Risk Aversion,Collective Bargaining,and Wages in Germany

We develop an open‐shop model of trade union membership in which workers differ in their risk attitudes, and derive conditions under which the bargained wage will fall and union membership will increase with a general rise in risk aversion. Using data from the German Socio‐Economic Panel we define broad bargaining units and show that wages decline as average risk aversion of union members in these units rises, controlling for individual effects of risk aversion. Given a negative relationship between wages and employment, this suggests that secular changes in risk attitudes, because of an aging workforce or greater female labour force participation, can help to explain variations in the employment performance of unionized economies.     

‘Investment’ in Union Membership: A Managerial Approach

This paper concerns wage formation in a unionized economy when union membership is endogenous and determined by employment. A union is run by a leadership which has as an objective to strengthen the union’s position in the labour market. This is achieved by building up membership. Among the results, it is found that since membership is determined by employment, the inclusion of the leadership’s preferences into a union’s objective function produces lower real wages than a static version would predict. It is also shown that an increase in the union’s rate of time preference increases the natural rate of unemployment, while an increase in the speed at which workers enter/leave a union has an opposite effect.     

More Jobs Through Less Employment Protection? Evidence for West Germany

ABSTRACT: In reaction to growing criticism of the allegedly negative employment effects of job protection regulations (lay-off and dismissal restraints), the West German government in 1985 introduced new legislation facilitating the conclusion of temporary (i.e. fixed-term) work contracts in order to stimulate employment growth (‘Employment Promotion Act 1985‘AZPA). The research unit ‘Labour Market and Employment‘ at the WZB has evaluated the employment and labour market impact of the new legislation for the period 1985-1988, and apart from providing a detailed analysis of the socio-economic and institutional diversity of job arrangements covered by the category of temporary (i.e. fixed-term) employment, the project‘s focus has been on the impact of minor changes in the institutional frame- work as effected by the EPA on firms‘ employment policies, as well as on the overall level of employment. Results show that like in most other European countries the temporary work force in Germany has considerably grown over the past years in both absolute and relative terms, this increase, however, being largely due to cyclical factors as well as medium-term structural changes on the supply and demand side of the labour market rather than to changes in the regulatory framework as effected by the EPA. The impact of the new regulations on firms‘ hiring decisions and on the overall number of hirings in the total economy have to be regarded as rather modest, in fact amounting to not more than an estimated 25,000 additional hires per year or roughly 0.5|X% of all employment contracts concluded in the private sector. This marginal positive impact on firms‘ employment decisions, however, is counterbalanced by unintended substitution effects and an increase in involuntary quits arising from them when labour demand declines. Even under the overall positive employment development given in the period under investigation the net employment effects of the EPA temporary work legislation thus are shown to be at best marginal. In case of a deterioration of the overall economic situation, however, the increase in temporary job arrangements supported by the new legislation is likely to lead to accelerated workforce adjustments by firms and thus over time to result in a depression of the overall level of employment. From a theoretical point of view, the findings suggest that measures aiming at de-regulating labour relations such as the EPA largely fail to modify essential behavioral parameters of economic actors in economic environments which for decades have adjusted to a relatively high level of welfare state regulation, as has been the case in Western Germany.     

The Rise in Union Wage Premiums in South Africa

The earnings premium received by African, urban, male union members in South Africa, as compared to other regular, urban male employees, is explored using two national sample surveys conducted in 1985 and 1993. The historical setting of this change is of particular interest, in the light of the transformation from the apartheid regime. Union membership grew very rapidly during this interval, as earlier prohibitions on African unions were lifted. Subsequently, the high rates of unemployment and segmentation of the labor force have been issues of central concern to the new government, elected in 1994. In this context, the paper extends prior methodology, by systematically comparing possible approaches to estimation, in addition to contributing fresh empirical results. Four approaches to estimation are adopted, allowing for: a single earnings regime with union dummy variable; the possibility of different earnings regimes among union members as compared to non‐members; endogenous switching between such regimes; sample selection arising from lack of employment and from division between regular and informal work. A series of tests on nested specifications indicate the importance of recognizing endogenous switching between differing pay structures in the covered and uncovered sectors. However (as with previous research on the South African labor market), no sample selection is detected with respect to employment status. The results suggest that collective bargaining resulted in wage compression among the expanding union membership while significantly widening the gap between members and non‐members. The latter widening gap cannot be attributed to the changing composition of union membership as reflected in observed characteristics of employees.     

THE RISE OF THE EAST AND THE FAR EAST: GERMAN LABOR MARKETS AND TRADE INTEGRATION

We analyze the effects of the unprecedented rise in trade between Germany and “the East” (China and Eastern Europe) in the period 1988–2008 on German local labor markets. Using detailed administrative data, we exploit the cross‐regional variation in initial industry structures and use trade flows of other high‐income countries as instruments for regional import and export exposure. We find that the rise of the East in the world economy caused substantial job losses in German regions specialized in import‐competing industries, both in manufacturing and beyond. Regions specialized in export‐oriented industries, however, experienced even stronger employment gains and lower unemployment. In the aggregate, we estimate that this trade integration has caused some 442,000 additional jobs in the economy and contributed to retaining the manufacturing sector in Germany. This is almost exclusively driven by the rise of Eastern Europe, not by China. We also conduct an analysis at the individual worker level, and find that trade had a stabilizing overall effect on employment relationships.     

