ASYMMETRY IN THE EFFECTS OF MONETARY AND GOVERNMENT SPENDING SHOCKS: CONTRASTING EVIDENCE AND IMPLICATIONS

Using quarterly data for the United States, demand contraction exceeds expansion in the face of monetary and government spending shocks. Demand contraction in the face of government spending shocks, is absorbed in nominal wage and price deflation. The variability of government spending shocks decreases average wage and price inflation. In contrast, the upward flexibility of price appears in sharp contrast to its downward rigidity in the face of monetary shocks. Furthermore, output contraction is notably larger relative to expansion in the face of monetary shocks. Monetary variability accelerates average price inflation and decreases average output and real wage growth.     

THE LONG-RUN LINK BETWEEN MONEY GROWTH AND INFLATION

Is inflation always a monetary phenomenon? Many economists believe that the link between money growth and inflation in the U.S. has weakened over the last two decades due in part to the Federal Reserve's policy experiment in 1979–1982 and innovations in the financial sector of the economy. I find that the long-run relationship between money growth and inflation is strong in a statistical sense and important economically. The key result is that the trend or growth component in CPI inflation is entirely due to the trend component of monetary base growth. (JEL C32, E31, E51)     

THE COMPOSITION AND CONSTRUCTION OF MONETARY AGGREGATES

An economic monetary aggregate is composed from a set of monetary goods that are at least weakly separable from other goods in the optimizing agent's utility function. We construct such an aggregate using a Divisia index number. We demonstrate that through the middle of the 1980s forecasts of the inflation rate based on our economic monetary aggregate are superior to forecasts based on the simple sum monetary aggregates M1 or M2.     

INTERNATIONAL PRICE BEHAVIOR AND THE DEMAND FOR MONEY

Oil prices, commodity prices and American monetary policy, the last operating through a variety of channels, have all figured prominently in explanations of the international inflation process in the late 1960s and early 70s. OUT major purpose in this paper is to test these various hypotheses. We do so in the context of a reduced-form rational-expectations price equation which we estimate for the United States and seven other industrial countries using quarterly data for the period 1955 through 1976.
The principal conclusion that emerges from this exercise is that movements in domestic money in these countries served as the key link in the inflation process. The factors that produced these monetary changes, however, differed among countries. Price shocks of various sorts were clearly of secondary importance.
The other important set of conclusions concerns the demand for money. In place of a traditional stock adjustment model, we used GLS with a second-order correction for autocorrelation. We believe this produced more plausible estimates of the parameters of the long-run demand function and of the adjustment process itself.     

THE SWINGS OF U.S. INFLATION AND THE GIBSON PARADOX

In recent business cycles, U.S. inflation has experienced a reduction of volatility and a severe weakening in the correlation to the nominal interest rate (Gibson paradox). We examine these facts in an estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with money. Our findings point at a flatter New Keynesian Phillips Curve (higher price stickiness) and a lower persistence of markup shocks as the main explanatory factors. In addition, a higher interest‐rate elasticity of money demand, an increasing role of demand‐side shocks, and a less systematic behavior of Fed's monetary policy also account for the recent patterns of U.S. inflation dynamics. (JEL E32, E47)     

LEANING AGAINST WINDY BANK LENDING

Using an estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with banking, this paper first provides evidence that monetary policy reacted to bank loan growth in the United States during the Great Moderation. It then shows that the optimized simple interest‐rate rule features no response to the growth of bank credit. However, the welfare loss associated to the empirical responsiveness is small. The sources of business cycle fluctuations are crucial in determining whether a “leaning‐against‐the‐wind” policy is optimal or not. In fact, the predominant role of supply shocks in the model gives rise to a trade‐off between inflation and financial stabilization. (JEL E32, E44, E52)     

STICKY PRICE AND STICKY INFORMATION PRICE‐SETTING MODELS: WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE?

