Network Neutrality Versus Paid Prioritization: Analyzing the Impact on Content Innovation

We examine the link between network neutrality (NN) and content innovation on the Internet by comparing the impact of NN and packet discrimination (PD) regimes on content innovation. We do this in the context of a two‐sided market model that simultaneously considers content provider (CP) and consumer decisions concerning market entry and participation while taking into account consumers’ response to network congestion. We find that content innovation flourishes under NN to a greater degree than under PD due to two effects we uncover: the generation of what we call a pro bono innovation zone in which CPs are able to enter the market without contributing to network provider profits; and the cross‐side congestion effect, a negative network externality wherein higher broadband market coverage levels result in greater congestion for CPs, and increased content results in greater congestion for consumers, taking into account consumers’ strategic response to network congestion. These results have important implications for current public policy debates regarding the Federal Communications Commission's Open Internet Rules.     

Broadband Network Management and the Net Neutrality Debate

The debate of net neutrality and the potential regulation of net neutrality may fundamentally change the dynamics of data consumption and transmission through the Internet. The existing literature on economics of net neutrality focuses only on the supply side of the market, that is, a broadband service provider (BSP) may charge content providers for priority delivery of their content to consumers. In this article, we explore a complete spectrum of broadband network management options based on both the supply and demand sides of the market. We find that although the BSP always prefers the non‐neutral network management options, it does not always discriminate both sides of the market. From the social planner's perspective, we find that some network management options maximize the social welfare under certain market conditions while other options reduce the social welfare. Using the terminology from a recent Federal Communications Commission report and order, we categorize the social welfare maximizing options as “reasonable network management” and the social welfare reducing options as “unreasonable discrimination.” We also identify conditions under which the BSP's network management choices deviate from the social optimum. These conditions help establish the criteria under which the social planner might wish to regulate the BSP's actions.     

Push or Pull? Design of Content Delivery Systems

Advances in information technology, especially the expansion of cellular and WiFi networks, are dramatically changing how people consume digital content. These changes in user access behavior present a challenge of delivering content to a diversified consumer base. This article addresses this challenge by identifying the key factors for the design of content delivery systems (gross value of content, delivery delay, sensitivity to delivery delay, accessing cost, and processing cost) and explicitly modeling their interactions. We investigate two content delivery systems—push and pull systems, and solve for the content provider's optimal push frequency decision and consumers’ push versus pull decisions. We show that the content provider's selection of push frequency plays a critical role determining the segmentation of the consumer market into the push group and the pull group. Our findings suggest that firms should set a relatively high push frequency to cater to high‐type consumers, which leads to two consumer groups with low‐type consumers belonging to the pull group and high‐type consumers belonging to the push group.     

Residential Mortgages and Public Policy: What to do with Fannie and Freddie?

The current debate on U.S. housing policy focuses on the role of the government in supporting the mortgage market. Existing organizations (Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac) are in conservatorship status, and Congress is considering alternative structures and guarantees including the Johnson‐Crapo bill, to provide catastrophic insurance in support of the coverage from private companies. The resolution of this issue is complicated by the various activities involved in the issue—investment securities, public policy, macroeconomics, accounting, and insurance. This article reviews the impact of these activities on U.S. housing, with a discussion of the feasibility of creating a catastrophic insurance program similar to that of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The federal government has successfully operated catastrophic insurance programs in support of private sector initiatives, and this experience—while certainly not perfect—may be a reasonable approach to the current Fannie/Freddie dilemma.     

非授权分享、定价分歧与知识付费平台运营策略

在崇尚“免费思维”的互联网时代，非授权分享已成为制约知识提供者持续输出优质内容的关键因素。而在“内容为王”的现实约束下，知识提供者的利益诉求位列知识付费平台的优先考虑级。本文基于知识付费参与人特性构建知识付费市场模型，通过分析知识提供者和平台的定价策略及利益分歧，探讨了非授权分享环境下知识付费平台的运营策略。本文研究发现：①当“道德消费者”和“普通消费者”共存于市场时，知识提供者可依据其产品市场信心分别采取“低价策略”和“高价策略”，而知识付费平台也将对此做出最优反应；②无论知识提供者采取何种定价策略，平台与知识提供者之间总存在一致的定价分歧（利益冲突）；③知识付费平台可通过优化“补贴和发现成本”、“佣金和流量收益”等运营参数弥合定价分歧，谋求与知识提供者建立长期互惠合作关系。本文研究为方兴未艾的知识付费产业发展提供了微观层面的理论支撑。     

