Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium

A step toward a strategic foundation for rational expectations equilibrium is taken by considering a double auction with n buyers and m sellers with interdependent values and affiliated private information. If there are sufficiently many buyers and sellers, and their bids are restricted to a sufficiently fine discrete set of prices, then, generically, there is an equilibrium in nondecreasing bidding functions that is arbitrarily close to the unique fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium of the limit market with unrestricted bids and a continuum of agents. In particular, the large double‐auction equilibrium is almost efficient and almost fully aggregates the agents' information.     

信息技术对价格信息不对称的影响研究

信息技术降低了企业和客户获取信息的成本,从而对价格信息不对称产生影响。本文从客户搜索产品价格信息的角度,分别对四种市场进行分析,得出了在短期市场中,考虑IT影响时信息不对称降低、客户获得较低价格的结论;长期市场中,考虑IT影响时,信息不对称消失、市场演变为完全竞争市场的结论。最后,给出企业制定价格策略的建议。     

Information Aggregation in Dynamic Markets With Strategic Traders

This paper studies information aggregation in dynamic markets with a finite number of partially informed strategic traders. It shows that, for a broad class of securities, information in such markets always gets aggregated. Trading takes place in a bounded time interval, and in every equilibrium, as time approaches the end of the interval, the market price of a “separable” security converges in probability to its expected value conditional on the traders' pooled information. If the security is “non‐separable,” then there exists a common prior over the states of the world and an equilibrium such that information does not get aggregated. The class of separable securities includes, among others, Arrow–Debreu securities, whose value is 1 in one state of the world and 0 in all others, and “additive” securities, whose value can be interpreted as the sum of traders' signals.     

Identification and Inference in Ascending Auctions With Correlated Private Values

We introduce and apply a new nonparametric approach to identification and inference on data from ascending auctions. We exploit variation in the number of bidders across auctions to nonparametrically identify useful bounds on seller profit and bidder surplus using a general model of correlated private values that nests the standard independent private values (IPV) model. We also translate our identified bounds into closed form and asymptotically valid confidence intervals for several economic measures of interest. Applying our methods to much studied U.S. Forest Service timber auctions, we find evidence of correlation among values after controlling for a rich vector of relevant auction covariates; this correlation causes expected profit, the profit‐maximizing reserve price, and bidder surplus to be substantially lower than conventional (IPV) analysis of the data would suggest.     

债券发行的单一价格和多种价格招标的比较

债券的发行一般采用单一价格机制和多种价格机制两种招标形式。为了比较这两类拍卖机制的经济效率,本文通过模拟实验的方法,分析了两类招标机制的效率差异。我们发现,从长期来看,单一价格招标要优于多种价格招标。与此同时,多种价格招标机制作为短期的政策调控手段是可行的,但如果作为一种长期政策则不太合适。     

Market Good Flexibility in Capacity Auctions

We consider the allocation of limited production capacity among several competing agents through auctions. Our focus is on the contribution of flexibility in market good design to effective capacity allocation. The application studied is a capacity allocation problem involving several agents, each with a job, and a facility owner. Each agent generates revenue by purchasing capacity and scheduling its job at the facility. Ascending auctions with various market good designs are compared. We introduce a new market good that provides greater flexibility than those previously considered in the literature. We allow ask prices to depend both on agents’ utility functions and on the number of bids at the previous round of the auction, in order to model and resolve resource conflicts. We develop both optimal and heuristic solution procedures for the winner determination problem. Our computational study shows that flexibility in market good design typically increases system value within auctions. A further increase is achieved if each agent is allowed to bid for multiple market goods at each round. On average, the multiple flexible market goods auction provides over 95% of the system value found by centralized planning.     

Speculative Overpricing in Asset Markets With Information Flows

In this paper, we derive and experimentally test a theoretical model of speculation in multiperiod asset markets with public information flows. The speculation arises from the traders' heterogeneous posteriors as they make different inferences from sequences of public information. This leads to overpricing in the sense that price exceeds the most optimistic belief about the real value of the asset. We find evidence of speculative overpricing in both incomplete and complete markets, where the information flow is a gradually revealed sequence of imperfect public signals about the state of the world. We also find evidence of asymmetric price reaction to good news and bad news, another feature of equilibrium price dynamics under our model. Markets with a relaxed short‐sale constraint exhibit less overpricing.     

