Normative, Gain and Hedonic Goal Frames Guiding Environmental Behavior

This article discusses new developments about goal-dependent framing and multiple goal frames (sometimes also called "multiple motives"), which are highly relevant for understanding environmental behavior. We introduce goal-framing theory, which postulates that goals "frame" the way people process information and act upon it. Three goal frames are distinguished: a hedonic, gain, and normative goal frame. In general, multiple goals are active at any given time, which may (or may not) be compatible; that is, the strength of the focal goal may be influenced by other goals that are in the background. Based on an extensive review of studies in environmental psychology, we suggest those conditions under which each goal frame may be dominant in influencing environmental behavior. In the environmental context, normative goal frames imply acting pro-environmentally, while gain and hedonic goal frames often result in not acting in an environmentally sound manner. Next, we argue that pro-environmental behavior may be promoted by strengthening normative goals or by making gain and hedonic goals less incompatible with normative goals. Finally, based on goal-framing theory, we suggest questions to be addressed in future research.     

Rethinking Risk Attitude: Aspiration as Pure Risk

There exists no completely satisfactory theory of risk attitude in current normative decision theories. Existing notions confound attitudes to pure risk with unrelated psychological factors such as strength of preference for certain outcomes, and probability weighting. In addition traditional measures of risk attitude frequently cannot be applied to non-numerical consequences, and are not psychologically intuitive. I develop Pure Risk theory which resolves these problems – it is consistent with existing normative theories, and both internalises and generalises the intuitive notion of risk being related to the probability of not achieving one’s aspirations. Existing models which ignore pure risk attitudes may be misspecified, and effects hitherto modelled as loss aversion or utility curvature may be due instead to Pure Risk attitudes.     

Emotional balance and probability weighting

We find suggestive evidence that emotional balance has an impact on probability weighting incremental to demographic controls. Specifically, low negative affectivity (implying high emotional balance) tends to be a characteristic of those whose probability weighting functions exhibit lower curvature and more neutral elevation. In other words, emotional balance seems to push people in the direction of normative expected utility theory.     

Known, Unknown, and Unknowable Uncertainties

In normative decision theory, the weight of an uncertain event in a decision is governed solely by the probability of the event. A large body of empirical research suggests that a single notion of probability does not accurately capture peoples' reactions to uncertainty. As early as the 1920s, Knight made the distinction between cases where probabilities are known and where probabilities are unknown. We distinguish another case –- the unknowable uncertainty –- where the missing information is unavailable to all. We propose that missing information influences the attractiveness of a bet contingent upon an uncertain event, especially when the information is available to someone else. We demonstrate that the unknowable uncertainty –- falls in preference somewhere in between the known and the known uncertainty.     

The Decline in Shared Collective Conscience as Found in the Shifting Norms and Values of Etiquette Manuals

In this article we address Emile Durkheim's theory that norms and values become more generalized and abstract in a society as it becomes more complex and differentiated. To test Durkheim's theory we examine etiquette manuals—the common texts that define normative manners and morals in American society. We perform a deductive content analysis on past and present etiquette manuals to understand what changes have occurred regarding shifting behavioral norms and values over time. Our findings suggest that a change has occurred in the presentation and language of contemporary etiquette manuals, reflecting a greater change in the normative order. We find—as Durkheim would expect—that three main shifts have occurred: a shift from specific to general expectations for behavior in social settings, a shift from demanding to more suggestive rules of behavior in social situations, and a weakening in the severity of sanctions for breaches of etiquette.     

Arbitrage,rationality, and equilibrium

No-arbitrage is the fundamental principle of economic rationality which unifies normative decision theory, game theory, and market theory. In economic environments where money is available as a medium of measurement and exchange, no-arbitrage is synonymous with subjective expected utility maximization in personal decisions, competitive equilibria in capital markets and exchange economies, and correlated equilibria in noncooperative games. The arbitrage principle directly characterizes rationality at the market level; the appearance of deliberate optimization by individual agents is a consequence of their adaptation to the market. Concepts of equilibrium behavior in games and markets can thus be reconciled with the ideas that individual rationality is bounded, that agents use evolutionarily-shaped decision rules rather than numerical optimization algorithms, and that personal probabilities and utilities are inseparable and to some extent indeterminate. Risk-neutral probability distributions, interpretable as products of probabilities and marginal utilities, play a central role as observable quantities in economic systems.     

