Fresh-product supply chain management with logistics outsourcing

We consider a supply chain in which a producer supplies a fresh product, through a third-party logistics (3PL) provider, to a distant market where a distributor purchases and sells it to end customers. The product is perishable, both the quantity and quality of which may deteriorate during the process of transportation. The market demand is random, sensitive to the selling price as well as the freshness of the product. We derive the optimal decisions for the three supply chain members, including the 3PL provider's transportation fee, the producer's shipping quantity and wholesale price, and the distributor's purchasing quantity and retail price. We find that the presence of the 3PL provider in the supply chain has a significant impact on its performance. We propose an incentive scheme to coordinate the supply chain. The scheme consists of two contracts, including a wholesale-market clearance (WMC) contract between the producer and the distributor, and a wholesale-price-discount sharing (WDS) contract between the producer and the 3PL provider. We show that the proposed contracts can eliminate the two sources of “double marginalization” that exist in the three-tier supply chain, and induce the three parties to act in a coordinated way.     

Optimization and Coordination of Fresh Product Supply Chains with Freshness‐Keeping Effort

We consider a supply chain in which a distributor procures from a producer a quantity of a fresh product, which has to undergo a long‐distance transportation to reach the target market. During the transportation process, the distributor has to make an appropriate effort to preserve the freshness of the product, and his success in this respect impacts on both the quality and quantity of the product delivered to the market. The distributor has to determine his order quantity, level of freshness‐keeping effort, and selling price, by taking into account the wholesale price of the producer, the cost of the freshness‐keeping effort, the likely spoilage of the product during transportation, and the possible demand for the product in the market. The producer, on the other hand, has to determine the wholesale price based on its effect on the order quantity of the distributor. We develop a model to study this problem, and characterize each party's optimal decisions in both decentralized and centralized systems. We further develop an incentive scheme to facilitate coordination between the two parties. Computational results are reported to show the effects of freshness‐keeping efforts.     

Push and Pull Contracts in a Local Supply Chain with an Outside Market*

Wholesale price contracts are widely studied in a single supplier‐single retailer supply chain, but without considering an outside market where the supplier may sell if he gets a high enough price and the retailer may buy if the price is low enough. We fill this gap in the literature by studying push and pull contracts in a local supplier–retailer supply chain with the presence of an outside market. Taking the local supplier's maximum production capacity and the outside market barriers into account, we identify the Pareto set of the push and/or pull contracts and draw managerial implications. The main results include the following. First, the most inefficient point of the pull Pareto set cannot always be removed by considering both the push and pull contracts. Second, the supplier's production capacity plays a significant role in the presence of an outside market; it affects the supplier's negotiating power with the retailer and the coordination of the supply chain can be accomplished only with a large enough capacity. Third, the import and export barriers influence the supply chain significantly: (i) an export barrier in the local market and the supplier's production capacity influence the supplier's export strategy; (ii) a low import (resp., export) barrier in the local market can improve the local supply chain's efficiency by use of a push (resp., pull) contract; and (iii) a high import (resp., export) barrier in the local market encourages the supplier (resp., retailer) to bear more inventory risk.     

Flexibility or Cost Saving? Sourcing Decisions with Two Suppliers

This article studies a decentralized supply chain in which there are two suppliers and a single buyer. One supplier offers the quantity flexibility (QF) contract to the buyer, while the other offers the cheaper price. Under the QF contract, the buyer does not assume full responsibility for the forecast, yet the supplier guarantees the availability of the forecasted quantity with additional buffer inventory. On the other hand, the price‐only contract places full inventory burden on the buyer, but with a cheaper price. We study this problem from the buyer's perspective and solve for the buyer's optimal procurement and forecasting decisions. We identify areas where flexibility and cheaper price have an advantage, one over the other. Our results indicate that the buyer significantly benefits from having multiple sources of supply. We also find that, from the system's standpoint, a multisupplier system may outperform a single‐supplier supply chain under certain conditions. Interestingly, we observe that providing too much flexibility may benefit the low‐price supplier rather than benefiting the QF supplier. We discuss the managerial implications and provide directions for future research opportunities.     

不确定需求下的冷链分销商最优决策

针对新鲜产品供应链 (冷链) 中分销商, 引入保鲜努力刻画分销商投入的保鲜工作, 考虑新鲜产品到达市场的数量与质量, 分析冷链分销商的最优决策问题.与前人研究相比, 本文使用加法形式需求函数刻画市场需求, 并使用相关企业数据验证加法形式需求函数合理性, 完善了冷链分销商决策问题的相关研究.研究发现, 当保鲜努力外生时, 分销商的最优订货数量和最优零售价格只与保鲜努力有关;当零售价格外生时, 分销商的最优保鲜努力与产品实际单位成本关于保鲜努力函数的一阶最优条件有关;当订货数量外生时, 分销商制定的零售价格随保鲜努力增加而增大, 所获得的利润也随保鲜努力递增, 但边际利润随保鲜努力递减.最后, 将所得结论应用于中国500强民营企业卓尔控股有限公司旗下的小雪冷链 (武汉) 物流有限公司, 为该公司提供相应的保鲜努力投入策略.     