Behavior in Multi‐Unit Demand Auctions: Experiments with Uniform Price and Dynamic Vickrey Auctions

We experimentally investigate the sensitivity of bidders demanding multiple units of a homogeneous commodity to the demand reduction incentives inherent in uniform price auctions. There is substantial demand reduction in both sealed bid and ascending price clock auctions with feedback regarding rivals' drop‐out prices. Although both auctions have the same normal form representation, bidding is much closer to equilibrium in the ascending price auctions. We explore the behavioral process underlying these differences along with dynamic Vickrey auctions designed to eliminate the inefficiencies resulting from demand reduction in the uniform price auctions.     

Measurement and Pricing of Risk in Insurance Markets

The theory and practice of risk measurement provides a point of intersection between risk management, economic theories of choice under risk, financial economics, and actuarial pricing theory. This article provides a review of these interrelationships, from the perspective of an insurance company seeking to price the risks that it underwrites. We examine three distinct approaches to insurance risk pricing, all being contingent on the concept of risk measures. Risk measures can be interpreted as representations of risk orderings, as well as absolute (monetary) quantifiers of risk. The first approach can be called an "axiomatic" one, whereby the price for risks is calculated according to a functional determined by a set of desirable properties. The price of a risk is directly interpreted as a risk measure and may be induced by an economic theory of price under risk. The second approach consists in contextualizing the considerations of the risk bearer by embedding them in the market where risks are traded. Prices are calculated by equilibrium arguments, where each economic agent's optimization problem follows from the minimization of a risk measure. Finally, in the third approach, weaknesses of the equilibrium approach are addressed by invoking alternative valuation techniques, the leading paradigm among which is arbitrage pricing. Such models move the focus from individual decision takers to abstract market price systems and are thus more parsimonious in the amount of information that they require. In this context, risk measures, instead of characterizing individual agents, are used for determining the set of price systems that would be viable in a market.     

连续双向拍卖市场中基于马尔可夫链的交易策略研究

连续双向拍卖市场中交易策略的设计问题远比单向拍卖复杂,本文首先检验了该市场中交易价格的马尔可夫性质,然后据此提出了基于马尔可夫链的自学习动态交易策略,最后通过比较实验发现,该策略明显优于"约束型零信息"策略。     

对我国期货市场价格发现功能的实证分析

本文利用协整检验、Granger因果检验、GS模型以及误差修正模型对上海期货交易所金属铜、铝的价格发现功能进行了实证分析。研究结果显示:金属铜、铝的期货价格和现货价格之间存在协整关系,期货价格具有良好的价格发现功能;金属铜的期货价格和现货价格之间存在双向引导关系且现货价格在价格发现功能中的作用更大;而对金属铝而言,仅存在从期货价格到现货价格的单向引导关系。     

On the Existence of Pure Strategy Monotone Equilibria in Asymmetric First‐Price Auctions

We establish the existence of pure strategy equilibria in monotone bidding functions in first‐price auctions with asymmetric bidders, interdependent values, and affiliated one‐dimensional signals. By extending a monotonicity result due to Milgrom and Weber (1982), we show that single crossing can fail only when ties occur at winning bids or when bids are individually irrational. We avoid these problems by considering limits of ever finer finite bid sets such that no two bidders have a common serious bid, and by recalling that single crossing is needed only at individually rational bids. Two examples suggest that our results cannot be extended to multidimensional signals or to second‐price auctions.     

集合竞价透明度提高对市场流动性的影响——基于中国股市开盘的实证研究

运用上海A股股票的交易数据,采用事件研究法分析了开盘集合竞价由封闭式改为开放式后市场流动性的变化。通过面板数据回归,检验了开盘交易量比率和连续竞价市场的买卖价差、市场深度、流动性比率和弹性的变化。实证结果表明：在开放式集合竞价机制下,交易者参与开盘的积极性明显提高,连续竞价开始后15min内的市场流动性明显减少。根据不N的交易者对信息揭示的反应不同,得到如下结论：实行开放式集合竞价开盘不仅吸引了更多的交易者参与交易,提高了开盘价格的信息效率,而且缓解了交易者对开盘信息的过度反应。     

电子市场中时间价格敏感需求下的交货期定价决策

电子市场中,如何通过交货期报价来增大需求、提高收益,对于网络营销企业来说是至关重要的.本文假定在一个包含网络营销企业与其客户的运作系统中,需求同时对价格与时间都敏感的条件下,以最优化自身收益为目标、以满足必须达到规定的服务水平为主要约束条件,构建了交货期定价决策模型.通过数值算例,探讨了在电子市场中消费者为价格敏感或交货期敏感时,网络营销企业的最优定价策略.上述结论可以为网络营销企业在电子市场中的定价决策提供有益的指导.     