Analyzing the Integration of WiMAX and Wi‐Fi Services: Bandwidth Sharing and Channel Collaboration

Several emerging studies have focused on the pricing issue of bandwidth sharing between Wi‐Fi and WiMAX networks; however, most either concentrate on the design of collaborated protocols or figure out the issue without the overall consideration of consumer preferences and contract design. In this study, we explore a wireless service market in which there are two wireless service providers operating Wi‐Fi and WiMAX. One of the research dimensions given in this study is whether wireless service providers implement bandwidth sharing, while the other is whether they make decisions individually or jointly. By involving consumer preferences and a wholesale price contract in the present model, we find that bandwidth sharing would benefit a WiMAX service provider, yet a Wi‐Fi service provider would make no significant savings under a wholesale price contract. In addition, the profit of a WiMAX service provider may increase with Wi‐Fi coverage when bandwidth sharing has been implemented but decrease with Wi‐Fi coverage when both wireless services operate without bandwidth sharing. Furthermore, the WiMAX service provider allocates more capacity when the average usage rate increases, but lowers the expenditure of capacity when the average usage rate is too high.     

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION,POLITICAL INTEGRATION OR BOTH?

We study the effects of economic and political integration by presenting a model in which firms compete with each other in both an economic market—where they produce a good and compete for market share—and in a political (rent seeking) market—where they compete for transfers from the government. Growth is driven by firms’ cost‐reducing innovation activity and economic and political integration affect firms’ incentive to innovate differently. In this setting, economic and political integration can be seen as complementary. Economic integration, when not accompanied by political integration, can lead to less innovation and slower growth as firms respond to increased competition in the economic market by focusing more on rent‐seeking activity. When economic integration is accompanied by political integration, innovation and growth will be stronger and welfare higher.     

Newsvendor Pricing Problem in a Two‐Sided Market

We study the pricing problem of a “platform” intermediary to jointly determine the selling price of the platforms (hardware) sold to consumers and the royalty charged to content developers for content (software), when the demands for content and for platforms are interdependent. Our model elucidates the impact of supply chain replenishment costs and demand uncertainty on the strategic issues of platform pricing in a two‐sided market.     

Financial Intermediaries and Markets

A complex financial system comprises both financial markets and financial intermediaries. We distinguish financial intermediaries according to whether they issue complete contingent contracts or incomplete contracts. Intermediaries such as banks that issue incomplete contracts, e.g., demand deposits, are subject to runs, but this does not imply a market failure. A sophisticated financial system—a system with complete markets for aggregate risk and limited market participation—is incentive‐efficient, if the intermediaries issue complete contingent contracts, or else constrained‐efficient, if they issue incomplete contracts. We argue that there may be a role for regulating liquidity provision in an economy in which markets for aggregate risks are incomplete.     

Perfect Competition in Markets With Adverse Selection

This paper proposes a perfectly competitive model of a market with adverse selection. Prices are determined by zero‐profit conditions, and the set of traded contracts is determined by free entry. Crucially for applications, contract characteristics are endogenously determined, consumers may have multiple dimensions of private information, and an equilibrium always exists. Equilibrium corresponds to the limit of a differentiated products Bertrand game. We apply the model to establish theoretical results on the equilibrium effects of mandates. Mandates can increase efficiency but have unintended consequences. With adverse selection, an insurance mandate reduces the price of low‐coverage policies, which necessarily has indirect effects such as increasing adverse selection on the intensive margin and causing some consumers to purchase less coverage.     

