Are Self‐Service Customers Satisfied or Stuck?

This paper investigates the impact of self‐service technology (SST) usage on customer satisfaction and retention. Specifically, we disentangle the distinct effects of satisfaction and switching costs as drivers of retention among self‐service customers. Our empirical analysis examines 26,924 multi‐channel customers of a nationwide retail bank. We track each customer's channel usage, overall satisfaction, and retention over a 1‐year period. We find that, relative to face‐to‐face service, customers who use self‐service channels for a greater proportion of their transactions are either no more satisfied, or less satisfied with the service they receive, depending on the channel. However, we also find that these same customers are predictably less likely to defect to a competitor if they are heavily reliant on self‐service channels characterized by high switching costs. Through a mediation model, we demonstrate that, when self‐service usage promotes retention, it does so in a way that is consistent with switching costs. As a robustness check, we examine the behavior of channel enthusiasts, who concentrate transactions among specific channels. Relative to more diversified customers, we find that self‐service enthusiasts in low switching cost channels defect with greater frequency, while self‐service enthusiasts in high switching cost channels are retained with greater frequency.     

Multiple Temptations

We use a preference‐over‐menus framework to model a decision maker who is affected by multiple temptations. Our two main axioms on preference—exclusion and inclusion—identify when the agent would want to restrict his choice set and when he would want to expand his choice set. An agent who is tempted would want to restrict his choice set by excluding the normatively worst alternative of that choice set. Simultaneously, he would want to expand his choice set by including a normatively superior alternative. Our representation identifies the agent's normative preference and temptations, and suggests the agent is uncertain which of these temptations will affect him. We provide examples to illustrate how our model improves on those of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) and Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (2009).     

Self‐Service Operations at Retail Stores: The Role of Inter‐Customer Interactions

Inter‐customer interactions are important to the operation of self‐services in retail settings. More specifically, when self‐service terminals are used as part of customers’ checkout processes in retail operations without the explicit involvement of retailers as the direct service providers, inter‐customer interactions become a significant managerial issue. In this article, we examine the impact of inter‐customer interactions at retail self‐service terminals on customers’ service quality perceptions and repeat purchase intentions at retail stores. We conduct a scenario‐based experimental design (N = 674) using a 2 × 2 factorial design in which inter‐customer interactions are divided into “positive” vs. “negative” and occur during the “waiting” or during the actual “transaction” stages of self‐services at a retail store. We use attribution theory to develop the hypotheses. The results demonstrate that, through their interactions, fellow customers can exert influences on a focal customer's quality perceptions and repeat purchasing intentions toward a retail store. Furthermore, these influences were impacted by how customers attribute blame or assign responsibility toward the retail store. Service operations managers should leverage these interactions by designing into self‐service settings the capacities and interfaces that are best suited for customers’ co‐production of their self‐service experiences.     

Poverty and Self‐Control

We argue that poverty can perpetuate itself by undermining the capacity for self‐control. In line with a distinguished psychological literature, we consider modes of self‐control that involve the self‐imposed use of contingent punishments and rewards. We study settings in which consumers with quasi‐hyperbolic preferences confront an otherwise standard intertemporal allocation problem with credit constraints. Our main result demonstrates that low initial assets can limit self‐control, trapping people in poverty, while individuals with high initial assets can accumulate indefinitely. Thus, even temporary policies that initiate accumulation among the poor may be effective. We examine implications concerning the effect of access to credit on saving, the demand for commitment devices, the design of financial accounts to promote accumulation, and the variation of the marginal propensity to consume across income from different sources. We also explore the nature of optimal self‐control, demonstrating that it has a simple and behaviorally plausible structure that is immune to self‐renegotiation.     

Outsourcing to a Powerful Contract Manufacturer: The Effect of Learning‐by‐Doing

The contract manufacturing industry has grown rapidly in recent years as firms have increasingly outsourced production to reduce costs. This growth has created powerful contract manufacturers (CMs) in several industries. Achieving a competitive cost position is often a primary motive for outsourcing. Outsourcing influences both the original equipment manufacturer's (OEM) and the CM's production levels, and, therefore, through learning‐by‐doing renders future costs dependent on past outsourcing decisions. As such, outsourcing should not be viewed as a static decision that, once made, is not revisited. We address these considerations by analyzing a two‐period game between an OEM and a powerful CM wherein both firms can reduce their production costs through learning‐by‐doing. We find that partial outsourcing, wherein the OEM simultaneously outsources and produces in‐house, can be an optimal strategy. Also, we find that the OEM's outsourcing strategy may be dynamic—i.e., change from period to period. In addition, we find both that the OEM may engage in production for leverage (i.e., produce internally when at a cost disadvantage) and that the CM may engage in low balling. These and other findings in this paper demonstrate the importance of considering learning, the power of the CM, and future periods when making outsourcing decisions.     

