Market Entry Costs,Producer Heterogeneity,and Export Dynamics

As the exchange rate, foreign demand, and production costs evolve, domestic producers are continually faced with two choices: whether to be an exporter and, if so, how much to export. We develop a dynamic structural model of export supply that characterizes these two decisions. The model embodies plant‐level heterogeneity in export profits, uncertainty about the determinants of future profits, and market entry costs for new exporters. Using a Bayesian Monte Carlo Markov chain estimator, we fit this model to plant‐level panel data on three Colombian manufacturing industries. We obtain profit function and sunk entry cost coefficients, and use them to simulate export responses to shifts in the exchange‐rate process and several types of export subsidies. In each case, the aggregate export response depends on entry costs, expectations about the exchange rate process, prior exporting experience, and producer heterogeneity. Export revenue subsidies are far more effective at stimulating exports than policies that subsidize entry costs.     

PRODUCT MARKET REGULATION,FIRM SELECTION,AND UNEMPLOYMENT

This paper analyzes the effect of product market regulation (PMR) on unemployment in a search model with heterogeneous multiple‐worker firms. In our setup, PMR modifies the distribution of firm productivities, thereby affecting the equilibrium rate of unemployment. We distinguish between PMR related to entry costs and PMR that generates recurrent fixed costs. We find that: (i) higher entry costs raise the rate of unemployment mainly through our novel selection effect, (ii) higher fixed costs decrease unemployment through the selection effect and increase it through the competition effect analyzed in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118, 879–907). Firm heterogeneity magnifies the impact of both types of regulatory costs. We propose econometric evidence consistent with the unemployment effects of sunk versus recurring costs.     

Last‐In First‐Out Oligopoly Dynamics

This paper extends the static analysis of oligopoly structure into an infinite‐horizon setting with sunk costs and demand uncertainty. The observation that exit rates decline with firm age motivates the assumption of last‐in first‐out dynamics: An entrant expects to produce no longer than any incumbent. This selects an essentially unique Markov‐perfect equilibrium. With mild restrictions on the demand shocks, sequences of thresholds describe firms' equilibrium entry and survival decisions. Bresnahan and Reiss' (1993) empirical analysis of oligopolists' entry and exit assumes that such thresholds govern the evolution of the number of competitors. Our analysis provides an infinite‐horizon game‐theoretic foundation for that structure.     

The effects of regulatory tools on organizational populations

One of the main activities of regulation is the control of market development by influencing the number of firms in an industry, their entry into an industry, and their exit from an industry. Population ecology is used as a framework for explaining both the direct and indirect effects of regulatory activity on entry, exit, and market structure. This framework is then used to derive specific propositions about regulatory effects on entry, exit, and market structure in the health maintenance organization industry.     

Capacity Investment and Product Line Decisions of a Multiproduct Leader and a Focus Strategy Entrant

In this article, I investigate the capacity investment cost conditions where a multiproduct market leader may respond to a focus strategy entrant by using different strategies such as changing the product mix, production volumes, quality levels, and/or by investing in more capacity. The products offered in the market are quality differentiated and customers are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for quality. The capacity investment costs of the two firms (i.e., the leader and the entrant) may also be different. The classical Stackelberg model predicts that an incumbent does not change its position in response to entry. However, when heterogeneous customer base, product differentiation, and capacity costs are taken into consideration, I find that the leader with a low capacity cost may choose to expand its product line and increase its production. The leader with low capacity cost may introduce a product that it was holding back when the entrant has to bear the high‐capacity cost and cannibalization threat is relatively small. Nevertheless, the extent of production volume strategies reduces as the capacity cost increases for the leader. I also find that when the leader has the power to set the industry standards by deciding the quality levels, as a response to a high‐quality focused entrant, the leader increases both levels of quality and production of the low‐quality product. Moreover, when the capacity investment cost is high for both the entrant and the leader, I find that market prices may increase with entry.     

Zur Rolle versunkener Kosten in aufeinander folgenden IT-Outsourcing-Entscheidungen

Despite the ongoing theoretical and practical investigations of IT outsourcing, there are still a large number of projects that are unsuccessful or even fail all along the line. Studies in the decision-making literature indicate that psychological effects in the evaluation of decision-relevant facts may be one relevant reason for unsuccessful decisions. By conducting a quantitative empirical study with German IT decision makers, we investigate the influence of non-rational factors within consecutive IT outsourcing decisions. We show that beside the rational economic factors (transaction, production and the rational part of switching costs) also non-rational switching costs in terms of sunk cost do significantly contribute to the explanation of consecutive IT outsourcing decisions. Furthermore, we examine moderating effects that affect the non-rational behavior of IT decision makers. Besides the theoretical contribution to analyze the effects of sunk cost on both an individual and organizational level, we also derive practical implications. In consecutive IT outsourcing decisions, the non-rational behavior triggered by sunk cost can for example be reduced by replacing the decision maker or consult a decision team when sunk cost play a considerable role.     