Using a partial equilibrium framework, Mankiw and Reis show that a sticky information model can generate a lagged and gradual inflation response after a monetary policy shock, whereas a sticky price model cannot. Our study demonstrates that the finding is sensitive to their model's parameterization. To determine a plausible parameterization, we specify a general equilibrium model with sticky information. In that model, we find that inflation peaks only one period after a monetary disturbance. A sensitivity analysis of our results reveals that the inflation peak is delayed by including real rigidities when the monetary policy instrument is money growth, whereas inflation peaks immediately when the policy instrument is the nominal interest rate. ( JEL E31, E32, E52)     

A New Empirically Weighted Monetary Aggregate for the United States

This article uses an approach to long-run modeling proposed by Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (2001) to develop an empirically weighted broad monetary aggregate for the United States and to demonstrate the advantages of this type of aggregate from a monetary policy perspective. The new empirically weighted aggregate performs well in out-of-sample nominal income and inflation forecasting tests, and in respect of the latter is clearly superior to simple sum M2, Divisia M2, and simple sum M2+ (which includes stock and bond mutual funds) over the period 1991–2001.     

IS THE PRICE ELASTICITY OF MONEY DEMAND ALWAYS UNITY?

Including both monetary gold and nonmonetary gold in a standard money‐in‐utility model, we establish a presumption that the price elasticity of money demand should be less than 1 under commodity standards. Applying cointegration methods to data of the world, the United Kingdom, and the United States, we find support for the new theory. (JEL E41, E42)     

ALTERNATIVE P* MODELS OF INFLATION FORECASTS

This paper reevaluates the inflation forecast performance of M2-based P* models relative to other competing models over the period of 1970–96. Included in the comparative study are newly developed monetary aggregates, including M2+, MZM, and M2*, and direct treatments of velocity changes associated with recent developments in M2. Out-of-sample rolling-horizon forecast exercises suggest that the predictive accuracy of alternative P* model specifications relative to traditional inflation models is not robust to different subsamples. The switching forecast performance between money-based and output-based models across periods highlights the extent of structural instability in the inflation generating process. (JEL E3, E4, C2)     

INFLATION DYNAMICS AND SUBJECTIVE EXPECTATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

We estimate a forward‐looking New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) for the United States using data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters as proxy for expected inflation. We obtain significant and plausible estimates for the structural parameters independently of whether we use the output gap or unit labor costs as a measure of marginal costs. Moreover, when estimating a Phillips curve where lagged inflation enters due to price indexation by nonreoptimizing firms, we obtain significant parameter estimates of the sign predicted by theory independently of the marginal cost measure used. (JEL E31)     

MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY DESIGN AT THE ZERO LOWER BOUND: EVIDENCE FROM THE LAB

The global economic crisis of 2007–2008 has pushed many advanced economies into a liquidity trap. We design a laboratory experiment on the effectiveness of policy measures to avoid expectation‐driven liquidity traps. Monetary policy alone is not sufficient to avoid liquidity traps, even if it preventively cuts the interest rate when inflation falls below a threshold. However, monetary policy augmented with a fiscal switching rule succeeds in escaping liquidity trap episodes. We measure the effect of fiscal policy on expectations, and report larger‐than‐unity fiscal multipliers at the zero lower bound. Experimental results in different treatments are well explained by adaptive learning. (JEL E70, C92, D83, D84, E52, E62)     

SUSTAINABILITY OF THE FRIEDMAN RULE IN AN INTERNATIONAL MONETARY POLICY GAME

This article develops a two-country monetary economy model in order to analyze the international monetary policy game between governments and the domestic monetary policy game between each government and its private sector. We prove that if governments can commit to their own private sectors, the cooperative equilibrium of the game between governments is for them to follow the Friedman rule. When governments lack such ability to commit, we find that the Friedman rule is more likely to be sustained in our open-economy model than in the closed-economy model of Ireland. ( JEL E31, E52, E61)     

DETERMINING OUTPUT AND INFLATION VARIABILITY: ARE THE PHILLIPS CURVE AND THE MONETARY POLICY REACTION FUNCTION RESPONSIBLE?

