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1.
We examine legislative policy making in institutions with two empirically relevant features: agenda setting occurs in real time and the default policy evolves. We demonstrate that these institutions select Condorcet winners when they exist, provided a sufficient number of individuals have opportunities to make proposals. In policy spaces with either pork barrel or pure redistributional politics (where a Condorcet winner does not exist), the last proposer is effectively a dictator or near‐dictator under relatively weak conditions.  相似文献   

2.
We consider a general mechanism design setting where each agent can acquire (covert) information before participating in the mechanism. The central question is whether a mechanism exists that provides the efficient incentives for information acquisition ex‐ante and implements the efficient allocation conditional on the private information ex‐post. It is shown that in every private value environment the Vickrey‐Clark‐Groves mechanism guarantees both ex‐ante as well as ex‐post efficiency. In contrast, with common values, ex‐ante and ex‐post efficiency cannot be reconciled in general. Sufficient conditions in terms of sub‐ and supermodularity are provided when (all) ex‐post efficient mechanisms lead to private under‐ or over‐acquisition of information.  相似文献   

3.
If voter preferences depend on a noisy state variable, under what conditions do large elections deliver outcomes “as if” the state were common knowledge? While the existing literature models elections using the jury metaphor where a change in information regarding the state induces all voters to switch in favor of only one alternative, we allow for more general preferences where a change in information can induce a switch in favor of either alternative. We show that information is aggregated for any voting rule if, for a randomly chosen voter, the probability of switching in favor of one alternative is strictly greater than the probability of switching away from that alternative for any given change in belief over states. If the preference distribution violates this condition, there exist equilibria that produce outcomes different from the full information outcome with high probability for large classes of voting rules. In other words, unless preferences closely conform to the jury metaphor, information aggregation is not guaranteed to obtain.  相似文献   

4.
This paper formulates and analyzes models of two-party bargaining behavior where each side possesses private information about its preferences that is unavailable to the other. We examine the strategic behavior that bargainers might exhibit when disclosing information either to an arbitrator or to each other. Our results show that when bargaining is over one issue, it is relatively uncomplicated analytically to calculate the optimal strategy, but, despite this, even sophisticated bargainers tend to make wrong assumptions about the behavior of others and to use strategies that are far from optimal. When the bargaining encompasses several factors, computation of optimal strategies becomes very cumbersome and the use of an optimal strategy does not gain a bargainer much over what he could have achieved with truthful revelation. Thus, in theory, truthful revelation is not the best course of action to adopt for a bargainer interested in maximizing individual gain, but in practice the alternatives may involve mistaken assumptions about the behavior of others and may therefore turn out to be inferior to truthful revelation.  相似文献   

5.
This paper shows that information imperfections and common values can solve coordination problems in multicandidate elections. We analyze an election in which (i) the majority is divided between two alternatives and (ii) the minority backs a third alternative, which the majority views as strictly inferior. Standard analyses assume voters have a fixed preference ordering over candidates. Coordination problems cannot be overcome in such a case, and it is possible that inferior candidates win. In our setup the majority is also divided as a result of information imperfections. The majority thus faces two problems: aggregating information and coordinating to defeat the minority candidate. We show that when the common value component is strong enough, approval voting produces full information and coordination equivalence: the equilibrium is unique and solves both problems. Thus, the need for information aggregation helps resolve the majority's coordination problem under approval voting. This is not the case under standard electoral systems.  相似文献   

6.
In this paper we focus on strategic voting behavior when both an election and a signaling motivation affect voters' behavior. We analyze a model of elections with two candidates competing on a one‐dimensional policy space. Voters are privately and imperfectly informed about a common shock affecting the electorate's preferences. Candidates are assumed to choose policy in response to information gleaned from election results and according to exogenous factors that may lead to polarization in candidates' policy choices. We analyze a subset of symmetric equilibria in which strategies are symmetric to candidates' names and private signals (CSS equilibria). We show that signaling and election motivations pull voters to vote in different directions. We provide conditions that show the relation between the amount of information aggregated in the election and the motivation that influences voting behavior the most. Finally, we show that when candidates are responsive and polarized, all CSS equilibria are inefficient in the limit.  相似文献   

7.
We study selection rules: voting procedures used by committees to choose whether to place an issue on their agenda. At the selection stage of the model, committee members are uncertain about their final preferences. They only have some private information about these preferences. We show that voters become more conservative when the selection rule itself becomes more conservative. The decision rule has the opposite effect. We compare these voting procedures to the designation of an agenda setter among the committee and to a utilitarian social planner with all the ex interim private information.  相似文献   

