航空公司收入管理价格与舱位控制的统一分析

收入管理对于改善民航企业的经济效益、增强民航企业的竞争能力具有重大意义. 文章 运用随机过程理论和最大凹向包络原理,探讨航空公司客运收入管理研究中动态价格与舱位 控制的统一分析模型,即在任意订票时刻,决定航班的哪些舱位该开放,以什么价格开放,从而 实现单个航班的收入最大化. 文章指出,航空公司可通过三阶段方法来获取最优的动态价格与 舱位控制策略,即确定最优价格集、开放舱位数及最优价格. 最后给出了实例分析.     

The effects of price subsidy and fairness concern on pricing and benefits of take-away supply chain

In this paper, from the perspective of game theory, we study the impact of price subsidy and fairness concern on the pricing strategies and benefits of members in the take-away industry. In the single-channel supply chain, we build a Stackelberg game model between the take-away platform and the restaurant for the online take-away business. By comparing and analyzing the product pricing and revenue in the cases of no price subsidy and price subsidy, we obtain the optimal pricing strategy for both parties. In the dual-channel supply chain, we explore the benefits of supply chain members under the combined effects of fairness concern and price subsidy. Under the single channel price subsidy model, we find that restaurant always raises prices, and the price increase is directly proportional to the subsidy intensity. Such a proper price increase always brings more benefits to both parties. Under the dual-channel model, consumer fairness concern may curb the price increase behavior of restaurants. Regardless of the model, in the long term, the optimal subsidy of the platform will decrease with the expansion of the online take-away market.

     

基于供应链收益共享契约的格子铺经营机制优化分析

格子铺经营模式已引起理论者和实践者广泛关注.针对格子铺经营模式的合作问题,在努力因素影响需求的市场环境里,基于供应链视角,通过建模与优化,分析了节点企业的决策特征与策略选择,讨论了收益共享机制对格子铺经营模式的影响,研究表明单纯的收益共享机制,无法实现格子铺经营模式的整体绩效最优(即由格主、铺主参与的供应链合作机制的协调),不能够改善格子铺合作；当对租金收取机制进行调整,使其为促销、广告投入的一定比例时,收益共享机制可以实现合作的协调,进而达到改善格子铺经营的目的.     

顾客有限“碳行为”偏好对选址-路径-库存联合优化的影响

针对考虑顾客有限“碳行为”偏好的选址-路径-库存联合优化问题,引入环保度系数作为碳排放量的特征向量,在低碳产品加价率存在的情况下,刻画了顾客有限“碳行为”偏好和市场逆需求系数对低碳产品需求量的影响,构建了选址-路径-库存系统中考虑有“碳行为”偏好的联合优化模型,并分析了顾客行为偏好对企业收益的影响。使用基于NNC的多目标求解方法,对考虑成本和碳排放的双目标问题进行处理并得到一组Pareto解集,数值实验证明了产品环保度、顾客有限“碳行为”偏好对企业运作方案和收益水平的影响。     

Assortment Optimization under the Multinomial Logit Model with Random Choice Parameters

We consider assortment optimization problems under the multinomial logit model, where the parameters of the choice model are random. The randomness in the choice model parameters is motivated by the fact that there are multiple customer segments, each with different preferences for the products, and the segment of each customer is unknown to the firm when the customer makes a purchase. This choice model is also called the mixture‐of‐logits model. The goal of the firm is to choose an assortment of products to offer that maximizes the expected revenue per customer, across all customer segments. We establish that the problem is NP complete even when there are just two customer segments. Motivated by this complexity result, we focus on assortments consisting of products with the highest revenues, which we refer to as revenue‐ordered assortments. We identify specially structured cases of the problem where revenue‐ordered assortments are optimal. When the randomness in the choice model parameters does not follow a special structure, we derive tight approximation guarantees for revenue‐ordered assortments. We extend our model to the multi‐period capacity allocation problem, and prove that, when restricted to the revenue‐ordered assortments, the mixture‐of‐logits model possesses the nesting‐by‐fare‐order property. This result implies that revenue‐ordered assortments can be incorporated into existing revenue management systems through nested protection levels. Numerical experiments show that revenue‐ordered assortments perform remarkably well, generally yielding profits that are within a fraction of a percent of the optimal.     