Temptation and Self‐Control

We study a two‐period model where ex ante inferior choice may tempt the decision‐maker in the second period. Individuals have preferences over sets of alternatives that represent second period choices. Our axioms yield a representation that identifies the individual's commitment ranking, temptation ranking, and cost of self‐control. An agent has a preference for commitment if she strictly prefers a subset of alternatives to the set itself. An agent has self‐control if she resists temptation and chooses an option with higher ex ante utility. We introduce comparative measures of preference for commitment and self‐control and relate them to our representations.     

Should I Text or Call Here? A Situation‐Based Analysis of Drivers’ Perceived Likelihood of Engaging in Mobile Phone Multitasking

This study investigated how situational characteristics typically encountered in the transport system influence drivers’ perceived likelihood of engaging in mobile phone multitasking. The impacts of mobile phone tasks, perceived environmental complexity/risk, and drivers' individual differences were evaluated as relevant individual predictors within the behavioral adaptation framework. An innovative questionnaire, which includes randomized textual and visual scenarios, was administered to collect data from a sample of 447 drivers in South East Queensland‐Australia (66% females; n = 296). The likelihood of engaging in a mobile phone task across various scenarios was modeled by a random parameters ordered probit model. Results indicated that drivers who are female, are frequent users of phones for texting/answering calls, have less favorable attitudes towards safety, and are highly disinhibited were more likely to report stronger intentions of engaging in mobile phone multitasking. However, more years with a valid driving license, self‐efficacy toward self‐regulation in demanding traffic conditions and police enforcement, texting tasks, and demanding traffic conditions were negatively related to self‐reported likelihood of mobile phone multitasking. The unobserved heterogeneity warned of riskier groups among female drivers and participants who need a lot of convincing to believe that multitasking while driving is dangerous. This research concludes that behavioral adaptation theory is a robust framework explaining self‐regulation of distracted drivers.     

Performance of Cellular Bucket Brigades with Hand‐Off Times

A cellular bucket brigade is a way to coordinate workers along an aisle with work content on both sides. Each worker in a cellular bucket brigade works on one side of the aisle when he proceeds in one direction, and he works on the other side when he proceeds in the reverse direction. Although the cellular bucket brigade eliminates the unproductive walk‐back, it requires more hand‐offs to assemble a product than a traditional (serial) bucket brigade. These hand‐offs may waste significant production capacity as each of them requires an exchange of work, which can be complicated and time‐consuming in practice. This motivates us to investigate the impact of hand‐off times on the cellular bucket brigade's performance. We identify sufficient conditions to ensure no workers are idle in the long run and for the system to self‐balance in a model with hand‐off times. Our results suggest that even with significant hand‐off times, the cellular bucket brigade can remain substantially (about 50%) more productive than the traditional bucket brigade especially if the team size is small and the workers’ work velocities are close to their walk velocity.     

The Influence of Feelings While Driving Regular Cars on the Perception and Acceptance of Self‐Driving Cars

Self‐driving vehicles will affect the future of transportation, but factors that underlie perception and acceptance of self‐driving cars are yet unclear. Research on feelings as information and the affect heuristic has suggested that feelings are an important source of information, especially in situations of complexity and uncertainty. In this study (N = 1,484), we investigated how feelings related to traditional driving affect risk perception, benefit perception, and trust related to self‐driving cars as well as people's acceptance of the technology. Due to limited experiences with and knowledge of self‐driving cars, we expected that feelings related to a similar experience, namely, driving regular cars, would influence judgments of self‐driving cars. Our results support this assumption. While positive feelings of enjoyment predicted higher benefit perception and trust, negative affect predicted higher risk and higher benefit perception of self‐driving cars. Feelings of control were inversely related to risk and benefit perception, which is in line with research on the affect heuristic. Furthermore, negative affect was an important source of information for judgments of use and acceptance. Interest in using a self‐driving car was also predicted by lower risk perception, higher benefit perception, and higher levels of trust in the technology. Although people's individual experiences with advanced vehicle technologies and knowledge were associated with perceptions and acceptance, many simply have never been exposed to the technology and know little about it. In the absence of this experience or knowledge, all that is left is the knowledge, experience, and feelings they have related to regular driving.     

Increasing the Revenue of Self‐Storage Warehouses by Facility Design

Self‐storage is a booming industry. Both private customers and companies can rent temporary space from such facilities. The design of self‐storage warehouses differs from other facility designs in its focus on revenue maximization. A major question is how to design self‐storage facilities to fit market segments and accommodate volatile demand to maximize revenue. Customers that cannot be accommodated with a space size of their choice can be either rejected or upscaled to a larger space. Based on data of 54 warehouses in America, Europe, and Asia, we propose a new facility design approach with models for three different cases: an overflow customer rejection model and two models with customer upscale possibilities, one with reservation and another without reservation. We solve the models for several real warehouse cases, and our results show that the existing self‐storage warehouses can be redesigned to generate larger revenues for all cases. Finally, we show that the upscaling policy without reservation generally outperforms the upscaling policy with reservation.     