On the emptiness of the stability set of order d

We know from Li's theorem (1993) that the stability set of order d may be empty for some preference profiles. However, one may wonder whether such situations are just rare oddities or not. In this paper, we partially answer this question by considering the restrictive case where the number of alternatives is the smallest compatible with an empty stability set. More precisely, we provide an upper bound on the probability for having an empty stability set of order d for the majority game under the Impartial Weak Ordering Culture assumption. This upper bound is already extremely low for small population and tends to zero as the number of individuals goes to infinity.     

心理学利己主义和伦理学利己主义

存在两种不同的利己主义学说:心理学利己主义和伦理学利己主义,并利用当代西方伦理学的一些研究成果和作者的研究心得,探讨了两个问题。第一,“心理学利己主义”作为一种描述人性或者人的心理结构的科学学说是否为真?第二,“伦理学利己主义”作为一种规范伦理学理论是否成立?严格的论证将证明心理学利己主义作为一种人性的描述性的理论不能为真,而伦理学利己主义尽管包含了某些合理因素,但作为一种规范伦理学理论也不能成立。     

Expected utility theory under non-classical uncertainty

In this article, Savage’s theory of decision-making under uncertainty is extended from a classical environment into a non-classical one. The Boolean lattice of events is replaced by an arbitrary ortho-complemented poset. We formulate the corresponding axioms and provide representation theorems for qualitative measures and expected utility. Then, we discuss the issue of beliefs updating and investigate a transition probability model. An application to a simple game context is proposed.     

The Theory of Conditionality: An Illustration of the Place of Norms in the Field of Social Thinking

In the field of the central core theory of social representations, research which has focused on the normative aspects is relatively recent as it dates back little more than ten years. The theory of conditionality which developed from research into the periphery of representation results from this. It is a particularly fruitful theory to explain “normative latitudes” and the behaviour accruing to them. One of the particularities of these works stresses the importance of linking the normative aspects with specific methods and/or analyses. In this paper, we will illustrate it via a specific tool developed in the field of traffic psychology: the Conditional Script Questionnaire (CSQ). This approach makes it possible to highlight the interactions between two systems of norms: the legal system and the social system. The implication of norms is fundamental in different processes already studied such as social influence or identity processes, and this article can be considered as an illustration of the place of norms in the field of social thinking.     

Subjective expected utility theory revisited: A reductio ad absurdum paradox

A paradox is posed and analyzed in which people reverse their preferences for information on probabilities versus prizes once the range of the unknown probabilities is sufficiently narrowed. This reversal is shown to be incompatible with both objective expected utility (EU) as well as subjective versions in which the same probability transformation applies to all random variables. Experimental data are presented showing that the reversals occur with small, medium and large payoffs.The present paradox is compared with those of Allais and Ellsberg, and found to differ in substantive ways. It raises further questions about the normative status of expected utility theory, especially its treatment of probability and value. The paradox specifically calls into question EU's substitution and compound probability axioms.     

The value of perfect information in nonlinear utility theory

Wakker (1988) has recently shown that, in contrast to an expected utility maximizer, the value of information will sometimes be negative for an agent who violates the independence axiom of expected utility theory. We demonstrate, however, that the value ofperfect information will always be nonnegative if the agent satisfies a weak dominance axiom. This result thus mitigates to some degree the normative objection to nonlinear utility theory implicit in Wakker's finding.     

Individual vs. couple behavior: an experimental investigation of risk preferences

In this article, we elicit both individuals’ and couples’ preferences assuming prospect theory (PT) as a general theoretical framework for decision under risk. Our experimental method, based on certainty equivalents, allows to infer measurements of utility and probability weighting at the individual level and at the couple level. Our main results are twofold. First, risk attitude for couples is compatible with PT and incorporates deviations from expected utility similar to those found in individual decision making. Second, couples’ attitudes towards risk are found to be consistent with a mix of individual attitudes, women being more influent on couples’ preferences at low probability levels.     