The Impact of Geographic Proximity on What to Buy,How to Buy,and Where to Buy: Evidence from High‐Tech Durable Goods Market*

Social contagion effects due to geographical proximity refer to the social effects wherein the behavior of an individual varies with the behavior of other individuals who are geographically close. Although the influence of such effects on consumer choices has been established in several contexts, much of the extant studies have focused on its effect on consumers’ decision of whether to buy a new product or adopt a new innovation. There has been no systematic examination of the influence of geographic proximity on other aspects of consumers’ product buying process such as what to buy (i.e., brand choice), how to buy (i.e., the channel), and where to buy (i.e., retailers). Such effects can matter significantly in high‐technology and durable goods markets and therefore, it is critical to understand the scope of these on consumers’ choice of retailers and channel as well. Drawing on literatures from word of mouth effects, ecommerce, and consumers’ perception of risk in their purchase process, we develop a set of hypotheses on the effect of geographic proximity on consumers’ choices of what to buy, how to buy, and where to buy. Leveraging a microlevel dataset of purchases of personal computers, we develop brand‐, retailer‐, and channel‐related measures of proximity effects at the individual consumer level and estimate a joint disaggregate model of the three choices that make up a product purchase process to test these hypotheses. Our results indicate a significant contagion effect on each of the three choices. Furthermore, we find evidence of a greater effect of geographic proximity on inexperienced consumers—those who are new to the product category. Our results thus help develop a holistic understanding of the influence of social contagion effects on consumers’ decision making.     

政府市场规制、产品消费选择和企业绿色技术创新

本文通过构建由地方政府、企业和消费者组成的绿色技术创新系统演化博弈模型,分析了不同现实情形下系统的均衡策略演化过程,并借助系统动力学实验方法进一步研究了相关因素对系统均衡的影响。研究发现:(1)在绿色技术创新演化博弈系统所有可能的均衡策略中,只存在三个稳定的均衡策略,即地方政府、企业和消费者的策略分别为(市场规制,不绿色技术创新,购买传统产品)、(市场规制,绿色技术创新,购买传统产品)、(市场规制,绿色技术创新,购买绿色产品)。(2)企业绿色技术创新品牌收益和消费者绿色产品消费的经济收益是影响博弈演化系统最终向不同稳定均衡策略演进的主要因素。(3)在第一种均衡状态下,产品的基础价值、绿色偏好收益、绿色消费意识和产品价格等是影响消费者购买绿色产品的主要因素;在第二种均衡状态下,政策收益、规制成本及产品市场需求量是影响政府采取市场规制策略的主要因素;在第三种均衡状态下,绿色技术创新补贴系数、市场规制强度和企业绿色技术创新品牌收益是影响企业采取绿色技术创新策略的主要因素,且各影响因素对博弈主体策略选择的方向和边际的影响均存在较大差异。上述结论将为进一步完善绿色发展理论提供参考,也为构建市场导向的绿色技术创新体系提供借鉴。     

Product Positioning in a Two‐Dimensional Market Space

This paper examines the optimal product portfolio positioning for a monopolist firm in a market where consumers exhibit vertical differentiation for product performance and horizontal differentiation for product feature. Our key results are as follows: (i) Variable costs drive vertical differentiation. In the presence of significant volume‐dependent manufacturing costs, the optimal portfolio contains a mix of vertically and horizontally differentiated products and an increase in the variable cost makes adding vertically differentiated products relatively more profitable; if fixed volume‐independent design costs dominate, the portfolio exhibits solely horizontal differentiation. (ii) Horizontal differentiation is the main profit lever, and vertical differentiation brings only a marginal benefit; this is true even when most of the consumers exhibit low willingness to pay for performance, which is often used as an excuse to offer low‐end products. (iii) There are more low‐quality products than high‐quality ones, and market coverage increases when the willingness to pay for performance increases. In summary, the model shows how portfolio composition decisions depend on the product cost structure and the consumer preferences.     

Combinatorial Voting

We study elections that simultaneously decide multiple issues, where voters have independent private values over bundles of issues. The innovation is in considering nonseparable preferences, where issues may be complements or substitutes. Voters face a political exposure problem: the optimal vote for a particular issue will depend on the resolution of the other issues. Moreover, the probabilities that the other issues will pass should be conditioned on being pivotal. We prove that equilibrium exists when distributions over values have full support or when issues are complements. We then study large elections with two issues. There exists a nonempty open set of distributions where the probability of either issue passing fails to converge to either 1 or 0 for all limit equilibria. Thus, the outcomes of large elections are not generically predictable with independent private values, despite the fact that there is no aggregate uncertainty regarding fundamentals. While the Condorcet winner is not necessarily the outcome of a multi‐issue election, we provide sufficient conditions that guarantee the implementation of the Condorcet winner.     