Timing and Self‐Control

The standard dual‐self model of self‐control, with a shorter‐run self who cares only about the current period, is excessively sensitive to the timing of decisions and to the interpolation of additional “no‐action” time periods in between the dates when decisions are made. We show that when the shorter‐run self is not completely myopic, this excess sensitivity goes away. To accommodate the combination of short time periods and convex costs of self‐control, we introduce a cognitive resource variable that tracks how the control cost depends on the self‐control that has been used in the recent past. We consider models with both linear and convex control costs, illustrating the theory through a series of examples. We examine when opportunities to consume will be avoided or delayed, and we consider the way in which the marginal interest declines with delay.     

Attenuating Initial Beliefs: Increasing the Acceptance of Anthropogenic Climate Change Information by Reflecting on Values

Anthropogenic climate change information tends to be interpreted against the backdrop of initial environmental beliefs, which can lead to some people being resistant toward the information. In this article (N = 88), we examined whether self‐affirmation via reflection on personally important values could attenuate the impact of initial beliefs on the acceptance of anthropogenic climate change evidence. Our findings showed that initial beliefs about the human impact on ecological stability influenced the acceptance of information only among nonaffirmed participants. Self‐affirmed participants who were initially resistant toward the information showed stronger beliefs in the existence of climate change risks and greater acknowledgment that individual efficacy has a role to play in reducing climate change risks than did their nonaffirmed counterparts.     

Residential Location,Job Location,and Wages: Theory and Empirics

I develop a stylized partial on‐the‐job equilibrium search model that incorporates a spatial dimension. Workers reside on a circle and can move at a cost. Each point on the circle has a wage distribution. Implications about wages and job mobility are drawn from the model and tested on Danish matched employer–employee data. The model predictions hold true. I find that workers working farther away from their residence earn higher wages. When a worker is making a job‐to‐job transition where he/she changes workplace location he/she experiences a higher wage change than a worker making a job‐to‐job transition without changing workplace location. However, workers making a job‐to‐job transition that makes the workplace location closer to the residence experience a wage drop. Furthermore, low‐wage workers and workers with high transportation costs are more likely to make job‐to‐job transitions, but also residential moves.     

Precision of Information,Sensational Information,and Self‐Efficacy Information as Message‐Level Variables Affecting Risk Perceptions

Studies that investigate how the mass media cover risk issues often assume that certain characteristics of content are related to specific risk perceptions and behavioral intentions. However, these relationships have seldom been empirically assessed. This study tests the influence of three message‐level media variables—risk precision information, sensational information, and self‐efficacy information—on perceptions of risk, individual worry, and behavioral intentions toward a pervasive health risk. Results suggest that more precise risk information leads to increased risk perceptions and that the effect of sensational information is moderated by risk precision information. Greater self‐efficacy information is associated with greater intention to change behavior, but none of the variables influence individual worry. The results provide a quantitative understanding of how specific characteristics of informational media content can influence individuals’ responses to health threats of a global and uncertain nature.     

Competition and The Operational Performance of Hospitals: The Role of Hospital Objectives

We examine the effect of a hospital's objective (i.e., non‐profit vs. for‐profit) in hospital markets for elective care. Using game‐theoretic analysis and queueing models to capture the operational performance of hospitals, we compare the equilibrium behavior of three market settings in terms of such criteria as waiting times and patient costs from waiting and hospital payments. In the first setting, a monopoly, patients are served exclusively by a single non‐profit hospital; in the second, a homogeneous duopoly, patients are served by two competing non‐profit hospitals. In our third setting, a heterogeneous duopoly, the market is served by one non‐profit hospital and one for‐profit hospital. A non‐profit hospital provides free care to patients, although they may have to wait; for‐profit hospitals charge a fee to provide care with minimal waiting. A comparison between the monopolistic and each of the duopolistic settings reveals that the introduction of competition can hamper a hospital's ability to attain economies of scale and can also increase waiting times. Moreover, the presence of a for‐profit sector may be desirable only when the hospital market is sufficiently competitive. A comparison across the duopolistic settings indicates that the choice between homogeneous and heterogeneous competition depends on the patients' willingness to wait before receiving care and the reimbursement level of the non‐profit sector. When the public funder is not financially constrained, the presence of a for‐profit sector may allow the funder to lower both the financial costs of providing coverage and the total costs to patients. Finally, our analysis suggests that the public funder should exercise caution when using policy tools that support the for‐profit sector—for example, patient subsidies—because such tools may increase patient costs in the long run; it might be preferable to raise the non‐profit sector's level of reimbursement.     

