Opting out of publicly provided services: A majority voting result

Our objective in this paper is to examine majority voting in an environment where both public and private alternatives coexist. We construct a model in which households are differentiated by income and have the option of choosing between publicly provided services and private services. Publicly provided services are financed through income tax revenues and made available to all citizens at zero price. Majority voting determines the tax rate. Even though preferences over tax rates are not single peaked, we provide conditions under which a majority voting equilibrium exists. We illustrate our existence result with CES preferences and a Dagum income distribution. Received: 21 December 1993 / Accepted: 2 September 1996     

Informatization, voter turnout and income inequality

In recent years, voter turnout has been decreasing in most industrial countries, and about 40% of all electors abstain from voting. This may affect income inequality and the GDP growth rate through a redistribution policy determined by majority voting. In this paper, we explore the reasons for this continuing decrease in voter turnout and assess its social costs. We conclude that informatization lowers voter turnout by generating an information overload, and that a decrease in voter turnout lowers GDP growth by limiting income redistribution.      

On the (sequential) majority choice of public good size and location

This article studies majority voting over the size and location of a public good when voters differ both in income and in their preferences for the public good location. Public good provision is financed either by a lump sum tax or by a proportional income tax. We analyze both the simultaneous and the sequential determinations of the public good’s size and location. We show that, while the choice of the type of public good follows the traditional median logic, the majoritarian determination of the taxation rate need not coincide with the preferences of a median income citizen. With lump sum financing, income heterogeneity plays no role and the sequential equilibrium consists of the median location together with the public good level most-preferred by the individual located at the median distance from the median. This policy bundle also constitutes an equilibrium with simultaneous voting in the special case of a uniform bivariate distribution of individuals’ income and location. With proportional taxation, there is no policy equilibrium with simultaneous voting. We offer a complete characterization of the equations describing the sequential equilibrium in the general case and we show why and how our results depart from those most-preferred by the median income individual located at the median distance from the median. We also compare these majority voting allocations with the socially optimal one.     

Aversion to inequality in Italy and its determinants

The main goal of this paper is to estimate the preferences of the Italian society towards equity in order to verify whether preferences (i) have changed across the years, and (ii) can be related to specific socio-demographic characteristics. Introducing equity concerns in the implementation of economic policies is a fundamental problem faced by both economists and policy makers. This paper uses a social welfare function à la Jorgenson and Slesnick to estimate society’s aversion towards inequality by implementing a voting scheme for compiling individuals’ equity preferences into a social choice by majority rule. The results show that preferences are highly polarized toward a low and a high concern for equity aversion and that this concern is significantly related with several sociodemographic characteristics. Among them, income plays an important role with richer people tending to favor less equity. Results also show that preferences towards equity have changed across the years.     

Political Incorporation Among Immigrants from Ten Areas of Origin: The Persistence of Source Country Effects

Using four years of data from the Current Population Survey, this study examines the effect of country of origin on two types of political incorporation among immigrants ‐ citizenship and voting ‐ in the contemporary United States. Results show that country of origin is a statistically significant predictor of citizenship acquisition for nine of ten immigrant groups and for voter turnout for five of ten groups, net of income, education, length of residence in the United States, and other demographic characteristics. The findings also suggest that country of origin matters as much for how it interacts with other key characteristics, such as education and income, as for the independent influence it exerts on these two political processes. For immigrants from most countries under examination, lower levels of education and income discourage citizenship acquisition. An exception is found among Britons, for whom lower levels of income encourages naturalizing. In the voting process, higher levels of education encourage voter turnout for most immigrant groups. Though country of origin has a greater effect on naturalizing than on voting, it significantly impacts both types of political incorporation. The differing effects of country of origin and other demographic factors on naturalizing and voting, respectively, suggest the two processes are distinct from one another.     

