Aspirations and Inequality

This paper develops a theory of socially determined aspirations, and the interaction of those aspirations with growth and inequality. The interaction is bidirectional: economy‐wide outcomes determine individual aspirations, which in turn determine investment incentives and social outcomes. Thus aspirations, income, and the distribution of income evolve jointly. When capital stocks lie in some compact set, steady state distributions must exhibit inequality and are typically clustered around local poles. When sustained growth is possible, initial histories matter. Either there is convergence to an equal distribution (with growth) or there is perennial relative divergence across clusters, with within‐cluster convergence. A central feature that drives these results is that aspirations that are moderately above an individual's current standard of living tend to encourage investment, while still higher aspirations may lead to frustration.     

The Distribution of Wealth and Fiscal Policy in Economies With Finitely Lived Agents

We study the dynamics of the distribution of wealth in an overlapping generation economy with finitely lived agents and intergenerational transmission of wealth. Financial markets are incomplete, exposing agents to both labor and capital income risk. We show that the stationary wealth distribution is a Pareto distribution in the right tail and that it is capital income risk, rather than labor income, that drives the properties of the right tail of the wealth distribution. We also study analytically the dependence of the distribution of wealth—of wealth inequality in particular—on various fiscal policy instruments like capital income taxes and estate taxes, and on different degrees of social mobility. We show that capital income and estate taxes can significantly reduce wealth inequality, as do institutions favoring social mobility. Finally, we calibrate the economy to match the Lorenz curve of the wealth distribution of the U.S. economy.     

Financial Market Globalization,Symmetry‐Breaking,and Endogenous Inequality of Nations

This paper investigates the effects of financial market globalization on the inequality of nations. The world economy consists of inherently identical countries, which differ only in their levels of capital stock. Each country is represented by the standard overlapping generations model, modified only to incorporate credit market imperfection. An integration of financial markets affects the set of stable steady states, as it changes the balance between the equalizing force of the diminishing returns technology and the unequalizing force of the wealth‐dependent borrowing constraint. The model is tractable enough to allow for a complete characterization of the stable steady states. In the absence of the international financial market, the world economy has a unique steady state, which is symmetric and stable. In the presence of the international financial market, symmetry‐breaking occurs under some conditions. That is, the symmetric steady state loses its stability and stable asymmetric steady states come to exist. In the stable asymmetric steady states, the world economy is endogenously divided into the rich and poor countries; the borrowing constraints are binding in the poor but not in the rich; the world output is smaller, the rich are richer and the poor are poorer in any of the stable asymmetric steady states than in the (unstable) symmetric steady state.     

A Parsimonious Macroeconomic Model for Asset Pricing

I study asset prices in a two‐agent macroeconomic model with two key features: limited stock market participation and heterogeneity in the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption (EIS). The model is consistent with some prominent features of asset prices, such as a high equity premium, relatively smooth interest rates, procyclical stock prices, and countercyclical variation in the equity premium, its volatility, and in the Sharpe ratio. In this model, the risk‐free asset market plays a central role by allowing non‐stockholders (with low EIS) to smooth the fluctuations in their labor income. This process concentrates non‐stockholders' labor income risk among a small group of stockholders, who then demand a high premium for bearing the aggregate equity risk. Furthermore, this mechanism is consistent with the very small share of aggregate wealth held by non‐stockholders in the U.S. data, which has proved problematic for previous models with limited participation. I show that this large wealth inequality is also important for the model's ability to generate a countercyclical equity premium. When it comes to business cycle performance, the model's progress has been more limited: consumption is still too volatile compared to the data, whereas investment is still too smooth. These are important areas for potential improvement in this framework.     

THE RIGHT AMOUNT OF TRUST

We investigate the relationship between individual trust and individual economic performance. We find that individual income is hump‐shaped in a measure of intensity of trust beliefs. Our interpretation is that highly trusting individuals tend to assume too much social risk and to be cheated more often, ultimately performing less well than those with a belief close to the mean trustworthiness of the population. However, individuals with overly pessimistic beliefs avoid being cheated, but give up profitable opportunities, therefore underperforming. The cost of either too much or too little trust is comparable to the income lost by forgoing college. Our findings hold in large‐scale international survey data, as well as inside a country with high‐quality institutions, and are also supported by experimental findings. (JEL: A1, A12, D1, O15, Z1)     