This study analyzes the policy parameters in a Taylor monetary policy reaction function and a Phillips curve equation to determine the variability of inflation and output. The theoretical and empirical investigations yield two key results. First, countries with large parameters in the monetary policy reaction function have low and stable inflation. Second, countries with flatter Phillips curves (i.e., those with a higher degree of price stickiness) have larger output variability. This article also examines the determinants of inflation and output variability as well as determinants of the slope of the Phillips curve.(JEL E32 , E52 )     

THE CYCLICALITY OF PRICE‐COST MARGINS IN BANKING: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF ITS DETERMINANTS

We study the determinants of the cyclical behavior of banks' price‐cost margins in the United States banking sector, using time series quarterly data for the period 1979–2005. We contribute to the literature by building an empirical model of the countercyclical behavior of these margins first documented by Aliaga‐Díaz and Olivero (2010a) . Doing so we are able to explore potential explanations for this behavior, and to show that margins are consistently countercyclical, even after controlling for the effects of credit risk and monetary policy. As a mechanism for the propagation of aggregate shocks, the countercyclical nature of margins in banking can provide additional support to stabilization policy. (JEL E32, E44, G21)     

THE EFFECTS OF ASSET PURCHASES AND NORMALIZATION OF U.S. MONETARY POLICY

This paper examines changes in the effects of unconventional monetary policies in the United States. To this end, we estimate a Markov-switching VAR model with absorbing regimes to capture possible structural changes. Our results detect regime changes around the beginning of 2011 and the middle of 2013. Before 2011, the U.S. large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs) had relatively large impacts on the real economy and prices, but after the middle of 2013, their effects were weaker and less-persistent. In addition, after the middle of 2013, which includes the monetary policy normalization period, the asset purchase (or balance sheet) shocks had slightly weaker effects than during the early stage of the LSAPs but stronger effects than during the late stage of the LSAPs, while interest rate shocks had insignificant effects on the real economy and prices. Finally, our results suggest that the positive responses of durables and capital goods expenditures to interest rate shocks weakened the negative impacts of interest rate hikes after the middle of 2013 including the period of monetary policy normalization. (JEL C32, E21, E52)     

WHO IS AFRAID OF THE FRIEDMAN RULE?

We explore the connection between optimal monetary policy and heterogeneity among agents in a standard monetary economy with two types of agents where the stationary distribution of money holdings is nondegenerate. Sans type-specific fiscal policy, we show that the zero-nominal-interest rate policy (the Friedman rule) does not maximize type-specific welfare; it may not maximize aggregate ex ante social welfare either. Indeed, one or, more surprisingly, both types may benefit if the central bank deviates from the Friedman rule. ( JEL E31, E51, E58)     

CROSS-COUNTRY ESTIMATES OF THE DEMAND FOR MONEY AND ITS COMPONENTS

The demand for money aggregates (M1, M2) and their components (currency, demand deposits, and time deposits) are estimated using a sample of 103 countries at two time periods. Money demand is found to be affected by age, literacy, industrial development, and political structure, as well as income and inflation. This expanded demand function helps to explain the considerable changes in money demand that have occurred over long periods and the large variation in money demand found across countries. The knowledge thus gained is useful for understanding differences in monetary and taxation policies across countries.     

THE EMPIRICAL RELIABILITY OF MONETARY AGGREGATES AS INDICATORS: 1983–1987

It is widely believed that monetary aggregates have failed to predict economic performance over 1983-87. This paper observes that the traditional definition of money (M1 lessother checkable deposits, or M1A) shows no evidence of structural change, and yields lower prediction errors for both real GNP and inflation over 1983-87Q2 than the errors obtained using M1 or M2. If there is a mystery, it is not why MIA has done so well, but why economists abandoned it for M1 or what was once called M1B (currency, demand deposits, and other checkable deposits).     

UNION POWER,COLLECTIVE BARGAINING,AND OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY

We study Ramsey policies and optimal monetary policy rules in a dynamic New Keynesian model with unionized labor markets. Collective wage bargaining and unions' monopoly power amplify inefficient employment fluctuations. The optimal monetary policy must trade off between stabilizing inflation and reducing inefficient unemployment fluctuations induced by unions' monopoly power. In this context the monetary authority uses inflation as a tax on union rents and as a mean for indirect redistribution. Results are robust to the introduction of imperfect insurance on income shocks. The optimal monetary policy rule targets unemployment alongside inflation. (JEL E0, E4, E5, E6)