Group Buying of Competing Retailers

Under group buying, quantity discounts are offered based on the buyers' aggregated purchasing quantity, instead of individual quantities. As the price decreases with the total quantity, buyers receive lower prices than they otherwise would be able to obtain individually. Previous studies on group buying focus on the benefit buyers receive in reduced acquisition costs or enhanced bargaining power. In this paper, we show that buyers can instead get hurt from such cooperation. Specifically, we consider a two‐level distribution channel with a single manufacturer and two retailers who compete for end customers. We show that, under linear demand curves, group buying is always preferable for symmetric (i.e., identical) retailers. For asymmetric retailers (i.e., differing in market base and/or efficiency), group buying is beneficial to the smaller (or less efficient) player. However, it can be detrimental to the larger (or more efficient) one. Despite the lower wholesale price under group buying, the manufacturer can receive a higher revenue. Interestingly, group buying is more likely to form when retailers are competitive in different dimensions. These insights are shown to be robust under general nonlinear demand curves, except for constant elastic demand with low demand elasticity.     

TRADE QUOTAS AND BUYER POWER,WITH AN APPLICATION TO THE E.U. NATURAL GAS MARKET

We consider a market in which domestic buyers negotiate contracts with foreign sellers, and explore how trade quotas can help to increase the buyers' countervailing power. We use the Shapley value to describe bargaining power and the distribution of the trade surplus in such a bilateral oligopoly. By exploiting strategic externalities among the buyers, bilateral trade quotas can improve the buyers' bargaining positions. In contrast, aggregate trade restrictions on all buyers' trade never improve buyer surplus. Minimum quotas on imports from fringe suppliers can benefit nonaffected buyers, as these enjoy positive externalities. We apply these insights to the E.U. market for natural gas and show that the effects of trade quotas on E.U. gas importers' power can be significant.     

BlueLinx can benefit from innovative inventory management methods for commodity forward buys

Commodity prices often fluctuate significantly from one purchasing opportunity to the next. These fluctuations allow firms to benefit from forward buying (buying for future demand in addition to current demand) when prices are low. We propose a combined heuristic to determine the optimal number of future periods a firm should purchase at each ordering opportunity in order to maximize total expected profit when there is uncertainty in future demand and future buying price. We compare our heuristic with existing methods via simulation using real demand data from BlueLinx, a two-stage distributor of building products. The results show that our combined heuristic performs better than any existing methods considering forward buying or safety stock separately. We also compare our heuristic to the optimal inventory management policy by full enumeration for a smaller data set. The proposed heuristic is shown to be close to optimal. This study is the first to decide both the optimal number of future periods to buy for uncertain purchase price and the appropriate purchasing quantity with safety stock for uncertain demand simultaneously. The experience suggests that the proposed combined heuristic is simple and can be very beneficial for any company where forward buying is possible.     

电子商务环境下合作采购效益分析

合作采购是一种重要的企业间电子商务应用模式,成功实施合作采购需要供应链成员的积极参与。本文针对供应商采取的两种批发价定价策略,比较分析了协调成本对买主间合作采购动力及其总体采购成本的影响。其结果表明,只要协调成本较小,买主便具有合作采购动力,且无论供应商采取固定价格策略还是采取数量折扣策略,都存在一个协调成本临界值,当协调成本小于该临界值时,合作采购将同时减少买主与供应商的总体成本;当协调成本大于该临界值时,则总有一方的总体成本在合作采购中增加。     

PRICE DISPERSION WITH DIRECTED SEARCH

We present a model that generates empirically plausible price distributions in directed search equilibrium. There are many identical buyers and many identical capacity‐constrained sellers who post prices. These prices can be renegotiated to some degree and the outcome depends on the number of buyers who want to purchase the good. In equilibrium all sellers post the same price, demand is randomly distributed, and there is sale price dispersion. Prices and distributions depend on market tightness and on the properties of renegotiation outcomes. In a labor market context, the model generates a strong empirical prediction. If workers can renegotiate the posted wage, then the model predicts a positively skewed and realistic‐looking density function of realized wages when the mean number of job‐seekers per vacancy is large. (JEL: C780, D390, D490, E390)     