INSTITUTION‐INDUCED PRODUCTIVITY DIFFERENCES AND PATTERNS OF INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS

This paper studies theoretically how the cross‐country differences in the institutional quality (IQ) of domestic credit markets shape the patterns of international capital flows when such IQ differences also cause productivity differences across countries. IQ affects productivity by changing productivity–agency‐cost trade‐offs across heterogeneous investment projects. Such institution‐induced productivity differences are shown to have effects on the investment and capital flows that are opposite of exogenous productivity differences. This implies that the overall effect of IQ could generate U‐shaped responses of the investment and capital flows. Among other things, this means that capital could flow from middle‐income countries to both low‐income and high‐income countries, and that, starting from a very low IQ, a country could experience both a growth and a current account surplus after a successful institutional reform. More generally, the results here provide some cautions when interpreting the empirical evidence on the role of productivity differences and institutional differences on capital flows. It also calls into question the validity of treating the degree of financial frictions as a proxy for the quality of financial institutions, as commonly done in the literature.     

Zero Expected Wealth Taxes: A Mirrlees Approach to Dynamic Optimal Taxation

In this paper, I consider a dynamic economy in which a government needs to finance a stochastic process of purchases. The agents in the economy are privately informed about their skills, which evolve stochastically over time; I impose no restriction on the stochastic evolution of skills. I construct a tax system that implements a symmetric constrained Pareto optimal allocation. The tax system is constrained to be linear in an agent's wealth, but can be arbitrarily nonlinear in his current and past labor incomes. I find that wealth taxes in a given period depend on the individual's labor income in that period and previous ones. However, in any period, the expectation of an agent's wealth tax rate in the following period is zero. As well, the government never collects any net revenue from wealth taxes.     

我国住宅市场财富效应研究

通过对我国总体数据的实证分析发现,预期收入增长对总消费具有显著正的影响;预期住宅价格对总消费也有显著正的影响,即我国住宅市场财富效应是显著存在的。这与最近关于OECD国家住宅市场研究中的结论是相吻合的。     

Poverty and Self‐Control

We argue that poverty can perpetuate itself by undermining the capacity for self‐control. In line with a distinguished psychological literature, we consider modes of self‐control that involve the self‐imposed use of contingent punishments and rewards. We study settings in which consumers with quasi‐hyperbolic preferences confront an otherwise standard intertemporal allocation problem with credit constraints. Our main result demonstrates that low initial assets can limit self‐control, trapping people in poverty, while individuals with high initial assets can accumulate indefinitely. Thus, even temporary policies that initiate accumulation among the poor may be effective. We examine implications concerning the effect of access to credit on saving, the demand for commitment devices, the design of financial accounts to promote accumulation, and the variation of the marginal propensity to consume across income from different sources. We also explore the nature of optimal self‐control, demonstrating that it has a simple and behaviorally plausible structure that is immune to self‐renegotiation.     

Differential Mortality and the Design of the Italian System of Public Pensions

Abstract. This paper considers the issue of actuarial fairness of the new Italian public pension system in view of the recent trends in old‐age mortality and the survival differences by gender, birth cohort and region of residence. After reviewing the secular trends in elderly mortality in Italy, and the evolution of regional differences in survival over the last three decades, we evaluate the impact, on the conversion factors introduced by the Dini reform, of a further decline in elderly mortality over the next few decades. We compute the conversion factors using a close approximation to the unknown formula employed in the Dini reform but allowing for gender‐ and region‐specific survival probabilities. Our results leave no doubt about the importance of frequently updating the conversion factors in the light of the rapid increase in elderly survival. The paper also quantifies to what extent gender‐ and region‐specific conversion factors may differ from their currently legislated values, that only vary by age. Finally, we recognize that the actuarial fairness of the system introduced by the recent reform can only be guaranteed on average and that, in the presence of a heterogeneous population of individuals that differ considerably in their mortality prospects, the current system implies a substantial degree of redistribution from high‐mortality groups (typically characterized by low income and low wealth) to low‐mortality groups (typically characterized by high income and high wealth).     