8.
This research investigates how to design procurement mechanisms for assortment planning. We consider that a retailer buys directly from a manufacturer who possesses private information about the per‐unit variable cost and per‐variety setup cost. We first develop a screening model to assist the retailer in integrating assortment planning into supply chain contracting processes when only one manufacturer is available. We demonstrate that the screening mechanism is optimal among all feasible procurement strategies. When there are multiple competing manufacturers, we propose a supply contract auctioning mechanism and evaluate its performance. In this mechanism, the retailer announces a contract menu and the manufacturer that bids the highest upfront fee paid to the retailer wins the auction. The winner then chooses and executes a contract from the contract menu. We show that when the retailer uses the optimal screening contract menu as the object of the auction, it achieves the optimal procurement outcome if the screening contract menu does not pay rent to any manufacturer type. This finding sheds light on the connection between screening and auction mechanisms when there exists multi‐dimensional private information.  相似文献   

9.
刘圣欢 《管理学报》2010,7(3):435-439
运用制度经济理论和分析方法,考察了不同费用分摊方式与不同选票分配规则组合情形下业主之间的财富转移问题,以及选用不同的投票决定规则水平对业主间财富转移问题的影响.结果显示,业主个人的经济利益(收益与费用分摊)和相应的选票数的差异越大,财富被侵蚀的机会就越大.为有效避免财富转移问题并使项目实施有效率,在具有不同面积分布的小区里,选用不同的选票分配规则和决定规则是必要的.  相似文献   

10.
We investigate the effect of female leadership on gender differences in public and private organizations. Female leadership impact was constructed using a quasi-experiment involving mayoral elections, and our research used a sample of 8.3 million organizations distributed over 5600 Brazilian municipalities. Our main results show that when municipalities in which a woman was elected leader (treatment group) are compared with municipalities in which a male was elected leader (control group) there was an increase in the number of top and middle female managers in public organizations. Two aspects contribute to the results: time and command/role model. The time effect is important because our results are obtained with reelected women – in their second term – and the command/role model (the queen bee phenomenon is either small, or non-existent) is important because of the institutional characteristics of public organizations: female leaders (mayor) have much asymmetrical power and decision-making discretion, i.e., she chooses the top managers. These top managers then choose middle managers influenced by female leadership (a role model). We obtained no significant results for private organizations. Our work contributes to the literature on leadership by addressing some specific issues: an empirical investigation with a causal effect between the variables (regression-discontinuity design – a non-parametric estimation), the importance of role models, and how the observed effects are time-dependent. Insofar as public organizations are concerned, the evidence from our large-scale study suggests that the queen bee phenomenon may be a myth; instead, of keeping subordinate women at bay, our results show that women leaders who are afforded much managerial discretion behave in a benevolent manner toward subordinate women. The term “Regal Leader” instead of “Queen Bee” is thus a more appropriate characterization of women in top positions of power.  相似文献   

11.
This paper constructs an efficient, budget‐balanced, Bayesian incentive‐compatible mechanism for a general dynamic environment with quasilinear payoffs in which agents observe private information and decisions are made over countably many periods. First, under the assumption of “private values” (other agents' private information does not directly affect an agent's payoffs), we construct an efficient, ex post incentive‐compatible mechanism, which is not budget‐balanced. Second, under the assumption of “independent types” (the distribution of each agent's private information is not directly affected by other agents' private information), we show how the budget can be balanced without compromising agents' incentives. Finally, we show that the mechanism can be made self‐enforcing when agents are sufficiently patient and the induced stochastic process over types is an ergodic finite Markov chain.  相似文献   

12.
本文考虑一个供应商和两个独立零售商构成的供应链系统。当供应商的产能受到约束时,零售商可能会竞争有限的产能。本文提出将“优先分配权”作为一个有价值的标的物进行拍卖,按照出价高低确定优先分配顺序。本文证明了优先权拍卖机制属于共同价值模型,并提出了两类拍卖机制:事先拍卖和事后拍卖。本文证明两类优先权拍卖机制均会促使零售商提交真实的需求作为订单量,并且满足收益等价定理。而就供应商期望利润而言,事后优先权拍卖机制要高于事先优先权拍卖机制。  相似文献   

13.
What is the optimal allocation of prizes in an innovation race? Should the winner take all, or is it preferable that the original inventor shares the market with subsequent independent duplicators? Some recent papers in law and economics have argued that the latter, more permissive solution is socially preferable under mild conditions. We re‐examine that issue, arguing that a permissive regime may turn the innovation race into a waiting game, reducing the power of incentives, and may invite socially wasteful duplicative R&D expenditures. In a model that accounts for these effects, the winner‐take‐all system turns out to be preferable in a broad set of circumstances, especially in highly innovative industries. (JEL: K11, L1, O34)  相似文献   

