action to the social dialectic of ‘defining a situation’ (W. Thomas) as conducted by the social actors in a renewal of Simmel's ‘empowering covenants’ (wechselwirkung) in the multiple casual social connections that make up the ‘social buzz’ in a society. The author moreover discusses Goffman's action as a kind of playacting regulating cognitive and expressive face-to-face ‘traffic’ between the social actors. This relational dynamic creates an interactive play based on encounters – in which one's opening to another is fraught with risks of deception – regulated by trust as a central resource for social interactions. Trust, in its interpersonal and systemic variants, constitutes a universal social datum and an elementary precondition for social exchanges and the cooperation between individuals. Trust, thus, functions as comparer between reciprocal expectations and a regulator of freedom tending to the stability of the social system.     

Shame,Peer, and Oscillating Frames in DWI Conviction: Extending Goffman's Sociological Landscape

Goffman argues that “the interaction order” is a substantive domain autonomous from formal social organization. His scholarship generally analyzes the interaction order in its autonomous workings but neglects the areas in which it is legally regulated. Analyzing the case of legal detention and conviction for the offense of driving while intoxicated (DWI), the article illustrates and extends Goffman's paradigm. A DWI conviction is the result of the legal system's response to distortion at the level of the interaction order. Conviction creates new interactive frames. The interaction order resists the official moral definition of DWI.     

Goffman Against Postmodernism: Emotion and the Reality of the Self

Goffman has been read as arguing that selves are no more than images created in conformity with situational expectations. I read Goffman as saying that the reality of selfhood is not an image, but a psychobiological proces shaped by signs and symbols. Seen in this way, the reality of the self is evident, as Goffman suggested, not in conformity but in moments of feeling, resistance, and choice. Drawing out what is implicit in Goffman, this article proposes that all forms of signifying behavior, including self-presentations, are means to sustain the coherence of the self. For this to work, however, people must, as Goffman pointed out, trust each other to respect the rules governing signifying behavior and must care about the feelings attached to selves. The article argues that the inequalities of so-called postmodern society are undermining the trust and care on which the interaction order and coherent selfhood depend. Goffman's ideas about the self are used to develop an optimistic critique of the conditions that have produced these pernicious trends.     

'Estrogen-filled worlds': fathers as primary caregivers and embodiment

Within the wide body of scholarship on gender work and caring, sub‐strands of research have grown tremendously in the past decade, including largely separate studies on fatherhood and embodiment. Drawing on a qualitative research project with Canadian fathers who self‐identify as primary caregivers of their children, this article focuses on recovering largely invisible links between theoretical and empirical understandings of fatherhood, caring and embodiment. The article builds on the work of key sociologists of the body as well as the work of Goffman and Merleau‐Ponty. Specifically, Merleau‐Ponty's concept of ‘body subjects’ and Goffman's work on the ‘moral’ quality of bodily movements through public spaces are utilized as lenses for understanding fathers' narratives of caring, particularly how men speak about their movements with children through what several fathers refer to as “estrogen‐filled” worlds. As caring for others involves forming social networks and relations, embodiment can matter in the spaces between men, between male and female caregivers, and between men and the children of others. This article argues that through the changing stages of caring for children, male embodiment constantly shifts in the weight of its salience in the identities and practices of fathers and caregiving.     

Credibility,Agency, and the Interaction Order

There are two ways of reading Goffman—as a theorist of trust and ritual accommodation, that is, as a theorist of the interaction order, or as a theorist of deception. I suggest a way of making these two readings compatible, by arguing that Goffman was interested in what I call the “production of credibility.” Credibility is the quality of being believable, and this quality is integral to both trust and deception. Viewed in this way, Goffman explored the ways in which people make their actions convincing to other people. Although Goffman's analysis of the interaction order did not need a theory of the self, his work actually contains two quite different theories of the self: one linked to role analysis, one to his analysis of mental illness. I argue for the latter at the expense of the former. I conclude that Goffman both initiated substantive work about the interaction order and contributed to a synthesis of a theory of the interaction order and a theory of the self.     

Normlessness,Anomie, and the Emotions

In Suicide, Durkheim described two qualitatively different experiences of normative anomie, each with a distinct affective basis: an intentional, if not ruthless, disdain for society's normative order; and an unintentional disregard for, or confusion about, norms or rules of conduct. We generalize Durkheim's classification of the socioaffective aspects of anomic suicide, and present two theoretical models of normlessness‐anomie and the emotions. These models posit that intentional anomie involves the primary emotions anger, disgust, and joy‐happiness; these emotions can combine to form the secondary emotions contempt, pride, and derisiveness. Unintentional, passive anomie rather involves the emotions surprise, fear, and sadness; these can combine to form the secondary emotions disappointment, shame, and alarm. We additionally hypothesize that each kind of anomie has distinct potential behavioral consequences: intentional anomie can result in immorality, shamelessness, acquisitiveness, and premeditated homicidality; unintentional anomie, in depression, confusion, uncertainty, unpremeditated homicidality, and suicidality.