效率参数不可观测下的SaaS云外包合约研究

客户企业在实施SaaS（软件即服务,Software as a Service）云外包时,面临因效率参数不可观测所引发的云服务提供商（Cloud Service Provider,CSP）道德风险问题。针对该问题,以激励机制设计方法为基础,以客户企业期望收益最大化为目标,在服务产出为公共信息,而效率参数信息为CSP私人信息下研究如何通过外包合约的设计诱使CSP显示出真实的信息,并付出最优的努力水平。研究表明,最优努力水平、服务报酬支付是效率参数的减函数;客户企业向CSP提供的最优合约可以用线性合约表示;在由固定服务报酬及收益共享构成的线性合约中,效率参数与固定服务报酬支付正相关,与收益共享系数负相关。     

Bounding Optimal Expected Revenues for Assortment Optimization under Mixtures of Multinomial Logits

We consider assortment problems under a mixture of multinomial logit models. There is a fixed revenue associated with each product. There are multiple customer types. Customers of different types choose according to different multinomial logit models whose parameters depend on the type of the customer. The goal is to find a set of products to offer so as to maximize the expected revenue obtained over all customer types. This assortment problem under the multinomial logit model with multiple customer types is NP‐complete. Although there are heuristics to find good assortments, it is difficult to verify the optimality gap of the heuristics. In this study, motivated by the difficulty of finding optimal solutions and verifying the optimality gap of heuristics, we develop an approach to construct an upper bound on the optimal expected revenue. Our approach can quickly provide upper bounds and these upper bounds can be quite tight. In our computational experiments, over a large set of randomly generated problem instances, the upper bounds provided by our approach deviate from the optimal expected revenues by 0.15% on average and by less than one percent in the worst case. By using our upper bounds, we are able to verify the optimality gaps of a greedy heuristic accurately, even when optimal solutions are not available.     

Revenue Management of Reusable Resources with Advanced Reservations

We consider a revenue management problem wherein the seller is endowed with a single type resource with a finite capacity and the resource can be repeatedly used to serve customers. There are multiple classes of customers arriving according to a multi‐class Poisson process. Each customer, upon arrival, submits a service request that specifies his service start time and end time. Our model allows customer advanced reservation times and services times in each class to be arbitrarily distributed and correlated. Upon arrival of each customer, the seller must instantaneously decide whether to accept this customer's service request. A customer whose request is denied leaves the system. A customer whose request is accepted is allocated with a specific item of the resource at his service start time. The resource unit occupied by a customer becomes available to other customers after serving this customer. The seller aims to design an admission control policy that maximizes her expected long‐run average revenue. We propose a policy called the ε‐perturbation class selection policy (ε‐CSP), based on the optimal solution in the fluid setting wherein customers are infinitesimal and customer arrival processes are deterministic, under the restriction that the seller can utilize at most (1 − ε) of her capacity for any ε ∈ (0, 1). We prove that the ε‐CSP is near‐optimal. More precisely, we develop an upper bound of the performance loss of the ε‐CSP relative to the seller's optimal revenue, and show that it converges to zero with a square‐root convergence rate in the asymptotic regime wherein the arrival rates and the capacity grow up proportionally and the capacity buffer level ε decays to zero.     

考虑产品绿色度的绿色供应链博弈模型及收益共享契约

本文以一个制造商和一个零售商组成的二级绿色供应链为背景,建立了考虑产品绿色度的四种绿色供应链博弈模型:以制造商为主导的Stackelberg博弈模型、以零售商为主导的Stackelberg博弈模型、制造商和零售商的Nash均衡博弈模型以及集中控制模型。对四种博弈模型在产品绿色度、产品价格以及批发价格等方面进行了比较分析,并进一步建立了收益共享契约下的博弈模型。通过数值仿真探讨了收益共享系数对产品绿色度、制造商利润和零售商利润的影响。     