Probability and juxtaposition effects: An experimental investigation of the common ratio effect

Several theories explain the common ratio effect as a probability effect resulting from properties of individuals' preference orderings over probability distributions of consequences. In contrast, regret theory explains it as the result of changes in the juxtaposition of consequences in the action/state matrix. This article reports an experiment that allowed probability effects and juxtaposition effects to be separately identified for some common ratio problems, some of which involved real gains and others, real losses. The main finding is that changes in the juxtaposition of consequences have systematic effects on choices in the direction predicted by regret theory.University of East Anglia     

The Generalized Means Model (GMM) for non-deterministic decision making: Its normative and descriptive power,including sketch of the representation theorem

Two schools of thought have been arguing during the last thirty years about the foundations of the theory of choice under uncertainty, namely: The neo-Bernoullian or American school defending an Expected Utility Model (EUM); and the Allais or French school proposing a model based on the moments of the probability distribution over psychological values (MM). In this paper we present a unified theory: the Generalized Means Model (GMM). By using the well known concept of the generalized mean it is possible to derive both contesting models from the same core of axioms, that — surprisingly enough — includes an extended form of the hotly debated Substitution Principle. It can be seen that the differences between the two models occur at the beginning and at the end of their axiomatic derivation, as follows: the EUM starts from a probability distribution function over consequences whereas the MM begins with a probability distribution over psychological values. The EUM finishes with an early introduction of a behavioural axiom on the existance of utility, whereas the MM uses first the properties of the distribution function, and then introduces the behavioural assumptions. The simplest MM consistent with all axioms of the GMM is the model proposed by the author some years ago. It is suggested that a reduced version, the Three Moments Model (TMM), is sufficient for practical applications. The second part of the paper demonstrates how the TMM solves in a very natural way the Allais Paradox, the certainty effect, the reflection effect, and several other behavioural observations.     

Estimation of a Bernouilli parameter: A normative approach to replace the Bayesian one

The paper deals with the problem of the estimation of an unknown probability from a finite number of experiments. We propose a normative (axiomatic) solution that restricts the class of admissible estimators to a one-parameter family. Moreover this solution coincides with the one obtained from Bayes theory with a prior. Thus our results can be interpreted as a justification for the use of Bayesian inference with a prior.     

Fair student placement

We revisit the concept of fairness in the Student Placement framework. We declare an allocation as \(\upalpha \)-equitable if no agent can propose an alternative allocation that nobody else might argue to be inequitable. It turns out that \(\upalpha \)-equity is compatible with efficiency. Our analysis fills a gap in the literature by giving normative support to the allocations improving, in terms of efficiency, the Student Optimal Stable allocation.     

Determinate attitudes and indeterminate norms

The aim of this paper is to offer a version of social normative pragmatism – that is, the approach that takes norms to be the result of shared practices – that comes closer to social reality than its cousins in the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind. The purpose is presenting a framework that can be useful for social theorists sympathetic to normative concepts. This version introduces the concepts of the adoption of the normative stance, the projective structure of evaluation and a sketch of a theory of normative force in terms of accumulation of normative attitude. In order to motivate this conceptual tools, we present them as allowing us to overcome the traditional skeptical challenge put forward by Kripke.     

自杀与现代人的境况——涂尔干的“自杀类型学”及其人性基础

涂尔干在《自杀论》中提出的“自杀类型学”是他对自杀研究做出的一个重要的理论贡献。他通过自杀的社会类型展开的广泛解释和论述,是和其著作中的一些实质问题密切相关的。本文检视了这个类型学的一些关键方面和存在的问题,并结合涂尔干的人性论进行了比较深入的分析,强调了涂尔干社会理论的人性基础;这种分析也表明,涂尔干的自杀类型学是他继《社会分工论》之后对个体与社会关系问题的进一步思考和推进。另外,涂尔干通过对作为社会事实的“自杀潮”的独特的社会病理学分析,深刻揭示了现代人的生存境况。因此,《自杀论》的经典意义在于其将理论图式与时代问题紧密结合起来的研究范式,这充分体现了古典社会理论的本质特征。