Supply Chain Conflict Due to Store Brands: The Value of Wholesale Price Commitment in a Retail Supply Chain*

Store brands are of increasing importance in retail supply chains, often causing channel conflict, as the retailer's product directly competes with the manufacturer's national brand. Extant research on the resulting channel interactions either assumes the national brand manufacturer can credibly commit to maintaining a wholesale price or that he lacks such ability. However, these two scenarios imply very different supply chain interactions, as only a national brand manufacturer with commitment ability can strategically adjust a national brand wholesale price to prevent a store brand introduction by the retailer. We specifically analyze the impact of this assumption on the manufacturer, the retailer, and the customers. We determine when long‐term contracts that provide the manufacturer with such commitment ability can improve supply chain profitability.     

Why Competition from a Multi‐Channel E‐Tailer Does Not Always Benefit Consumers*

Empirical studies have delivered mixed conclusions on whether the widely acclaimed assertions of lower electronic retail (e‐tail) prices are true and to what extent these prices impact conventional retail prices, profits, and consumer welfare. For goods that require little in‐person pre‐ or postsales support such as CDs, DVDs, and books, we extend Balasubramanian's e‐tailer‐in‐the‐center, spatial, circular market model to examine the impact of a multichannel e‐tailer's presence on retailers' decisions to relocate, on retail prices and profits, and consumer welfare. We demonstrate several counter‐intuitive results. For example, when the disutility of buying online and shipping costs are relatively low, retailers are better off by not relocating in response to an e‐tailer's entry into the retail channel. In addition, such an entry—a multichannel strategy—may lead to increased retail prices and increased profits across the industry. Finally, consumers can be better off with less channel competition. The underlying message is that inferences regarding prices, profits, and consumer welfare critically depend on specifications of the good, disutility and shipping costs versus transportation costs (or more generally, positioning), and competition.     

A note on the random yield from the perspective of the supply chain

Keren [The single-period inventory problem: extension to random yield from the perspective of the supply chain. Omega 2009;37:801-10] considers a supply chain in which the distributor faces a known demand and orders from the producer subject to a random production yield, and shows that the distributor may find it optimal to order more than what is needed due to supply uncertainty under a uniform distribution. However, Keren (2009) does not address the questions whether it is always optimal for the distributor to order more, or when to order more. In this note, we point out that ordering more is not always an optimal strategy and specify the condition under which this strategy becomes optimal. We also examine the profit losses of the supply chain members resulting from the random yield supply, which is another question not considered in Keren (2009). The producer is found to possibly benefit from this production yield uncertainty, although the performances of the distributor and of the entire supply chain are always undermined. Our results are obtained under a more generalized yield distribution, and can thus be applied to wider industrial domains.     

Gray Markets,A Product of Demand Uncertainty and Excess Inventory

Diverting large quantities of goods from authorized distribution channels to unauthorized or “gray market” channels, albeit legal, significantly affects both firms and consumers due to effects on price, revenue, service and warranty availability, and product availability. In this paper we consider mechanisms by which the uncertainty surrounding inventory ordering decisions drives gray markets. We start with a minimal stochastic supply chain model composed of a producer and a retailer; then we restructure the model to add a distributor whereby the distributor and authorized retailer have the option of diverting inventory to a gray market. Our analysis sheds light on three issues: impacts of diversion on the various supply chain participants, strategies producers could use to combat or exploit gray markets, and important considerations for authorized retailers trying to set optimal order quantities in the presence of a gray market. Our analysis yields new insights into the behavior and impact of gray markets, which can inform management strategies and policies for confronting them.     

Delayed Differentiation for Multiple Lifecycle Products

Modular design allows several generations of products to co‐exist in the installed base as product designs change to take advantage of improved performance via modular upgrades. Use of a common base platform and modular design approach allows a firm to offer updates for improved performance and flexibility via remanufacturing when products have multiple lifecycles. However, as the product evolves through multiple lifecycles, the large pool of product variants leads to the curse of product proliferation. In practice, product proliferation causes high levels of line congestion and results in longer lead times, higher inventory levels, and lower levels of customer service. To offer insights into the product proliferation problem, the authors employ a delayed differentiation model in a multiple lifecycle context. The delayed differentiation model gives flexibility to balance trade‐offs between disassembly and reassembly costs by adaptively changing the push‐pull boundary. An adaptive, evolving push‐pull boundary provides flexibility for a remanufacturing firm to meet changing customer demands. The delayed differentiation model includes both a mixed‐integer linear program and an analytical investigation of the evolutionary nature of the push‐pull boundary. Both field observations and experimental results show that the nature of product proliferation and changing demand structures play significant roles in the cost and flexibility of the evolving delayed differentiation system.     