The Bounded Rationality Bias in Managerial Valuation of Real Options: Theory and Evidence from IT Projects*

Although real options theory normatively suggests that managers should associate real options with project value, little field research has been conducted to test whether they suffer from systematic biases in doing so. We draw on the notion of bounded rationality in managerial decision making to explore this understudied phenomenon. Using data collected from managers in 88 firms, we show that managers exhibit what we label the bounded rationality bias in their assessments: They associate real options with value only when a project's easily quantifiable benefits are low, but fail to do so when they are high. The study also contributes the first set of empirical measures for all six types of real options. The study contributes to managerial practice by identifying the conditions under which managers must be vigilant about inadvertently neglecting real options and by providing a simple approach for assessing real options in technology development projects.     

Keyword Auctions,Unit‐Price Contracts,and the Role of Commitment

Motivated by the enormous growth of keyword advertising, this paper explores the design of performance‐based unit‐price contract auctions, in which bidders bid their unit prices and the winner is chosen based on both their bids and performance levels. The previous literature on unit‐price contract auctions usually considers a static case where bidders' performance levels are fixed. This paper studies a dynamic setting in which bidders with a low performance level can improve their performance at a certain cost. We examine the effect of the performance‐based allocation on overall bidder performance, auction efficiency, and the auctioneer's revenue, and derive the revenue‐maximizing and efficient policies accordingly. Moreover, the possible upgrade in bidders' performance level gives the auctioneer an incentive to modify the auction rules over time, as is confirmed by the practice of Yahoo! and Google. We thus compare the auctioneer's revenue‐maximizing policies when she is fully committed to the auction rule and when she is not, and show that the auctioneer should give less preferential treatment to low‐performance bidders when she is fully committed.     

Supply Chain Learning and Spillovers in Vendor Managed Inventory

Despite extensive literature on the value of supply chain collaboration programs, little research has examined the issue from the perspective of organizational learning. Using a unique, operational level dataset, we empirically examine the learning curves through which performance improvements are realized under vendor managed inventory (VMI). Performance is measured at the downstream distributor locations by examining inventory levels after controlling for customer service performance (stockouts). We identify and assess three sources of learning: a supply chain dyad's self‐learning, learning spillovers from electronic data interchange (EDI), and learning spillovers from other supply chain dyads. We find that self‐learning, learning spillovers from EDI, and learning spillovers from other supply chain dyads, all have positive and significant impacts on a distributor's inventory performance. In addition, we find that self‐learning may exhibit a U‐shaped learning curve (i.e., performance first improves and then plateaus or declines). These findings suggest that the various learning experiences with VMI and EDI can lead to improved performance over time, but the path to improvement may be complex.     

Temptation and Taxation

We study optimal taxation when consumers have temptation and self‐control problems. Embedding the class of preferences developed by Gul and Pesendorfer into a standard macroeconomic setting, we first prove, in a two‐period model, that the optimal policy is to subsidize savings when consumers are tempted by “excessive” impatience. The savings subsidy improves welfare because it makes succumbing to temptation less attractive. We then study an economy with a long but finite horizon which nests, as a special case, the Phelps–Pollak–Laibson multiple‐selves model (thereby providing guidance on how to evaluate welfare in this model). We prove that when period utility is logarithmic, the optimal savings subsidies increase over time for any finite horizon. Moreover, as the horizon grows large, the optimal policy prescribes a constant subsidy, in contrast to the well known Chamley–Judd result.     

The Impact of Revenue‐Maximizing Priority Pricing on Customer Delay Costs

Speed is an increasingly important determinant of which suppliers will be given customers' business and is defined as the time between when an order is placed by the customer and when the product is delivered, or as the amount of time customers must wait before they receive their desired service. In either case, the speed a customer experiences can be enhanced by giving priority to that particular customer. Such a prioritization scheme will necessarily reduce the speed experienced by lower‐priority customers, but this can lead to a better outcome when different customers place different values on speed. We model a single resource (e.g., a manufacturer) that processes jobs from customers who have heterogeneous waiting costs. We analyze the price that maximizes priority revenue for the resource owner (i.e., supplier, manufacturer) under different assumptions regarding customer behavior. We discover that a revenue‐maximizing supplier facing self‐interested customers (i.e., those that independently minimize their own expected costs) charges a price that also minimizes the expected total delay costs across all customers and that this outcome does not result when customers coordinate to submit priority orders at a level that seeks to minimize their aggregate costs of priority fees and delays. Thus, the customers are better off collectively (as is the supplier) when the supplier and customers act independently in their own best interests. Finally, as the number of priority classes increases, both the priority revenues and the overall customer delay costs improve, but at a decreasing rate.