The Digital Journey: Reflected Learnings and Emerging Challenges

This paper identifies and examines the four stages of marketing's digitalization journey to date and the points of interest along the way. The metaphor of a journey provides a narrative through which to understand the complex changes that are occurring within the digitalization of marketing. The digital journey has no final destination yet, but it is possible to identify an origin and chart its route thus far. In reflecting on this journey, insights emerge, which pose ongoing challenges for businesses and for the marketing discipline. The digitalization of marketing provides new options for routes to markets, communication, brand building, relationship development, trialling pricing, product development, sourcing insights, as well as a platform for innovation. But, only if businesses embark on this journey, and then keep up with the pace once en route. The implications for business stemming from marketing's digital journey are detailed along with avenues for future research, to develop further understanding of digitalization. The theoretical contributions made by this paper include both a novel mapping of the complex trajectory of marketing's digitalization through a visualization and an articulation of the main four gaps in current research and practice knowledge within marketing. The gaps include the need for a strategic view, the issue of technical silos, the changing conceptions of time, and the tension between empowered consumers and their reliance on pre‐filtered information. This paper provides a critical appraisal of the digital journey so far, resulting in a distilled conceptualization and route map, which should help guide future researchers.     

How Provider Selection and Management Contribute to Successful Innovation Outsourcing: An Empirical Study at Siemens

It is becoming increasingly common to involve external technology providers in developing new technologies and new products. Two important phases involved in working with technology vendors are vendor selection and vendor management. Because for both steps theory development of key decision guidelines is still immature, we use detailed case studies of 31 innovation outsourcing projects at Siemens to develop grounded theory on provider selection criteria and on project management success drivers. A selection criterion often associated with successful outsourcing is the provider's “track record” or previous experience. Our cases suggest that there is no standard “track record” for success but that a “match” between the client firm's outsourcing motivation and the provider's strengths appears to be a necessary condition for a successful outsourcing collaboration. As to the second phase—managing the vendor—we identify a number of operational project success drivers. There seems to be no universal checklist, but the most important drivers seem to be contingent on the type of vendor chosen and on the maturity of the technology. We compare five provider types—universities, competitors, customers, start‐up companies, and component suppliers—and find that some success drivers are common to all providers, while others are relevant only for certain types of provider. Moreover, drivers in the case of a mature technology are more focused on successful transfer to manufacturing than on development itself. Our findings offer guidelines for innovation managers on how to select innovation providers and how to manage them during the project.     

企业数字化转型对创新生态系统的影响：基于市场规模动态的多agent模型

企业数字化转型不仅影响了企业的创新绩效，还通过“自下而上”的作用机制影响着整个创新生态系统的演化。构建了一个多agent模型，在考虑市场规模动态的情况下研究企业数字化转型对创新生态系统的影响。数值实验和案例分析表明，企业数字化转型对创新生态系统的影响与市场规模有着密切的关联。成长型市场条件下，企业数字化转型有力地提升了整个创新生态系统的数字化程度、创新成功率和创新收益。稳定型和衰退型市场条件下，整个创新生态系统的数字化程度和创新成功率到达一定程度后会停滞不前，衰退型市场条件下创新收益还会逐步下降。这意味着并非所有的企业和产业都可以从数字化转型中获益，需要基于市场规模特征进行权变决策。     

考虑消费者环保意识与政府补贴的企业绿色技术创新决策研究

在绿色经济时代,绿色技术创新已经成为越来越多企业获取竞争优势的途径。本文基于消费者需求偏好,在不同的政府补贴情形下,构建了包含绿色产品与普通产品生产企业的双寡头竞争模型和斯塔克博格模型,分析了企业绿色技术创新驱动因素和行动时机。研究表明：消费者环保意识有助于提升绿色产品市场份额和企业利润,而绿色产品的单位成本增加会降低其市场份额和企业利润,且绿色产品的单位成本与普通产品企业的利润呈倒U型关系;政府对绿色产品的补贴,可以促进企业绿色技术创新。补贴消费者与补贴企业两种方式下产品的市场份额和社会总福利相同,考虑到补贴的执行成本,补贴消费者更优;绿色产品生产企业作为追随者时,绿色产品的市场占有率最高,社会总福利也最高,因此,后发行动策略是企业绿色技术创新的占优行动策略。