RETHINKING THE EFFECT OF IMMIGRATION ON WAGES

This paper calculates the effects of immigration on the wages of native US workers of various skill levels in two steps. In the first step we use labor demand functions to estimate the elasticity of substitution across different groups of workers. Second, we use the underlying production structure and the estimated elasticities to calculate the total wage effects of immigration in the long run. We emphasize that a production function framework is needed to combine own‐group effects with cross‐group effects in order to obtain the total wage effects for each native group. In order to obtain a parsimonious representation of elasticities that can be estimated with available data, we adopt alternative nested‐CES models and let the data select the preferred specification. New to this paper is the estimate of the substitutability between natives and immigrants of similar education and experience levels. In the data‐preferred model, there is a small but significant degree of imperfect substitutability between natives and immigrants which, when combined with the other estimated elasticities, implies that in the period from 1990 to 2006 immigration had a small effect on the wages of native workers with no high school degree (between 0.6% and +1.7%). It also had a small positive effect on average native wages (+0.6%) and a substantial negative effect (−6.7%) on wages of previous immigrants in the long run.     

IMMIGRATION,JOBS, AND EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION: EVIDENCE FROM EUROPE BEFORE AND DURING THE GREAT RECESSION

In this paper we analyze the impact of immigrants on the type and quantity of native jobs. We use data on 15 Western European countries during the 1996–2010 period. We find that immigrants, by taking manual‐routine type of occupations pushed natives towards more “complex” (abstract and communication) jobs. This job upgrade was associated to a 0.7% increase in native wages for a doubling of the immigrants' share. These results are robust to the use of an IV strategy based on past settlement of immigrants across European countries. The job upgrade slowed but did not come to a halt during the Great Recession. We also document the labor market flows behind it: the complexity of jobs offered to new native hires was higher relative to the complexity of lost jobs. Finally, we find evidence that such reallocation was larger in countries with more flexible labor laws.     

IMMIGRATION,WAGES, AND COMPOSITIONAL AMENITIES

There is strong public opposition to increased immigration throughout Europe. Given the modest economic impacts of immigration estimated in most studies, the depth of anti‐immigrant sentiment is puzzling. Immigration, however, does not just affect wages and taxes. It also changes the composition of the local population, threatening the compositional amenities that natives derive from their neighborhoods, schools, and workplaces. In this paper we use a simple latent‐factor model, combined with data for 21 countries from the 2002 European Social Survey (ESS), to measure the relative importance of economic and compositional concerns in driving opinions about immigration policy. The ESS included a unique battery of questions on the labor market and social impacts of immigration, as well as on the desirability of increasing or reducing immigrant inflows. We find that compositional concerns are 2–5 times more important in explaining variation in individual attitudes toward immigration policy than concerns over wages and taxes. Likewise, most of the difference in opinion between more‐ and less‐educated respondents is attributable to heightened compositional concerns among people with lower education.     

THE IMPACT OF INCOME SHOCKS ON HEALTH: EVIDENCE FROM COHORT DATA

We study the effect of permanent income innovations on health for a prime‐aged population. Using information on more than half a million individuals sampled over a 25‐year period in three different cross‐sectional surveys we aggregate data by date‐of‐birth cohort to construct a “synthetic cohort” data set with details of income, expenditure, socio‐demographic factors, health outcomes, and selected risk factors. We then exploit structural and arguably exogenous changes in cohort incomes over the 1980s and 1990s to uncover causal effects of permanent income shocks on health. We find that such income innovations have little effect on a wide range of health measures, but do lead to increases in mortality and risky health behaviour. (JEL: I10, D31)     

COMMON COMPONENTS OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY ATTITUDES ACROSS CONTEXTS AND DOMAINS: EVIDENCE FROM 30 COUNTRIES

Attitudes towards risk and uncertainty have been indicated to be highly context‐dependent, and to be sensitive to the measurement technique employed. We present data collected in controlled experiments with 2,939 subjects in 30 countries measuring risk and uncertainty attitudes through incentivized measures as well as survey questions. Our data show clearly that measures correlate not only within decision contexts or measurement methods, but also across contexts and methods. This points to the existence of one underlying “risk preference”, which influences attitudes independently of the measurement method or choice domain. We furthermore find that answers to a general and a financial survey question correlate with incentivized lottery choices in most countries. Incentivized and survey measures also correlate significantly between countries. This opens the possibility to conduct cultural comparisons on risk attitudes using survey instruments.     

