CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS AND INFORMATION REVELATION IN PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS

We utilize laboratory experiments to study behavior in sequential procurement auctions where winning an auction round increases a bidder's future costs. The game admits competitive as well as bid‐rotation style collusive equilibria. We find that (a) bidders show some propensity to account for the opportunity cost of winning an auction, but underestimate its magnitude; (b) revealing all bids (instead of only the winning bid) after each round leads to dramatically higher procurement costs. The rise in procurement costs is accompanied by an increase in very high (extreme) bids, a fraction of which appear to be collusive in nature. (JEL C91, D44, L44)     

Optimum taxation of life annuities

The market for private life annuities is characterised by adverse selection; that is, contracts offer lower than fair payoffs to individuals with low life expectancy. Moreover, longevity and income have been found to be positively correlated. We formulate an optimum income taxation model that incorporates these facts and discuss the conditions under which a linear tax on annuity payoffs, which raises more revenues from long-living individuals than from short-living, can serve as an instrument for redistribution. Further, we consider a nonlinear tax on annuity payoffs, and find that it can be employed to correct the distortion of the rate of return caused by asymmetric information.     

A cognitive model of individual well-being

This paper offers a model of individual well-being that takes into account cognitive factors. It postulates that individuals compare payoffs to aspiration levels. The latter are determined by past experiences (adaptation), by other people's performance (interpersonal comparison), as well as by reasoning (justifications and excuses). We axiomatize a measure of well-being defined on real-valued vectors of various lengths. It is a linear combination of differences between payoffs and aspiration levels, where the aspiration level at each instance is a linear function of past payoffs. Received: 3 April 1998/Accepted: 23 March 1999     

Leveling the playing field: Dishonesty in the face of threat

We examined the effects of framing and perceived vulnerability on dishonest behavior in competitive environments. Participants were randomly matched into pairs and took a short multiple-choice test, the relative score of which determined their merit-based payoffs. After learning about the test scores, participants were asked to report them, thus affecting the final payoffs. Framing was varied as participants could either report their own scores or the scores of their counterparts. The presence of threat, or vulnerability to other players’ dishonesty, was varied as either one or both players in a pair could misreport scores. Participants who reported their counterparts’ scores were more likely to report honestly than participants who entered their own score. Participants, whose payoffs were threatened by their opponents’ misreporting, were more likely to cheat to the fullest extent. Furthermore, we found that framing significantly reduced misreporting in the absence, but not in the presence of threat. Results suggest that when actors feel vulnerable to other people’s dishonesty they would often cheat as much as they can in order to “level the playing field”, even when they strongly disapprove of the behavior.     

The stability of exchange networks

Economic and sociological exchange theories predict divisions of exchange benefits given an assumed fixed network of exchange relations. Since network structure has been found to have a large impact on actors’ payoffs, actors have strong incentives for network change. We answer the question what happens to both the network structure and actor payoffs when myopic actors change their links in order to maximize their payoffs. We investigate the networks that are stable, the networks that are efficient or egalitarian with varying tie costs, and the occurrence of social dilemmas. Only few networks are stable over a wide range of tie costs, and all of them can be divided into two types: efficient networks consisting of only dyads and at most one isolate, and Pareto efficient and egalitarian cycles with an odd number of actors. Social dilemmas are observed in even-sized networks at low tie costs.     

Social and Psychological Challenges of Poker

Poker is a competitive, social game of skill and luck, which presents players with numerous challenging strategic and interpersonal decisions. The adaptation of poker into a game played over the internet provides the unprecedented opportunity to quantitatively analyze extremely large numbers of hands and players. This paper analyzes roughly twenty-seven million hands played online in small-stakes, medium-stakes and high-stakes games. Using PokerTracker software, statistics are generated to (a) gauge the types of strategies utilized by players (i.e. the ‘strategic demography’) at each level and (b) examine the various payoffs associated with different strategies at varying levels of play. The results show that competitive edges attenuate as one moves up levels, and tight-aggressive strategies––which tend to be the most remunerative––become more prevalent. Further, payoffs for different combinations of cards, varies between levels, showing how strategic payoffs are derived from competitive interactions. Smaller-stakes players also have more difficulty appropriately weighting incentive structures with frequent small gains and occasional large losses. Consequently, the relationship between winning a large proportion of hands and profitability is negative, and is strongest in small-stakes games. These variations reveal a meta-game of rationality and psychology which underlies the card game. Adopting risk-neutrality to maximize expected value, aggression and appropriate mental accounting, are cognitive burdens on players, and underpin the rationality work––reconfiguring of personal preferences and goals––players engage into be competitive, and maximize their winning and profit chances.     