14.
This paper presents new identification results for models of first–price, second–price, ascending (English), and descending (Dutch) auctions. We consider a general specification of the latent demand and information structure, nesting both private values and common values models, and allowing correlated types as well as ex ante asymmetry. We address identification of a series of nested models and derive testable restrictions enabling discrimination between models on the basis of observed data. The simplest model—symmetric independent private values—is nonparametrically identified even if only the transaction price from each auction is observed. For richer models, identification and testable restrictions may be obtained when additional information of one or more of the following types is available: (i) the identity of the winning bidder or other bidders; (ii) one or more bids in addition to the transaction price; (iii) exogenous variation in the number of bidders; (iv) bidder–specific covariates. While many private values (PV) models are nonparametrically identified and testable with commonly available data, identification of common values (CV) models requires stringent assumptions. Nonetheless, the PV model can be tested against the CV alternative, even when neither model is identified.  相似文献   

15.
In recent years, there has been increasing managerial and academic attention given to a variety of mechanisms for companies to respond to stakeholder concerns about global business ethics. One area that merits further analysis is the role of industry‐level cooperation regarding issues in global business ethics such as labor practices. There are two main issues that we will address in this article: institutional pressures that predict when an industry will create a code of conduct and institutional complements for an industry‐level code of conduct to be “successful” with regard to responding to stakeholder concerns about international business operations. We offer a number of propositions—bringing together work from both the corporate social responsibility and (neo)institutional theory literatures—with regard to both predictors and complements of industry self‐regulation in reference to labor practices.  相似文献   

16.
未来5~10年,将是家族企业新老交替的动荡期"交接班危机将成为中国民营企业发展的第一大难题!未来5~10年,将是家族企业新老交替的动荡期。"方太集团董事长茅理翔接受《经理人》采  相似文献   

17.
余航  田林  陈云 《中国管理科学》2022,30(5):192-203
电商平台模式下,供应商决定产品价格将产品直接出售给消费者,并与平台企业共享收益。通常,消费者与产品供应商/平台企业在产品属性(匹配)信息上存在不对称性。本文基于博弈理论,研究电商平台(如:亚马逊、京东等)的产品信息披露策略,比较两种信息披露方式:“平台披露”与“供应商披露”。首先考虑由一个平台企业和一个供应商组成的垄断结构。研究表明,信息披露策略取决于产品属性(匹配)的相对重要性。同时,与平台披露相比,供应商更愿意披露全部产品信息。然后考虑一个平台企业和两个供应商组成的竞争结构。研究发现,与垄断结构不同,平台披露下,平台总是披露全部产品信息;而供应商披露下,信息披露策略取决于产品属性(匹配)信息的相对价值。此外,平台会偏好由供应商负责信息披露。  相似文献   

18.
We consider a large market where auctioneers with private reservation values compete for bidders by announcing cheap‐talk messages. If auctioneers run efficient first‐price auctions, then there always exists an equilibrium in which each auctioneer truthfully reveals her type. The equilibrium is constrained efficient, assigning more bidders to auctioneers with larger gains from trade. The choice of the trading mechanism is crucial for the result. Most notably, the use of second‐price auctions (equivalently, ex post bidding) leads to the nonexistence of any informative equilibrium. We examine the robustness of our finding in various dimensions, including finite markets and equilibrium selection.  相似文献   

19.
This paper studies the design of optimal contracts in dynamic environments where agents have private information that is persistent. In particular, I focus on a continuous‐time version of a benchmark insurance problem where a risk‐averse agent would like to borrow from a risk‐neutral lender to stabilize his utility. The agent privately observes a persistent state variable, typically either income or a taste shock, and he makes reports to the principal. I give verifiable sufficient conditions showing that incentive‐compatible contracts can be written recursively, conditioning on the report and two additional state variables: the agent's promised utility and promised marginal utility of the private state. I then study two examples where the optimal contracts can be solved in closed form, showing how persistence alters the nature of the contract. Unlike the previous discrete‐time models with independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) private information, the agent's consumption under the contract may grow over time. Furthermore, in my setting the efficiency losses due to private information increase with the persistence of the private information, and the distortions vanish as I approximate an i.i.d. environment.  相似文献   

20.
Swati Agiwal 《Risk analysis》2012,32(8):1309-1325
In the aftermath of 9/11, concern over security increased dramatically in both the public and the private sector. Yet, no clear algorithm exists to inform firms on the amount and the timing of security investments to mitigate the impact of catastrophic risks. The goal of this article is to devise an optimum investment strategy for firms to mitigate exposure to catastrophic risks, focusing on how much to invest and when to invest. The latter question addresses the issue of whether postponing a risk mitigating decision is an optimal strategy or not. Accordingly, we develop and estimate both a one‐period model and a multiperiod model within the framework of extreme value theory (EVT). We calibrate these models using probability measures for catastrophic terrorism risks associated with attacks on the food sector. We then compare our findings with the purchase of catastrophic risk insurance.  相似文献   

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