SOCIAL COMPARISON AND EFFORT PROVISION: EVIDENCE FROM A FIELD EXPERIMENT

Social comparison has potentially far reaching consequences in many economic domains. We conducted a field experiment to examine how social comparison affects workers' effort provision if their own wage or that of a co‐worker is cut. Workers were assigned to groups of two, performed identical individual tasks, and received the same performance‐independent hourly wage. Cutting both group members' wages caused a decrease in performance. But when only one group member's wage was cut, the affected workers decreased their performance more than twice as much as when both workers' wages were cut. This finding indicates that social comparison among workers affects effort provision because the only difference between the two wage‐cut treatments is the other group member's wage level. In contrast, workers whose wage was not cut but who witnessed their group member's pay being cut displayed no change in performance relative to the baseline treatment in which both workers' wages remained unchanged. This indicates that social comparison exerts asymmetric effects on effort.     

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHILD HEALTH,DEVELOPMENTAL GAPS,AND PARENTAL EDUCATION: EVIDENCE FROM ADMINISTRATIVE DATA

We use administrative German data to examine the role of physical and mental health conditions in explaining developmental gaps between children whose parents have different educational levels. Specifically, we employ sibling fixed effect models to estimate the effect of a comprehensive list of childhood health conditions—diagnosed by government physicians—on the cognitive and verbal ability of pre‐school children. We also apply decomposition methods to examine the extent to which gaps in child development can be attributed to child health conditions. While most physical health conditions have small and insignificant effects, mental health conditions, in particular hyperactivity, have a large and significant effect on development. Mental health conditions account for 14%–36% of the gap in cognitive ability and for 23%–24% of that in verbal ability. Thus, policies aimed at reducing disparities in child development and socioeconomic inequalities later in life should focus more on the early diagnosis and effective treatment of mental health conditions.     

CREDIT CONSTRAINTS AND THE CYCLICALITY OF R&D INVESTMENT: EVIDENCE FROM FRANCE

We use a French firm‐level data set containing 13,000 firms over the period 1994–2004 to analyze the relationship between credit constraints and firms’ R&D behavior over the business cycle. Our main results can be summarized as follows: (i) R&D investment is countercyclical without credit constraints, but it becomes procyclical as firms face tighter credit constraints; (ii) this result is only observed for firms in sectors that depend more heavily upon external finance, or that are characterized by a low degree of asset tangibility; (iii) in more credit‐constrained firms, R&D investment plummets during recessions but does not increase proportionally during upturns.     

MORE MISSING WOMEN,FEWER DYING GIRLS: THE IMPACT OF SEX‐SELECTIVE ABORTION ON SEX AT BIRTH AND RELATIVE FEMALE MORTALITY IN TAIWAN

This study finds that the introduction of sex‐selective abortion in Taiwan due to the legalization of abortion when prenatal sex‐detection technology was already available increased the fraction of males born at higher parities and changed the composition of mothers choosing to give birth. Controlling for compositional changes, we find that access to sex‐selective abortion reduced relative neonatal female mortality rates for higher‐parity births.     

THE MONOPOLY OF VIOLENCE: EVIDENCE FROM COLOMBIA

Many states in Latin America, Africa, and Asia lack the monopoly of violence, even though this was identified by Max Weber as the foundation of the state, and thus the capacity to govern effectively. In this paper we develop a new perspective on the establishment of the monopoly of violence. We build a model to explain the incentive of central states to eliminate nonstate armed actors (paramilitaries) in a democracy. The model is premised on the idea that paramilitaries may choose to and can influence elections. Since paramilitaries have preferences over policies, this reduces the incentives of the politicians they favor to eliminate them. We then investigate these ideas using data from Colombia between 1991 and 2006. We first present regression and case study evidence supporting our postulate that paramilitary groups can have significant effects on elections for the legislature and the executive. Next, we show that the evidence is also broadly consistent with the implication of the model that paramilitaries tend to persist to the extent that they deliver votes to candidates for the executive whose preferences are close to theirs and that this effect is larger in areas where the presidential candidate would have otherwise not done as well. Finally, we use roll‐call votes to illustrate a possible “quid pro quo” between the executive and paramilitaries in Colombia.     

VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND TECHNOLOGY: THEORY AND EVIDENCE

We study the determinants of vertical integration. We first derive a number of predictions regarding the relationship between technology intensity and vertical integration from a simple incomplete contracts model. Then, we investigate these predictions using plant‐level data for the UK manufacturing sector. Most importantly, and consistent with the theoretical predictions, we find that the technology intensity of downstream (producer) industries is positively correlated with the likelihood of integration whereas the intensity of upstream (supplier) industries is negatively correlated with it. Also consistent with theory, both correlations are stronger when the supplying industry accounts for a large fraction of the producer's costs. These results are generally robust and hold with alternative measures of technology intensity, with alternative estimation strategies, and with or without controlling for a number of firm‐ and industry‐level characteristics. (JEL: L22, L23, L24, L60)     

POVERTY AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC EDUCATION SPENDING: EVIDENCE FROM BRAZIL

A large body of literature has emphasized the elite capture of democratic institutions as the explanation for the low levels of spending on public education in many low‐income democracies. This paper provides an alternative to that longstanding hypothesis. Motivated by new cross‐country facts and evidence from Brazilian municipalities, we hypothesize that many democratic developing countries might invest less in public education spending because poor decisive voters prefer the government to allocate resources elsewhere. One possible explanation is that low‐income voters could instead favor redistributive programs that increase their incomes in the short run, such as cash transfers. To test for this possibility, we design and implement an experimental survey and an incentivized choice experiment in Brazil. The findings from both interventions support our hypothesis.     