A majority-rule characterization with multiple extensions

When May's necessary and sufficient conditions for majority rule as a binary voting rule are extended in a natural way to decisions over more than two options, the resulting conditions are consistent with the Borda and Black voting rules, but not with a variety of other voting rules for more than two options. This paper presents an alternative set of necessary and sufficient conditions for binary majority rule, which permits the plurality, Condorcet and (simplified) Dodgson rules, as well as the Borda and Black rules, but not the Copeland or Nanson rules, to be classified as extensions of binary majority rule to decisions over more than two options.I am indebted to Amartya Sen and anonymous referees for helpful suggestions     

Voter Preferences and State Regulation of Smoking

Voters' preferences for smoking restrictions in restaurants, bars, malls, indoor sporting events, and hospitals are consistent with state-level restrictions on smoking in each of these public areas. This analysis is based on constructed measures of political pressure that take into account both individual preferences and voting behavior. Although smokers are less likely to vote than nonsmokers, their lower voting rate does not substantially influence the probability that a state has a restriction. Other factors, such as tobacco's role in the state economy and state income, are rarely influential.     

MANIPULATING VOTING PROCEDURES

A voting procedure can be manipulated if, by misrepresenting his preferences, some individual can secure an outcome which he prefers to the outcome he gets when he is honest.
This is an expository paper on the theory of voting manipulation. Section I is an historical sketch of the contributions of Condorcet, de Borda, Arrow, and others. Section II provides a set of examples of manipulation: of plurality voting, of majority voting, of exhaustive voting, of the single transferable vote procedure, and of approval voting. It also contains an example of a nonmanipulable random voting scheme. Section HI provides a simple proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite manipulation theorem.     

Subgame perfect implementation of voting rules via randomized mechanisms

We characterize completely ordinal and onto choice rules that are subgame perfect of Nash equilibrium (SPE) implementable via randomized mechanisms under strict preferences. The characterization is very operationalizable, and allows us to analyse SPE implementability of voting rules. We show that no scoring rule is SPE implementable. However, the top-cycle and the uncovered correspondences as well as plurality with runoff and any strongly Condorcet consistent voting rule can be SPE implemented. Therefore our results are favourable to majority based voting rules over scoring rules. Nevertheless, we show that many interesting Condorcet consistent but not strongly Condorcet consistent rules, such as the Copeland rule, the Kramer rule and the Simpson rule, cannot be SPE implemented.     

Are Condorcet procedures so bad according to the reinforcement axiom?

A Condorcet social choice procedure elects the candidate that beats every other candidate under simple majority when such a candidate exists. The reinforcement axiom roughly states that given two groups of individuals, if these two groups select the same alternative, then this alternative must also be selected by their union. Condorcet social choice procedures are known to violate this axiom. Our goal in this paper is to put this important voting theory result into perspective. We then proceed by evaluating how frequently this phenomenon is susceptible to occur.     

THE COMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE: ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND PREFERENCES

This paper examines the question of why the composition of government expenditure differs among democratic countries and to what extent it may be explained by differences in economic conditions or preferences. A simple overlapping generations model, which allows for a range of relevant factors, is constructed to examine the division of expenditure on public goods and a transfer payment under majority voting. The model yields a closed‐form solution for the majority choice of the expenditure ratio. An empirical examination suggests that income inequalities play a minor role while different preferences for public goods reflecting cultural differences across countries may play an important role in accounting for the substantial variations in expenditure patterns. (JEL D72, H41, H53, H11)     

Limiting distributions for continuous state Markov voting models

This paper proves the existence of a stationary distribution for a class of Markov voting models. We assume that alternatives to replace the current status quo arise probabilistically, with the probability distribution at time t+1 having support set equal to the set of alternatives that defeat, according to some voting rule, the current status quo at time t. When preferences are based on Euclidean distance, it is shown that for a wide class of voting rules, a limiting distribution exists. For the special case of majority rule, not only does a limiting distribution always exist, but we obtain bounds for the concentration of the limiting distribution around a centrally located set. The implications are that under Markov voting models, small deviations from the conditions for a core point will still leave the limiting distribution quite concentrated around a generalized median point. Even though the majority relation is totally cyclic in such situations, our results show that such chaos is not probabilistically significant.We acknowledge the support of NSF Grants #SOC79-21588, SES-8106215 and SES-8106212.     