Why Competition from a Multi‐Channel E‐Tailer Does Not Always Benefit Consumers*

Empirical studies have delivered mixed conclusions on whether the widely acclaimed assertions of lower electronic retail (e‐tail) prices are true and to what extent these prices impact conventional retail prices, profits, and consumer welfare. For goods that require little in‐person pre‐ or postsales support such as CDs, DVDs, and books, we extend Balasubramanian's e‐tailer‐in‐the‐center, spatial, circular market model to examine the impact of a multichannel e‐tailer's presence on retailers' decisions to relocate, on retail prices and profits, and consumer welfare. We demonstrate several counter‐intuitive results. For example, when the disutility of buying online and shipping costs are relatively low, retailers are better off by not relocating in response to an e‐tailer's entry into the retail channel. In addition, such an entry—a multichannel strategy—may lead to increased retail prices and increased profits across the industry. Finally, consumers can be better off with less channel competition. The underlying message is that inferences regarding prices, profits, and consumer welfare critically depend on specifications of the good, disutility and shipping costs versus transportation costs (or more generally, positioning), and competition.     

Does a combined strategy outperform independent policies? Impact of incentive policies on renewable power generation

Incentives for renewable energy based on feed-in-tariffs (FITs) and the renewable portfolio standard (RPS) have succeeded in reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from the power generation sector. Although numerous countries have adopted a strategy combining both approaches, few studies compare its performance with either the individual FITs or RPS approach. To evaluate the effects of these three policy instruments, this study takes market transactions into account, such as net transfers to the renewable and non-renewable sectors, RPS allocation, and renewable certificate/credit (RECs) exchange. It proposes central planning, bi-level regulation, and regulation under screening as the three market structure scenarios to construct its cases and includes social welfare in the incentive performance index. Further, this study extends to cases of asymmetric information by means of optimal control to reflect market reality for comparison. The numerical examples and counterfactual analyses reach the following conclusions. First, a combined incentive policy performs best when renewable power is in its early stage of development. Second, an integrated incentive policy may neutralize the drastic volatility of FITs or the RPS. Third, the RPS is a favorable approach when the levelized cost of renewable energy is lower than that of non-renewable, while FITs do well when the costs of renewable and non-renewable energy differ slightly. The key policy implication is that along with the reduction in renewable energy generation costs, an RPS and RECs exchange mechanism or combined strategy might be adopted for social welfare benefits, the benefit of the power plants or the TSOs, respectively.     

基于两阶段博弈模型的钢铁行业碳强度减排机制研究

减少温室气体排放,高耗能行业将承担主要的减排任务,不同的减排机制对减排任务在不同技术水平的企业间分配和减排成本影响不同,而且对企业竞争力和社会福利有影响。本文构造了一个两阶段动态博弈模型,以两个代表性钢铁企业(东部和西部)为研究对象,来考察在完成一定减排目标前提下,政府设置统一碳税和差异化碳税对减排成本、社会经济福利、企业竞争力等的影响。实证结果表明:统一碳税下,钢铁行业产量降幅较小,行业减排任务分解的更加平均,西部钢铁企业竞争力损失较小;差异税下,实现既定减排目标的减排成本较小;社会经济福利损失较小,且随着减排目标的不断升高,两种碳税下社会经济福利损失之差有拉大的趋势;东部钢铁企业竞争力提高幅度较大,但对西部钢铁企业的负面影响十分明显。因此,在碳税机制设计时应充分考虑不同税率模式对减排任务分解、钢铁行业产量、社会经济福利以及企业竞争力的具体影响,需要在社会成本较低和个体企业的竞争力受影响较小之间进行权衡。     