PERFORMANCE AND BEHAVIOR OF FAMILY FIRMS: EVIDENCE FROM THE FRENCH STOCK MARKET

This paper empirically documents the performance and behavior of family firms listed on the French stock exchange between 1994 and 2000. On the French stock market, approximately one third of the firms are widely held, whereas the remaining two thirds are family firms. We find that, in the cross‐section, family firms largely outperform widely held corporations. This result holds for founder‐controlled firms, professionally managed family firms, but more surprisingly also for firms run by descendants of the founder. We offer explanations for the good performance of family firms. First, we present evidence of a more efficient use of labor in heir‐managed firms. These firms pay lower wages, even allowing for skill and age structure. We also find that descendants smooth out industry shocks and manage to honor implicit labor contracts. Second, we present evidence consistent with outside CEOs in family firms making a more parsimonious use of capital. They employ more unskilled, cheap labor, use less capital, pay lower interest rates on debt and initiate more profitable acquisitions. (JEL: G32, L25, J31)     

PARTY CUES IN ELECTIONS UNDER MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM US STATES

In federal countries, voters’ ability to evaluate the performance of their leaders might be reduced when different levels of government shape policy outcomes. This can blur political accountability. In this article, we analyze how party cues (i.e., politicians’ party membership acting as a cue towards their characteristics) affect voters’ incomplete information in a federal setting. We theoretically show that party cues allow indirect inference regarding politicians using observed policy outcomes, and can alleviate the accountability problem. Empirical evidence from US presidential election results across all 50 US states over the period 1972–2008 supports this proposition. However, party cues also have a downside in that they may reduce politicians’ effort, particularly when politicians at different levels of government are from different parties.     

FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND VERTICAL INTEGRATION: THEORY AND EVIDENCE

Existing evidence is mostly inconclusive on the relevance of financial development as a determinant of vertical integration. This paper presents evidence that, once industry heterogeneity in firm size distribution is taken into account, financial development is an important determinant of cross‐country differences in vertical integration. Financial development fosters entry of firms and increases competition in the industry. This reduces vertical integration of larger firms, but also leads smaller, non‐integrated, firms to exit the industry. As a result, higher financial development reduces vertical integration in industries where a high share of output is produced by small firms. The positive effect of financial development on entry also reduces vertical integration by fostering the development of input markets.     

TEAM INCENTIVES: EVIDENCE FROM A FIRM LEVEL EXPERIMENT

Many organizations rely on teamwork, and yet field evidence on the impacts of team‐based incentives remains scarce. Compared to individual incentives, team incentives can affect productivity by changing both workers’ effort and team composition. We present evidence from a field experiment designed to evaluate the impact of rank incentives and tournaments on the productivity and composition of teams. Strengthening incentives, either through rankings or tournaments, makes workers more likely to form teams with others of similar ability instead of with their friends. Introducing rank incentives however reduces average productivity by 14%, whereas introducing a tournament increases it by 24%. Both effects are heterogeneous: rank incentives only reduce the productivity of teams at the bottom of the productivity distribution, and monetary prize tournaments only increase the productivity of teams at the top. We interpret these results through a theoretical framework that makes precise when the provision of team‐based incentives crowds out the productivity‐enhancing effect of social connections under team production.     

THE EFFECT OF FINANCIAL REWARDS ON STUDENTS' ACHIEVEMENT: EVIDENCE FROM A RANDOMIZED EXPERIMENT4

This paper reports on a randomized field experiment in which first‐year university students could earn financial rewards for passing all first‐year requirements within one year. Financial incentives turn out to have positive effects on achievement of high‐ability students, whereas they have a negative impact on achievement of low‐ability students. After three years these effects have increased, suggesting dynamic spillovers. The negative effects for less‐able students are consistent with results from psychology and behavioral economics showing that external rewards may be detrimental for intrinsic motivation. (JEL: I21, I22, J24)     

ELECTED VERSUS APPOINTED REGULATORS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE

This paper contrasts direct election with political appointment of regulators. When regulators are appointed, regulatory policy becomes bundled with other policy issues the appointing politicians are responsible for. Because voters have only one vote to cast and regulatory issues are not salient for most voters, there are electoral incentives to respond to stakeholder interests. If regulators are elected, their stance on regulation is the only salient issue so that the electoral incentive is to run a pro‐consumer candidate. Using panel data on regulatory outcomes from U.S. states, we find new evidence in favor of the idea that elected states are more pro‐consumer in their regulatory policies. (JEL: H1, K2)