Union Membership and the Union Wage Gap in the UK

We consider the choice of union membership in the UK and its effect on the union/non‐union wage differential allowing for the endogeneity of the union choice. We include identifying variables not previously used and find that correcting for selectivity is important and has a large impact on the estimated differential. Moreover, union choice is itself affected by the wage gap.     

What Explains the 2007–2009 Drop in Employment?

We show that deterioration in household balance sheets, or the housing net worth channel, played a significant role in the sharp decline in U.S. employment between 2007 and 2009. Counties with a larger decline in housing net worth experience a larger decline in non‐tradable employment. This result is not driven by industry‐specific supply‐side shocks, exposure to the construction sector, policy‐induced business uncertainty, or contemporaneous credit supply tightening. We find little evidence of labor market adjustment in response to the housing net worth shock. There is no significant expansion of the tradable sector in counties with the largest decline in housing net worth. Further, there is little evidence of wage adjustment within or emigration out of the hardest hit counties.     

Nature or Nurture? Learning and the Geography of Female Labor Force Participation

One of the most dramatic economic transformations of the past century has been the entry of women into the labor force. While many theories explain why this change took place, we investigate the process of transition itself. We argue that local information transmission generates changes in participation that are geographically heterogeneous, locally correlated, and smooth in the aggregate, just like those observed in our data. In our model, women learn about the effects of maternal employment on children by observing nearby employed women. When few women participate in the labor force, data are scarce and participation rises slowly. As information accumulates in some regions, the effects of maternal employment become less uncertain and more women in that region participate. Learning accelerates, labor force participation rises faster, and regional participation rates diverge. Eventually, information diffuses throughout the economy, beliefs converge to the truth, participation flattens out, and regions become more similar again. To investigate the empirical relevance of our theory, we use a new county‐level data set to compare our calibrated model to the time series and geographic patterns of participation.     

Trade Union Membership and the Free Rider Problem: the Role of Harassment Activities

Abstract. Although there exists an extensive literature which uses econometric techniques to examine the process of unionisation in the industrial countries, a well established theory about the individual propensity to join the union has still to be developed. We feel that the workers' personal relationships in the working places impinge on their decision to unionise. To this end, we have set out a coercion model of trade union membership without compulsory membership, based on the rank and file union members' harassment activities. Union members use these unfriendly activities to eliminate the free-rider ploblem, encouraging unionisation and reducing the cost of joining a union.     

Jurassic Union Man? A Profile of the British Trade Union Member

This paper examines the determinants of trade union membership in Great Britain utilising micro-data taken from the British Social Attitudes Survey over the period 1985–91. Our results suggest that, contrary to previous micro-studies, personal characteristics and the perceptions of workers' attitudes as regards their working environment impact significantly upon the decision to join a trade union. Moreover, it would appear that the union membership decision is becoming increasingly endogenised, especially in the case of the white-collar worker.     

A Structural Model of Trade Union Behaviour under Uncertainty,with Sticky Wage

ABSTRACT: Trade union concern for job security is modelled under asymmetric information about labour demand, with rigid wage. Sequential decision processes are discussed, for the individual, on whether to join the union (utility defined over consumption and leisure); for the union, about the contribution to charge (utility defined over level of membership and level of contributions); for the employer, on level of labour to hire (profit maximizer). Equilibrium solutions, and ‘disequilibrium‘ solutions with shocked output price, are provided in a general and algebraic formulation; simulations with 1982 British data are shown, with shocks on probability of fall in output price, on technology, and on working time.     

Fixed‐Effects Dynamic Panel Models,a Factor Analytical Method

We consider the estimation of dynamic panel data models in the presence of incidental parameters in both dimensions: individual fixed‐effects and time fixed‐effects, as well as incidental parameters in the variances. We adopt the factor analytical approach by estimating the sample variance of individual effects rather than the effects themselves. In the presence of cross‐sectional heteroskedasticity, the factor method estimates the average of the cross‐sectional variances instead of the individual variances. The method thereby eliminates the incidental‐parameter problem in the means and in the variances over the cross‐sectional dimension. We further show that estimating the time effects and heteroskedasticities in the time dimension does not lead to the incidental‐parameter bias even when T and N are comparable. Moreover, efficient and robust estimation is obtained by jointly estimating heteroskedasticities.     

Union Density and Relative Wages: What is the Relationship?