PAYOFF LEVELS,LOSS AVOIDANCE,AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN GAMES WITH MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY

Game theorists typically assume that changing a game's payoff levels—by adding the same constant to, or subtracting it from, all payoffs—should not affect behavior. Although this invariance is an implication of the theory when payoffs mirror expected utilities, it is an empirical question when “payoffs” are actually money amounts. Loss avoidance is a phenomenon where payoff‐level changes matter when they change the signs of payoffs: gains become losses or vice versa. We report the results of a human‐subjects experiment designed to test for two types of loss avoidance: certain‐loss avoidance (avoiding a strategy leading to a sure loss, in favor of an alternative that might lead to a gain) and possible‐loss avoidance (avoiding a strategy leading to a possible loss, in favor of an alternative that leads to a sure gain). Subjects in the experiment play three versions of Stag Hunt, which are identical up to the level of payoffs, under a variety of treatments. We find strong evidence of behavior consistent with certain‐loss avoidance in the experiment. We also find evidence of possible‐loss avoidance, although weaker than that for certain‐loss avoidance. Our results carry implications for theorists modeling real‐life situations with game theory and for experimenters attempting to test theory and interpret observed behavior in terms of theory. (JEL D81, C72, C73)     

Network similarity and collusion

This study focuses on how collusive construction industry cartels structure their bidding patterns to increase their market shares, while preserving an illusion of competition. Using past research on the economics and social organization of bid-rigging and collusion, we examine a key issue related to similarities within bidding structures that are likely tainted by cartels. The study is empirically based on public procurement data to recreate the structure of interactions between construction industry firms in the province of Quebec (Canada) over a 12-year period (2002–2013). Cross-level multivariate analyses demonstrate that our indicator of similarities in bidding patterns, the Jaccard coefficient, is a positive factor of market shares, but particularly in cities that are targeted for collusive practices. We also emphasize the need to develop a monitoring system that allows researchers and analysts to track collusion patterns in various ways so as to prevent an increase of more sophisticated schemes and cartels.     

Modelling reference dependence for repeated choices: A horse race between models of normalisation

In the logit model, a choice between options is driven by payoff differences. Existing evidence on repeated choices suggests that the way payoff differences are evaluated depends on historically observed differences. We capture such reference dependence using the value normalisation approach developed in neuroscience. We use experimental data and run a horse race between various models with normalisation, including widely used divisive and range normalisation. We show that a parsimonious logit model with maximum difference normalisation has both the best goodness of fit and a strong quasi-out-of-sample predictive power. In this structural parameter-free logit model, an agent makes a choice based on the difference in payoffs in the previous period, normalised by the maximum difference in payoffs in two previous periods. The model has a wide range of applications, from studying learning dynamics in repeated games to predicting retirement plans choices.     

Rent-seeking for a public good with additive contributions

We analyze rent-seeking for a public good with two groups, where the provision of a public good is decided in the all-pay contest where “the winner takes all”. We assume that the valuation of the public good varies across groups, but is the same for all members within a group. Free-riding in such situation was predicted by Baik et al. (J Public Econ 82(3):415–429, 2001). We describe a continuum of equilibria where all players make contributions. There is room for substantial payoff asymmetry, which ranges from equal payoffs to all group members to a zero payoff for the player who makes a contribution and positive payoffs for free-riders. The results generalize for the case where the prize has both a private and a public component.     

The relevance of thinking-by-analogy for investors’ willingness-to-pay: An experimental study

People tend to think by analogies. We investigate whether thinking-by-analogy matters for investors’ willingness-to-pay for a risky asset in a laboratory experiment. We find that thinking-by-analogy has a strong influence when the assets in question have similar (but not identical) payoffs. The hypothesis of thinking-by-analogy or coarse thinking clearly outperforms other hypotheses including the hypothesis of arbitrage-free or rational pricing. When the similarity between the payoffs is reduced, the risk neutral and risk averse hypotheses outperform the hypothesis of thinking-by-analogy. Regardless of the similarity between the payoffs, the arbitrage-free or rational pricing remains the hypothesis with the worst performance.     

COMMUNICATION AND COORDINATION IN A TWO‐STAGE GAME

We study the impact of communication on behavior in a two‐stage coordination game with asymmetric payoffs. We test experimentally whether individuals can avoid a head‐to‐head confrontation by means of coordinated strategies. In particular we analyze whether and how quickly a conflict‐avoidance take turn strategy can emerge. First, our results show that players learn to solve the conflict by choosing opposite options at both stages of the game. Second, many adopt a take turn strategy to sustain coordination over time and alleviate the inequality induced by the asymmetry of payoffs. Third, communication increases the likelihood of conflict resolution regardless of whether communication is unilateral or bilateral. (JEL C91, D74, L15, H71)     

Minimum wages and poverty with income-sharing

Textbook analysis tells us that in a competitive labor market, the introduction of a minimum wage above the competitive equilibrium wage will cause unemployment. This paper makes three contributions to the basic theory of the minimum wage. First, we analyze the effects of a higher minimum wage in terms of poverty rather than in terms of unemployment. Second, we extend the standard textbook model to allow for income-sharing between employed and unemployed persons in society. Third, we extend the basic model to deal with income sharing within families. We find that there are situations in which a higher minimum wage raises poverty, others where it reduces poverty, and yet others in which poverty is unchanged. We characterize precisely how the poverty effect depends on four parameters: the degree of poverty aversion, the elasticity of labor demand, the ratio of the minimum wage to the poverty line, and the extent of income-sharing. Thus, shifting the perspective from unemployment to poverty leads to a considerable enrichment of the theory of the minimum wage.      