考虑社交关系的网购拼单研究

本文提供理论模型对比分析拼单模式和统一价格模式(正常模式)给商家带来的影响，为商家实施精准营销提供参考。对此，首先考虑消费者的社交关系并以此将消费者进行细分，随后分析社交关系的成本系数(社交成本)和潜在市场需求对价格和收益的影响。结果指出，在一定条件下，拼单模式可以为商家带来了更大的收益，但是拼单模式只是正常模式的一种补充，并且随着两类消费者的社交成本差额逐渐变小或偏好拼单的消费者的潜在市场需求不断增加，拼单模式的优势逐渐减弱。因此，建议电商平台与微信等社交平台合作，降低消费者的社交成本，以吸引消费者通过拼单模式购买商品，从而实现“商家、平台和消费者” 多方共赢。最后建议，平台对消费者进行二次或三次细分，开发新的细分市场。     

考虑消费者细分的网购拼单机制研究

本文提供理论模型分析网购拼单机制分别给销售者和消费者带来的影响，为销售者（消费者）的抉择提供参考。研究结果显示，当拼单价格和正常价格均很低时，销售者（消费者）无动机实施（参与）拼单机制。但随着正常价格的提高，拼单机制的营利能力（消费者剩余）会不断增大，进而激励销售者（消费者）实施（参与）拼单机制，并有会将低估价类型消费者驱逐出市场。这一结果从另一个方面反映了拼单机制的最终目标不是为了迎合低估价类型的消费者，而是为了吸引高估价类型的消费者参与交易。进一步地，在拼单机制有效实施的情形下，最优拼单数量、最优期望收益均与两种类型消费者估值比例密切相关。所以，在实施拼单机制过程中，应该有意识地对消费者进行细分，并挖掘不同类型消费者的私人信息，从而制定有效的拼单策略。     

双边多轮价格谈判过程的建模与分析

针对电子商务环境下集中采购的价格谈判的特点,提出了讨价还价轨迹图的概念.该轨迹图可以记录谈判对手的历史谈判数据,分析其心理特性,为当前谈判提供参考.基于这种轨迹图,提出了多点组合法和折线延伸法两种在谈判中预估成交价格的计算方法.这些方法可以在谈判过程中,实时地为谈判人员提供信息支持,避免大的失误,使谈判取得更好的经济收益.以上工作已在某企业采购中心电子商务系统获得应用,并取得满意的效果.     

Unraveling quantity discounts

We consider the situation in which a buying organization deals with a discrete quantity discount schedule offered by a selling organization. Furthermore, the buying organization can negotiate with the selling organization about the lot size and purchase price, but does not know the underlying function that was used by the selling organization to determine the quantity discount schedule. In this paper, we provide an analytical and empirical basis for one general quantity discount function (QDF) that can be used to describe the underlying function of almost all different quantity discount types. We first develop such a QDF analytically. Among other things, this QDF enables buying organizations to calculate detailed prices for a large number of quantities. We subsequently show that the QDF fits very well with 66 discount schedules found in practice. We discuss that the QDF and related indicators can be a useful tool in supplier selection and negotiation processes. It can also be used for competitive analyses, multiple sourcing decisions, and allocating savings for purchasing groups. Additionally, the QDF can be included in research models incorporating quantity discounts. We conclude the paper with an outlook on further QDF research regarding the characterization of commodity markets from a demand elasticity point of view.     

COUNTERVAILING POWER AND DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY

This paper studies the impact of buyer power on dynamic efficiency. We consider a bargaining model in which buyer power arises endogenously from size and may impact on a supplier’s incentives to invest in lower marginal cost. We challenge the view frequently expressed in policy circles that the exercise of buyer power stifles suppliers’ incentives. Instead, we find that the presence of larger buyers keeps a supplier “more on his toes” and induces him to improve the competitiveness of his offering, in terms of both price and quality, relative to buyers’ alternative options.     

平台竞争、排他性协议与竞争瓶颈

在很多双边市场中,经常出现平台一边的用户与平台之间产生利益纠纷的现象,例如顺丰速运与菜鸟网络之间的纠纷等,本文从理论模型的角度研究了这种经济现象。文章通过将双边市场的用户分为视平台有差异和无差异两种类型,研究了平台如何掠夺视平台无差异的用户所有剩余的问题。研究发现,平台厂商有与视平台无差异的用户签订排他性协议的激励;无论签订排他性协议与否,这类用户都将被掠夺所有剩余,产生了所谓的"竞争瓶颈";排他性协议带来的福利效应并不明确,当平台的边际成本和交叉外部性参数较大时,排他性协议的签订能够提升社会总福利。     