从市场势力到有效市场势力--以中国化学药品制剂制造业为例

企业层面市场势力及其福利损失的准确估计是产业组织领域的基础性研究问题,厘清市场份额、市场势力及福利损失的相互关系有助于为反垄断政策的制定提供参考并帮助企业决策。本文定义"有效市场势力"为企业销售额所占市场份额和Lerner指数的乘积,并证实在给定的垄断竞争行业中有效市场势力与福利损失存在近似线性关系,因此从福利分析的角度,有效市场势力比市场势力更需要被重视。通过理论分析,本文给出了企业层面市场势力和福利损失的估计方法,修正了以产出价值量代替实物量进行生产函数估计时存在的偏误。通过实证分析,本文将相关方法应用于中国化学药品制剂制造业研究,发现1999~2015年中国上市化药企业平均市场势力为0.149,未表现出太强的垄断性;样本期间每家上市化药企业每年平均福利损失为0.76亿元,约占营业收入的7%;政府规制对化药企业市场势力和有效市场势力具有一定的影响,但近年来该影响趋于稳定,因此放弃直接的药品价格规制转而依靠药品价格谈判机制和反垄断规制不会对化学药品制剂市场产生剧烈影响。     

Money in Search Equilibrium,in Competitive Equilibrium,and in Competitive Search Equilibrium

We compare three market structures for monetary economies: bargaining (search equilibrium); price taking (competitive equilibrium); and price posting (competitive search equilibrium). We also extend work on the microfoundations of money by allowing a general matching technology and entry. We study how equilibrium and the effects of policy depend on market structure. Under bargaining, trade and entry are both inefficient, and inflation implies first‐order welfare losses. Under price taking, the Friedman rule solves the first inefficiency but not the second, and inflation may actually improve welfare. Under posting, the Friedman rule yields the first best, and inflation implies second‐order welfare losses.     

Market Structure and Multiple Equilibria in Airline Markets

We provide a practical method to estimate the payoff functions of players in complete information, static, discrete games. With respect to the empirical literature on entry games originated by Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) and Berry (1992), the main novelty of our framework is to allow for general forms of heterogeneity across players without making equilibrium selection assumptions. We allow the effects that the entry of each individual airline has on the profits of its competitors, its “competitive effects,” to differ across airlines. The identified features of the model are sets of parameters (partial identification) such that the choice probabilities predicted by the econometric model are consistent with the empirical choice probabilities estimated from the data. We apply this methodology to investigate the empirical importance of firm heterogeneity as a determinant of market structure in the U.S. airline industry. We find evidence of heterogeneity across airlines in their profit functions. The competitive effects of large airlines (American, Delta, United) are different from those of low cost carriers and Southwest. Also, the competitive effect of an airline is increasing in its airport presence, which is an important measure of observable heterogeneity in the airline industry. Then we develop a policy experiment to estimate the effect of repealing the Wright Amendment on competition in markets out of the Dallas airports. We find that repealing the Wright Amendment would increase the number of markets served out of Dallas Love.     

ENTRY AND ASYMMETRIC LOBBYING: WHY GOVERNMENTS PICK LOSERS

Governments frequently intervene to support domestic industries, but a surprising amount of this support goes to ailing sectors. We explain this with a lobbying model that allows for entry and sunk costs. Specifically, policy is influenced by pressure groups that incur lobbying expenses to create rents. In expanding industries, entry tends to erode such rents, but in declining industries, sunk costs rule out entry as long as the rents are not too high. This asymmetric appropriability of rents means losers lobby harder. Thus it is not that government policy picks losers, it is that losers pick government policy. JEL: H32, P16.     

An optimal design for process quality improvement: modelling and application

Existing research works on process quality improvement focus largely on the linkages between quality improvement cost and production economics such as set-up cost and defect rate reduction. This paper deals with the optimal design problem for process improvement by balancing the sunk investment cost and revenue increments due to the process improvement. We develop an optimal model based on Taguchi cost functions. The model is validated through a real case study in automotive industry where the 6-sigma DMAIC methodology has been applied. According to this research, the management can adjust the investment on prevention and appraisal costs on quality improvement that enhances process capability, reduces product defect rate and, as a result, generates remarkable financial return.     

基于厂商理论的区域产业边界和最优要素配置结构

区域经济发展核心是产业结构优化升级和资源的优化配置。在全球经济结构亟待优化升级和要素资源呈现不同层次紧缺的大背景下,如何合理配置和引导区域资源配置,优化产业发展方向,确定包括新兴产业在内的产业发展战略,是每一个地区新形势下面临的重要问题。一方面,在经济全球化和零边际成本趋势驱动下,区域产业发展不再局限于区域内部资源禀赋,资源流动性加强,区域产业发展的选择更加广泛和灵活;另一方面,资源日益短缺和经济快速发展推动了劳动力成本和资本成本上升,产业的生产要素配置也随之变化。基于厂商理论,将区域作为市场经济中的生产主体,在考虑区域交易成本和生产要素成本的基础上,构建区域产业边界模型和产业的最佳要素配置结构模型,开创了资源和商品全球化趋势下的产业升级战略的研究范式,探索了成本约束下的产业生产要素优化配置模式,为经济新常态下的区域产业升级战略和资源配置研究提供理论指引,为区域制定个性化的产业发展战略提供实践依据,同时对零边际成本社会趋势下的产业格局进行了初步的探索。研究得出:产业边界能够在一定程度下反映区域产业长期演化趋势,在完全市场经济下产业边界是产业发展的最优规模;区域产业的要素配置格局取决于产...     