突发性产出下的供应链协调应对策略

针对突发事件影响制造商产出的情形，研究了收益共享契约协调应对突发产出事件的有效性问题。首先论证了无突发产出事件时收益共享契约协调供应链的有效性，进而分析了突发产出事件对供应链最优生产计划、定价决策、绩效和协调性的影响。然后，建立了突发产出事件下的收益共享契约协调应对模型，并对原收益共享契约和修正后的收益共享契约进行了对比分析。研究表明：当突发产出事件导致产出扰动范围较小时，供应链的最优生产计划、批发价格和零售价格几乎保持不变，仅当产出扰动范围较大时，三者才需要同时调整，此时原供应链的协调性也将被打破，而修正后的收益共享契约具有良好的抗突发性。最后，通过算例进行了验证。     

“农户+餐饮企业”有机农产品供应链模式构建研究

有机农产品具有巨大的消费市场，但是目前有机农产品的供应链模式相对单一，不能满足有机市场发展的需要。本文提出"农户+餐饮企业"的新模式，并与农户直销模式及农超合作的模式进行比较。结论表明这种新模式能够使得农户和餐饮企业共同受益，并建议政府采取措施促进市场形成多种模式并存的有机农产品供应链格局。     

基于顾客公平偏好的服务机制与定价研究

由于顾客异质性（单位时间等待成本不同），服务提供商通常对顾客采取分类服务策略，然而分类服务会引起服务系统中不同类型顾客之间等待时间和服务价值的差异性，从而给顾客带来心理上的不公平感，进而引起顾客在服务系统中的流动和转移，进一步影响企业收益和社会福利。本文针对非抢占M/M/1服务系统顾客分类情形为背景，由两种顾客之间期望等待时间的不同和公平偏好参数相结合构建普通顾客的公平心理效用模型，以垄断型服务系统为背景，分别从企业收益、社会福利与顾客效用三个视角进行分析。研究表明，服务提供商应对顾客采取可观测型的分类服务机制来获得最大收益；从社会福利视角，服务提供商应对顾客采取不可观测型的分类服务机制；从顾客效用视角，服务提供商应取消顾客分类服务，仅保留普通顾客。最后同现有结论进行比较分析，并进行拓展研究。本文研究对服务提供商采取合理的服务机制及相应的服务定价具有重要参考价值和指导意义。     

混合需求下考虑专利保护因素的闭环供应链定价与协调

在新产品需求为随机需求,再制造产品需求受销售价格影响的混合需求条件下,以博弈论为主要工具,研究了受专利保护的再制造闭环供应链的定价与协调问题,分析了集中决策和分散决策两种情形下的新产品最优订购量、废旧产品最优回收价格、最优专利许可费用、再制造品最优零售价格以及供应链的最优利润,并通过收益分享一费用分担契约对闭环供应链系统进行了协调,并通过数值算例验证了集中决策和分散决策情形下再制造成本节约对供应链成员的最优决策和利润的影响,以及收益分享.费用分担契约对闭环供应链的协调效果。研究表明再制造受专利保护的情况下,原制造商能通过专利许可费来影响第三方再制造商回收的废旧产品的回收价格和回收量,进而去影响原制造商和第三方再制造商的收益。     

A New Dynamic Programming Decomposition Method for the Network Revenue Management Problem with Customer Choice Behavior

In this paper, we propose a new dynamic programming decomposition method for the network revenue management problem with customer choice behavior. The fundamental idea behind our dynamic programming decomposition method is to allocate the revenue associated with an itinerary among the different flight legs and to solve a single‐leg revenue management problem for each flight leg in the airline network. The novel aspect of our approach is that it chooses the revenue allocations by solving an auxiliary optimization problem that takes the probabilistic nature of the customer choices into consideration. We compare our approach with two standard benchmark methods. The first benchmark method uses a deterministic linear programming formulation. The second benchmark method is a dynamic programming decomposition idea that is similar to our approach, but it chooses the revenue allocations in an ad hoc manner. We establish that our approach provides an upper bound on the optimal total expected revenue, and this upper bound is tighter than the ones obtained by the two benchmark methods. Computational experiments indicate that our approach provides significant improvements over the performances of the benchmark methods.     