To claim or not to claim: Anonymity,symmetric externalities and honesty

In many situations, economic actors submit claims for money which are unverifiable or hard to verify. Examples include claims for a tax return or an insurance payout. This paper investigates what role anonymity and externalities play for the decision of whether to be (dis)honest when making such claims. First, does honest claiming increase when anonymity is removed and unverified claims are made public? We present experimental evidence to this effect. Second, does honest reporting increase when it is public knowledge that claims affect others’ payoffs and claimants’ payoffs are symmetrically affected by others’ claims? We find no such effect. Making claims public and having symmetric externalities together increases honesty, but this effect is driven solely by the reduction in anonymity.     

STRATEGIC DECISIONS ON LAWYERS' COMPENSATION IN CIVIL DISPUTES

We study a model of civil dispute with delegation in which a plaintiff's lawyer works on a contingent-fee basis but a defendant's lawyer on an hourly fee basis. We first derive the condition under which delegation to the lawyers brings both litigants more payoffs compared with the case of no delegation. We then show that under this profitable delegation condition, the contingent-fee fraction for the plaintiff's lawyer is about one-third. Next, allowing the plaintiff to choose between the two fees, we show that under the profitable delegation condition, the plaintiff chooses the contingent fee, given that the defendant adopts the hourly fee. ( JEL K41, K13, D74, D72)     

THE HAYEK HYPOTHESIS IN EXPERIMENTAL AUCTIONS: INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTS AND MARKET POWER

We report twelve market experiments utilizing a "seller market power" supply and demand structure where two of five sellers can unilaterally increase their profit by withholding supply. The data indicate that both the double auction and posted offer institutions result in traders extracting the bulk of the potential gains from exchange in the market; however, prices generally occur above the competitive equilibrium prediction. Market power in the form of strategic supply withholding does not appear to be responsible for the supra-competitive prices.     

LIVING IN TWO NEIGHBORHOODS—SOCIAL INTERACTION EFFECTS IN THE LABORATORY

Field evidence suggests that people belonging to the same group often behave similarly, that is, behavior exhibits social interaction effects. We conduct a laboratory experiment that avoids the identification problem present in the field and allows us to study the behavioral logic of social interaction effects. Our novel design feature is that each subject is simultaneously a member of two randomly assigned and identical groups where only members (“neighbors”) are different. We study behavior in a coordination game with multiple equilibria and a public goods game, which has only one equilibrium in material payoffs. We speak of social interactions if the same subject at the same time makes group‐specific decisions that depend on their respective neighbors' decisions. We find that a majority of subjects exhibit social interaction effects both when the game has multiple equilibria in material payoffs and when it only has one equilibrium. (JEL C91, H41, K42, H26)     

ON THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF TIME AND RISK PREFERENCES: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY

When explaining risk taking, intertemporal allocation, and distributing behavior, economists rely on risk, time, and other-regarding preferences but offer no guidance on how these three crucial aspects are interrelated. We report on an experiment exploring such interrelation. For this sake, we compare evaluations of several prospects, each of which allocates certain or risky and immediate or delayed payoffs to the actor and to another participant. We find that individuals are self-oriented as to social allocation of risk and delay and other-regarding with respect to expected payoffs . ( JEL C91, D63, D81)     

TOWARD AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF FASHION

Competition for rank within animal societies is an innate drive recognized in sociobiological and evolutionary theory. In human societies, fashion signals social rank or status. We extend standard economic theories of competitive and noncompetitive markets to analyze fashion by including the status-seeking incentive. In the competitive case, the conditions under which fashion cycles occur are examined. In the noncompetitive case, producers of fashion services discriminate between customers intertemporally to sustain the fashionability of their services. Unlike the standard models of fashion that populate marketing textbooks, our theory of fashion does not require that demand curves slope upward.     

DIRECT TESTS OF INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES FOR EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY

Departures from “economic man” behavior in many games in which fairness is a salient characteristic are now well documented in the experimental economics literature. These data have inspired the development of models of social preferences that assume agents have preferences for equity and efficiency as well as their own material payoffs. Empirical failure of the economic man model comes from experiments that provide direct tests of its distinguishing characteristic: indifference to the payoffs of others. This paper reports an experiment that subjects popular social preferences models to the same type of empirical challenge. We report direct tests of the distinguishing characteristics of these models: preference for allocations that have higher efficiency and greater equity. (JEL A12, A13, B49, C70, C91, D63)