Aversion to inequality in Italy and its determinants

The main goal of this paper is to estimate the preferences of the Italian society towards equity in order to verify whether preferences (i) have changed across the years, and (ii) can be related to specific socio-demographic characteristics. Introducing equity concerns in the implementation of economic policies is a fundamental problem faced by both economists and policy makers. This paper uses a social welfare function à la Jorgenson and Slesnick to estimate societys aversion towards inequality by implement in a voting scheme for compiling individuals equity preferences in to a social choice by majority rule. The results show that preferences are highly polarized toward a low and a high concern for equity aversion and that this concern is significantly related with several sociodemographic characteristics. Among them, income plays an important role with richer people tending to favor less equity. Results also show that preferences towards equity have changed across the years.     

Condorcet efficiencies under the maximal culture condition

The Condorcet winner in an election is a candidate that could defeat each other candidate in a series of pairwise majority rule elections. The Condorcet efficiency of a voting rule is the conditional probability that the voting rule will elect the Condorcet winner, given that such a winner exists. The study considers the Condorcet efficiency of basic voting rules under various assumptions about how voter preference rankings are obtained. Particular attention is given to situations in which the maximal culture condition is used as a basis for obtaining voter preferences. Received: 4 February 1998/Accepted: 13 April 1998     

Ensuring Pareto Optimality by Referendum Voting

We consider a society confronting the decision of accepting or rejecting a list of (at least two) proposals. Assuming separability of preferences, we show the impossibility of guaranteeing Pareto optimal outcomes through anonymous referendum voting, except in the case of an odd number of voters confronting precisely two proposals. In this special case, majority voting is the only anonymous social choice rule which guarantees Pareto optimal referendum outcomes.     

Equitable agendas: agendas ensuring identical sincere and sophisticated voting decisions

 Sophisticated voting under amendment procedure using majority rule usually results in a decision that is distinct from the decision obtained through sincere voting. In this article it is shown that the underlying majority tournament (determined by the voters’ preferences) admits an agenda so that the sincere and sophisticated decisions are identical if and only if the initial strong component of the tournament is not a 3-cycle. As a result, most tournaments, in an asymptotic sense, admit an agenda so that the sincere and sophisticated decisions are identical. Received: 31 August 1993/Accepted: 28 August 1995     

Modeling large electorates with Fourier series, with applications to Nash equilibria in proximity and directional models of spatial competition

 In this paper we introduce harmonic analysis (Fourier series) as a tool for characterizing the existence of Nash equilibria in two-dimensional spatial majority rule voting games with large electorates. We apply our methods both to traditional proximity models and to directional models. In the latter voters exhibit preferences over directions rather than over alternatives, per se. A directional equilibrium can be characterized as a Condorcet direction, in analogy to the Condorcet (majority) winner in the usual voting models, i.e., a direction which is preferred by a majority to (or at least is not beaten by) any other direction. We provide a parallel treatment of the total median condition for equilibrium under proximity voting and equilibrium conditions for directional voting that shows that the former result is in terms of a strict equality (a knife-edge result very unlikely to hold) while the latter is in terms of an inequality which is relatively easy to satisfy. For the Matthews [3] directional model and a variant of the Rabinowitz and Macdonald [7] directional model, we present a sufficiency condition for the existence of a Condorcet directional vector in terms of the odd-numbered components of the Fourier series representing the density distribution of the voter points. We interpret our theoretical results by looking at real-world voter distributions and direction fields among voter points derived from U.S. and Norwegian survey data. Received: 7 July 1995 / Accepted: 14 May 1996     

AN EXPRESSIVE VOTING THEORY OF STRIKES

Union members may vote for a strike even if they do not expect to thereby increase their wages. For under majority voting any one member's vote for a strike is unlikely to be decisive. A union member who obtains a non-infinitesimal emotional benefit from the act of voting for a strike may therefore vote in its favor. This hypothesis can explain the existence of strikes and the conditions which make strikes especially likely.     

Cross-over Voting in a 1976 Open Presidential Primary

Using data collected from a polling place survey with 1,279voters in the four-county metropolitan Milwaukee area, thisreport considers how much cross-over voting took place in the1976 presidential primary, the degree to which the cross-overvote was a mischief one, the social backgrounds of cross-overand consistent voters, and the reasons cited for the candidatechoice of cross-over and consistent voters