LIQUIDITY AND INEFFICIENT INVESTMENT

We study consumer liquidity in a general equilibrium model where the friction is the nonpledgeability of future income. Liquidity helps to overcome the absence of a double coincidence of wants. Consumers over‐hoard liquidity and the resulting competitive equilibrium is constrained inefficient. Fiscal policy following a large negative shock can increase ex‐ante welfare. If the government cannot commit, the ex‐post optimal fiscal policy will be too small from an ex‐ante perspective. The model throws light on the holding of foreign reserves in international markets.     

Shareholders' Wealth‐Maximizing Operating Decisions and Risk Management Practices in a Mixed Contracts Economy

This paper establishes a critically important positive role for operations management practices and financial hedging. We show that operations management decisions and financial hedging are intertwined, and we advance a framework that can identify their combined effects on investors' wealth. We show that: (a) firms (publicly traded corporations) will optimally hold adequate riskless working capital (e.g., cash) to minimize the cost of obtaining non‐financial inputs, and the magnitude of this cash holding depends on operating details, and (b) operations management and financial hedging can lower firms' cash requirements, and boost productivity, defined as the wealth created in the firm per dollar of invested capital. Productivity‐enhancing practices—by “freeing up” some of the firm's cash—can maximize the investors' wealth. We show that these results obtain because firms' contracts with many of the providers of non‐financial inputs are not traded, and because investors can invest not just in public corporations but also in businesses “outside the markets” (e.g., proprietorships, partnerships, and private equity).     

INCOME AND WEALTH CONCENTRATION IN SPAIN FROM A HISTORICAL AND FISCAL PERSPECTIVE

This paper presents series on top shares of income and wealth in Spain using personal income and wealth tax return statistics. Top income shares are highest in the 1930s, fall sharply during the first decade of the Franco dictatorship, then remain stable and low till the 1980s, and have increased since the mid 1990s. The top 0.01% income share in Spain estimated from income tax data is comparable to estimates for the United States and France over the period 1933–1971. Those findings, along with a careful analysis of all published tax statistics, suggest that income tax evasion and avoidance among top income earners in Spain was much less prevalent than previously thought. Wealth concentration has been about stable from 1982 to 2005 as surging real estate prices have benefited the middle class and compensated for a slight increase in financial wealth concentration in the 1990s. We use our wealth series and a simple model to analyze the effects of the wealth tax exemption of stocks for owners‐managers introduced in 1994. We show that the reform induced substantial shifting from the taxable to tax exempt status, hence creating efficiency costs. (JEL D31, H31, O15)     

THE WELFARE GAINS OF FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION: CAPITAL ACCUMULATION AND HETEROGENEITY

Research has shown that, absent individual heterogeneity and under complete markets, the welfare impact of financial openness is quantitatively limited. Not only are inequalities in wealth and labor productivity a feature of most societies, but also financial markets suffer from many well‐known frictions. This paper demonstrates that, when households face borrowing constraints and uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks to income, the welfare implications of financial liberalization are considerable. For instance, the average increase in welfare of a typical emerging market economy that switches from a closed capital market to perfect capital mobility is equivalent to a permanent increase in average consumption of roughly 5.4%. This is about 3.9 times more than the welfare gains of the same policy under a complete markets environment without any individual heterogeneity. We show that individual heterogeneity accounts for two thirds of this additional increase in the average welfare gain; market incompleteness accounts for the remaining third. In our calibration, the median household in capital‐scarce countries is in favor of international financial integration. However, if the pivotal voter is wealthy enough then such reform might not be implemented, since richer households have a vested interest in capital market closedness.     

Equilibrium Financing in a Distribution Channel with Capital Constraint

There exist capital constraints in many distribution channels. We examine a channel consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer, where the retailer is capital constrained. The retailer may fund its business by borrowing credit either from a competitive bank market or from the manufacturer, provided the latter is willing to lend. When only one credit type (either bank or trade credit) is viable, we show that trade credit financing generally charges a higher wholesale price and thus becomes less attractive than bank credit financing for the retailer. When both bank and trade credits are viable, the unique equilibrium is trade credit financing if production cost is relatively low but is bank credit financing otherwise. We also study the case where both the retailer and the manufacturer are capital constrained and demonstrate that, to improve the overall supply chain efficiency, the bank should finance the manufacturer if production cost is low but finance the retailer otherwise. Our analysis further suggests that the equilibrium region of trade credit financing shrinks as demand variability or the retailer's internal capital level increases.     