Recent Developments in Dynamic Pricing Research: Multiple Products,Competition, and Limited Demand Information

Dynamic pricing enables a firm to increase revenue by better matching supply with demand, responding to shifting demand patterns, and achieving customer segmentation. In the last 20 years, numerous success stories of dynamic pricing applications have motivated a rapidly growing research interest in a variety of dynamic pricing problems in the academic literature. A large class of problems that arise in various revenue management applications involve selling a given amount of inventory over a finite time horizon without inventory replenishment. In this study, we identify most recent trends in dynamic pricing research involving such problems. We review existing research on three new classes of problems that have attracted a rapidly growing interest in the last several years, namely, problems with multiple products, problems with competition, and problems with limited demand information. We also identify a number of possible directions for future research.     

两级商业信用下存在顾客预付的易腐品库存模型

在销售单一品种的易腐品供应链中,假设销售商在获得供应链上游供应商延时还款的同时,也从（供应链）下游顾客处获得了部分预付款。分三种情况分别讨论销售商的成本构成,并由此建立数学模型以求解最优订货周期使得销售商单位时间总成本最小化。通过数学证明得到了目标函数的解析性质,结果显示每种情况下在可行域范围内至多存在一个极小值点。以此为基础给出了相应的命题以有效地确定销售商的最优决策。最后结合运作管理实践,通过数值算例说明了模型的有效性。     

需求具有价格敏感性的供应链的利益共享合约

利益共享合约是促使供应链协作的一种重要手段。本文建立了具有价格敏感性的最终消费需求的利益共享合约模型。在考虑最终销售价格为内生变量的条件下,借助于报童模型,分别分析在此合约下销售商和供应商的决策行为,并给出销售商的最优决策的计算公式以及该合约参数Φ的取值范围。最后给出实例分析,验证在利益共享合约下的供应链能达到协作状态。     

Quality‐Speed Competition in Customer‐Intensive Services with Boundedly Rational Customers

We consider a system in which two competing servers provide customer‐intensive services and the service reward is affected by the length of service time. The customers are boundedly rational and choose their service providers according to a logit model. We demonstrate that the service provider revenue function is unimodal in the service rate, its decision variable, and show that the service rate competition has a unique and stable equilibrium. We then study the price decision under three scenarios with the price determined by a revenue‐maximizing firm, a welfare‐maximizing social planner, or two servers in competition. We find that the socially optimal price, subject to the requirement that the customer actual utility must be non‐negative, is always lower than the competition equilibrium price which, in turn, is lower than the revenue‐maximizing monopoly price. However, if the customer actual utility is allowed to be negative in social optimization, the socially optimal price can be higher than the other two prices in a large market.     

多零售商供应链应对突发事件的协调机制研究

本文针对一个供应商和n个Cournot竞争零售商组成的供应链系统,从系统优化和企业管理的角度研究了该供应链系统如何应对突发事件。首先证明稳定条件下的收益共享合约能实现该供应链协调。但突发事件引起的成本和需求的扰动会打破供应链协调,当突发事件导致供应链的市场需求增加而生产成本减少时,供应商必须通过增加生产来应对突发事件;当突发事件导致供应链的市场需求减少而生产成本增加时,供应商必须通过减少生产来应对突发事件;并通过求解突发事件下供应链系统最优利润的Karush-Kuhn-Tucker(KKT)条件,提出了供应链在一体化时应对突发事件的最优策略。进一步证明了改进的收益共享合约可以协调突发事件下分散化决策的供应链系统。最后运用数值实验对模型进行了验证。     

基于收益共享-双向期权契约的供应链金融风险控制研究

通过核心企业的信用水平为中小企业获取贷款提供担保,使得整个供应链有效运行是实施供应链金融的重要意义。本文考虑分销商（核心企业）-零售商（贷款企业）组成的二级供应链,为了降低银行面临的零售商违约风险,在银行监督下,分销商与零售商引入收益共享—双向期权契约。本文计算得到了零售商的违约概率,在此基础上,深入分析了各方期望收益、零售商最优初始订货量与最优期权购买数量、分销商最优收益共享比例、银行下侧风险规避前提下可参考的收益共享比例范围。并构造了数值算例,探讨了期权执行价格、收益共享比例及银行质押率等关键参数对风险控制方面的影响。本文所得结果能够为银行及企业在供应链金融决策方面提供参考。