Optimal pricing for group buying with network effects

In this paper, we analyze online group-pricing mechanisms for sellers and compare them with the option of selling only to individuals. We formulate the demand for group buying and individual buying (GB and IB, respectively) based on the utility a consumer attains from each environment considering two specific types of externalities unique to our problem. First, we assume that consumers receive positive “network effects” from GB, i.e., they obtain utility from shopping with others because of information exchange and collective support. Second, they encounter a negative externality of group buying because of inconvenience costs and delays in receiving the products. The two types of externalities lead to distorted demand, which in turn affects prices and profits. We analyze the optimal and equilibrium strategies for a seller operating in monopoly, duopoly, and multiple-firm competition. We derive the equilibrium strategies and show the existence of a Nash Equilibrium under competition of multiple firms. In addition, we show that positive network effects from group buying often outweigh the negative externalities arising from costs.     

Dynamic Matching,Two‐Sided Incomplete Information,and Participation Costs: Existence and Convergence to Perfect Competition

Consider a decentralized, dynamic market with an infinite horizon and participation costs in which both buyers and sellers have private information concerning their values for the indivisible traded good. Time is discrete, each period has length δ, and, each unit of time, continuums of new buyers and sellers consider entry. Traders whose expected utility is negative choose not to enter. Within a period each buyer is matched anonymously with a seller and each seller is matched with zero, one, or more buyers. Every seller runs a first price auction with a reservation price and, if trade occurs, both the seller and the winning buyer exit the market with their realized utility. Traders who fail to trade continue in the market to be rematched. We characterize the steady‐state equilibria that are perfect Bayesian. We show that, as δ converges to zero, equilibrium prices at which trades occur converge to the Walrasian price and the realized allocations converge to the competitive allocation. We also show the existence of equilibria for δ sufficiently small, provided the discount rate is small relative to the participation costs.     

电子市场价格分散、信息价值与效率:多视角的分析框架

电子市场是集合买卖双方交换价格和产品信息的跨组织信息系统,已成为撮合交易的重要虚拟场所,其对有形市场的影响力日益彰显,引起理论界和实务界的密切关注.本文将电子市场价格分散、信息价值与效率问题放在同一分析框架下研究,从不同的视角审视电子市场现存文献的解释力度;指出电子市场价格分散现象是多种因素综合作用的结果,消费者的搜寻异质、买方偏好(品牌、信任与忠诚度等因素)、服务质量、市场结构特征等多变量共同决定了电子市场的价格分散度、信息价值及效率大小;最后,提出了未来电子市场的研究方向,即通过价格比较购物技术扩散模型的引入,建立集影响电子市场价格的多变量于一体的理论分析框架,探讨电子市场价格分散及与其相关联的信息价值测度和市场效率等基础理论问题.     

Decentralizing Wage Bargaining in Germany — A Way to Increase Employment?

Abstract. The area‐wide wage agreement is at the centre of Germany's system of collective bargaining. In recent years, however, there has been a tendency towards the decentralization of collective bargaining. Individual wage agreements have led to more moderate wage developments, whilst collective agreements with individual firms, and agreements at the production unit level, have not had this moderating effect. On the other hand, collective bargaining has become more flexible, leading to greater pay differentiation. The further decentralization of collective bargaining, although desirable, has given rise to objections based in constitutional law and to resistance from employees and employers.     

The Strategic Role of Third‐Party Marketplaces in Retailing

Retailers are increasingly adopting a dual‐format model. In addition to acting as traditional merchants (buying and reselling goods), these retailers provide a platform for third‐party (3P) sellers to access and compete for the same customers. We investigate the strategic rationale for a retailer to introduce a 3P marketplace. Our analysis provides insights into the growing prevalence of 3P marketplaces. We show that by committing to having an active 3P marketplace, the retailer creates an “outside option” that improves its bargaining position in negotiations with the manufacturer. This can explain the increasing prevalence of such marketplaces. On the other hand, the manufacturer would prefer to eliminate the retailer's outside option and should seek to limit or prevent sales through 3P marketplaces. This is consistent with actions that several manufacturers have taken to limit such sales. Interestingly, if the manufacturer fails to eliminate sales of competing products through the 3P marketplace, then the best strategy for the manufacturer is to allow the retailer to dictate the terms of their contract. This is because a powerful retailer will rely less on its outside option in generating profit, and therefore it will increase the fees charged to 3P sellers and soften the competition between 3P sellers and the manufacturer. The decrease in competition will lead to an increase in the value of outside option of the manufacturer and improve its profit. Additionally, we find that the presence of a 3P marketplace benefits consumers, but this benefit diminishes as the retailer becomes more powerful.     