Advance Selling in the Presence of Speculators and Forward‐Looking Consumers

This article examines the pricing policy of a monopolist seller who may sell in advance of consumption in a market that comprises of myopic consumers, forward‐looking consumers, and speculators. The latter group has no consumption value for the goods and is in the market with the sole objective of making a profit by reselling the purchased goods shortly after. Consumers, although homogeneous in terms of their valuations, are different with respect to their perspectives. We show that in an “upward” market where the expected valuation increases over time, the optimal pricing policy is an ex ante “static” one where the seller “prices into the future” and prices the myopic consumers out of the advance market. However, in a “downward” market where the expected valuation decreases over time, the seller adopts a dynamic pricing strategy except for the case when higher initial sales can trigger more demand subsequently and when the downward trend is not too high. In this case, the seller prefers an ex ante “static” pricing strategy and deliberately prices lower initially to sell to speculators. We identify the conditions under which the seller benefits from the existence of speculators in the market. Moreover, although the presence of entry costs is ineffective as an entry deterrence, we determine the conditions under which exit costs can rein in speculative purchase.     

寡头竞争模型下的非对称R&D分析

本文考虑的是Stackelberg寡头竞争模型下的产品市场合作对研发投入,利润,消费者剩余和福利的影响.我们发现在非时称R&D情况下,产品市场合作的产业利润总是高于产品市场竞争的情形.产品市场合作对R&D投入、消费者剩余以及福利的影响取决于知识溢出程度和R&D效率参数的大小.假如知识溢出程度足够大,R&D的效率参数足够小,产品市场的合作对生产商,消费者和社会来说比在非合作状态下更有利.     

The Impact of the Potential Entry of Copycats: Entry Conditions,Consumer Welfare,and Social Welfare

This article examines the implications of the potential entry of a copycat who produces and sells a copycat (i.e., imitation) product that competes with the incumbent product. By analyzing a two‐period dynamic noncooperative game between these two firms, we identify conditions under which the copycat can gain successful market entry. More importantly, we find that the potential entry of a copycat creates (implicit) pressure for the incumbent to lower its selling price; hence, it improves consumer welfare. Finally, we identify conditions under which the potential entry of a copycat can increase social welfare (i.e., consumer welfare and the profit of both firms).      

技术赋能、用户规模与共享经济社会福利

以Airbnb和Uber为代表的共享经济业态已成为学术界关注热点,但当前研究侧重于商业模式,而忽视了凸显其"普惠"本质的社会福利分析。基于共享经济市场结构演进的三个典型阶段,本文构建理论模型刻画了技术赋能、用户规模与社会福利之间的内在关系。研究发现:在起步阶段,市场处于局部垄断状态,此时共享经济社会福利存在损失,且福利水平主要取决于技术赋能;在发展阶段,各个共享经济平台的市场范围产生重叠,平台企业间扩张用户规模的竞争将提升社会福利;在成熟阶段,平台间并购而形成"竞争性垄断"市场结构,此时社会福利可能再次得到提升。进一步的模型分析揭示了其内在机理:技术赋能对社会福利具有"替代"和"挖掘"的双重效应,而用户规模则对社会福利产生了"正负"两方面的外部性影响。本文为共享经济的平台战略和政府规制提供了有益指导。     

基于用户规模的双边平台适应性动态定价策略研究

鉴于交叉网络效应导致用户加入双边平台的效用随用户规模动态变化,提出根据用户规模进行适应性动态定价的策略思想,并运用数值计算方法对该定价策略的效果进行深入研究。首先,引入平台动态竞争建模方法,构建了包含用户规模的双边平台适应性动态定价模型;接着,根据数值计算结果对动态定价与静态定价的效果进行比较;最后,考察了平台竞争主要参数的变化对动态定价策略效果的影响。研究表明：（1）动态定价显著优于静态定价,模型主要参数的取值变动不会改变动态定价具有相对优势这个定性结论;（2）提升服务质量或改变基准用户数不会明显增加动态定价的相对优势,但强交叉网络效应或前瞻性用户都会增强动态定价的相对优势。研究结果有助于平台企业管理者更好地制定平台定价策略。