Supply Chain Inventory Replenishment: The Debiasing Effect of Declarative Knowledge

Previous experimental research demonstrates that inefficient replenishment decision making in the supply chain can be caused by specific judgment and decision biases. Based on the literature we use controlled experiments involving both student subjects and supply chain managers to test debiasing interventions that provide declarative knowledge, which is theorized to enhance the acquisition of procedural knowledge. We first investigate the effects of three debiasing components in a single‐echelon setting: knowledge of bullwhip, inventory position (IP), and use of a target order‐up‐to quantity. Experiment 1 (N = 1,608 decisions by 67 student subjects) using a 2 × 2 × 2 factorial design for the three components finds that the conceptual understanding of IP is salient for efficient replenishment decisions. We next examine the effects of the components in a simulated, multi‐echelon, serial supply chain, which introduces the additional complexity of coordination risk. Experiment 2 (N = 3,072 decisions by 128 student subjects) using a 2 × 2 × 2 factorial design finds that although subjects benefit from training components, there is evidence of cognitive overload with an increased quantity of information. Finally we test whether these debiasing components may be an effective training program for practicing supply chain managers who can be expected to have higher levels of procedural knowledge through experience gained in the field. Experiment 3 (N = 864 decisions by 36 supply chain managers) using a 2 × 1 design investigates the effects of an instructional training intervention which includes all three debiasing components and finds the intervention to reduce costs by 14%. We provide avenues for future research and successful practice.     

Supply Chain Strategy,Product Characteristics,and Performance Impact: Evidence from Chinese Manufacturers*

Supply chain management has become one of the most popular approaches to enhance the global competitiveness of business corporations today. Firms must have clear strategic thinking in order to effectively organize such complicated activities, resources, communications, and processes. An emerging body of literature offers a framework that identifies three kinds of supply chain strategies: lean strategy, agile strategy, and lean/agile strategy based on in‐depth case studies. Extant research also suggests that supply chain strategies must be matched with product characteristics in order for firms to achieve better performance. This article investigates supply chain strategies and empirically tests the supply chain strategy model that posits lean, agile, and lean/agile approaches using data collected from 604 manufacturing firms in China. Cluster analyses of the data indicate that Chinese firms are adopting a variation of lean, agile, and lean/agile supply chain strategies identified in the western literature. However, the data reveal that some firms have a traditional strategy that does not emphasize either lean or agile principles. These firms perform worse than firms that have a strategy focused on lean, agile, or lean/agile supply chain. The strategies are examined with respect to product characteristics and financial and operational performance. The article makes significant contributions to the supply chain management literature by examining the supply chain strategies used by Chinese firms. In addition, this work empirically tests the applicability of supply chain strategy models that have not been rigorously tested empirically or in the fast‐growing Chinese economy.     

促进低碳产品需求的供应链减排成本分担模型

减排成本的存在,导致低碳产品的零售价格偏高,市场需求偏低,从而制约低碳产品的推广。以此为背景,针对单一制造商和单一零售商构成的双边垄断供应链,建立了基于减排成本分担契约的Stackelberg模型,分析比较了有、无减排成本分担契约两种情况下订货量、供应链各成员利润及供应链整体利润变化。研究发现,引入减排成本分担契约后,低碳产品最优订货量增加,零售价格降低,且在一定条件下制造商和零售商的利润得到帕累托改进,并推导出了制造商和零售商的参与约束和最优分担率。在此基础上,进一步分析了消费者对低碳产品的认知与零售商的产品订货量、供应链整体利润呈正相关关系,与制造商承担的减排成本分担率呈负相关关系。最后结合数值分析验证了成本分担契约的有效性。     

两生产商单零售商的货架展示量与定价决策模型及协调策略设计

研究两个生产商和单个零售商的供应链,生产商生产的产品为可替代产品,产品需求是货架展示量和零售价格的函数。首先分析了零售商以最大化自身利润为目标的分散式决策,然后分别研究了供应链系统利润最大化、以及生产商与零售商组成联盟后的渠道利润最大化下的集中式决策模型,进而提出了与零售价和展示量相关的批发价加补贴合同、以及与零售价和展示量相关的批发价加补贴加利润共享合同,两种合同能分别协调零售商的分散式决策达到与系统利润最大化和渠道利润最大化决策一致。最后的算例表明了上述决策模型的差异和协调合同的有效性。     