Does the Entry of Third‐Party Remanufacturers Always Hurt Original Equipment Manufacturers?

Researchers and managers broadly agree that the entry of third‐party remanufacturers (TPRs) hurts original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) because of the cannibalization problem. Thus, OEMs should always try to deter the entry of TPRs. In this article, we present a contrasting view: Competing OEMs without remanufacturing capacities sometimes benefit from the entry of TPRs. The key feature of our model is that there exists a group of newness‐conscious consumers in the market who do not buy the remanufactured product regardless of the price, whereas a group of functionality‐oriented consumers (FOCs) may buy a remanufactured one at a low price. In a steady‐state‐period setting, we investigate how the number of TPRs affects the OEMs’ profits. We find that, from the perspective of two competing OEMs: (i) The entry of one or many TPRs may lead to a higher profit; (ii) The entry of many TPRs may be better than the entry of one TPR; and (iii) The impact of the entry of one or many TPRs may be reversed as FOCs’ willingness‐to‐pay for the remanufactured product increases.     

The Dynamics of Inequality

The past forty years have seen a rapid rise in top income inequality in the United States. While there is a large number of existing theories of the Pareto tail of the long‐run income distributions, almost none of these address the fast rise in top inequality observed in the data. We show that standard theories, which build on a random growth mechanism, generate transition dynamics that are too slow relative to those observed in the data. We then suggest two parsimonious deviations from the canonical model that can explain such changes: “scale dependence” that may arise from changes in skill prices, and “type dependence,” that is, the presence of some “high‐growth types.” These deviations are consistent with theories in which the increase in top income inequality is driven by the rise of “superstar” entrepreneurs or managers.     

A Model of the Consumption Response to Fiscal Stimulus Payments

A wide body of empirical evidence finds that approximately 25 percent of fiscal stimulus payments (e.g., tax rebates) are spent on nondurable household consumption in the quarter that they are received. To interpret this fact, we develop a structural economic model where households can hold two assets: a low‐return liquid asset (e.g., cash, checking account) and a high‐return illiquid asset that carries a transaction cost (e.g., housing, retirement account). The optimal life‐cycle pattern of portfolio choice implies that many households in the model are “wealthy hand‐to‐mouth”: they hold little or no liquid wealth despite owning sizable quantities of illiquid assets. Therefore, they display large propensities to consume out of additional transitory income, and small propensities to consume out of news about future income. We document the existence of such households in data from the Survey of Consumer Finances. A version of the model parameterized to the 2001 tax rebate episode yields consumption responses to fiscal stimulus payments that are in line with the evidence, and an order of magnitude larger than in the standard “one‐asset” framework. The model's nonlinearities with respect to the rebate size and the prevailing aggregate economic conditions have implications for policy design.     

RELATIVE RISK AVERSION IS CONSTANT: EVIDENCE FROM PANEL DATA

Most classical tests of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) based on individual portfolio composition use cross‐sectional data. Such tests must assume that the distributions of wealth and preferences are independent. We use panel data to analyze how individuals’ portfolio allocation between risky and riskless assets varies in response to changes in total financial wealth. We find the elasticity of the risky asset share to wealth to be small and statistically insignificant, supporting the CRRA assumption; this finding is robust when the sample is restricted to households experiencing large income variations. In addition, we find a small but significant negative correlation between wealth and risk aversion. Various extensions are discussed.     

Redistribution Through Education and Other Mechanisms Under Capital‐Market Imperfections and Uncertainty: A Welfare Effect Analysis

Abstract. This paper considers a two‐period model of endogenous human capital formation under the credits‐market imperfection and uncertainty assumptions. We compare in the first part of the paper ex‐ante and ex‐post general‐equilibrium effects of the education subsidy policy to those of the negative income tax and the unskilled wage subsidy regimes. We show that the education subsidy policy raises an efficiency‐inequality trade‐off issue, and therefore it is optimal unless the degree of inequality aversion is relatively high and financing the subsidy is not too distorsive. Public loans are generally claimed to provide a solution for such issue. We explore the implications of implementing the public loan under several schemes in the second part of the paper. We show that combining between a pure public loan and education subsidies provides higher levels of welfare than these two policies taken separately provided that the inequality aversion degree is high. For low degrees of inequality aversion, the pure public loan is the optimal policy.