Pricing Policy in a Supply Chain: Negotiation or Posted Pricing

This article examines the choice of pricing policy (posted pricing or negotiation) toward end customers in a supply chain. Many retailers actively decide whether or not to encourage negotiation on the shop floor. Of course, the retailer's pricing policy influences not only the retailer's profit, but also the profits of the manufacturers who sell through the retailer. However, little is known about the forces that shape the pricing policy when two self‐interested parties interact in a supply chain. We consider two alternative models depending on who has the power to decide the pricing policy: the manufacturer or the retailer. We find that an increase in the wholesale price weakens the retailer's ability to price discriminate through negotiation. Therefore, the retailer prefers negotiation at lower wholesale prices and posted pricing at higher wholesale prices. We also find that whenever the retailer prefers negotiation, the manufacturer does too. Therefore, the retailer's discretion over the pricing policy causes friction only when the retailer wants to use posted pricing, while the manufacturer wishes the retailer to use negotiation. We show that such friction arises only when product availability or the cost of negotiation is moderate. In this case, we show that the manufacturer may offer a substantial discount to persuade the retailer to negotiate. Surprisingly, in this region of friction, a decrease in the supply chain's capacity or an increase in negotiation costs (both of which are typically considered as worsening the retailer's business environment) translates into higher profit for the retailer.     

考虑消费者参照效应与策略行为的多产品动态定价

在考虑客户同时表现出参照依赖和策略行为的场景下，本文构建了一个垄断厂商两阶段的多产品动态定价模型。该模型将易逝品的销售分为正常价格阶段和促销价格阶段，每个阶段又分为多期。客户分为短视型和策略型，其中策略型客户会根据两个阶段价格的差异和获得商品的概率，决定是在第一阶段和等到第二阶段购买商品。基于随机动态规划的结构属性和超模理论，得到了两个阶段稳态价格的解析解，并且证明最优价格路径是单调且随着初始参照价格变化而变化。最后，通过对两种产品的数值实验，分析了各种参数对最优稳态价格的影响。结果显示，零售商可以采取多产品联合定价策略，即基于商店水平的定价策略，并通过调整核心产品的比重来获得更高的利润。     

基于好评返现和差评偏好的体验型产品两阶段定价决策研究

假定产品存在发布试销期与正式销售期,在销售商不采取好评返现与采取好评返现两种情形下分别建立考虑消费者差评偏好的两阶段定价决策模型,用KT方法得到相应的最优决策和利润,给出了销售商实施好评返现的条件。基于导函数分析方法与数值仿真技术,分析了好评返现与差评偏好对产品定价、销售商利润和消费者效用的影响,证实了好评返现下消费者重视差评信息的合理性,并针对消费者、平台和销售商提出了对策。研究表明:只有产品质量中等的销售商才会采取好评返现策略,其利润随产品质量的提升而先递增后递减;好评返现提高了销售商第二阶段的市场份额和售价,导致消费者效用损失;消费者越重视差评信息,实施好评返现的高(低)质量产品销售商越多(少),且销售商利润将下降;好评返现扭曲了评价信息的真实性,降低了消费者对在线评价系统的信任度。     

Managing the Revenue of Sales Platforms: Insights into Service Fees

Online sales platforms have grown substantially in recent years. These platforms assist sellers to conduct sales, and in return, collect service fees from sellers. We study the fee policies by considering a fee‐setting platform, on which a seller may conduct a sale with a reserve price to a group of potential buyers: the seller retains the object for sale if the final trading price is below the reserve price. The platform may charge two types of fees as in current practice: a reserve fee as a function of the seller's reserve price and a final value fee as a function of the sale's final trading price. We derive the optimality condition for fee policies, and show that the platform can use either just a final value fee or just a reserve fee to achieve optimality. In the former case, the optimal final value fee charged by the platform is independent of the number of buyers. In the latter case, the optimal reserve fee is often a decreasing, instead of increasing, function of the seller's reserve price. An increasing reserve fee may make the seller reluctant to use a positive reserve price and hurt the platform's revenue. In general, the optimal fees are nonlinear functions, but in reality, linear fees are commonly used because of their simplicity for implementation. We show that a linear fee policy is indeed optimal in the case that the seller's valuation follows a power distribution. In other cases, our numerical analysis suggests close‐to‐optimal performance of the linear policy.