Quantity Flexibility Contract in the Presence of Discount Incentive

We design a new contract, which we refer to as the QFi contract, that combines the quantity flexibility (QF) mechanism and the price‐only discount incentive. Under the QF contract, the buyer does not assume full responsibility for the forecast, yet the supplier guarantees the availability of the forecasted quantity and extra buffer inventory. In contrast, the price‐only discount contract places full inventory burden on the buyer. We show that the proposed QFi contract effectively balances the inventory risk for both the buyer and the supplier considering both the QF and discount mechanisms. We also show that the QFi contract is able to achieve supply chain coordination. More importantly, the QFi contract's coordinating price scheme does not require knowledge of demand distribution. We identify areas where the buyer and supplier may both benefit from implementing the QFi contract as opposed to the extant QF or price‐only (wholesale) discount contractual decisions in a decentralized supply chain. We also specify the conditions under which supply chain coordination can be achieved in a win‐win manner. We conclude with managerial implications and provide directions for future research.     

实报还是谎报——双边信息激励与供应链效率

探讨了双边不对称信息下供应链信息真实分享和谎报对效率的影响。首先,给出完全信息下的最优商品交易量和供应链利润作为比较基准。其次,构建双方信息真实分享的激励模型。研究发现激励双方信息真实共享所需的信息租金降低交易量和供应链利润。再次,构建允许信息谎报的交易量谈判模型。研究发现,供销双方都偏好高报自己的信息类型。个体谎报信息的幅度随着谈判力增加而减小。拥有绝对谈判力的一方不会谎报信息。供应链效率与谎报信息的幅度、成本上界以及销售价格相关。最后,通过数值算例对实报信息和谎报信息下交易量、供应链个体利润及效率进行对比分析。研究结果为管理实践提供一定的洞见:供应链企业是否激励双边信息分享可根据双方成本大小进行选择。     

Prices,Markups, and Trade Reform

This paper examines how prices, markups, and marginal costs respond to trade liberalization. We develop a framework to estimate markups from production data with multi‐product firms. This approach does not require assumptions on the market structure or demand curves faced by firms, nor assumptions on how firms allocate their inputs across products. We exploit quantity and price information to disentangle markups from quantity‐based productivity, and then compute marginal costs by dividing observed prices by the estimated markups. We use India's trade liberalization episode to examine how firms adjust these performance measures. Not surprisingly, we find that trade liberalization lowers factory‐gate prices and that output tariff declines have the expected pro‐competitive effects. However, the price declines are small relative to the declines in marginal costs, which fall predominantly because of the input tariff liberalization. The reason for this incomplete cost pass‐through to prices is that firms offset their reductions in marginal costs by raising markups. Our results demonstrate substantial heterogeneity and variability in markups across firms and time and suggest that producers benefited relative to consumers, at least immediately after the reforms.     

基于合同理论的逆向供应链定价策略研究

利用合同理论的方法,借鉴类似回购合同的假设,研究"制造商-零售商"二级供应链中3种不同质量水平的产品回收最优定价问题,以最大化零售商、制造商和供应链的利润。该闭环供应链中只有一个制造商和零售商,零售商负责产品的回收。从分析可知,通过调整参数值,在回收率确定或随机的情况下供应链都可以达到协调,也都可以找到最优订货量和回收价格。研究发现,零售商的最优价格与最优订货量紧密相关,制造商的回收价格并不影响供应链的总体利润。     

Demand uncertainty and manufacturer returns policies for style-good retailing competition

This paper investigates the role of the returns policy in the co-ordination of supply chain: A manufacturer provides a return policy for unsold goods to two competing retailers who face uncertain demand. The problem is described with a game theory structure: The manufacturer, as the Stackelberg leader, first commits a returns price to the retailers under a given wholesale price. Upon receiving this information, two competing retailers, as followers, make decisions for their retail price and order size, in which the process of pricing and ordering is played as Nash equilibrium. Anticipated the retailers’ responses, the manufacturer designs his returns policy. Adopting the classic newsboy problem model framework and using numerical study methods, the study finds that the provision of a returns policy is dependent on the market conditions faced by the retailers. The paper also analyses the impact of demand variability on the decisions of optimal retail price and order quantity and profit reallocation between the manufacturer and the retailers. Finally, it investigates how the competing factor influences the decision-making of supply chain members in response to uncertain demand and profit variability.     

Understanding the Price Effects of the MillerCoors Joint Venture

We document abrupt increases in retail beer prices just after the consummation of the MillerCoors joint venture, both for MillerCoors and its major competitor, Anheuser‐Busch. Within the context of a differentiated‐products pricing model, we test and reject the hypothesis that the price increases can be explained by movement from one Nash–Bertrand equilibrium to another. Counterfactual simulations imply that prices after the joint venture are 6%–8% higher than they would have been with Nash–Bertrand competition, and that markups are 17%–18% higher. We relate the results to documentary evidence that the joint venture may have facilitated price coordination.