ABSTRACT: This paper examines the impact of union density on relative wages under decentralised bargaining settings. Whilst, traditionally, empirical studies have focused on the impact of union status on wages (either at the individual or at the plant level), here it is argued that local trade union density can have an independent (positive) effect on wages. This occurs through the threat of collective action and the ability of the union to impose costs onto employers. First, a Nash bargaining model is presented under efficient-bargaining settings, and a wage-membership equation is derived. Wages are shown to be an increasing and convex function of union membership. Second, an empirical specification of the wage-membership equation, suitable for estimation, is obtained and fitted to establishment-level data for the Italian metal-mechanical engineering industry. A positive monotonic relationship between wages and union density is detected. Furthermore, wages are shown to be increasing with union density even where no formal local bargaining agreement is in force, thus suggesting that “union-threat” effects might be relevant.     

Delegation and Wage Determination in Trade Unions

Delegation of wage determination is modelled as the transferral of decision‐making rights to better‐informed agents. The rank and file of trade unions has less information and can, therefore, benefit from delegation. However, delegation might be disadvantageous for union members, since delegates pursue their own objectives. Also, delegates might incur a utility reduction, since becoming a delegate implies forfeiting a better‐paid outside option. We investigate under what conditions delegation of wage bargaining power is beneficial for union members and their potential leaders. The wage and employment effects of delegation are derived.     

Welfare Effects of Local versus Central Wage Bargaining

The paper analyses the welfare effects of union bargaining (de)centralization in a dual labour market with a unionized and a competitive sector. We show that social welfare depends on both the structure of the union's objective function and the elasticities of labour demand in both sectors. The welfare‐maximizing employment allocation can be obtained under a high degree of centralization if the union maximizes the total wage‐bill. Otherwise, if the union is rent maximizing, welfare is higher under local bargaining. However, in that case neither central nor local wage setting yields the social optimum.     

Dynamic Effects of the Minimum Wage on Informality in Colombia

Informality is a common phenomenon in developing countries and is not uncommon in industrialized societies. Although persistent aggregate rates of informal employment for a certain period of time may be indicative of low rates of employment status change among individuals, more intensive studies regarding persistent individual informal employment are needed. We used a reduced‐form dynamic pseudo panel data model approach that accounted for unobserved heterogeneity and initial conditions to present empirical evidence of the extent of persistent informality in a developing country, where education is the primary force of mitigating permanent informality. Using data from Colombia, we also provide results on the complex effect of minimum wage levels on informality. An increase in the minimum wage resulted in increased informality and increased the persistence of informality. Our results may be a basis with which to discuss the persistence of informality in other developing countries.     

The Union Effect on Wages in Chile: A Two‐Stage Approach Using Panel Data

We estimate the union effect on wages in Chile to be between 18 and 24 per cent. We follow a two‐stage procedure that allows us to correct the endogeneity of union status and to separate true from spurious dependence, by exploiting the union history of individuals using panel data. We find evidence of comparative‐advantage sorting in union status, strong true state dependence and a re‐distributional effect of union membership (i.e. wage gains from unionization are larger for lower‐wage earners).     

The Microeconomics of Efficient Group Behavior: Identification1

Consider a group consisting of S members facing a common budget constraint p'ξ=1: any demand vector belonging to the budget set can be (privately or publicly) consumed by the members. Although the intragroup decision process is not known, it is assumed to generate Pareto‐efficient outcomes; neither individual consumptions nor intragroup transfers are observable. The paper analyzes when, to what extent, and under which conditions it is possible to recover the underlying structure—individual preferences and the decision process—from the group's aggregate behavior. We show that the general version of the model is not identified. However, a simple exclusion assumption (whereby each member does not consume at least one good) is sufficient to guarantee generic identifiability of the welfare‐relevant structural concepts.     

Crime and the Decline of Unions

In this paper we investigate the relationship between union membership and crime. Using state level data between 1993 and 2006, we find the elasticity of crime with respect to union membership is roughly −0.5. From our results, we predict the decline in union membership has increased crime by 15 per cent since 1993. Furthermore, we find the elasticity between union jobs and crime is larger in absolute value when using an instrumental variable approach to control for the impact unions have on labor market efficiency.     

Idiosyncratic Shocks and the Role of Nonconvexities in Plant and Aggregate Investment Dynamics

We study a model of lumpy investment wherein establishments face persistent shocks to common and plant‐specific productivity, and nonconvex adjustment costs lead them to pursue generalized (S, s) investment rules. We allow persistent heterogeneity in both capital and total factor productivity alongside low‐level investments exempt from adjustment costs to develop the first model consistent with the cross‐sectional distribution of establishment investment rates. Examining the implications of lumpy investment for aggregate dynamics in this setting, we find that they remain substantial when factor supply considerations are ignored, but are quantitatively irrelevant in general equilibrium. The substantial implications of general equilibrium extend beyond the dynamics of aggregate series. While the presence of idiosyncratic shocks makes the time‐averaged distribution of plant‐level investment rates largely invariant to market‐clearing movements in real wages and interest rates, we show that the dynamics of plants' investments differ sharply in their presence. Thus, model‐based estimations of capital adjustment costs involving panel data may be quite sensitive to the assumption about equilibrium. Our analysis also offers new insights about how nonconvex adjustment costs influence investment at the plant. When establishments face idiosyncratic productivity shocks consistent with existing estimates, we find that nonconvex costs do not cause lumpy investments, but act to eliminate them.