股价暴涨的风险:基于中国股市的实证

股价暴涨直观上带来高收益，激发市场正面情绪，那么为什么暴涨被视为风险?本文利用2006年至2016年中国A股上市公司数据，通过计量建模对暴涨股票的特征和日后的市场表现进行刻画。实证发现：（1）股价暴涨频度高的股票，呈现低资产收益率、高市值账面比、多散户持股、少沪深300成份股等特点；（2）易发生暴涨的股票其长期超额收益率更低，未来有更大的暴跌风险和更高的收益率波动率；（3）对于运营基本面较差、市场过于乐观、信息披露质量较低的股票，暴涨后的暴跌风险更加明显。研究结论在不同代理变量选择、多种计量模型设定下均稳健成立。本文揭示了暴涨不仅仅是极端价格波动，而且更容易发生在高风险股票中，未来蕴含着更大的潜在损失。暴涨是实实在在的风险。     

The Dark Side of Information and Market Efficiency in E‐Markets*

Price dispersion reflects the differences in prices for identical products. While in physical markets such dispersion is prevalent due to high search costs, many researchers argue that search costs and price dispersion will be much lower in electronic markets (e‐markets). Empirical evidence does not support this contention, and researchers have studied search costs, market factors, and service‐quality factors to explain this dispersion. Previous research has largely assumed that more information is better. By ignoring the dark side of information, we argue that only a partial understanding of price dispersion is possible. In this article, information overload and equivocality are studied as two dark attributes of information that lead sellers to different pricing decisions in e‐markets. Hypotheses relating these attributes to price dispersion are supported through analysis of 161 product markets. This work opens up new avenues in the study of e‐markets and discusses the implications of these findings for research and practice on consumer and seller decisions.     

关键词拍卖中基于广义第一价格的投标价格决策分析

在关键词拍卖中,由于广告商不能保证对关键词的估价是最优投标价格,因此如何选取最优的关键词投标价格一直是广告商急于解决的问题。基于与Friedman投标模型假设条件等价的关键词拍卖投标假设条件,计算了各个关键词广告位置的胜标概率,并在广义第一价格拍卖机制下建立了关键词投标价格决策模型。该模型可以使广告商选取最优的关键词投标价格。最后通过仿真验证了该模型的有效性。     

中国股票市场的信息反应曲线和股票价格波动的非对称性

股票价格波动对于市场信息的反应过程具有非对称性。通过利用多种非对称性GARCH 模型,描述和检验了沪市股票日收益率序列的条件波动性,并通过对股票市场信息影响曲线的分析,发现沪市股票价格波动中存在显著的非对称性反应。这说明股市波动对于不同的政策干预和信息冲击具有不同程度的反应,“利好消息”对股市的刺激作用仍然需要其他市场干预的配合才能发挥出来。     

基于机制转换Copula模型的股市量价尾部关系研究

针对传统模型只能考察正常市场条件下的量价关系,本文构建了机制转换Copula模型来研究极端市场条件下我国股市量价间的尾部相依性,发现沪深两市收益率、绝对收益率与交易量间的尾部关系存在明显的非对称特征。高收益率、高绝对收益率对应着高交易量,而低收益率、低绝对收益率与高、低交易量不存在对应关系。另外,量价间尾部关系与机制状态有关,呈现明显的周期性动态特征与结构性变化,结构变化点对应着股市周期中较大调整的开始或结束。研究还发现沪市量价间尾部关系要强于深市,但深市收益率与交易量尾部在两机制间的变动更大,而两市绝对收益率与交易量间的尾部相依性在两机制间变动较小。     

电信运营市场网间价格歧视的系统动力学模型及仿真

网间价格歧视是电信运营企业的一个重要竞争手段,运用系统动力学分析电信运营市场的这种价格竞争,结果表明,对于市场中的主导者来说实行网间价格歧视有利可图,对于追随者出于理性只能选择不实行网间价格歧视。这种主导者实行-追随者不实行的均衡,对增加社会福利是有利的。企业的市场地位是相对的概念,因此对于某些企业来说可能会表现为一个相对强势和相对弱势同时并存的局面,这使实行或不实行网间价格歧视成为一个两难选择。